Subject: TUM Date: 11 Oct 1999 04:56:41 GMT From: psacom@aol.com (PSAcom) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: alt.assassination.jfk TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1975. Testimony of William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Committee met at 10 A.M. in the Russell Building. Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado Baker, Goldwater, Mathias, and Schweiker. Also present: William G. Miller, staff director, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, chief counsel, Curtis Smothers and Paul Michel, Committee staff members. Chairman Church: The particular case under examination today involves the illegal possession of deadly biological poisons which were retained within the CIA for five years after their destruction was ordered by the President. . . . The main questions before the Committee are why the poisons were developed in such quantities in the first place: why the Presidential order was disobeyed; and why such a serious act of insubordination could remain undetected for so many years. William Colby: The specific subject today concerns the CIA's involvement in the development of bacteriological warfare materials with the Army's Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick, CIA's retention of an amount of shellfish toxin, and CIA's use and investigation of various chemicals and drugs. . . . Information provided by him [a CIA officer not directly associated with the project] and by two other officers aware of the project indicated that the project at Fort Detrick involved the development of bacteriological warfare agents--some lethal--and *associated delivery systems suitable for clandestine use* [emphasis added]. The CIA relationship with the Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick was formally established in May 1952. The need for such capabilities was tied to earlier Office of Strategic Services World War II experience, which included the development of two different types of agent suicide pills to be used in the event of capture and a successful operation using biological warfare materials to incapacitate a Nazi leader temporarily. The primary Agency interest was in the development of dissemination devices to be used with standard chemicals off the shelf. Various dissemination devices such as a fountain pen dart launcher appeared to be peculiarly suited for clandestine use. . . . A large amount of Agency attention was given to the problem of incapacitating guard dogs. Though most of the dart launchers were developed for the Army, the Agency did request the development of a small, hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs for this purpose. Work was also done on temporary human incapacitation techniques. These related to a desire to incapacitate captives before they could render themselves incapable of talking, or terrorists before they could take retaliatory action. [Or to prevent guard dogs from barking.] One such operation involved the penetration of a facility abroad for intelligence collection. The compound was guarded by watchdogs which made entry difficult even when it was empty. Darts were delivered for the operation, but were not used. Church: Have you brought with you some of those devices which would have enabled the CIA to use this poison for killing people? Colby: We have indeed. Church: Does this pistol fire the dart? Colby: Yes it does, Mr. Chairman. The round thing at the top is obviously the sight; the rest of it is what is practically a normal .45, although it is a special. However, it works by electricity. There is a battery in the handle, and it fires a small dart. [Self-propelled, like a rocket.] Church: So that when it fires, it fires silently? Colby: Almost silently; yes. Church: What range does it have? Colby: One hundred meters, I believe; about 100 yards, 100 meters. Church: About 100 meters range? Colby: Yes. Church: And the dart itself, when it strikes the target, does the target know that he has been hit and [is] about to die? Colby: That depends, Mr. Chairman, on the particular dart used. There are different kinds of these flechettes that were used in various weapons systems, and a special one was developed which potentially would be able to enter the target without perception. Church: Is it not true, too, that the effort not only involved designing a gun that could strike at a human target without knowledge of the person who had been struck, but also the toxin itself would not appear in the autopsy? Colby: Well there was an attempt-- Church: Or the dart? Colby: Yes; so there was no way of perceiving that the target was hit. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1975. Richard Helms' testimony: Huddleston: Mr. Helms, you said you were surprised, or that you had never seen the dart gun that was displayed here yesterday. Would you be surprised or shocked to learn that that gun, or one like it, had been used by agents against either watchdogs or human beings? Helms: I would be surprised if it had been used against human beings, but I'm not surprised it would have been used against watchdogs. I believe there were various experiments conducted in an effort to find out how one could either tranquilize or kill guard dogs in foreign countries. That does not surprise me at all. Huddleston: Do you know whether or not it was used, in fact, against watchdogs? Helms: I believe there were experiments conducted against dogs. Whether it was ever used in a live operational situation against dogs, I do not recall. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1975. Testimony of Charles A. Senseney: Senseney: I worked in the Biological Warfare Section of Fort Detrick from 1953. . . . I was the project engineer of the M-1 dart launcher and following on microorganism projectiles and so forth. Smothers: Is this a device that looks roughly like a .45 caliber pistol with a sight mount at the top? Senseney: This was a follow-on. It was to replace the M-1 projectile to go into the Army stockpile. It did look like a .45. Smothers: Did the CIA have, Mr. Senseney, the wherewithal to utilize this dart launcher against humans? Senseney: No, they asked for a modification to use against a dog. Now, these were actually given to them, and they were actually expended, because we got all of the hardware back. For a dog, the projectile had to be made many times bigger. It was almost the size of a .22 cartridge, but it carried a chemical compound known as 46-40. Smothers: And their interest was in dog incapacitation? Senseney: Right Baker: Your principle job with the DOD, I take it, was to develop new or exotic devices and weapons: is that correct? Senseney: I was a project engineer for the E-1, which was type classified and became the M-1. They were done for the Army. Baker: Did you have any other customers? Senseney: To my