A CRITIQUE OF "OSWALD AN THE CIA," a book by John M. Newman, PhD in History, assistant professor of history at U. of MD, and retired major, MI, USA, with 21 claimed years of service in intelligence. This is only a partial critique focussing on his chapter tryimg to tie Oswald to the U-2. As I have time, I will add to it. Written by Ed Dolan, 74030,3022 Comments are welcome. Permission to post elsewhere, or for other use, will be granted on request with the reason for the request. ED In reading Mr. Newman's book he seems to rely on the "credentials" cited above, thus avoiding real analysis as he apparently did little fact checking. On many points the book displays an apparent lack of intelligence knowledge, uses unsupported, and unsupportable material, material contrary to fact, to advance his case. In doing this, he shows a definite lack of scholarship. Perhaps I am naive, but I understand a historian, an academic, and a member of the American Historical Association should be seeking and writing about facts, the truth. In Mr. Newman's book this does not seem to be his goal. I am fascinated that based on a claimed background of twenty years service with Army intelligence he could write the things he has about intelligence, particularly the U-2. His comments do not show a credible intelligence background, in particular about reconnaissance and Soviet S&T activities that occurred as far back as the late 50s and early 60s, much of which has long been declassified. Is it any wonder why he wrote a message to me when I sought to engage him in discussion on a CompuServe forum, to wit: "I have often thought about responding to Dolan's posts but I have explained to all here why that is fruitless?" Yes, it IS fruitless to respond when truth demolishes inventions. There is no defending the indefensible. Before discussing the book, I would note it appears Mr. Newman can be less that truthful. Prior to the October 1994 Coalition on Political Assassinations (COPA) meeting he asserted in a letter on COPA letterhead that at the meeting "[w]e will go back to basics and present a definitive refutation of the Warren Commission single-bullet, single-gunman theory and those who defend it." This assertion that there was more than a "single- gunman" stipulates a conspiracy had to exist. Yet at a 1995 book signing by Mr. Newman at a Borders bookstore in Gaithersburg, MD, he stated he was an agnostic on a conspiracy. The two views are mutually exclusive. He either believes or doesn't, but has yet to explain which he really believes and why. Mr. Newman's primary element in trying to tie Oswald to the CIA is Oswald's alleged participation U-2 operations, operations about which I have extensive personal knowledge because of my association in CIA with U.S. reconnaissance activities. In addition much information, factual not wild guesses, that he could have used but didn't has long been declassified and is in the public domain. What is most disturbing is that any true intelligence officer should be unaware of U-2 capabilities, the open material on the bird, and Oswald's the lack of knowledge of anything of value. Most of what Mr. Newman asserts of Oswald's knowledge is false. An intelligent, educated, thinking person even without access to classified material should see that. Ignoring the facts, Mr. Newman dedicates a whole chapter, entitled "Top Secret Eider Chess," on Oswald's service at the Atsugi, Japan, Naval Air Station (NAS) where a CIA U-2 unit was based from mid-1957 to mid-1960 as he tries to show CIA should have been concerned what Oswald could reveal about the U-2 to the Soviets after his defection. In sum, Mr. Newman speculates on Oswald's supposed knowledge of U-2 operations in the Far East to show his defection should have either triggered an in-depth investigation or, if it didn't, would indicate he was in the USSR under some CIA guidance. This is false and the latter point is also stupid. Mr. Newman lays the ground work in his first chapter for using the U-2 issue. (I will come back later to comment on Mr. Newman's introduction in which he reaches a questionable conclusion with no support.) In this chapter, Mr. Newman writes: "[FSO Richard] Snyder later theorized that what Oswald may have had in mind by using the words `something of special interest' was the supersecret American U-2 spy plane based at Atsugi." How much later? 1994. Basis? None given. But it implies Mr. Snyder was a mind reader some 35 years after the fact as the U-2 was NEVER mentioned by Oswald to anyone in American Embassy in Moscow. The assertion of the U-2 being "supersecret" is built on by Mr. Newman in chapter three as he writes on page 30: "The U-2 program was TOP SECRET and more, but it was no secret to the Marines in Oswald's unit." This is in part false as experienced, competent intelligence officers have known for many years. Such an officer knows once a large piece of equipment is deployed where the public, especially foreigners, can observe it, it is no long secret. This is very true with aircraft like the U-2, large and of an unusual configuration. There were secrets involved in the U-2 and its operations - the camera (lost when it was shot done), the specific targets for which photo coverage was sought, the course, date, and time of a mission (lost when flown), and the success of a mission that came from evaluating the photography. The U-2 was long known to military in England where RAF pilots were trained to fly it with one crashing on their base, and to British civilians on and off base who could see it. There were flights from Germany and one crashed off base there. It was observed in Turkey flying from the primary U-2 base at Incirlik, a base on which Turkish civilians worked; at Atsugi where it could be easily seen by all Marines on the base as Mr. Newman would have known if he had done real research, and by the Japanese who worked on base and living and working around it; at the Cubi Point Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines where Marine, Navy, and Air Force personnel saw it along with the Filipinos who worked on the bases, and lived or worked around them; and finally the Chinese National Air Force on Taipei where some of its personnel were trained to fly it and did so over the People's Republic of China (PRC). As to what Oswald could divulge to the Soviets that would be useful, Mr. Newman only speculates, wildly. In the spring of 1973 (before Mr.Newman entered the Army, and more than 20 years before his book was published) a CIA officer wrote for CIA's "Studies in Intelligence: "The U-2 program was carried out in secret from 1956 to May 1960. Its existence was NO SECRET TO THE SOVIETS [my emphasis], of course, but they chose to let it remain a secret to the general public (and to most of the official community) rather than publicize it and thereby admit they lacked the means of defending their air space against the high-flying U- 2." 