Second Oral History Interview

                              with

                       PIERRE E. SALINGER

                         April 18, 1970
                    Beverly Hills, California

                               By
                        Larry J. Hackman

         For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program
                     of the Kennedy Library



HACKMAN:       You reminded me at the end of the last interview
               of a couple of things that we ought to talk about. 
               I think I'll just start off with them and not
stick to a strictly chronological order.  The [Howard R. Hughes]
thing in Nevada:  What can you remember about that?

SALINGER:      In almost any Kennedy campaign . . . We had
               trouble raising money for Robert Kennedy's
               campaign.  People don't like to give to people
they think are already rich and can spend their own money in
political campaigns.  We had a meeting in Steve's [Stephen E.
Smith] office and we were going over potential givers in the
country.  I mentioned that I thought Howard Hughes might be
approached.  They asked me if I had the entree to Howard Hughes
and I said I was very close with [Robert] Bob Mayhew, who's the
outside man for Howard Hughes.

So, I flew to Las Vegas and set up a meeting by telephone with
Mayhew.  I saw him, spent about an hour with him.  My approach to
him was that we wanted some money for the campaign, that Mr.
Hughes really, with his kind of unique position in life and the
amount of money he had and everything, didn't need a President of
the United States, he could survive very well without one, but he
needed probably a President who had the imagination that Robert
Kennedy did who would understand some of his concepts.  Anyway, I
made the case and Mayhew said he would present it to Hughes the
next day and would call me the next day.  I told him that I would
be at the Benson Hotel in Portland.  I went, I think, to Las
Vegas on the way to Portland.

The next morning he called me and he said that Mr. Hughes had
agreed to give Kennedy $25,000 and that I could come to Las Vegas
any time and pick it up; they were going to give it to me and
they wanted to hand it to me personally.  So, I said I would be
down between the Oregon primary and the California primary.  
Well, then Bob lost the Oregon primary and things were really in
a. . . . So I called Mayhew as I went from Oregon to California
and said, "I can't quite make it."  He said, "Just come down
after the California primary."  Then, of course, Bob was killed.

The day after he died--I was preparing for the funeral; I was in
New York--I got a call from Bob Mayhew.  In a very simple message
he just said, "I just want you to know that Mr. Hughes said that
the money is as good today as it was yesterday."  Eventually, the
money was paid.  I always thought it was a rather remarkable
thing about Hughes.

As long as we're talking about what Hughes did, Hughes did
another nice thing at that time involving Bob.  That was that
Kathleen [H. Kennedy] after Bob was killed went to the Indian
reservation.  Ethel [S. Kennedy] called Nicole [Salinger], my
wife, and asked if Kathleen and her girlfriends could come out
here and spend the Fourth of July holidays.  The life was very
tough on the reservation and they wanted to get away for a couple
of days.  So, we were delighted to have them.

They were in a kind of a remote place in Arizona as I recall. 
Anyway, I called Mayhew and Howard Hughes provided a plane, flew
them from the reservation down to Los Angles and then back again
to the reservation, which is, again, very nice.

HACKMAN:       Yes.  Well, you also had some other involvement in
               Nevada in '68.  Can you remember who else you
               talked to out there?  Was Hughes of any help on
politics in Nevada?  Do you remember that at all?  Grant Sawyer?

SALINGER:      I don't remember getting involved in delegates in
               Nevada in 1968.

HACKMAN:       I thought I saw in one of the black boiler room
               books. . . .

SALINGER:      It's possible that I did.  Now, I'd have to go
               back and look through it.

Let me tell you another anecdote.  This is an anecdote I think
ought to be put in the really deep freeze until like fifty years
from now, but I'm reminded of it by saying that I went to Oregon. 
They ran out of ready cash in the Oregon.  Did I tell you this
story?

HACKMAN:       No, but I was in [Allard K.] Lowenstein's office
               one night and some kid who's in Lowenstein's
               office said, "Ask Pierre Salinger about the
$50,000 that got lost in Washington."  So, I mentioned it to you
last time but you didn't put it down.  So, why don't you?

SALINGER:      Well, anyway, just before I left for Oregon--
               actually I didn't go to Las Vegas on the way to
               Oregon:  that must have been another time because 
I recall very clearly how I went to Oregon.  I'm trying to think
of the name of the fellow who was kind of handling money around
the campaign.  It was one of the old fellows from the John
Kennedy days.

HACKMAN:       Yeah, I know.  Out of Steve Smith's office, you
               mean?

SALINGER:      Yeah.

HACKMAN:       Yeah, I can never remember the name.

SALINGER:      Kind of an Italian name.

HACKMAN:       I can never get it.

SALINGER:      It's not. . . .  But anyway, he showed up and
               handed me $50,000.  I have had a terrible back
               problem for the last six or seven years; I try to
avoid carrying any bags, if I can, when I travel.  Even the
thought of the $50,000 was not enough to make me careful of the
thing because my back hurt so bad.  So, I stuck the $50,000 in
between a number of shirts and I checked three bags from
Washington to Portland and we had a plane change in St. Louis.

When I got off the plane in Oregon, I was met by Jim McManus and
[William R.,III] Bill Gruver.  We went down to pick up the
baggage and two of the bags came.  The third bag didn't come. 
The third bag is the one that had the $50,000 in it.  It was a
disastrous feeling because there was nothing I could do about it. 
I couldn't complain to Eastern Airlines.  I mean, I could tell
them that the bag was missing, but I couldn't tell them about the
value of the bag because that would immediately alert somebody to
go into the bag and take it out; the bag was not locked.  Second,
it was illegal to take that kind of cash into Oregon.  So, I
couldn't make any great outcry about it.  I mean I felt a little
like Carmine DeSapio did when he put the money on the back seat
of the taxi cab.

It was a long night.  At about 9 o'clock the next morning there
was a knock on the door in my room.  There was a guy from Eastern
Airlines who brought the bag.  As soon as he came, I locked the
door, opened it up and there was the $50,000.

HACKMAN:       What was the money for in Oregon?

SALINGER:      I don't know.  I turned the money over to
               [William] Bill vanden Heuvel.  I suppose it was
               for precinct workers and things like that.  I
don't know what they used it for exactly.

HACKMAN:       Did you get involved in that kind of thing in
               other places in the '68 primary?

SALINGER:      No, that was the only time that I carried any cash
               in that campaign as I recall.  I raised some
               fairly good amounts of money for the campaign from
various sources, but that was the only time that. . . .

