The Kennedy Heritage
Boris Izakov
New Times, No. 48, 2 December 1964, pp. 9-10.
The Democratic Party’s slogan in the recent presidential
election campaign in the United States was “Let Us Continue.” Under that
slogan Lyndon Johnson was returned to the White House by an overwhelming
majority vote and with a strong Democratic majority in the Senate and the House.
In other words, the American electorate gave the Democratic Party a mandate to
continue the course laid down by John Fitzgerald Kennedy, killed in Dallas just
a year ago.
With his father’s millions assuring him a firm position
among the social elite of the country, John Kennedy came to the White House as a
carefree darling of fortune. “Sure,” he said half in just, half seriously,
“it’s a big job. But I don’t know anybody who can do it any better than I
can…It isn’t going to be so bad. You’ve got time to think. You don’t
have all those people bothering you that you had in the Senate. Besides, the pay
is pretty good.”
He had a programme of sorts, ambiguously labeled “New
Frontiers” (for reasons easily understood, nearly every candidate promises
something new), but events showed it to be of an exceedingly vague nature. In
fact, it was less a programme than a desire to break away from set patterns and
apply to the problems that cropped up some new approach free of prejudice.
It was with such nebulous ideas that Kennedy entered upon
his “big job.” In the 34 months and 2 days of his administration, his policy
on many issues, especially that of war and peace, underwent substantial
revision.
U.S. presidents, it must be remembered, are subjected to
unrelenting pressure by influential social groups, above all, the powerful
military-industrial complex that no less a man than General Eisenhower found it
necessary to warn the American citizenry about when he left the White House. In
the early period of Kennedy’s presidency the military exerted a very marked
influence.*
Over that period the Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba,
engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency, cast a dark cloud. And though the
CIA began preparing this shameful venture long before Kennedy became president,
it was he who sanctioned it and then had to bear full responsibility for its
failure. Also, it was in that early period that the U.S.A. got involved in the
dirty war in South Viet-Nam and that the young president took over intact the
Dulles-Adenauer line on the German question.
Kennedy won neither glory not popularity in that period.
When people speak of the Kennedy heritage it is not the Bay of Pigs episode they
have in mind.
The march of world events, the changing correlation of
forces on the international scene impelled Kennedy to do some deep thinking and
reappraising. He could not ignore the changing mood of his countrymen. “The
people tire of the long battle in the cold war. I don’t blame them,” he once
said to a journalist. The shock experienced by the Americans during the
Caribbean crisis, when the fate of the world and the future of mankind hung by a
thread, had a very strong effect on him. He had felt the breath of nuclear war
come close and he knew such a war to be hopeless folly. And so little by little
he began to apply new criterions to world affairs. He did not fear to draw the
conclusions called for by the new international situation, by common sense and
public opinion.
To steer the ship of state into a new course in modern-day
America took considerable courage, but Kennedy was a brave man, as he proved in
the war when in command of a torpedo boat in the Pacific Ocean. Only now he was
faced with a much more serious test than that he passed on the August night in
1943 when, his boat having been sunk under him, he and a handful of his men swam
to an unknown island three miles away, he towing an injured sailor all the way
by holding the man’s life-belt strap in his teeth.
Twenty years later, on June 10, 1963, President Kennedy
delivered at the American University in Washington what may rightly be called a
programmatic speech. He said:
“And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward—by examining his own attitude towards the course of the cold war and toward freedom and peace here at home.
“First: Examine our attitude towards peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it is unreal. But that is a dangerous,. defeatist belief…
“And second: Let us re-examine our attitude towards the Soviet Union…Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war.”
This bold speech was hailed with satisfaction by all who
cherish peace. And Kennedy proceeded from words to deeds. Six weeks later the
Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water was
initialled. That was the beginning of some relaxation of international tension.
Kennedy’s biographers all agree that he attached
paramount importance to the Moscow Treaty. Hugh Sidey, the Time
magazine correspondent in the White House, underlines in his book “John F.
Kennedy, President,” that Kennedy rated this test-ban treaty as an achievement
“second to none” in his term in office.
