OTEPKA.TXTWDBNMSWD6@@Det7#$(;4'......(.0b0b0b0b 0l 0v0v0x.V 1 1"1*1k.11<114Q\111111Sylwester -- Otepka -- Page 1 Mike Sylwester 710-B Caroline Street Fredericksburg, Virginia 22401-5904 (703) 373-9807 December 23, 1993 The Ordeal of Otto Otepka One of the possible motives for the assassination of President Kennedy was the so-called Ordeal of Otto Otepka. This affair was described in a book by that name, written by William J. Gill (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1969). Otepka was the Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Security (SY) and had worked in that office since 1953. During the following years, Otepka and his first boss, Scott McLeod, had identified 258 cases of State Department employees about whom there was serious evidence of Communist affiliations. This became known as the McLeod List. About 150 of the officials on the list had high-level postions that could influence foreign policy. In December 1960, when President-elect Kennedy was trying to appoint Walt Rostow as Special Assistant on National Security, Otepka resisted the pressure to immediately grant Rostow a security clearance. Otepka was called in to explain the reasons to Robert Kennedy. Otepka began to list some of the problems: Rostow's father had been a Socialist Revolutionary in Russia before immigrating to the United States. Two of his aunts, with whom he was close, were Communists. He had long been associated with other Communist Party members, some of whom had been identified as active Soviet espionage agents. The CIA and Air Force had also previously denied Rostow clearances. As soon as John Kennedy was inaugurated, one of his first acts was to appoint two leftists, William Wieland and Clayton Miller, to reorganize the State Department's Office of Security. At this point, Wieland's own security clearance had been suspended for more than a year. The new State Department leadership also demoted Otepka for supposedly spending too much time on evaluations of security clearances, particularly the clearance of Wieland. (ibid, ch 11) During the first 14 months of the new administration, Secretary of State Dean Rusk signed 152 security clearance waivers, compared to five such waivers that had been signed during the entire eight years of the Eisenhower administration. Some of these waivers were improperly backdated to create the impression they were issued after the background investigations had been completed. In addition, more than 600 low-level clerical employees were hired on "blanket waivers." During most of 1961, the State Department leadership kept Otepka out of SY by assigning him to a "special project" that involved evaluation of whether defectors were genuine. When he returned to SY in March 1962, he began to analyze the cases of 152 new State Department officials who had received emergency security clearances. He found that 44 of the clearances had been backdated, as much as 135 days. In other words, these employees had worked that long without even "emergency" clearances. On April 12, he was called to testify before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Unknown to Otepka, his testimony blatantly contradicted the testimony that his boss, William Boswell, had provided several weeks earlier about the situation. On April 16, Boswell was replaced by a new official named John Francis Reilly, who was transferred from the Federal Communications Commission. Reilly had been selected for the new position by Robert Kennedy, with instructions to get rid of Otepka. On May 7, Reilly nominated Otepka for a ten-month course of study at the National War College. Otepka initially accepted the nomination, but when he discovered that he would not return to his security position after graduating, he withdrew his acceptance. After that gambit failed, Reilly tried to surround Otepka with new assistants who were supposed to control Otepka. For example, David Belisle, who had been in charge of personnel security at the National Security Agency, was transferred to the State Department and introduced several simplified procedures to speed up the clearance process. One example was a "short form report" that eliminated a lot of background questions that applicants had to answer. In the following months, Otepka fought against what he considered blatant abuses. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee became involved in this controversy and published a report about it in October 1962. This report coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis, so the report made a point of insinuating that perhaps the reason the State Department had not provided timely warning of Soviet intentions was because of leftists in the organization. The prime example was William Arthur Wieland, a specialist on Cuba who had a leftist background and who was considered to be a Castro apologist. The report recommended that Otepka be returned to his previous position, and it was signed by all nine subcommittee members -- five Democrats and four Republicans. In the following months, SY reevaluated Wieland's security clearance, leading to increasingly angry internal disagreements. SY chief Reilly assigned the case to a new employee named Robert McCarthy. Otepka considered McCarthy an incompetent who owed his job to political connections to the "Massachusettes Mafia." Otepka gradually came to believe McCarthy was just sitting on the