HACKMAN:       The thing that I had a note on in Nevada was that
               there was some effort made with Grant Sawyer, who,
               I guess, was a former Governor at that time, who
was a [Hubert H.] Humphrey guy.   There was some chance of
pulling him off of Humphrey.  Can you remember it?

SALINGER:      No, I had nothing to do with that.  I know Grant
               Sawyer.  I did not talk to him during that time.

HACKMAN:       Did you get involved in whether Robert Kennedy
               should make some kind of issue for the Nevada
               thing on gambling?

SALINGER:      Now, that rings a bell with me.  I think somebody
               did mention to me that one of the reasons why the
               whole Nevada delegation was going to be against
him was a feeling that he was going to crack down and try to get
gambling eliminated.

HACKMAN:       Yeah, that's right.

SALINGER:      There was an attempt to obtain some assurances
               from Robert Kennedy that if he became President,
               he would not try to interfere with what was
essentially a state matter.

HACKMAN:       Yes, that's the kind of statement that was made,
               yeah.

SALINGER:      It was a woman.  It was a national committeewoman
               who talked to me:  It wasn't Grant Sawyer.

HACKMAN:       Out there you mean?

SALINGER:      Yeah.

HACKMAN:       Yeah, I've forgotten her name.  I don't have it
               written down.

SALINGER:      As a matter of fact, now that you begin to put it
               in my mind, I think that Mayhew, at the time I was
               talking about the contribution from Hughes,
suggested that I call this woman who was a national
committeewoman.  He gave me a rundown on who the delegates were
and who the possible delegates might be for Robert Kennedy.  I
think that's how it turned up in the boiler room operation.

HACKMAN:       Yeah, okay.  Okay, I want to skip back to the
               beginning of the campaign.  I believe you said
               that the day before the announcement or on the day
of the announcement you were talking to Steve Smith about who
might do what in the campaign.  Do you remember that at all? 
Maybe it was only a discussion of what role you might play.

SALINGER:      No, I don't remember having any discussion of
               roles as it worked out.  The day that Robert
               Kennedy announced happened to be the day I taped
the first of my television shows--first and last, I might add.  I
remember that after Bob announced--he announced on a Friday--I
got a call from Teddy's [Edward M. Kennedy] office saying there
was to be a meeting Saturday morning at Teddy's office.  It was
to be Saturday afternoon, I guess.  Bob was going to come up and
march in the St. Patrick's day parade because I remember I saw
him in New York before I went to Washington.

At that point there had not been any precise discussion of the
roles.  But I remember that I called Keith Barrish, who was the
chief person in my company, and told him I'd like to take a leave
of absence.  He gave me one immediately.  So, I went to
Washington the next day for the meeting where there was some
attempt made to divide up areas of immediate responsibility for
the first week or ten days of the campaign.  Even at that time,
there was no discussion as to what I would do on a permanent
basis.  I was really in a kind of a funny position because I
didn't want to move in on Frank Mankiewicz's operation, and yet
that was probably my best expertise.

Anyway, at the meeting at Teddy's office, it was decided that the
first thing I should do would be to fly to California and to work
with [Jesse M.] Jess Unruh in putting together the California
delegation, the idea being that in the creation of the delegation
Bob would have certain ideas of people he wanted to put on the
delegation, to make some effort to get them in and to make sure
that Jess didn't just kind of pack the delegation with his
people.  So, I went to California and never left the airport,
really, because the operation all took place at the International
Hotel at the airport.

HACKMAN:       [John E.] Nolan was out at that point, and I know
               he got involved in interviewing some of Unruh's
               people who then took campaign roles.

HACKMAN:       Did you get at all involved in the selection of
               those people [Art] Seltzer, [Steven E.] Smith,
               [Ray] King?

SALINGER:      No, I did not.  Dick Nolan (John E.) was handling
               . . . .  I was strictly working with the selection
               of the delegates.  As I recall, I got calls from
Washington or New York or maybe it was relayed to me through Dick
Nolan.  I don't have the precise recollection of how it's handled
at the moment but, for example, I got a call saying that they
wanted to have representatives of students on the thing.  We went
out and found student leaders.  They wanted to make sure that
there was a good black representation.  They wanted to make sure
that Cesar Chavez was on the delegation.  There were people that
had been associated with Bob in the past that they wanted to make
sure of like Shirley MacLaine.  I think they wanted to get Andy
Williams on the delegation.

Then there was quite an argument about my own position on the
delegation.  Actually, I started the argument myself because at
that time I had not made a definitive decision not to go ahead
with the television show.  I check with, I guess, [Myer S.] Mike
Feldman on what would be the equal time situation.  In other
words if I was a candidate for delegate, would it cause any FCC
[Federal Communications Commission] problems?  Well, anyway, I
think his judgment was that it wouldn't cause any problem, but I
decided I'd stay off the delegation.  Then I was given a
commitment by Jess; after the election there would be vacancies
and I would be named to the delegation.

HACKMAN:       Can you remember discussions at that meeting in
               Edward Kennedy's office about what other people
               were supposed to be doing, maybe that meeting and
then subsequent to that?  What was your understanding of how
responsibilities were to be  divided?

SALINGER:      I don't remember really, precisely.  As I recall,
               that meeting was more about the immediate things
               that had to be done in the next two or three days,
I mean, moving people out to various areas, less than a
discussion of precise roles.  In fact, I think one of the great
problems of Robert Kennedy's campaign was that they never really
sat down and had a discussion as to precise roles.

HACKMAN:       As your role developed in the campaign, how did
               you handle that?  How much of a problem was it to
               know who you were supposed to go to on what?

SALINGER:      After I did the California thing, I finally had
               this discussion with Bob.  I said to Bob that I
               thought the best way to handle it was, first of
all, I should not be the press secretary of the campaign--that
should stay in Frank's hands--and that he should make a decision
as to who would be the road man and who would be the inside man. 
You needed an inside man and you needed a road man on the job.  I
remember that we discussed that for a while and he said, "Well, I
want you with me."

I spent a couple of days with him on the campaign in California. 
Then it became absolutely obvious to me that that was just going
to produce a disaster in the long run because so many of the
press people who had now turned up on the campaign were really
more my contacts than they were Frank's.  So, I finally went to
Bob and said, "You know, it's not going to work this way.  What I
ought to do is go into Washington and handle the inside work with
the Washington press as well as setting up the campaign press
organization in the various primary states.  That should be the
division.  Frank should stay on the road and we should have some
kind of a liaison operation."  That's the way it finally worked
out.