It was not a coincidence that the new foreign policy course
was accompanied by attempts to curb the racist extremists at home. Kennedy
himself linked the one with the other. And so did the forces of reaction, race
hatred and war. The “lunatic fringe” promptly leveled vicious attacks at the
man in the White House and openly threatened his life.
It has been aptly said that Kennedy signed the Moscow
Treaty with his blood. H. Stuart Hughes, a Harvard professor who ran for the
Senate from Massachusetts in 1962, wrote soon after the assassination:
“…Jack Kennedy’s last months were his best. He seems to have had a sense
that there was not much time left…He gave the impression of not being able to
wait, of feeling that his every minute was counted.”
No, I do not think, and I doubt that Stuart Hughes does
either, that Kennedy knew his end was imminent; John Kennedy, more than most,
had strong faith in his star. What he did know, and know well, was how powerful
were the forces he had challenged. The battle with them would claim him body and
soul and leave him no breathing space. And knowing this, he yet disregarded
appeals to go slow, brushed aside warnings of danger and hastened to attack the
enemy in his citadel, in Texas.
And on November 22, 1963, the fatal shots were fired in
Dallas.
The recently published Warren Commission report contains
strong criticisms of the FBI, the President’s bodyguards and, above all
others, the local police. Not only were they astonishingly incompetent, the
report suggests, but they grossly neglected their duties. At the same time,
however, the commission upholds the Dallas police version, conceived within
minutes of the fatal shooting, that Lee Harvey Oswald alone, acting on his own
and without accomplices, was responsible for the crime.
If the Dallas police are so uncommonly expert that they
could solve the crime with lightning speed, how could they be so monstrously
incompetent in all else? How, for instance, could they have allowed Oswald to be
killed right within the walls of the police station? The Warren Commission parts
company with elementary logic there. Little wonder that public opinion polls
show that a considerable number of American citizens (The
New York Post estimate is 45 per cent) believe that the Commission has left
many questions unanswered.
One is inevitably reminded of “Seven Days in May,” the
popular novel by Fletcher Knebel and Charles Bailey. In it militarists
infuriated by the conclusion of an American-Soviet nuclear disarmament treaty
plot to overthrow the government. The president and his closest associates
manage to disarm the conspirators on the quiet, without attracting public
attention. When at a press conference he is asked whether the dismissed army
generals were not plotting to overthrow the government, the president flatly
denies it for fear the truth would imperil American prestige as he understands
it.
It looks as if the Warren Commission were guided by the
same considerations.
But to get back to Kennedy’s heritage. The thoughts he
expressed at the American University must be accepted as the mature Kennedy’s
political credo. It is the course he outlined in that speech that the present
Democratic Administration has undertaken to follow.
Addressing the U.N. General Assembly in December 1963,
President Lyndon Johnson solemnly declared that the assassin’s bullet had not
deflected the government of the United States from its aims. As Kennedy’s
successor he aimed to put an end to the cold war once and for all, to prevent
the dissemination of nuclear weapons, to work for disarmament, international
co-operation, security and peace for all. And after the recent elections he
reaffirmed the continuity of U.S. policy and his devotion to peace. He
proclaimed November 22 a Day of National Rededication to the late president’s
ideals.
These are fine words. Now the world waits for the deeds
that will show whether America has really made its own the ideals John F.
Kennedy arrived at and died for.
Though there has been some improvement of the international
climate in the past year, the cold war cannot be said to have ended. American
diplomacy suffers from bad relapses of it. For one thing, there is the delayed
action mine it has planted under the coming U.N. General Assembly session in the
guise of the so-called “financial issue.” For another, Washington is acting
with Bonn to push through the MLF project, which will only result in further
dissemination of nuclear weapons and bring them within reach of the militarists
on the Rhine. For still others, in the 18-Nation Committee the U.S. is
obstructing practical steps toward disarmament. U.S. armed action in South
Viet-Nam is becoming increasingly aggressive. And now American planes are
bombing towns and villages in the Congo.
Is that the heritage John Kennedy left his country? Is that
the course the Democratic Administration bound itself to follow?
* Interesting details about this dangerous group may be found in M.S. Arnoni’s article “The U.S. Military Junta” reprinted in our issues Nos. 47 and 48.
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