Subject: Re: JFK out of Vietnam? YES! Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 04:42:36 GMT From: 6489mcadamsj@vms.csd.mu.edu (John McAdams) Newsgroups: alt.assassination.jfk,alt.conspiracy.jfk This is a splendid post! The document quotes you have posted will certainly find their way onto my web site. On Wed, 09 Feb 2000 15:02:42 -0500, "David T. Fuhrmann" wrote: > > >> dtf: >There is no NSAM countermanding the Kennedy "order." That notion is >> one >> >of the fallacy's of the JFK problem and a careful examination of the >> >various drafts of NSAM 273 will quickly reveal this. >> >> I disagree. >> I seem to recall that the Taylor MacNamara report gave a very >> pessimistic view of continued American involvement in Indo-China and >> was all for getting out. > >On the contrary, the Taylor-McNamara Report offered guarded optimism that IF >there was an effective program to train the Vietnamese to take over the roles >being handled by Americans, and the war continued to go well, then the US could >pull out most of its forces by the end of 1965. They noted that while the >political problems in SVN had not yet impacted the war effort, there was the >danger that "Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change the >present favorable trends." Their recommendations, which Kennedy approved (and >Prouty misrepresents) were that Harkins "review with Diem the military changes >necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas >(I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the >end of 1965. They also recommend a program to train the Vietnamese "so that >essential functions now performed by US military personnel can be carried out >by Vietnamese by the end of 1965." > >Kennedy himself was reluctant to be tied too closely to that prediction, as the >following excerpted exchange indicates (anyone interested in the entire >document, just let me know ): > >"The President objected to the phrase "by the end of this year" in the sentence >"The U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point >where 1000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam could be >withdrawn." He believed that if we were accused of being over optimistic. >Secretary McNamara said he saw great value in this sentence in order to meet >the view of Senator Fulbright and others that we are bogged down forever in >Vietnam. He said the sentence reveals that we have a withdrawal plan. >Furthermore, it commits us to emphasize the training of Vietnamese, which is >something we must do in order to replace U.S. personnel with Vietnamese. > The draft announcement was changed to make both of the time predictions >included in paragraph 3 a part of the McNamara-Taylor report rather than as >predictions of the President." [Source: Kennedy Library, National Security >Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meeting No. 519. Top Secret. This >meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and lasted until 6:30 p.m., according >to the President's Log.] > >Now why might he be reluctant to go on record with this prediction? Possibly >because he was aware of the following consensus of opinion among his advisers >as indicated in an "Annex to the Draft Report Prepared for the Executive >Committee of the National Security Council Washington, October 4, 1963": > >"CAVEATS TO RECOMMENDED APPROACH: > >It is only prudent to recognize that the course of action outlined above can be >substantially affected by developments beyond our control. Among these might be >one or more of the following: > >a) Unanticipated coup d'etat (e.g. by junior officers), or death of Diem. >b) Other unanticipated internal developments (similar to the Hue incident on >May 8) which could take place in the volatile atmosphere that characterizes the >Vietnamese political scene. This could include a marked step-up in the pace and >nature of the Viet Cong effort. >c) International developments affecting the war or the GVN's position, e.g. >active Chinese Communist or Cambodian support to the Viet Cong; a UN initiative >toward the condemnation of the GVN or neutralization of the area; or active and >direct intervention by North Vietnamese forces in Central Viet-Nam. >d) A posture by the GVN vis-a-vis the United States characterized by outright >and stubborn hostility to "foreign interference," accompanied by efforts to >rally popular xenophobia. >e) A bid by Hanoi or the National Front for a rapprochement on terms attractive >to Diem and Nhu (a contingency we believe conceivable, but unlikely). >f) A situation in which the Ngos carry out the forms of change, but maintain >the fundamental character and image of their regime. > >[SOURCE: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-233-69. Top Secret; >Sensitive. Drafted by Krulak who did not provide a list of participants. A >record of the discussion by Bromley Smith lists the following participants: >"Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, Under Secretary >Harriman, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric (later), Administrator Bell, Director >McCone, Acting Director Wilson, General Krulak, Assistant Secretary Hilsman, >Deputy Assistant Secretary William Bundy, Mr. Janow (AID), Mr. Koren (Hilsman's >office), Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith." (Kennedy >Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Meetings on Vietnam)] > > > > > > > >> Since JFK issued NSAM 263 in the context of taking their advice on >> board I believe it is quite obvious what his intentions were. >> Of course he couldn't be seen to blatantly abandon the South, nor >> would he have wanted to, but he did not want American servicemen >> having to fight their battles for them. > >If his intentions were so obvious, why is it that virtually no knowledgeable >historians of the Vietnam War and especially of the Kennedy period have >presented a substantive case for it? In fact, about the only group who seem to >believe this was "obvious" are assassination folks whose "expertise" is not in >the history of the Vietnam War or Kennedy's foreign policy, but in the arcana >of the assassination. > > >> dtf: >TO understand the so-called "withdrawal order" one cannot only look at >> the >> >document itself but should also examine the context in which that decision >> >was made. The original idea of pulling 1000 men out by Dec 31, 1963 was >> >suggested by R.G.K. Thompson as a PR gesture and a way of demonstrating >> >progress. The entire plan was predicated on continued progress in the >> >war. At