HACKMAN:       As time went on then, how much of a problem did
               you have, when problems would come up in what you
               were doing, of either getting to Robert Kennedy or
getting to whoever else should get in on the thing?

SALINGER:      That was a fair sized problem.  Basically, if I
               couldn't get Bob, I'd try to get a decision out of
               Ted Kennedy or Steve.  Then when [Kenneth P.] Ken
O'Donnell came in, I leaned on him quite a bit because we had had
that kind of a relationship at the White House.

There was a considerable amount of friction in the headquarters
staff of Bob's campaign.  I mean, there were an awful lot of
people around there who didn't like each other and thought that
the other was too important.  There was a lot of that
unfortunately.  Ken O'Donnell, for example, was most unhappy
about the arrival on the scene of [Lawrence F.] Larry O'Brien. 
There were a lot of people who felt that [Theodore C.] Ted
Sorensen had a role in the campaign that was far beyond his
importance.

I say this not in really any. . . .  I don't think in the long
run it would have been any real problem.  I can't think of any
time that a campaign had been created that rapidly and moved into
gear that fast.  It was bound to have that kind of problems, so
you just had to put up with them.  I tried as much as I could to
stay out of the day-to-day strategy of the campaign and to
concentrate on the press aspects of the campaign.

HACKMAN:       What kind of problems did you have in getting 
               your side of the operation going then at the
               Washington end or in the states?

SALINGER:      None, really.  Basically none.  I mean, I geared
               up very rapidly.  I figured I had a license to do
               the job, so, I went out and got people and put
them in the primary states.  I went to guys that I knew, that I
could rely on or hurry.  For example, Indiana was the immediate
problem.  I remember I call Bill Gruver in California--and,
incidentally, you ought to talk to him; he's here and he's pretty
good--and he agreed to go to Indiana.  Then I tried to get the
fellow who had been a press secretary to [Matthew E.] Mat Welsh.

HACKMAN:       There's a guy named Jim McManus who gets involved.

SALINGER:      I'll get to him in a second.  This is another
               fellow; he also was secretary to Mat Welsh at one
               point.  This fellow kind of dillydallied, he
couldn't make up his mind whether he wanted to come to work for
him, but he suggested Jim McManus.  Jim McManus was working for
Westinghouse [Broadcasting Corporation] at that time in a
contract poverty deal that Westinghouse was running.  Anyway
[James L.] Jimmy Greenfield was at Westinghouse at that time. 
What Jim wanted more than anything else was to get a leave of
absence so he wouldn't get trapped out if anything happened, so
Jimmy arranged that with the Westinghouse people.  Jim McManus
came to work; Jim McManus headed up the operation in Indiana. 
Then the Indiana guy said he was available, so I sent him to
Nebraska.  He was also a very able fellow.

Then I also picked up a fellow named--well, we have to think of
his name because he's played a rather interesting role since
Bob's death.

HACKMAN:       Not Hugh McDonald?

SALINGER:      No, the guy who is now the press secretary to
               Charles Goodell.  I'll think of his name in a
               minute.  We put him in Nebraska--well, he was
the original guy in Nebraska.  Then he got into some fight with
Sorensen's brother [Philip C. Sorensen].  They felt he was not
doing his job, I thought he was.  Anyway, we had some
conversation and I just decided I'd move in on it right away
before it got out of hand.  I sent the second fellow in Indiana
out there over him but left him out there.  He turned out to be
very good.  The first fellow turned out to be fine when he had
somebody over him.

Then Gruver and McManus were leapfrogged into Oregon from
Indiana.  Hugh McDonald was put in as kind of my assistant in
Washington.  I always felt he was awful light.  I liked High as a
fellow, but he had a small amount of experience and his judgment
was not always too good.  Some stories appeared, I mean, he was
backgrounding people left and right on stuff that he really
shouldn't have been.  I finally had to kind of slow him up.

Then we needed writers awfully bad, people to write releases who
had had experience.  I brought Barbara Coleman in who had been
with me at the White House.  Then I had my own secretary that I
brought from California.  Then I brought a fellow in from the New
York Times.  I don't know what's happened to him and I can't
remember his name at the moment.  I'll think of it.  It's a short
name.

HACKMAN:       I've got some lists here.  Let me see them.

SALINGER:      We did a couple of innovative things that had
               never been done in a political campaign before
               which were worthy of some note.  Xerox had
perfected in late '67 or early '68 a system that permitted people
to send documents by telephone, basically is what the system was. 
So, we set up a system so that the candidate had one of these
Xerox machines and we had one of them in the headquarters.  We
could send speech drafts out to him on the Xerox machine and they
could send back actual copies of speeches as delivered and
messages and stuff like that.

HACKMAN:       Did it work?

SALINGER:      Not totally.  I knew a little bit how tough it is
               on the road to campaign.  It's awfully hard to get
               people to gear up after they've been through like
eighteen hours a day of campaigning, have them gear up the
machine and start sending out what they should send to us or to
receive from us.  But it worked moderately; and I'm sure, thought
out well, it would be a tremendous help in any political
campaign.  It would work well.

HACKMAN:       Were there any other new things that you can
               remember doing in '68?

SALINGER:      That was the one I remember the most.  Let's hold
               on a minute; let me just look through this.

HACKMAN:       I was thinking maybe [Richard C.] Dick Drayne was
               one of the people you were thinking about.

SALINGER:      Dick Drayne!  No, he wasn't one of the people I
               was thinking about.  Dick Drayne was a very able
               fellow.  Now, he worked with me.  He was, of
course, a great deal more able than Hugh McDonald.  I came to
really rely on him a great deal.  Dick Drayne would handle the
Washington office principally when I was gone.  After we got the
Washington office organized and everything else, then the idea
was for me to go into the primary states about ten days before
and take over the primary operation, press operation,
headquarters operation while Frank was traveling with the
candidate, which I did in the three states where we operated.

HACKMAN:       So, you were on the first trip on the road with
               Robert Kennedy in California.  Then I believe you
               came back through part of that western swing, at
least?

SALINGER:      No, I dropped him in Los Angeles.

HACKMAN:       Well, anyway, can you remember, after that first
               trip, getting involved in either a discussion with
               him or a broad discussion with the top level
campaign people about what kind of changes had to be made after
that first trip, either in terms of how you tried to present him
during the campaign or . . .?

SALINGER:      Well, I remember that there was a feeling that his
               television was inadequate and that we were really
               going at it in too haphazard a way.  I wanted to
try to bring some expertise into the thing.  I argued very
strongly.  I'd had a call from--who was the motion picture
producer or director?