1956 was one year before Oswald arrived at Atsugi. Some "supersecret" or "TOP SECRET and more" aircraft. The U.S. also kept it secret to avoid have to answer public questions of what it was doing with the plane. I will digress briefly here to note the following statement inre the U-2 by Mr. Newman on page 161 in Chapter 10. "[Petr] Popov had indicated in April 1958 that there was a leak in this top secret spy plane program. Popov's reporting indicated that a Soviet colonel, apparently in a drunken boast, had said the KGB had learned the technical details about a new high-altitude spy plane overflying the Soviet Union. Such details had been so tightly held that the leak might have come from a highly placed mole, and the CIA could not be sure whether the Soviets knew enough about the aircraft's cruising altitude to shoot it down with a missile." Mr. Newman uses an unverified secondary source, the book "Wedge," for this false assertion. The previous CIA officer's article from "Studies in Intelligence" makes clear no leak was needed as some, but not most, Soviet officials knew about the flights. In fact the officer wrote in the same article, remember this was over 20 years before Mr. Newman's book was published: "As it turned out, the United States had underestimated the Soviet radars, which promptly acquired and continuously tracked the very first U-2 flight over Soviet territory." In other words, if there was a suspected mole in the CIA it did not involve the U-2. The leak was not in CIA, but in the USSR and the agency's counter- intelligence staff would know it. There's more on this matter as a former CIA colleague of mine who was deputy director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, Dino Brugioni, wrote in his book "Eyeball to Eyeball," published in 1991 and cleared by CIA. This was a time Mr. Newman says he was a serving as an Army intelligence officer. Although about the Cuban Missile Crisis, Dino touches on U-2 operations over the USSR. In his book Dino wrote: "There are a number of references in books on Powers U-2 flight and the Kennedy assassination to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald provided Russians with data on the U-2 that was subsequently used in downing Gary Powers U-2. (N.B. Historian and retired Army intelligence officer John M. Newman unqualifiedly asserts, p. 46: "Powers did not fly out of Atsugi. The only link between Atsugi and the shootdown of Powers was Lee Harvey Oswald." In other words NEWMAN KNOWS FOR CERTAIN IT WAS THE ONLY LINK, if there ever was one. Mr. Newman does not make any attempt to show a link existed. For Mr. Newman to show otherwise would destroy part of his theory about Oswald and the U-2.) Most of these accounts focus on the fact that in 1957, Oswald, then a seventeen-year old U.S. Marine Corps private, was assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station, about twenty miles west of Tokyo, as a trained radar operator. During the period Oswald was assigned at Atsugi, U-2's used the naval air station as a staging base for missions over the Soviet Union. Oswald returned to the U,S., and on October 31, 1959, renounced his U.S. citizenship. At the U.S. Embassy on Moscow, he indicated he would tell the Russians everything he knew about U.S. radar operations and something else `of special interest.' [see previous FSO Snyder comment]. The knowledge derived from the radar intercepts--i.e., course, altitude, and speed--is the same whether learned from U.S. or Russian radar operations. The Soviets had certainly begun to compile data on U-2 performance beginning with the first mission over the USSR on July 4, 1956. On subsequent missions, the data was refined so that in a relatively short period the Soviets had an accurate record of U-2 characteristics. The Russians had publicly confirmed the fact they had been tracking and were knowledgeable of U-2 operations. (in addition to using MiG-17s, MiG-19's, and later MiG-21's in zoom-climb intercept techniques, the Russians recently admitted that also tried to use an Su-9 Fishpot fighter stripped of its armor to climb and ram the U-2.) All of these intercept attempts were vectored by ground control stations, so the Russians were well aware of the U-2's altitude, course, and speed." Why wasn't Army intelligence officer Newman aware before he retired in 1995? Historian and retired Army intelligence officer Newman discusses comments by former Marine Lt. John Donovan on being asked about the U-2 by CIA prior to Mr. Newman's attempt to connect Oswald to the downing of Francis Gary Powers. Mr. Newman categorically asserts: "It is not surprising that the CIA was asking questions about the U-2 in 1963--no more surprising than was their decision to close down U-2 operations at Atsugi after Gary Powers was shot down." Ah yes, we know historians want to be factual, to tell the truth, but Dino Brugioni wrote in his book: "[President] Eisenhower informed officials [after the Powers shoot down] that U-2 flights would be discontinued and gave two reasons: 1) the utility of the U-2 was limited because of the new Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles; and 2) considerable progress was now being made in the developmental program of photographing the earth from space." Recall Dino's book came out in 1991, four years before Mr. Newman's, while the latter was still an active participant in Army intelligence. In the words of Mr. Newman's chapter four title "I am Amazed." Now back to specifics in chapter three. Mr. Newman begins it on page 29 by quoting Marine Sam Berry saying: "We would track [with height-finding radars] the U-2, sometimes up to 100,000 feet." He has another Marine, Donald Athey, saying U-2 pilots "would check in with us at 60,000 feet and the check out at 80,000 and kept climbing." The notes for the chapter show these statements were given in 1994. Both statements are false as the U-2's ceiling, its maximum altitude, was 70,000 feet at which it became unstable in flight as an experienced, competent intelligence officer could quickly learn. There are a number of unclassified publications on U-2 performance, one highly regarded is entitled "American Spyplanes" in the Osprey Combat Aircraft Series published in Great Britain. I asked Mr. Newman at the earlier mentioned book signing why he included these untrue, and unsupportable, statements. Incredibly, he responded with that was what they said. Is that all he needed? Mr. Newman includes these statements without comment thus giving them his cachet. To me the questions are if they are false why did he include them in the book, or if our former Army intelligence officer thought it necessary to include them why didn't he state they were false and provide the facts on the bird? Continuing with Mr. Newman's focus on Oswald's Marine Corps duty at bases from whence the U-2 flew: Oswald's presumed association with the plane is the sole basis for Mr. Newman, when associated with his defection in Moscow in October 1959, to charge CIA was, or should have been, interested in him after the defection. It is from this base he builds his flimsy story, a veritable house of cards, by twisting and distorting evidence to advance his goal. With his analysis in this chapter so distorted and essentially false, how should the rest of Mr. Newman tale be evaluated? Moving on in chapter three, on page 30, Mr. Newman claims with no evidence: "The ballistic missile information these dark planes from Atsugi collected as they overflew the Communist giant was vital intelligence for U.S. estimates of the Soviet Union's ability to wage nuclear war." This he attributes to a Richard C. Thornton, another secondary, unvalidated source.. The statement is untrue but by including it without providing a basis other than a secondary reference Mr. Newman is assuring the reader it is to be believed. Yet, Atsugi flights provided no VITAL intelligence on the USSR's ability to wage nuclear war as alert intelligence officers knew, or even an Asian scholar without access to classified information could determine. There were no Soviet ICBM deployments, much less in the far east while the U-2 flew. It wasn't until mid-1961, long after Oswald left Atsugi, that even deployment of SS-4/SS-5 missiles (MR/IRBMS) were confirmed in the far east by satellite photography. On page 31, Mr.Newman, after noting Detachment C was the CIA U-2 operation at Atsugi that air control radar operator Oswald could view, asks: "What did he know that could betray what the Americans had learned through [TOP SECRET] EIDER CHESS intelligence channels?" by citing a report from CIA's Deputy Director of Science