knowledge, our only customer was Special Forces and the CIA, I guess. Baker: Special Forces meaning Special Forces of the Army? Senseney: That is correct. Baker: And the FBI? Senseney: The FBI never used anything. Baker: Looking at your previous executive session testimony, apparently you developed for them a fountain pen. What did the fountain pen do? Senseney: The fountain pen was a variation of an M-1. An M-1 in itself was a system, and it could be fired *from anything* [emphasis added]. It could be put into-- Baker: Could it fire a dart or an aerosol or what? Senseney: It was a dart. Baker: It fired a dart . . . a starter, were you talking about a fluorescent light starter? Senseney: That is correct. Baker: What did it do? Senseney: It put out an aerosol in the room when you put the switch on. Baker: What about a cane, a walking cane? Senseney: Yes, an M-1 projectile could be fired from a cane; also an umbrella. Baker: Also an umbrella. What about a straight pin? Senseney: Straight pin? Baker: Yes, sir. Senseney: We made a straight pin, out at the Branch. I did not make it, but I know it was made, and it was used by one Mr. Powers on his U-2 mission. Huddleston: Were there frequent transfers of material between Dr. Gordon's [a researcher at Fort Detrick] office and your office, either the hardware or the toxin? Senseney: The only frequent thing that changed hands was the dog projectile and its loaders 46-40. This was done maybe five or six in one quantity. And maybe six weeks to six months later, they would bring those back and ask for five or six more. They would bring them back expended, that is, they bring all of the hardware except the projectile, okay? Huddleston: Indicating that they have been used? Senseney: Correct. Huddleston: But it could have been used on a human being? Senseney: There is no reason why it could not, I guess. Schweiker: Mr. Senseney, I would like to read into the record [from a CIA document] at this point a quote from paragraph nine [exhibit 6, document 67]: "When funds permit, adaptation and testing will be conducted of a new, highly effective disseminating system which has been demonstrated to be capable of introducing materials through light clothing, subcutaneously, intramuscularly, and silently, without pain." Now, I just have a little trouble, Mr. Senseney, reconciling your answers in conjunction with this project, when the CIA document makes clear that one of the very specific purposes of the funding and the operation was to find a weapon that could penetrate light clothing subcutaneously, which obviously means through the skin, and intramuscularly, which obviously means through the muscles of a person. And are you saying that you have absolutely no recollection at all that tests or programs were designed to use any of these devices to permeate clothing on people and not dogs? Senseney: We put them on mannequins. Schweiker: What's that? Senseney: We put clothing on mannequins to see whether we could penetrate it. These were the requirements. You almost read the exact requirements that the SDR quoted from the Special Forces there. Schweiker: I would not expect you to test them on live human beings. I would hope that you did use mannequins, Mr. Senseney. Wouldn't that be directed toward people-usage, though? That is the point we're trying to establish. Senseney: That is what the Special Forces direction was. You have to look at it this way. The Army program wanted this device. That is the only thing that was delivered to them. It was a spin-off, of course, from the M-1. The M- 1 was a lethal weapon, meant to kill a person, for the Army. It was to be used in Vietnam. It never got there, because we were not fast enough getting it into the logistics system. Schweiker: What was the most-utilized device of the ones with which you worked and supervised? Senseney: The only thing I know that was really used was the dog projectile. The other things were in the stockpiles. I don't think anyone ever requested them. Schweiker: How do you know for certain it was for dogs? Senseney: Well that is what they asked us to test them against. They wanted to see whether they could put a dog to sleep, and whether sometime later the dog would come back and be on its own and look normal. Schweiker: Of the devices that came through you, which of these were utilized in any capacity other than for testing? Senseney: That was the only one that I know of--the dog projectile. I call it a dog projectile. We were developing it because the scenario read that they wanted to be able to make entrance into an area which was patrolled by dogs, leave, the dog come back, and then no one would ever know they were in the area. So that was the reason for the dog projectile. Church: Thank you Senator Schweiker. I think it is clear that the CIA was interested in the development of a delivery system that could reach human beings, since not many dogs wear clothing. And you would agree with that, wouldn't you? Senseney: Yes. Church: Okay. Schwarz: Along the same line, I assume you must agree that spending money in order to make darts of such a character that they cannot be detected in an autopsy does not have much to do with dogs? Senseney: No, that would not have anything to do with dogs. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY: In 1960, the CIA purchased from the Army at Fort Detrick, Maryland a poison-dart weapon system, consisting of small flechette-type projectiles, self-propelled by solid-state rocket fuel, and launched by a series of devices, including umbrellas. The flechettes were about 5mm in diameter and about an inch long. The poisons carried were of two types. One was a lethal poison, apparently used against enemies in Vietnam. The other was a quick-acting, paralyzing poison that took effect in less than two seconds and lasted for several hours. This was intended for use against dogs guarding a secured enemy area. It had to cause paralysis fast enough to prevent the dog from barking. The flechette completely dissolved in the body, leaving no trace, so that enemy agents would not be suspicious. The dogs recovered after several hours and behaved as though nothing had happened. The launching devices did not have to be very accurately aimed and fired, because the weapon was designed for close range. The flechette could hit any part of the body of a dog or human and still cause complete paralysis. The solid-state fuel was ignited by completing an electrical circuit. The umbrella used a battery-powered circuit. The battery and trigger button were located in the handle of the umbrella. Wires running up the shaft connected the button and battery to the igniter, which was mounted on the shaft. The trigger button activated the igniter, firing the solid propellant, which sent the flechette through the rocket launcher--a straw-sized metal tube--to its target.