no time does Kennedy ever indicate that the withdrawal would take >> >place regardless of the situation in SVN. >> > >> Negative. > >Excerpted from RGK Thompson's comments to the President contained in a >Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, April 4,1963,10 a.m > >SUBJECT > >Situation in Viet-Nam > >PARTICIPANTS > >The President >The Honorable David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador >Mr. R.G.K. Thompson, Head, British Advisory Mission to Viet-Nam >Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, Director, Working Group, Viet-Nam > >14. U.S. Presence. If the GVN continued to progress at the present rate, if it >were possible to declare one or two provinces white areas by summer 1963 (no >announcement about white areas should be made unless it were certain that the >areas were indeed freed of the Viet Cong), and finally, if confidence of >success continued to grow until the end of the year, an announcement out of the >blue by the United States that it was reducing the American military in >Viet-Nam by say 1,000 men would have three good effects: >a) It would show that we were winning; > b) It would take the steam out of the Communists' best propaganda line, >i.e., that this was an American war and the Vietnamese were our >satellite; and >c) It would reaffirm the honesty of American intentions. > > >(1) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, >4/63-5/63. Secret. Drafted by Wood on April 5. Approved by the White House on >April 9. > > >The directive to CINCPAC to deveop plans for such a withdrawal were sent by >McNamara and the JCS in May. CINCPAC Admiral Felt, btw, expressed his doubts >warning "it is overly optimistic to assume that insurgency can be controlled >as early as FY 65 as hopefully expressed in reference (a)." > > > >> And LBJ had every intention of reversing JFK's decision in this >> respect but had to tread softly to start with because he had an >> election coming up. Counting on votes in sympathy for and out of the >> popularity of JFK could only take him so far. He had to show that he >> was continueing with as many of JFK's initiatives as he could. >> It's not like he had any big decisions of his own to make anyway. He >> wasn't calling the shots but simply doing what he was told. > >Source for this totally unsubstantiated assertion? > > >> >If Kennedy really wanted to get out, he would not have initiated planning >> >for the bombing of North VIetnam, but during the summer and early fall of >> >1963 he specifically directed the JCS to begin contingency planning for >> >that strategy, as well as approving logistics efforts necessary to support >> >such action. Moreover, had Kennedy REALLY wanted out, he would not have >> >acquiesced in the coup against Diem. He would simply have waited until >> >either the Diem regime requested that the US leave (which was a very real >> >possibility by the fall of 1963) or Congress and the American public >> >increased their agitation for us to stop supporting a deeply flawed regime >> >in SVN. Either option, both of which were quite likely by late 1963, >> >would have provided Kennedy with the necessary political cover to protect >> >him from attacks by his domestic political opposition on the right. >> >Instead he went ahead with the coup, in the clear hopes that the regime >> >which would replace Diem would be able to effectively and successfully >> >prosecute the war.......thereby allowing the US withdrawal by 1965. >> >> Like I said, he couldn't just walk out. Get real. It was always going >> to take some time which is why he said it would not be complete until >> 1965. >> > >I am real. Kennedy was unwilling to be personally pinned down on the 1965 >projection, no doubt because he was already aware of significant issues that >were likely to alter the nature of the war in the south, not the least of which >was increasing North Vietnamese infiltration and support for the southern >insurgency. > > > > >> Therefore he could not really support Diem, who along with his brother >> in law, Nhu, were in charge of a diabolical outfit and bad news for >> SVN and it's allies. He did not want him assassinated tho, I dont care >> what anyone says against that. > >We do agree on one thing. Kennedy did not really want or expect Diem to be >killed. >He was naive in that regard. However, he didn't have to "support" Diem and >Nhu. All he had to do was sit back and wait for one of two things to happen. >Either Diem and Nhu would cut a deal with the NLF/VC and "request" that the US >withdraw (something Kennedy and his advisers clearly feared might happen, and >which they were not willing to accept), or Congress and the American public >would start to pressure the administration to back away from our involvement >with an unpopular and repressive regime in Saigon. In either case, it would >have provided Kennedy with perfect political cover to effect a desired >"withdrawal." That he chose to commit us more deeply by supporting the ARVN >generals coup against Diem is clear evidence that he wanted to win the war >before pulling out. > > > >> The threat to use air power is quite logical from my point of view. >> JFK would having been telling Hanoi to back off or risk the >> consequences, to cover troop withdrawals, to show the South that they >> still had friends. A quite logical strategy. > >They weren't planning to THREATEN Hanoi, they were following a carefully staged >series of escalations against North Vietnam leading up to the direct use of >American air power to force the north to halt its infiltration and support of >the NLF/VC. But even if you're right and it was only to be a threat, what was >Kennedy going to do when after publically threatening to bomb the north, they >ignored him, stepped up the infiltration, and escalated the war in the south? >That would have left him two options: (turn tail and run from South Vietnam as >the Communists escalate and take over, or (2) bomb the north. > > > >> But my point about LBJ writing a draft of what was to become NSAM 273, >> before JFK was assassinated, was what made him think he would be in a >> position to issue any NSAMs at that stage. > >LBJ didn't write any NSAMs. McGeorge Bundy wrote the initial draft on 20 >November and circulated it to Hilsman, Rusk, and William Bundy for revision. >The draft was based on the discussions in Honolulu on the 20th of November. >LBJ wasn't there. > >dtf > > The Kennedy Assassination Home Page http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/home.htm