and Technology to the House Special Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) on U-2 activities. The answer is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING. Mr. Newman uses this to develop further the fallacy that CIA should have been concerned about the defection. But apparently Mr. Newman was not high enough in the food chain in Army intelligence to know the facts. If he were he wouldn't have asked such an asinine question. It is an absolute fact Oswald had no access to any top secret material, especially Top Secret Eider Chess material, as he was not cleared for anything and, according to the Marine Corps, probably never had access to anything above confidential. In an another attempt to advance his fallacy the learned Mr. Newman devotes an entire section in which he uses hearsay, uncorroborated comments, rumors heard by various minor players at Atsugi, and to which he adds inconsequential information mainly from interviews with former Marine Donovan of events that occurred 36 years previously. Perhaps some information on the Atsugi installation should be noted here. It had been an Air Force base during the Korean War and allegedly used by CIA to train infiltrators into North Korea and the PRC. With the 1953 truce these operations ceased with the base being turned over to the Navy. As Marine units withdrew from Korea some were assigned to Atsugi. Among them were the headquarters and an air group, of which Oswald's squadron was an element, from the First Marine Air Wing, and elements of the 3d Marine Division, including one regiment. Among these comments and rumors are: (a) Donovan telling Newman that while at Cubi ". . . Oswald's unit had an additional duty with a direct connection to the U-2: sentry duty to guard the U-2 hangar" (p. 32). This is meaningless. Military sentries usually stand duty shifts of 4 hours on and 8 off, thus there were at least two other Marines who pulled guard duty along with Oswald. If more than one was on duty at a time guarding the hangar, it would not be a surprise if there were, the number of sentries per watch would be at least six. Sentry duty would not give access to secrets. (It should be noted that Oswald was not at Cubi every time the U-2 was there.) (b) this same Donovan commenting in 1994 that Oswald noted the U-2 from Cubi was moving over China, which Mr. Newman writes confirms the gossip overheard by a Navy corpsman (p. 32). Other Marines knew this, or believed it as well. At least one with whom I have spoken said those at Cubi believed the U-2 left Atsugi, flew over China, and landed at Cubi. It returned to Atsugi the next day. If Mr. Newman had really done his research he would have known information on China flights was publicized no later than 1991. Anyway the PRC knew it as several had gone down in China well before the JFK assassination as noted by Secretary Rusk in August 1962 when CIA sought permission for U-2 flights OVER Cuba. . Donovan further told Mr. Newman that Oswald, while on Taiwan, spent many hours drawing traces of U-2 tracks over Communist China (p. 33). This is a prize example of misleading information by Mr. Newman. There were flights from Taiwan over Quemoy and Matsu during a crisis. The president authorized flights over the area for information on the ChiCom forces. These flights, insofar as they were not deep penetration flights, could readily be tracked on radar from Taiwan. Deep penetration flights over China could not be as they flew out of radar range. This included the flights that left Atsugi and landed in Cubi Point NAS. Mr. Newman ends this section with: "The Soviet ballistic missile testing program [in 1958] had ground to a halt. The president [Eisenhower] knew this, in part, because of the intelligence collected by the very U-2s Oswald was watching. It is reasonable, therefore, to try to determine if the CIA ever investigated what Oswald knew about the U-2 program (p. 33)." The president knew nothing of testing stand down "because of the intelligence collected by the very U-2s Oswald was watching." This statement is untrue as the Far East U-2s collected NOTHING on Soviet missile testing. It has long been known the main missile test sites were located at the Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka Missile Test Center (KYMTC), and Tyura Tam Missile Test Center (TTMTC). KYMTC is on the Volga not far south of then Stalingrad. TTMTC is north and slightly west of Tashkent, neither within easy flying range of Atsugi. Mr. Newman persists in his false reasoning when he writes (p. 39): "By March 1958, ten to 15 ICBM's had been launched to distances up to 3700 miles. Thus, Atsugi was an ideal location from which to launch espionage flights to collect the Far East end--presumably impact areas--of the evidence of these test flights." This is laughable, foolish. When I asked him what would be learned from photos of impact areas, Mr, Newman asserted it would show how close the impact was to the target. No missile intelligence analyst would assert such a stupid claim, nor should any intelligence officer. Accuracy, as any competent intelligence officer knows, is determined by other means -- primarily telemetry and radar. Impact areas tell an analyst NOTHING. Collection methodology was publicly discussed during SALT negotiations of the past 15 or so years as someone concerned with recent Asian history, as Mr. Newman, should surely know. Apparently he was not interested as these were not in his area of interest. One can only guess at what Mr. Newman was thinking when he remarked about impacts near a target. How near does a warhead need to hit if it is thermonuclear? Does he believe when testing long range missiles there is a ground target aimed at? Anyone with any knowledge of ballistic missile testing, ours or that of other countries and this should especially apply to intelligence officers in research as he claims was his specialty, knows much testing of long range ballistic missiles have water impacts. The U.S. has tested ICBMs, and trained missilemen to fire them, from Vandenburg and SLBMs from Point Mugu toward a water area near Kwajalein. The Navy test fires SLBMs from submarines off Florida to a water area near Ascension Island. The USSR tested ICBMs from the Plesetsk MTC, developed after 1960, to a Pacific Ocean area they publicly declared closed during testing. The ChiComs have fired missiles into the Pacific near Taiwan. The USSR's internal ICBM test impact area was on land at the northern end of Kamchatka Peninsula, an area where weather is usually bad (a check by Mr. Newman with NOAA would have brought that out) and where there is almost nothing but tundra and no strategic intelligence targets. It is a very inhospitable area. A U-2 flight to the area, even if launched immediately after a Soviet test launch would have been an utter waste as competent intelligence analysts know. A comment on U-2 flights would be in order here. These planes cannot be launched quickly, on demand. The pilot has to be properly conditioned. They wore space suits like astronauts used to, because of the altitude flown and the low pressure at that altitude, and completely briefed on his route. A flight only to photo a hole in the ground, if there was one not buried in snow, would have been a misuse of a valuable asset. On p. 34, Mr. Newman, after discussing an unsubstantiated investigation alleged to have occurred after Oswald's defection (another matter to be discussed later) writes: "Oswald had worked at three locations in Asia, where one of the most sensitive CIA programs in the world was in progress, and he had traveled directly to the very country against which this supersecret program was targeted. American intelligence methods and the lives of American U-2 pilots were at stake." A