Editorial Note: A word of warning on drawing firm conclusions from one or two documents. It is like trying to describe the make, model, horsepower, engine-type, color, year, etc. of an automobile by examining a single hubcap. It provides clues only. Documents such as those below MUST be examined in broader context. These memos are drawn thousands of documents, all of which provide necessary context and background to what the policy makers were thinking. This is particular true of documents such as NSAMs and Action memoranda, where the policy makers knew they were writing for the record. In the source from which these particular documents were drawn, there are hundreds of other cables, memos, and items which may provide considerably more insight to what was behind these specific statements. Nothing can substitute for reading as much of the available documentary record as possible. ************************ ************************ Summary Record of the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council White House, Washington, October 2, 1963 (1) [Here follows an attendance list.] The President opened the meeting by summarizing where we now stand on U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Most of the officials involved are in agreement. We are not papering over our differences. We are agreed to try to find effective means of changing the political atmosphere in Saigon. We are agreed that we should not cut off all U.S. aid to Vietnam, but are agreed on the necessity of trying to improve the situation in Vietnam by bringing about changes there. Reports of disagreements do not help the war effort in Vietnam and do no good to the government as a whole. We must all sign on and with a good heart set out to implement the actions decided upon. Here and in Saigon we must get ahead by carrying out the agreed policy. Because we are agreed, we should convey our agreement to our subordinates. There are no differences between Washington and Ambassador Lodge or among the State and Defense Departments and the CIA. Ambassador Lodge has full authority to pull into line all U.S. government representatives in Saigon. The President then turned to consideration of the draft public statement (copy attached).(2) He said that attacks on the Diem regime in public statements are less effective than actions which we plan to take. He preferred to base our policy on the harm which Diem's political actions are causing to the effort against the Viet Cong rather than on our moral opposition to the kind of government Diem is running. Mr. Ball said that he and Secretary Rusk felt that there should be a stress on the moral issues involved because of the beneficial effect which such emphasis produced in world public opinion, especially among UN delegates. The President replied that the major problem was with U.S. public opinion and he believed we should stress the harm Diem's policies are doing to the war effort against the Communists. Mr. Bundy said Secretary McNamara and General Taylor wanted to emphasize the objective of winning the war. State Department officials wanted something more than an objective of merely winning the war. Mr. Harriman commented that he was prepared to accept the language as proposed. The President objected to the phrase "by the end of this year" in the sentence "The U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam could be withdrawn." He believed that if we were accused of being over optimistic. Secretary McNamara said he saw great value in this sentence in order to meet the view of Senator Fulbright and others that we are bogged down forever in Vietnam. He said the sentence reveals that we have a withdrawal plan. Furthermore, it commits us to emphasize the training of Vietnamese, which is something we must do in order to replace U.S. personnel with Vietnamese. The draft announcement was changed to make both of the time predictions included in paragraph 3 a part of the McNamara-Taylor report rather than as predictions of the President. Mr. Bundy raised the question as to Ambassador Lodge's view of the proposed draft policy statement. He said Ambassador Lodge could be told that because of the time pressure it had not been possible to clear the statement with him, but that it was felt here it would meet his requirements. The President then asked about the measures which we would take to bring pressure on Diem. Secretary McNamara replied that a working group would propose recommendations for the President's decision at a later date. The President directed that no one discuss with the press any measures which he may decide to undertake on the basis of the recommendations to be made to him. He said we should not talk about such measures until they are agreed. The selected cuts in U.S. assistance should be discussed only in the Cabinet Room until all of them were finally agreed upon. Mr. Salinger said he would decline to answer any press questions about what measures the U.S. proposed to take. In response to a question by Administrator Bell, the President said he should reply to inquiring Congressmen that we are continuing our present aid schedule. After a further exchange, the President made clear that what he thought we should tell the Congressmen should be limited to saying that aid which we are now extending would be continued. He recognized that aid we are now extending is not that [sic] we had been extending prior to the August disturbances. Secretary McNamara felt that Mr. Bell should say nothing. The group would return to the President by Friday(3) with specific recommendations. ****************** (1). Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meeting No. 519. Top Secret. This meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and lasted until 6:30 p.m., according to the President's Log. (2). Not attached, see infra. (3). October 4. ********************* ********************* Record of Action No. 2475; Taken at the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 2, 1963.(1) McNAMARA-TAYLOR REPORT ON VIETNAM(2) a. Endorsed the basic presentation on Vietnam made by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor. b. Noted the President's approval of the following statement of U.S. policy which was later released to the press:(3) "1. The security of South Viet Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet Nam to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet Nam. 2. The military program in South Viet Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvement are being energetically sought. 3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet Nam are capable of suppressing it. "Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgement that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet Nam can be withdrawn. ******************* (1) Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meetings. Secret. (2)Document 167 (FRUS, Vietnam 1961-63, Vol IV). (3) Printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John E Kennedy, 1963, pp 759-760. McGeorge Bundy sent Lodge the following telegram explaining this statement: "Statement issued after NSC meeting today represents President's own judgment of common purpose and policy established by you and McNamara mission and is designed to strengthen your hand in next phase. "Urgency of immediate public proof of unity here prevented prior reference to you but President asked me to insure that if you need any adjustment or modification you let us know." (CAP 63556, October 3; Kennedy Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country Series, State Cables) Lodge responded in telegram 624 from Saigon: "The statement is excellent in substance and well-tempered in tone. I am proud to be associated with it." (Ibid.)