HACKMAN:       [Charles E.] Guggenheim?

SALINGER:      No, no.  This was the guy who did "The Train" and
               "Grand Prix" and "The Fixer."  Frankenheimer, John
               Frankenheimer.  John Frankenheimer had been in
touch with me and said he really wanted to work for Bob Kennedy. 
He was one of the really good guys in this business.  Anyway, as
I recall, I talked to Bob and then I talked to Steve and Teddy
and they agreed that John Frankenheimer should come on
immediately and start filming the campaign and putting together
with the idea of half-hour program spots and so on.  So, I
remember I called John Frankenheimer one night or one afternoon
around 4 o'clock California time.  He was on an overnight plane
to Indianapolis, showed up the next morning and stayed with the
campaign the rest of the way.

HACKMAN:       How does the relationship between Frankenheimer, I
               guess Guggenheim was involved in some of this
               stuff, Papert, Koenig and Lois [Advertising
Agency]--I mean, is there a lot of duplication here and overlap?

SALINGER:      There was some duplication and there was . . .

HACKMAN:       [Richard N.] Goodwin gets in then sometimes.

SALINGER:      Goodwin was part of the Frankenheimer operation. 
               Goodwin was writing the stuff for Frankenheimer. 
               Frankenheimer did basically two things:  he'd take
the kind of question and answer things that Bob did in Indiana
and in Oregon and Nebraska with groups of people.  Then he did
the documentary.  We did kind of a half-hour documentary in each
state.  "Robert Kennedy in Indiana" which were montages of stuff
that Frankenheimer's people had shot.  Goodwin would be writing
the script for those, you know, for the voice-over on it.  That's
where his principal role was.

I didn't really have much to do with Guggenheim's people.  I
don't remember running into them very much.  The Papert people
were always close to us.  In fact their office was across the way
from us in Indiana, but I would think that [Donald M.] Don Wilson
would have a much clearer idea of how these relationships worked
out because to me it was kind of a blur.  I mean, we had enough
problems of our own without getting involved in that.

HACKMAN:       Did you ever get any feedback from Robert Kennedy
               or from anyone else about how well the TV things
               were going after Frankenheimer came in, how
satisfied he was?

SALINGER:      Well, I think that Kennedy liked the TV as it
               started to emerge after Frankenheimer came aboard. 
               He though it was better.

HACKMAN:       What were the early problems?

SALINGER:      Well, I think the problems were more a lack of
               plan.  I mean, I don't think anybody was doing--
               there was nobody really filming him as he went
along, capturing those moments that you really have to capture if
you're going to show the candidate in his natural habitat rather
than in a kind of a manufactured situation.  Bob was damn good on
the stump and good with people and we weren't capturing that.  I
think that was the major thing that I was pressing when we tried
to get Frankenheimer in there.  We needed somebody to get him as
he was.

HACKMAN:       I've heard there was some kind of debate taking
               place about what kinds of things you show him
               doing and, in fact, what kinds of things he does
in terms of appearances, primarily ghetto versus suburbs or
crowds versus crowds in motorcades, whatever?

SALINGER:      I was not in on the central part of those
               discussions but I remember on the edge of those
               discussions that there was a feeling that maybe 
there was too much association with blacks in the early part of
the campaign.  Also, I do remember myself calling Bob several
times in the first ten days of the campaign and also talking to
Ted Kennedy and talking to Steve about what I thought was a
terrible, strident tone in Bob's speeches in those early days in
an effort to try to bring those down into focus.  They were tough
speeches.  The one, for example, that got me particularly
involved was the speech he gave at the Greek Theater in
California when they talked about the dark, dark impulses. . . .

HACKMAN:       Darker impulses.

SALINGER:      The darker impulses and so on.  I think he did
               move away from that stridency.  Of course, that
               gets down to the central argument of the campaign,
which has been talked about now in three books, as to whether the
old Kennedy hands came in there and tried to change Robert
Kennedy back into a more conservative mold and take away. . . . 
Personally, I never got into that fight at any point except at
one time.  The only time I ever saw a confrontation between the
so-called "old politics" and the "new politics" was in Oregon
when we were debating on whether he should debate [Eugene J.]
McCarthy.  At that time I was the guy who was trying to put it
together for him to debate him.  [Adam] Walinsky and all these
people were on my side--I was on their side, let's put it that
way.  I think that was an unfortunate decision not to debate him
in Oregon; I think that may have blown the Oregon primary.

HACKMAN:       Can you remember after, let's say, the Greek
               Theater speech or maybe some of those other early
               speeches that created similar problems what you
did to try to track that down in terms of dealing with specific
reporters?  I know [Robert J.] Donovan in the Los Angeles Times
was one of the guys who was criticizing him for being inaccurate
and too passionate or whatever.

SALINGER:      Well, I remember one of the central issues was
               people trying to find out who wrote the speech.  I
               was getting a lot of feedback from the press which
I was communicating on to Bob and to others that they thought
that he was going too far on the thing.  That was mainly my role,
as a conduit of the information that I was getting from press
people who I thought Bob respected.

HACKMAN:       Was your operation putting out the daily digest of
               the press thing?

SALINGER:      Yeah, we did the daily digest.

HACKMAN:       Who was that sent to then?  How was it handled?

SALINGER:      The daily digest was sent around to everybody
               involved in the campaign as well as out to the
               candidate.  That was one of the things we xeroxed
out to him.  That was one of my ideas.

HACKMAN:       Would those things be fed to the press also?

SALINGER:      No.

HACKMAN:       Skipping back a little bit, did you get involved
               at all in discussions of which primaries to go
               into, Indiana, some debate on New Jersey or
Florida or anything like that?

SALINGER:      No, I did not.

HACKMAN:       You took an early trip out, I believe, to Indiana,
               sort of a scouting trip, is that correct?

SALINGER:      That's correct.

HACKMAN:       What can you remember?  Who did you talk to and
               what did you report back?

SALINGER:      The trip was for the purpose of getting my
               operation planted out there, getting McManus
               aboard and getting the thing started.  I talked to
a lot of people at the headquarters.  I came back feeling we had
a very tough job there.  I remember at the time in Indiana. . . .

Some other things happened in Indiana on that trip as I recall. 
That trip happened to coincide with the assassination of Martin
Luther King.  It was during that trip that I had my first
confrontation with the [Eugene C.] Pulliam Newspapers, which is
not on the subject you're asking, but since I'm thinking about
it, I wanted to tell you about it.