gross exaggeration, a distortion, deception. As noted earlier, the program was known immediately TO THE SOVIETS when the first mission flew over their country in 1956 as CIA noted in a 1973 article. A deployed airplane, especially one the size and configuration of the U-2, can't be hidden. It wasn't a "supersecret program" from the Soviets nor from the Chinese who had Soviet air defense radars. A knowledgeable intelligence officer would (should?) be aware of that. It is stupid to aver American intelligence methods and pilots were at stake because of Oswald. How the U-2 pilots lives were at stake, Mr. Newman does not say. They were always at stake from aircraft failure or a shootdown. Oswald could not affect that. It was not true as Oswald had information not available to the Soviets to place any lives at stake. Mr. Newman cannot support this and, of course, does not. Mr. Newman goes on, after questioning if an investigation occurred, to assert if it didn't ". . .it SHOULD [his emphasis] have. The situation called for quick and accurate answers to the questions. Who was Oswald? What did he know? What damage could he do to the program? If such an investigation did not exist, it is reasonable to begin wondering why not." However, Mr. Newman is being totally UNREASONABLE. There was absolutely no reason for CIA to investigate Oswald, NONE. Oswald knew nothing of the use of the U-2, nor the results of any mission, and had no knowledge that could damage the program. Mr. Newman does not show otherwise, and can't, but with his questions tries to make people believe he knows. One point he ignores is that most of the missions flown by the Atsugi based U-2s were not over Soviet territory. Mr. Newman then suggests if the investigation did not occur "one would be justified in asking if there had been some terrible lapse in U.S. counterintelligence" adding from an uncorroborated article (in that well regarded publication of historical material, "Hustler") by the less than accurate lawyer Mark Lane raises the question if the defection "may have been planned" by U.S. intelligence. Never!!! It is intriguing to know Mr. Newman is willing to attach his credibility to that of Lane, whose reputation for truthfulness on the JFK assassination is at best questionable. There isn't the slightest evidence to assert any U.S. intelligence agency, especially CIA, in any way planned his defection. A good intelligence researcher interested in facts would realize this. An American citizen would not be placed in jeopardy in this way. There is no evidence it was ever done. Further on the investigation, Mr. Newman adds on p. 35, again citing from Mark Lane noted for distortions and lying about the assassination, that Lane argues the still unconfirmed, apparently non-existent investigation "was a cover investigation so it could be said there had been an investigation." This is unsubstantiated, without merit, but Newman presents it in his book as absolute fact. If the latter is not Mr. Newman's intent, why was it included except for deception by him? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Before continuing my comments on Mr Newman's book and after the forgoing appeared on the forum, I received questions from a member, Larry Hancock leading to an exchange. It is pertinent to the issue and what follows is the colloquy that resulted: LH> Mr. Dolan, as this was addressed to all I guess you won't mind a couple of questions? No. The more the merrier. LH> You seem to be making a firm case that none of the U2 flights out of Atsugi were targeted for intel about Soviet nuclear capability....primarily because they had no ICBM sites in place in Siberia at that time, at when they did put them in Satellite recon. was the key e.g. "deployment....was confirmed by satellite photography" in mid-61. That is true. LH> I'm curious, was the confirmation done by Discoverer....my understanding was that Samos and Corona were not operational until '62...and that frankly there was not any significant strategic intel from Satellite unitil after that time. That is not true. Discover was the initial part of the CORONA project. The first successful photo flight, Discoverer XIII (a KH-1), was recovered 19 August 1960 after "seven passes over denied territory." This was followed by a second successful mission in the same month (Discoverer XIV). Another successful Discoverer mission occurred in December 1960. In 1961 were two more successful photo mission through August. By then approximately 50% of denied areas had been covered with usable satellite photography. LH> Were U2's not the core of the huge effort to determine if the "missile gap" was real (estimates of 1,500 launchers in '59)....and didn't they scour the TransSiberian route for installations? No. There were many missile launch sites by 1959, but they were in the European USSR and were covered. I have not sent for the declassified estimates of that period, but I believe the 1500 number is the USAF number. They always were on the high side. These missile sites were for the SS-4/5s and were mainly aimed at western Europe. I believe the number came close to a 1,000. These led to U.S. deploying the Thor in the U.K. and the Jupiter in Turkey. The USSR either in 1960 or 1961 deployed some in the Turkmen SSR to cover the Middle East, and near Vladvostok to cover Japan and Korea. The USSR is believed to have produced so many SS-4/5s it led to them being deployed in Cuba in the late summer/fall of 1962. The Soviet ICBM testing program was in its early stages in the late 1950s. The only missile then being tested was the SS-6, a huge bird using non- storable cryogenic liquid fuels. It had to be fueled just before launch. This bird was also the early space booster. There was searching for launch sites near the railroads, mainly from January 1959 to May 1961 well after Oswald had left Atsugi. The main areas being searched were near the European USSR, areas close to production sites to reduce shipping distances. A TOP SECRET CIA report published in July 1960 stated (after Powers and before Discoverer XIII): "In view of the large areas still uncovered [by photography] and the limited number of ICBMs that are likely to be deployed so early in the Soviet program, it is not surprising that none of these sites has been positively identified." The first SS-6s, and the only ones ever deployed, were at Plesetsk and found during on early satellite photography. The ONLY operating missile test pad at Tyura Tam Missile Test Range before 1960 was for the SS-6. A second SS-6 pad was completed during 1960, followed by other pads. This first pad was covered by U-2s from Incirlik from whence most U-2 flights over the USSR were launched. LH> Also, I'd think that ICBM's were not the only measure of Russian nuclear capability...what about bomber bases, sub pens, warhead storage facilities...and test range activity. Other than ICBMs which had yet to be deployed, the capability against the continental U.S. was close to nil in the late 1950s. They had no real intercontinental bomber in the late 50s that could reach the U.S. and return even with air refueling which they have then. This was admitted after Eisenhower won the election in which he raised the "bomber gap." They did have the TU-95 Bear, a turboprop similar to the B-36. It was not believed it could make the U.S. without discovery by our air defenses. Their submarines, and I am only trying to recall, with a nuclear delivery capability during the Eisenhower years could only launch short range (300-500 nm) cruise missiles. They could not be launched without the submarine surfacing and fueling the missile. Carrying them fueled was very hazardous. Test range activity was covered from Incirlik but use for a first strike was ruled out as there was