case. Step by step, Reilly marginalized Otepka in the office. In March 1963, the State Department leadership ordered its electronics expert, Elmer Dewey Hill, to place a wiretap on Otepka's office phone, and Otepka quickly noticed various indications of this fact. In addition, discarded papers were secretly retrieved from Otepka's burn bags, and his office safe was secretly drilled open and searched. Hill himself was a real wild card in the State Department. He had been hired in January 1962 to maintain security of electronic devices at the embassies. He looked like a beatnik, with a shaved head and whispy beard. He would come to work wearing jeans and sneakers without socks. On his trips abroad, he repeatedly became obnoxiously drunk, insulting diplomats, their families, and local nationals. Although many State Department officials denounced him, he was promoted to head the Department's electronic security office. On April 25, 1963, Reilly was called before the Senate subcommittee to testify for several days about the Wieland case and office's problems. Reilly explained the Wieland case was delayed because of slow coordination with the Justice Department . Reilly also remarked that Otepka was "unbalanced." In general, Reilly testified in an evasive and dishonest manner. On June 27, 1963, the State Department transferred Otepka completely out of the Office of Security and gave him a meaningless job "preparing guidelines for evaluators and developing recommendations ... relative to updating and reviewing the Office of Security handbook." He was denied further access to his safes, and the combinations were changed. Two other Otepka loyalists were also transferred away at the same time, and four more were transferred in the following weeks. . At the end of July, Otepka learned he was being investigated by the FBI for violation of the Espionage Act. The so-called espionage accusation was that he had leaked documents to the Senate subcommittee that contradicted Reilly's testimony. His formerly colleages were questioned, and his many of them strongly argued that Otepka was actually a hero had tried to prevent Communist infiltration. Starting on August 14, Otepka himself was questioned for three days by two FBI special agents. Otepka made a statement defending his right to inform the Senate of these problems. Of course, the FBI investigation cleared Otepka of espionage. Nevertheless, the State Department formally notified Otepka on September 22 that it was initiating proceedings to fire him. In the following days, several outraged well-wishers in the electronics unit secretly informed Otepka about the continuing wire tap and other snooping. Word spread, and other like-minded State Department employees also began to believe their phones were tapped. Information was leaked to the Senate, and on October 2, the Judiciary Committee wrote an angry memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, demanding that he appear to testify about the Otepka case, security clearances, and wire tapping. Rusk refused. On October 31, the Internal Security subcommittee also requested Rusk's testimony, and he refused again. On November 5, 1963, the State Department formally notified Otepka that the proceedings to fire him were complete, so he was fired, but he had ten days to appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Senator Thomas Dodd began to make angry speeches about the case on the Senate floor, also revealing that Otepka and his loyalists in the State Department were being wire-tapped. The affair became known throughout the country, especially in conservative circles. The affair was considered to be compelling proof that the Kennedy administration was allowing Communism to spread, illegally persecuting conservative heroes, and establishing a police state. Accusa-tions of wire tapping spread. Angry editorials and columns were published. On November 18, Rusk informed the Senate subcommittee that Reilly and Hill had "resigned" from the State Department because of the controversy. Nevertheless, Dodd made another speech on the Senate floor the next day, announcing that "I am certain that when the facts are made public," Dodd said, "they will shock every member of the Congress and every American citizen, as they have already shocked members of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security." Otepka's appeal dragged on through the entire Johnson administration. On March 19, 1969, the new president, Richard Nixon, appointed Otepka to the Subversive Activities Control Board. The Senate subsequently approved the appointment, and Otepka was thereby vindicated. [end] u Written by [title]   x x 5 5 5 x x x^^^^^^^^^^#^9KK x^^^KKKKKKKKKK^^ x x x x 5 xK x x 5 5 x x b^^K^KKK^K K^K 5KK x x x x 5 xKKKKKKKKKKK(;(>(?(@(B(D(F(H(J(L(N(P(R(T(V(X(Z(\(^(`(b(d(f(j(l(v(w( @ /Ejy~$ ?! "u#:%W'#(4(5(;(?(@(A(B(C(D(E(F(G(H(I(J(K(L(M(N(O(P(Q(R(S(T(U(V(W(X(Y(Z([(\(](^(_(`(a(b(c(d(e(f(g(h(i(j(k(l(w$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ Q '@(;8'P 1VewxyNO [\VWrsbc!T!U""$8$9&&'''$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ ((wHP@R(,, `,-^&'A=/B@P-:DW 3.1 (Serial) ChicagoNew YorkGenevaMonacoPalatinoTimes HelveticaCourierSymbolOldHaroldReeTT'''(#(h wxyMO Z\UWqsac!S!U""$7$9&&''''(l(v(w(>(?(@~(B$(D(F (H (J(L(N(P?(R(T(V(X(Z(\! (^"u(`#:(b%W(d'#(f(5(:\Article ab out Otto OtepkaFor CompuserveMike Sylwester23 December 1993Mike Sylwester