HACKMAN:       No, that's all right.

SALINGER:      That speech of Robert Kennedy's after the
               assassination of King was probably one of the
               greatest, if not the greatest speech he gave in
his lifetime.  When I went to pick up the Indianapolis paper the
next morning, I read the entire paper through without being able
to find any reference to the speech.  So, then I read back
through it again, and buried down in about the eighteenth
paragraph about the Young Democrats or something was about a four
paragraph mention of Robert Kennedy.  So, I thought I could see
the portent of things to come and I decided it wouldn't hurt to
go by and see [Eugene S.] Gene Pulliam, this is the younger
Pulliam who runs the paper there who I'd gotten to know rather
well when I was at the White House because he was the chairman of
the Freedom of Information Committee of the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, I guess.

HACKMAN:       Right.

SALINGER:      So, I called up and asked if I could come by to
               see him and he said he was delighted and was very
               cordial.  I said, "Listen, I'm not here in any way
to complain about treatment by the paper; I haven't seen enough
of it to.  And I don't expect you to be for us because I know
you're not going to be for us no matter what happens.  All that
I'm saying is that I hope that we get a fair break in the paper. 
We just want an even treatment in the paper.  I thought this
morning it was not quite even."  And he said, "Well, as a matter
of fact I was a little disturbed by this morning myself."  He
said, "I knew Robert Kennedy was in town last night and I looked
around for the story and I couldn't find it myself in the paper." 
So, I said, "Well, that illustrates the point better than
anything I could say so why don't you. . . ?"  So, I left rather
cordial.  I mean, he took me around, introduced me to a couple of
guys, and I went away.  Of course, I mean that was one of the
great wasted calls of all time because we were really killed by
those newspapers.

HACKMAN:       Well, why don't you just follow up with that on
               through.  How much more talking did you do with
               him or other people at the paper?

SALINGER:      I did no more talking with him.  I figured it was
               worthless to talk to him.  We yelled at the local
               political editor from time to time.  McManus had
dealt with them over a long period of time and knew them well and
was constantly on their backs, but it just did absolutely no
good.  I mean they were just determined to kill Bobby.

So, I guess it was the Sunday before the primary that I decided
it wouldn't hurt to make an issue out of it.  [Interruption]

HACKMAN:       About the Sunday before the end of Indiana when
               you went to . . .

SALINGER:      Well, I called up Bob.  I said I thought we'd
               taken enough from those papers and I thought that
               it might be helpful to us if we made an issue out
of it.  So he said, "Fine, go ahead."  So, that's when I sent the
telegram to the chairman of the American Society of Newspaper
Editors asking that they make an investigation of the Pulliam
papers.

All apart from the political considerations, because obviously
there were some political considerations in it, I'm still
outraged by the response I got from him:  that that's not their
job, that it's not a policing organization, that they have no
influence over other newspapers.

HACKMAN:       That response wasn't anticipated then?

SALINGER:      No.  I don't think I anticipated that they would
               do anything about it, but I thought that the
               response was so bad that it really revealed the
lack of desire of the whole newspaper profession to look at their
own problems.  They have got them and they've got them no place
worse than in Indianapolis or in Phoenix where Mr. Pulliam
operates.

HACKMAN:       How did you try to get around that situation in
               Indiana?  Here's the biggest newspaper in Indiana
               . . .

SALINGER:      Well, we got around it through television.  I
               mean, that was the only solution.

HACKMAN:       No other newspapers that reached into the area
               that you could. . . .

SALINGER:      There were no other newspapers of any consequence
               reaching Indianapolis that could help you at all. 
               They have a monopoly in Indianapolis; they have
both papers.  Now, I'm not convinced, however. . . . In fact, I'm
fairly convinced that the opposition of those papers helped us in
the long run in Indianapolis.  Bob ran well in Indianapolis,
despite those papers.  They went too far in my opinion.  I think
that people began to sympathize with Bob for the treatment he was
getting from those papers.  They've seen that treatment given to
others.  We got the same treatment in the 1960 campaign from
those papers.

HACKMAN:       In terms of getting around it through the use of
               TV, does that mean you just tried to get him on TV
               a lot or is there a specific contact that you have
to make with TV stations to try to do certain kinds of things.

SALINGER:      Well, we tried to make it as simple as possible
               for the TV stations to get the information.  We
               even had a crew to travel with the candidate who
would produce film for stations who didn't have the funds or the
desire to go out and cover it themselves.  In addition to that,
of course, we're talking about buying a lot of time.  We bought a
lot of time and tried to use that as best we could.

HACKMAN:       Okay, now getting back to that first trip you took
               out to Indiana, can you remember why you came back
               with a feeling that it was going to be tough?  Did
you have any contact with Gordon St. Angelo or any of the local
pols in Indiana?

SALINGER:      I don't remember seeing Gordon on that trip, I may
               have talked to him on the telephone.

HACKMAN:       There has always been some suggestion that people
               were unclear as to what role he had, what his
               position really, was, that he was playing slightly
favorable when in fact he wasn't.

SALINGER:      Well, I never had the impression that he was
               playing favorable at all.  I remember that was one
               of Larry O'Brien's theories that we shouldn't be
too tough on Gordon because he as going to be with us in the long
run.  I never accepted that.  Certainly, in Indiana. . . .  The
guy was either with us or he wasn't with us, I mean, it was that
simple.  I remember, I think I talked to [Andrew, Jr.] Andy
Jacobs and some of his people on the first trip I went out there. 
I remember when I was out there I did a background of some of the
press that was out there in which I said that I thought that we
were in for a tough time in Indiana.  Then, of course, the next
day there were all kinds of stories saying, "It's the return of
Pierre Salinger and the old poor-mouth technique that he used so
beautifully in 1960."  They said, "Now we can recognize it."  But
I meant it; I was serious about it, I thought we were going to
have a tough time winning that one.

HACKMAN:       Did you ever get involved in any discussions of
               what to do in the South in the campaign?

SALINGER:      Well, I had some discussions with Robert Troutman. 
               I'm trying to think.  I'm going to be spending a
               couple days with Bob Troutman next week and maybe
in my conversation with him I can refresh my memory on what the
hell we talked about.

Troutman, incidently, was put in charge of the 1968 [Democratic
National] Convention arrangements in Chicago as he had been in
1960.

HACKMAN:       Is that something that came out of one of the fall
               meetings, or when does that take place?  In
               Sorensen's new book he says that one of the
decisions made either in the October or December '67 meeting is
that you start doing something in terms of organizing for the
Convention, in terms of facilities whatever.  Do you remember
that?  Coming out of it? 