only the one pad, as I noted above. LH> I've found references to Atsugi U2 flights going out to targets like that in Siberia, as well as to the Kamchatka facilities..... You can find all sorts of references but the validity of most, if not all, is questionable. A good, well-qualified, and knowledgeable intelligence officer will know most of the old Soviet Far East was/is a very inhospitable area. The weather is controlled by the Siberian high. There is little to no production facilities in the area. One should also note the Trans-Sib RR in the then Soviet Far East was very close to the PRC border. It was where many camps of the Gulag were located, the populations of which were used for mining. Kamchatka, although somewhat militarized was not heavily defended, had no rail access and, because of the conditions, not a good place for ICBM deployment. The CPSU was trying to have it populated by civilians. Soviet areas of interest in the Far East were near Vladvostok where the Far East Fleet was based, and the Kurile Islands north of Hokaido, taken over from Japan. The most important site east of the Soviet missile test range heads, as I recall, was the uranium hexafloride plant at Angarsk, north of Lake Baikal. I don't recall it being photographed until the KH systems were up and running. LH> I guess my real question is, if the Atsugi U2's weren't doing vitalc nuclear warfare intel (and even if they din't find ICBM sites), what were they doing? The main targets for the Atsugi U-2s were other than the USSR. It was in 1953 that a truce with the North Koreans was signed. Of interest to U.S. leaders was what they would do with combat ended. Also of concern was whether Chinese forces would leave. I would have to look it up as I don't know when they surfaced, but there were Soviet-ChiCom border concerns along the Amur which led to border conflicts. Developments in Indochina after the French pull out and the split between North and South Vietnam raised questions that could be answered by overhead photography. In the midst of all this were the ChiCom threats to Quemoy and Matsu. The People's Republic of China, was a major target for overhead photography as it was very closed. It too was into developing missiles and nuclear weaponry in areas that could be covered by U- 2s, mainly flown by ChiNats from Taiwan. A final comment that any intelligence officer participating in recce knows. The U-2s were not sent off spur-of-the-moment because we had this wonderful aircraft. All missions were carefully planned in Washington to get the most out of each flight. Requirements for coverage were carefully reviewed, then prioritized. Since they were scattered, grouping occurred by a multi-service team to decide on a mission route. Several routes were drawn up because a major factor in launching a flight was weather in the target area. Pictures of clouds are useless. A high probability of clear weather was needed. You may look out your window and say it is a nice day as you see sunshine but there may be 40% cloud cover. Not good enough. I recall one mission being flown after we had a good forecast and the film was 90% clouds. Often we got a clear picture of the target for one frame, but the second frame needed for stereo was clouds. Very frustrating. Another mission for the same targets would not be planned until the results of the first were evaluated. On the U- 2 flights over the USSR one should remember they protested, secretly, after each. Flights were then suspended for a period before the next was flown. Flights took time to get off as the pilot had to be prepped almost like an astronaut. There was no calling to say you will take off in an hour, let's go. Mr. Newman, who has commented on things on CompuServe, never commented. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Now to continue with Mr. Newman's "OSWALD AND THE CIA" chapter three "I am amazed" at his assertion of Oswald apparent ability for recall. Oswald was a high school dropout still 17 when he arrived at Atsugi and only three months past his 19th birthday when he left. Mr. Newman attributes to this individual the ability to retain detailed information on the U-2, its operations, and all activity associated with it for the period from April 1957-December 1958 when he left Atsugi until after October 1959 when he defected to the USSR. The fact is that Atsugi was not important to flights penetrating the USSR that were mostly launched from Europe beginning in May 1956 and continued until May 1960. Oswald knew nothing about the European flights. In addition to the knowledge of the U-2 that Mr. Newman attributes to Oswald, he is also supposed to have retained massive detailed knowledge about all U.S. West Coast military installations, activities, and electronics (including frequencies) learned while stationed at El Toro during 1959 until October, something Mr. Newman attributes to Lt. Donovan. No one has ever suggested this man Oswald, who never rose above private first class, kept a diary during his service. Thus it must be assumed he would have had to rely on memory alone. Those who comment on Oswald's off- duty activities indicate he did a lot of reading in the barracks about matters unrelated to his service activities while also studying Russian, but no one tells of his keeping a diary of any kind. He was dyslexic and would get things wrong. Is anyone else amazed? Oswald's knowledge of West Coast deployments had to be encyclopedic. A 1995 unclassified publication on current West Coast military bases lists four Army in California and one in Washington; for the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard 28 in California and 6 in Washington. The Air Force had 8 in California and 2 in Washington. The are an additional 6 for all services in Alaska. Not included in these totals are those close to the coast in Arizona, Nevada, and Idaho, or those closed since 1959. Again to continue with Mr. Newman's book. On p.35 Mr. Newman asserts: "For our purposes, however, we may proceed by observing that given Oswald's extensive knowledge of U-2 operations in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Soviet could be expected to be interested in him." Mr. Newman never tells who the "our" is in "[f]or our purposes" or the "we" in we may proceed." Is he speaking of himself in the sense of the royal "we" or for all conspiracy buffs? "Our" and "we" are sweeping, all-inclusive terms and certainly do not include me nor many others who served in U.S. intelligence services with and ties to reconnaissance activities as we know Oswald had no extensive, much less worthwhile, knowledge of U-2 operations useful to any hostile intelligence service. Mr. Newman continues by claiming: "Whether we look at Oswald as a `lone nut' or a `fall guy' in the assassination of John Kennedy, we know that he knew a lot about the CIA's U-2 program." On p. 36, Mr. Newman iterates this for the third time: "Even though the U-2 operations at Atsugi, Cubi Point, and Taiwan were very `closely held' (intelligence jargon meaning very limited distribution), Oswald obviously knew a great deal about the program." At no time does Mr. Newman provide any support for these claims by showing what "extensive knowledge" Oswald had, or that he knew "a lot" or "a great deal" about the U-2 program, or what it was that could be of any use to a major foreign intelligence service. In fact Oswald knew little more than any civilians working on, or living near, the bases from which the U-2 flew. And he knew far, far less that the Soviets did, and what little he knew would add nothing useful to their knowledge. Mr. Newman tries, desperately, to show Oswald knew something. I have previously cited how he wrote about the U-2 collecting Far East information on ICBM test launches, "presumably impact areas," and telling me it would show missile accuracy. This is unrealistic. Related to this Mr. Newman notes, unreferenced, that 10 to 15, presumably SS-6s the only ICBM under development at the time, had been fired through March 1958. Where did this information come from? NIE 11-5-58 (a national intelligence estimate representing the views of the intelligence community), issued 11/25/58, stated the community believes "since August 1957, the USSR has fired at least four and possibly six missiles to a distance of approximately 3,500 nautical miles. NIE 11-5-57 issued the previous year stated "We have no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM. There are other questions about Mr. Newman's analysis. One is why doesn't he show there were U-2 flights out of Atsugi to the impact areas immediately after missile launches? The intelligence community was uncertain about the number ICBMs launched, far less than Newman claims. The other has to do with his knowledge, as an Asian scholar, of the climate in that area of Asia? Do not forget the U-2 was a very valuable collection instrument and was not used to seek information on single events. With one exception of which I am aware, all flights had multiple targets to cover. FYI, the only single target was in October 1962 when a specific areas in Cuba was covered where intense Soviet activity had been reported. The entire time over Cuba on that flight was about six minutes. It was highly successful as it located Soviet MR/IRBMS in Cuba. Mr. Newman's comments about Soviet missile testing and deployment display his ignorance of their test program prior to 1960, provoking serious questions about the quality of his research, his intelligence background, his clearances, and his understanding of things military. On p. 40 he writes of Soviet missile deployments without sourcing: "Khrushchev fed these American fears [of a missile gap] by hinting at an intercontinental capability and his willingness to use it. The deployments were anticipated, and CIA intelligence estimates in 1958 and 1959 projected the early prospects for Soviet ICBMs in the hundreds. Senator Stuart Symington predicted the Soviets would have 3000 ICBM's by 1959." There were no estimates of, nor any basis for, large numbers of ICBMs as apparently alleged by Symington a former USAF Secretary, known to promote the USAF line in Congress. The Soviet ICBM program was still in a early testing stage in 1958-59. As CIA noted in a report, not an estimate, on possible ICBM deployment areas in June 1960, before satellite photo coverage: "[in] view of the large areas still uncovered and the limited numbers of ICBMs that are likely to be deployed so early in the Soviet [testing] program, it is not surprising that none of these sites has been positively identified." The only ICBM under development at the time was the SS-6 which was soon abandoned as such because of operational difficulties for its use as an offensive weapon. It remained a work-horse space booster. But what was being estimated? NIE 11-5-58 states for the intelligence community, not just CIA: "The USSR will probably have a first operational capability with ten prototype ICBMs at some time during calendar 1959; the possibility should not be disregarded, however, that in the latter part of 1958 the USSR may establish an ICBM capability with missiles comparatively unproven as to accuracy and reliability." It goes on to state: "We estimate that the USSR has the technical and industrial capability to produce ICBMs, complete launching facilities, establish logistic lines and train troops at a rate sufficient to have an operational capability with 100 ICBMs (Footnote: These numbers are selected arbitrarily in order to provide some measure of the Soviet capacity to produce and supply ICBMs; they do not represent an estimate of probable Soviet requirements or stockpiles.) about one year after its first operational capability date (i.e. some time in 1960), and with 500 ICBMs (Same footnote cited) two or three years after the first operational capability date (i.e. some time in 1961, or at the latest in 1962)." The lack of certainty shows no photography was involved, much less U-2 photography from aircraft based on Atsugi. Further to advance his invalid thesis, Mr. Newman writes of Allen Dulles in 1963 recalling "how it was in 1957 to 1958." According to Mr. Newman Dulles wrote: "When the Soviets started testing their missiles, they chose launching sites in their most remote and unapproachable wasteland." Mr. Newman adds his personal comment to this: "The location of the U-2s at Atsugi was crucial in getting at these remote areas." This is not only utterly false, but stupid from anyone who served in intelligence. Not only were the U-2s at Atsugi not crucial to get at missile test launch ranges (MTRs), i.e., the range heads, the Atsugi U-2s were useless to do so. The location of the SSM MTR range heads had long been known on an unclassified basis when Mr. Newman was writing his book, as noted earlier. Any competent non-cleared investigator using a ruler and doing simple arithmetic would understand the Atsugi U-2s would not be used for such coverage. I will now cover more detail on the Soviet test ranges. The first Soviet SSM MTR was established with the range head at KYMTC on the east side of the Volga River not far from, and a few miles to the south of, then Stalingrad in the European USSR. This range was begun to test surface to air missiles, SAMs. It later became the range for short to medium range surface-to-surface missiles, SSMs, through the SS-5, firing no more than about 1,800 to 2,200 nautical miles east in the general area of Sary Shagan. The second test range to be established was at Tyura Tam (aka Baikanur) (TTMTC) named by the U.S. after the range head, north and slightly west of Tashkent in Western Siberia. Unclassified satellite photos of the site from the French SPOT satellite were commercially available in the mid-80s. A third range for SSMs. was located at Plesetsk the MTC in the northern European USSR but was not operational until the 1960s. An anti-missile test center was later located at Sary Shagan with target missiles launched toward it from KYMTR. For those interested, the shortest direct round trip flight from Atsugi to TTMTR, a distance of about 6400 nautical miles, would take it over north China. Since the U-2's maximum speed was about 450 knots, no plane flies at max but at a fuel saving cruising speed, the flight time to go solely to TTMTR with few other targets, would be close to 14.5 hours. As the plane flew with only the pilot who had to drive it continually during the entire flight, it makes the flight close to impossible because of the strain it would place on the pilot. Such a flight would contradict one of Mr. Newman's sources in whom he puts faith who said they at Atsugi would see the U-2 take off in the morning and return in the afternoon, obviously not a time of 14 hours. If one took the time to check a map it would show a flight to TTMTC from the main U-2 base at Incirlik would require a round trip of about 3100 nautical miles and could be programmed to cover other significant targets in a flight of slightly more than 8 hours. Apparently Mr. Newman failed to do this. In an another attempt to tie U-2 flights from Atsugi to reports on the Soviet ICBM program, Mr. Newman (p. 40) again relies on his secondary source, Richard C. Thornton, without showing he had any real knowledge of the U-2 program. This time it is a discussion of difficulties in the test program supposedly discovered by U-2s being the cause of a testing halt between April 1958 and March 1959. This is not recorded in the estimates. (Note: Oswald had returned to the States in December 1958 and had no contact with anything concerning U-2 flights after then.). Apparently Mr. Newman believes this presumed U-2 information obtained by flights from Atsugi affected predictions of major ICBM deployments without saying how. Since the first ICBM tests didn't occur until the TTMTR pad was completed in 1957, and there were some failures through 1958, ICBM deployment of the SS-6 was questionable and not expected at first in any area accessible to Atsugi's U-2s. In reports based on the KH photo satellite program the only site ever located where SS-6s were deployed was at Plesetsk and that occurring in the 1960-61 period. This was the only deployed ICBM site at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It is only a couple of pages later, on p. 42, that Mr. Newman has different dates for the test halt -- March to August 1958. Of this Mr,. Newman provides false information as he writes: ". . .the U-2 missions flown from Atsugi provided critical intelligence on this significant development in U.S.