SALINGER:      Yeah.  It wasn't the October meeting, but I do
               remember something about the December meeting
               because I remember I had a conversation with
Troutman.  I remember putting in a call to the telephone
specialist out here at the Pacific Telephone Company who would
handle our problems in Los Angeles and asking him to start kind
of feeling around with his people as to whether he could get
loose and be assigned to Chicago to work with us in setting up
our phone systems there.

HACKMAN:       Speaking of O'Brien, what did he spend most of
               time doing after he came with the campaign?

SALINGER:      Talking to the press.

HACKMAN:       Yes.  Any one directing what he was doing, or was
               he more or less operating on his own?

SALINGER:      He was operating on his own.  I mean, I got the
               distinct impression that he was kind of just
               placed out there.  He really didn't have a hell of
a lot to do; the campaign was already running.  He didn't seem to
me to be involved in any of the day-to-day decisions on how the
campaign was being run.  I never remember having to check with
him about anything I ever had to do.

HACKMAN:       Yeah.  What kinds of  problems did his
               conversation with the press present to you?  Were
               there many?

SALINGER:      No, because he was fairly skilled about that.  I
               don't remember him saying anything outrageous but
               I don't remember him calling me up and telling me
what he was going to say to the press before either.

HACKMAN:       What were your problems in terms of--maybe they
               were some of the same problems Mankiewicz had--
               controlling what people were saying of the
campaign?  Was there any way that you could get a hold on that?

SALINGER:      There was no way that you could get a hold on that
               in that particular campaign.  The only thing was
               to make it so easy for yourself to be approached,
to set up an operation that enticed people to come there and
check in with you before they did anything else when they got to
a state.  You had some hold on it that way, but that was about
the only way.

In all these states what I tried to do was to create in the press
office--that was the inside deal--such a basic source of
information for the press--I mean, getting everything for them
that they could possibly want--that they almost were compelled to
come there when they  first arrived in the state, which would
give you an opportunity then to talk to them and give them some
idea what you thought was going to happen.

HACKMAN:       Did that in fact happen?

SALINGER:      Yeah, it did.  The press is really broken down
               into two groups, the ones that are traveling
               constantly with the candidate, and therefore Frank
had direct access to them, and then the specialists and the
people who come in in the last ten days of a campaign to follow
it to its climax.  Those people, generally, were kept contact
with through the headquarters.

HACKMAN:       What about people within a state, sort of the
               local press, either in the major cities or, say,
               in Omaha or Lincoln or on . . .

SALINGER:      Yeah, that was, of course, the job that we sent
               these guys into the state to handle, the local
               press.   They did a good job.  Jim McManus knew
these people across the state.

HACKMAN:       Okay.

SALINGER:      I'm trying to think, did we have a beeper in
               Indiana?

HACKMAN:       Yeah.

SALINGER:      Yeah, I think we did.  Oh yeah, we brought what's-
               his-name in.

HACKMAN:       I can't remember his name either.

SALINGER:      My beeper man.

HACKMAN:       He was the guy who did it before.

SALINGER:      That's one thing I remember I had a discussion
               with Steve as to whether we could pay the cost of
               bringing him in.  He was my beeper man when I ran
for the Senate in '64; he's damn good.

HACKMAN:       When did you next get to California after you were
               out here in March?  I think you told me last time
               you didn't get into California until the last ten
days.

SALINGER:      That's right.

HACKMAN:       Were you getting many reports back from California
               as things developed on what the problems were?

SALINGER:      I was getting reports back on California and that
               was basically the only problem I ever had in the
               campaign, kind of an interaction with the. . . .
I never was able to pin it down, but every once in a while I
would hear from friends of mine in California that they had been
told flatly by people in the Kennedy campaign that I was being
kept out of California on purpose because I was a controversial
figure in California because I had been a candidate there myself. 
Every time I would try to pin that down I was not able to pin it
down.  But I didn't go to  California.  I had a couple of
opportunities to go to California which I passed up on my own. 
Not being able to pin it down, I didn't want to really exacerbate
the situation, so I stayed out of the state.  That was the only
place I really had any conflict with Frank.  For some reason or
the other Frank thought that he was a bigger expert on California
than I was and he got himself assigned out there.

He went off the campaign--Dick Drayne went out to take his place
--and Frank went out there.  Frank had not been in California for
four or five years, was not really up on the political thing,
didn't have the relationship with Jess.

HACKMAN:       It had been longer than that really.

SALINGER:      Now, see, part of the thing was that I had not
               been exactly on friendly terms with Jess in the
               period from '64 to '68, but we kissed and made up
at the beginning of Bob Kennedy's campaign.  We had absolutely no
problems, and we weren't going to have any problems.  But people
thought that we still had that lingering feud going between us,
and I think maybe that was part of it.

HACKMAN:       Well, who were you hearing from in California? 
               What were they telling you?

SALINGER:      Well, I was hearing. . . .  I'm trying to think
               now who the principal people I was talking to
               were.  I can't think of the precise people, I
mean, as people would come through, I would talk to them.  I
guess [Frederick G.] Dutton was out there quite a few times.  I
remember the major theme that I was getting was that there was a
lot of friction in the campaign, that Jess wasn't doing
everything he could for Bob, that the national direction of the
campaign was unfortunate because they didn't really understand
the California situation and they were trying to impose ideas
that didn't work in California.  This is the kind of thing I was
getting back.

HACKMAN:       When you went out there the last ten days, what
               did you get involved in?

SALINGER:      Well, in the last ten days then I got involved in
               the press operation principally.  I stayed out of
               everything else.

HACKMAN:       Where, mostly down here?

SALINGER:      In the headquarters on Wilshire Boulevard.

HACKMAN:       What were the press problems at that point? 
               Remember a fellow named [Richard] Dick Kline?

SALINGER:      Very well.

HACKMAN:       How well was he doing on what he was supposed to
               be doing?

SALINGER:      Well, Frank didn't like him, I did like him.  Dick
               tried to do the best he could in what was
               basically an unfortunate situation for him.  Frank
thought he was lazy; Dick is a pretty effective fellow.  So,
there was that kind of friction.  By the time election day came
we had too many people in California.  There were just too many
people who didn't know anything about California trying to tell
people in California how to run their campaign.  The fact that we
won in California was miraculous in my opinion, in view of the
campaign.  It was an atrociously run campaign.

HACKMAN:       In terms of newspapers out here, any personal
               contact that you had with editors, whatever?