-Soviet strategic relations." Neither Atsugi U-2s, nor U-2 flights from elsewhere. ever provided CRITICAL intelligence on Soviet missile tests, ever. Atsugi U-2s did not cover range heads from where missiles were launched. There were other intelligence sources that provided intelligence on missile tests that, if Mr. Newman was actively involved in intelligence matters during the 1980's when SALT II was being negotiated would, or should, have known considering he claims to be an Asian scholar. I return to another of Mr. Newman's unsupported, undocumented, indeed false, declarations, these on pages 35 and 36. He wrote: "The disclosure of information relating to the U-2s, their personnel, logistical and security support, the frequency of their missions, and the countries against which they were targeted--all subjects upon which Oswald could offer the Soviets information--would reasonably be considered damaging to the national security." To this Mr. Newman added: "It would not have been unusual for a U-2 damage assessment to have been so highly classified that only a few people in the Agency knew about it." This second comment too is completely false, but is necessary to justify his first assertion that at best is questionable. These comments can only be seen by either true historians or REAL intelligence officers as utterly incredible. Mr. Newman accepts he knows that Oswald could disclose to the Soviets - "information relating to the U-2s, their personnel, logistical and security support, the frequency of their missions, and the countries against which they were targeted" that could be useful. Up to this point Mr. Newman has provided nothing to establish Oswald had even as much knowledge as the Soviets, indeed that he had any real information on the bird. The little he has tried to show would have easily been contradicted by checking facts that Mr. Newman obviously failed to do. Oswald had less, much less, information relating to the U-2s than the Soviets. Oswald was not an aviation expert and there is nothing about his history to show he could discuss any of the U-2's unique characteristics the Soviets would not know. He never saw the cameras or the film then secret. Even if he had, what would a non-technical person like Oswald learn? Oswald never knew the targets selected for coverage, something the Soviet could deduce from the flight path they knew and Oswald did not, nor the results. The latter is especially true of the non-Far East flights, those most important for covering key Soviet targets. Mr. Newman deliberately chooses to ignore coverage of Soviet targets from Europe began in mid-1956, about a year BEFORE Oswald got to Atsugi, and continued for a year and a half after Oswald left Atsugi, flights he knew nothing about. Oswald had no knowledge of tracks after the U-2 went beyond radar range of his tower (the "bubble"). As for Atsugi and other far east U-2 operations, a competent researcher would have learned Oswald even was not always at bases from which the bird flew while he was in the far east especially if the researcher, such Mr. Newman claims to be, had intelligence connections. The absurdity of Mr. Newman's assertion can be seen in the information that most flights over the USSR both before and after Oswald was at Atsugi were flown from Europe, primarily the Turkish base at Incirlik. But apparently facts such as this are unimportant to a PhD assistant professor of history with a 21-year career in Army intelligence. Specifically, what could Oswald tell of the frequency of U-2 missions, one of the bits of information Mr. Newman claims Oswald would know but the Soviets wouldn't already know? Zilch, as flights were not flown on any frequency. If Mr. Newman had done his research, as he supposedly did for his book "JFK and Vietnam," he would have found flights occurred only with presidential approval following full evaluation of previous mission results. The evaluation provided the main basis for planning future missions, i.e., targets that needed repeat coverage and targets not covered for whatever reason but remained on the target list. Based on what was recommended the president then would only approve a few at a time. As for Oswald being able to tell about frequency, since the Soviets tracked every flight from mid-1956 until the Power's shootdown they knew the frequency of all U-2 flights flown over their territory from Europe, flights Oswald never knew existed. There are some things to understand that apparently an intelligence officer of Mr. Newman's caliber, or a historian of his background, does not. One is that the Soviets whose radars "promptly acquired and continuously tracked the very first U-2 flight over Soviet territory," and every one after that, almost all flew from Europe. With this tracking the Soviets had information Oswald NEVER had, or could have had, on the U-2 -- operational altitudes, operational speed and, most of all, the areas overflown. From the last the Soviets could determine probable targets of the mission as the Soviets KNEW what was on the ground under the bird. Another is the Soviets gained information from spy trawlers operating in international waters near the various countries with major U.S. installations in Europe and Asia. These could and did observe visually and with radar U.S. air operations as they collected other information. Since flights in areas outside the USSR targeted for U-2 coverage were tied to events, the KGB should be given enough credit to read the papers as these were of such significance they were in the media. Back to allegations of an investigation about Oswald that begins on page 33. For this Mr. Newman cites comments by Oswald's fellow Marine, Nelson Delgado, to Edward J. Epstein. Apparently neither Epstein nor Mr. Newman were able to validate any information that there was some type of investigation at El Toro after Oswald's defection. Yet, Mr. Newman asks "[i]f Delgado's account of this investigation is true, who were the men in dark suits [who reportedly undertook the alleged investigation]?" Ignoring the "if" he used, Mr. Newman goes on to show the story must be true as he avows: "It is not unreasonable to assume they were from the intelligence agency that had the most at risk with respect to U-2 operations when Oswald defected: the CIA." Finally after several pages discussing a possible investigation of Oswald's presumed knowledge Mr. Newman ends the section on p. 36 with: "We still lack, however, hard evidence of any Oswald damage assessment--and this will likely remain the case. Even a `light' investigation into the potential damage if it fell into the KGB's hand would have been alarming enough to prompt a quick and quiet burial of the matter." Mr. Newman never considers that reports of an investigation are