SALINGER:      Well, I knew the writers all very well, I mean the
               political writers.  We got a pretty good ride from
               the press in California.  I don't remember any
place where we were really getting screwed by the press in
California.

The major thing was trying to handle those requests for the
special things that people wanted, you know, CBS [Columbia
Broadcasting System] had a California special and they wanted to
do five minutes with Bob.  The BBC [British Broadcasting
Corporation] wanted to do this, and the French were there. 
That's what you end up spending your time on, those problems.

HACKMAN:       Was [Edwin O.] Guthman a significant help on the
               [Los Angeles] Times, or does that enter into it or
               anything?

SALINGER:      I think I would say no, not, I mean.


[BEGIN TAPE ONE SIDE II] 


SALINGER:      It was kind of train-meeting operation, our press
               operation.  We had so many people coming up to
               give speeches.  We had to arrange their schedules.
And we worked from [Charles] Charlie Evers to [Arthur M., Jr.]
Arthur Schlesinger.  We had--what's the name of the guy that used
to be head of the Consulate department at the State Department?

HACKMAN:       Abba Schwartz.

SALINGER:      Abba Schwartz and, I mean, it was just a constant
               progression of guys that simply appeared one day
               and said, you know, "What am I doing today?" 
You'd try to find fifty people who would listen to him.

HACKMAN:       Can you remember a big debate going on out here as
               to, again, what group you appealed to, the
               minorities versus the suburbs?  Did you get
involved in that?

SALINGER:      I didn't get involved in that, but it was obvious
               in the television debate that whoever got involved
               in it had decided.  The thing that actually won
the election for him was the statement he made on television . .
..

HACKMAN:       The Orange County thing?

SALINGER:      . . . about McCarthy wanting to send blacks to
               Orange County.  McCarthy didn't realize--that was
               the fantastic thing about it--for about twenty
-four hours that he had just made one of the great boo-boos of
his life.

HACKMAN:       What about in Indiana?  There have always been a
               lot of rumors that there were problems in the way
               the organization was going.  One time [Gerald F.]
Jerry Doherty, who was Edward Kennedy's guy was running it and
then along comes John Douglas.  Did you get involved in any of
that?

SALINGER:      No, I saw the fights going on.  Then there was
               [Joseph F.] Joe Dolan, and then there was [Gerald
               J.] Bruno who was blowing his top about once an
hour and screaming and yelling.

HACKMAN:       What was it all about?  Did you get a feel for it?

SALINGER:      Scheduling was one of the central things, where he
               was going to go on this date and how he was being
               scheduled.  Terrible fights between Dolan and
Bruno's people and Doherty's people.  John Douglas was kind of a
peacemaker in the thing, as I recall, more than anything else.

HACKMAN:       You basically tried to stay out though?

SALINGER:      Basically, I tried to stay out.  I had my hands
               full talking with the press.

I'm big for trains in campaigns.  I think I was one of the first
to suggest in the campaign, if not the first to suggest that we
do trains into various states, basically on my own experience
that trains have been a damn effective way of campaigning.  The
press liked them.

HACKMAN:       Can you remember getting involved in other
               discussions of that kind of thing?  You know, in
               some places he was using, what was it?--STOL
[Short Take Off & Landing] system, you know, the airplane hops
around states.  Did you get involved in that, the scheduling and
all?

SALINGER:      No.  You see, what I was mainly bogged down doing,
               if I was not in the primary state I was in
               Washington where I was filtering hundreds if not
thousands of requests for articles by him on various subjects and
quotes by him for various publications around the country, trying
to put out stuff for specialized types of publications.  Breaking
down publications across the country, you could hit their special
interest.  The foreign press swarmed into the country, including
my wife--that's how I met her.  That was in '64 she swarmed in,
but I mean, you know, that type of thing.

You were trying to keep some basic liaison with the campaign so
you weren't saying things that were too far out from what the
campaign was trying to say in those days.  You went more on gut
feeling, actually, most of the time on what you were saying in
the press than you did on any great direction.  I don't remember
getting a substantial amount of briefing direction from anybody. 
You know, occasionally, I'd get some briefing direction, but most
of the time I was going on instinct of what the candidate was
saying, on what we were supposed to be saying and how we were
supposed to be moving.

HACKMAN:       Can you remember anything significant about
               Nebraska?  Any problems peculiar to Nebraska?

SALINGER:      No, I remember after Indiana Nebraska was a hell
               of a lot easier.  It seemed to be a lot easier.

HACKMAN:       At the Indian . . .

SALINGER:      There was a bomb--you know about the bomb threat
               in Nebraska?

HACKMAN:       Yeah, I've heard.  Maybe you've got something
               else.

SALINGER:      Well, you know, they cleaned out the hotel, I
               think it was the day of the election or the day
               before the election, with the bomb threat.

HACKMAN:       Did you ever talk to them about security during
               the campaign?

SALINGER:      Well, the one time, of course, was the
               conversation we had at Frankenheimer's house which
               was about ten days before he was killed.  That, of
course, has been published quite extensively.

HACKMAN:       What about at the end of Nebraska?  You made a
               statement about McCarthy, this defeated McCarthy
               or McCarthy was finished.  Is that completely your
own?  

SALINGER:      That was my own, that was my own direction.

Let me go back to Indiana a minute.  One of the things we devised
in Indiana, and actually it was Bob's idea originally, was the
summary of the election results.  In other words taking the
results and putting them together in a fashion which put us in
the best possible light--statistical, political economics, social
analysis of the returns which we stayed up all night doing in
Indiana after the election and which we then had a briefing the
next day to the press about--to make Indiana look. . . .  We did
that in every state where we ran a primary.

HACKMAN:       Now, this was sort of new in '68?

SALINGER:      Yeah.  We never did that before, never did that
               before.  That was damn effective with the press. 
               I mean, they began to look for it after the
things, how many counties we. . . .  It was tougher to do in a
state where you lose, like Oregon, but I don't know.  You ought
to get those copies.  Those were all mimeographed and they should
be available.

HACKMAN:       Yeah, they're probably at the [Kennedy] Library.

You also at least took one trip into the State of Washington and
in Hawaii, anything in either one of those two?

SALINGER:      Well, I was sent to Hawaii to represent the 
               Senator at the State Democratic convention there. 
               I would say that that trip was largely
unsuccessful from the standpoint of. . . .  I mean, in other
words, we held the delegates we had and maybe added a half
delegate or one delegate more, but we didn't make any real
impact.  The situation was pretty well locked up.

Washington was different.  I went to Washington to address the
King County Democratic convention.  There I think it made a
substantial difference.  I think it was one of the best speeches
that I gave in my whole life and brought the convention to their
feet which [Walter F.] Mondale had not done and the other guys
had not done.  I think that Bob would have done exceedingly well
in the Washington delegation if he had not been killed.

HACKMAN:       Yeah.  Do you remember in Hawaii getting involved
               in discussions of cooperation with McCarthy or how
               to split the delegation?

SALINGER:      Yes, I tried to put that together, as a matter of
               fact.

HACKMAN:       Some guy named [Thomas P.] Tom Gill being involved
               who was the Lieutenant Governor?

SALINGER:      Yeah.  Tom Gill, who I knew well, was the
               Lieutenant Governor out there.  But we were never
               able really to do it there.  Now they were able to
do it in Washington with the cooperative move between the
McCarthy. . . .  I was pushing that very strongly at that time,
but I figured there would be no problem because we would emerge
with the leading candidate and pick up that strength as we went
along.

HACKMAN:       Was that ever discussed with Robert Kennedy, I
               mean, how much strength to give the McCarthy
               people in any of the states that you visited?

SALINGER:      I think that was pretty much handled on a state-
               by-state basis and not handled with any overall
               direction.  Now, I think that in both those states
it was pretty much left up to my judgment to see when I got there
what could be accomplished by putting that together.  It didn't
work in Hawaii, but in Washington it was pretty clear that that
movement was already moving very strongly and that to have been
against that would have been a terrible mistake in Washington.

HACKMAN:       How well was [James] Whittaker doing in
               Washington?  Here's an example of a friend who
               doesn't have much political experience.

SALINGER:      But he was doing damn well.  He had managed to get
               some fellows out in front who had a lot of
               political experience.  I remember a bright young
lawyer was handling the thing and was damn good.  The fact is
that after Bob was killed, I went back to Washington for [George
S.] McGovern and was able to almost pick up that entire group of
people as McGovern supporters.

HACKMAN:       When and how did you first get into Oregon?

SALINGER:      I went to Oregon the day after Nebraska.

HACKMAN:       Yeah.  For the last part, right.

SALINGER:      No, I didn't do exactly that.  I went to
               Washington for a day, I guess, or two days to look
               at the office and then went out to Oregon.  That
was the same trip where I took the money out.  I went to
Washington on that trip.  When I got to Oregon I really., . . . 
I mean the first twenty-four hours in Oregon I really had the
sense that we were down the tubes in Oregon.  It was very
depressing, to arrive in Oregon.  The thing was that nobody could
figure out anything to do to change it because if you were going
to carry on the central theme of Bob's campaign which had to do
with poverty and blacks and people, this subject was absolutely
falling on dead ears in Oregon.  They couldn't care less.  I mean
the black ghetto in Portland was maybe five city blocks or
something.  It just was not a ringing issue.  Second, the
McCarthy people had a tremendous confidence.  I saw a lot of the
McCarthy people while I was in Oregon.  They used to come over to
the Benson [Hotel] and drink at night.  We'd sit in the bar and
have a couple of drinks.  In fact, I made a lot of bets with the
McCarthy people, lost money to them.

Then the debate thing was definitely having an impact across the
state.  We kept trying to tell Bob and everybody that people were
really reacting to it.

HACKMAN:       Was he primarily opposed to it or were there
               strong feelings on the part of other people?

SALINGER:      Dutton was very strongly opposed to it.  Frank
               Mankiewicz, I don't think, was for it much.   As I
               recall, vanden Heuvel was ambivalent on the
subject.  Really the only people that were for it were Walinsky
and [Jeff] Greenfield, and they were kind of irritating Bob at
that time so he was paying less attention to them than he
normally might have.  So he didn't do it.  He had an opportunity
to do it the Saturday night before the primary, which would have
been very good.

The Oregon primary, incidentally, was one of the places. . . . 
You know about the Drew Pearson story about the Oregon primary,
about my paying barmaids money to spy on the McCarthy people? 
Have you heard about that?  Well, it deserves to be mentioned
because it's part of the. . . .  Drew Pearson, of course, had
made a big thing about Martin Luther King wiretaps.

HACKMAN:       Right, right.

SALINGER:      And that was something I got into extensively
               involved personally.  They turned over all the
               documents to me from the Justice Department so
that we could intelligently talk to the press about the situation
without lying to them about it.  About three days after the
Oregon primary in California, McCarthy gave a speech at the
Ambassador Hotel in which he charged that I had bribed barmaids
in the Benson Hotel in Portland to spy on his campaign and it was
another evidence of the kind of a fascist mind of Robert Kennedy
that I would be involved in this kind of activity.  I mean it was
the most outrageous, goddamn thing.  I sent him a telegram
demanding a retraction, and less than twenty-four hours later I
got a call from [Benjamin C.] Ben Bradlee saying that Pearson was
in with a detailed column on the subject that was for release on
Thursday, two days after the California primary. 

I had the column sent to me.   The source of the column was
Senator [Mark O.] Hatfield of Oregon.  So I called Senator
Hatfield and I said that was the most outrageous, goddamn thing
I'd ever seen, did he have any personal knowledge?  On what was
he basing his things.  Then he said he had good information.  I
said, "I'm going to sue Drew Pearson, and I'm going to sue you,
too"  I've scratched Hatfield off my books forever as a result of
that conversation.  I never heard a guy that was more. . . .  He
had some kind of a game going with McCarthy; I don't know what it
was.  His press guy was around a hell of a lot during the Oregon
primary, a fellow named Travis Cross, who was kind of active
around there.  I never quite could figure out what he was doing,
but I'm sure he's the source of this story and the basis on which
it was made.

So then [Herbert J., Jr.] Herb Miller--I retain Herb Miller as my
lawyer--we sent telegrams to Drew Pearson.  Then of course, Bob
was killed and the column was pulled.  I mean, I'll never know
whether the column was pulled because Bob was killed or because
Pearson was critically worried about it.

HACKMAN:       What can you remember on the King wiretap story
               regarding your discussion with Robert Kennedy and
               the people around him?  Were there contacts with
 Burke Marshall and Herb Miller and whoever else?

SALINGER:      Well, somewhere in my file I have all those
               documents; I'll have to look at those documents to
               refresh my memory.

HACKMAN:       These are things that came from where?

SALINGER:      These are things that came out of the Attorney
               General's Office.

HACKMAN:       But he had had them before?

SALINGER: 
.