false when the Soviets knew all about the flights. Why? In light of my extensive comments, the CIA obviously KNEW Oswald could not cause damage as he knew nothing of significance about the U-2 that would be of any interest to the KGB other than what most people at Atsugi knew and far less than the Soviets themselves knew. Even Mr. Newman should have known this even though he was Army intelligence. Again, the U-2 first flew over Soviet territory in 1956. Oswald know only a little about flights based on Astugi during the period from April 1957 to December 1958 when he returned to the continental U.S. This is almost a year and a half before U-2 overflights of the USSR, and those from Atsugi flying elsewhere, ceased. Whatever little information Oswald could have acquired, he knew nothing of cruising speed, altitude, and possible targets, nor mission results and success, and that little would not only be very fragmentary and stale. I will now touch briefly on Mr. Newman's introduction. On page xvi, he brings in statements made by a James Wilcott (a name NOT found in the index), a former CIA finance officer in Japan during a period which overlapped Oswald's assignment to the Marine unit at Atsugi. Mr. Newman states: "Wilcott claimed that a CIA case officer told him--the day after Kennedy was assassinated--that Oswald was an agent." The first official record of Wilcott saying anything is in 1978 when Wilcott told the HSCA that "Oswald was a CIA agent who received financial disbursements under an assigned cryptonym." As Newman writes: "Wilcott could only cite informal conversations as evidence, and after talking with Wilcott's coworkers, the HSCA `concluded that Wilcott's allegation was not worthy of belief.'" Mr. Newman then adds his own spin: "The record suggests that neither the Agency's official story nor Wilcott's characterization is accurate. The truth lies between. The Agency appears to have had a serious operational interest in Oswald and there probably was a relationship, though not that of an `agent' or `informant.'" Nowhere does Mr. Newman explain how the record "suggests" anything nor how he rejects the Agency's official story as inaccurate in view of one significant fact that a person named by Wilcott as one he spoke with about Oswald after the assassination had returned to Virginia in 1962. Yet Mr. Newman avows: "The truth lies between." There are several points to note about Wilcott and his story that Mr. Newman seems to have deliberately ignored. The first is that Wilcott's tale is hearsay without the slightest evidence supporting it. The second is that the Agency does not pay military personnel, neither officers or enlisted, when assigned to duty with it, nor can they as it is against the law. Another point is that Wilcott apparently never mentioned this before 1978. A final point to make is that Wilcott before testifying, and his wife Elsie. had become involved with CIA renegade Philip Agee and some of his friends as an associate editor of "Counterspy" the vehicle Agee was using to publish names of CIA personnel and its agents he had not named in his book "Inside the Company." Shortly after his HSCA appearance, in July 1978 Wilcott and his wife joined with Agee and company--Ellen Ray, her husband William Schaap, and Louis Wolf--in Havana as "special guests" for a Soviet sponsored 11th World Youth Festival. One purpose of the festival was to conduct an international tribunal with a theme "Youth Accuses Imperialism" that included an all-out attack on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. A tribunal judge was Schaap. Among the tribunal witnesses attacking CIA were Agee, the Wilcotts, and Wolf. While in Havana these "special guests" announced a new publication for which they would be co-editors--"Covert Action Information Bulletin (CAIB)." In an editorial statement, signed by the co-editors, they asserted: "We are confident that there will be sufficient subscribers to make this publication a permanent weapon in the fight against the CIA, FBI, military intelligence, and all the other instruments of U.S. imperialist oppression throughout the world. . . Most especially, we will never stop exposing CIA personnel and operations whenever and wherever we find them." This was in the first issue of the CAIB handed out in Havana. Before moving on there are a couple of items of interest concerning the CAIB group: - Ellen Ray was associated as a technical advisor for Stone's movie "JFK" with Mr. Newman, before he wrote his Oswald book. - One person whom Mr. Newman cites for assistance in writing the book is Jim DiEugenio. - DiEugenio wrote a book praising a book by New Orleans District Attorney who tried a Clay Shaw as a particiant in a conspiracy to assassinate JFK. - Both Garrison, who is now dead, and DiEugenio praised Ray and Schaap for their assistance in writing their books, and to their Sheridan Square Press that published them. - Another person warmly praised by Newman for his help is Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat and lately a professor at UC, Berkeley. Scott, among other things, has written for CAIB, and at one point in time was one of two non-intelligence persons elected together to the board of directors of the Agee-founded Association of National Security Alumni. The other elected with him was Louis Wolf. Before concluding the current discussion of Mr. Newman's book there are two items to quickly cover. One is his studying routing slips attached to reports from various intelligence agencies as if they were tea leaves. As he explains in one place "the `routing and record' sheets attached to these reports tell us who read them and when they read them." From my experience, and in discussing this with others, Mr. Newman's statement is at best questionable. None of us would conclude the appearance of our initials on a routing slip would show we read a report. The only conclusion would be is that it crossed our desk. Many times, because of key words, reports would be routed to us. Many times it would only receive a quick glance because it would be obvious it contained nothing of interest. Oswald was not of real interest to the CIA UNTIL AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF JFK. Another point is the date an item it arrived in the office and was forwarded to the next recipient. Perhaps while in Army intelligence Mr, Newman had little come to his desk, so he read everything. This next is about nonsense Newman has in Chapter Nineteen. Early on in a paragraph on p. 393, Mr. Newman makes the comment: "It is the thesis of this chapter that the connection between these two compartments [different office holdings] was known before the assassination, a connection closely held on a `need-to-know' basis." Not really true and no evidence is presented. It seems more of being held on a "who cares" basis. But Mr. Newman regularly makes assertions without evidence. In the chapter is a distortion of information in an attempt to prove his thesis. At this time I will only deal with one point, but one of which Mr. Newman makes a big issue. Mr. Newman began the above mentioned paragraph presenting his thesis by citing CIA material involving Oswald that surfaced from CIA observations in Mexico City and reported about a week AFTER Oswald left there. He ends it with: "The accused assassin of the president had been involved in very sensitive CIA operations." If by involved Mr. Newman means Oswald actively participated in anything, he doesn't tell how. If all he means is that Oswald passed through an ongoing CIA activity without being a part of it, he would be correct. Nothing Mr. Newman writes shows this is not the case. Using the Mexico City visit by Oswald, Mr. Newman declares certain released materials he obtained show the agency had a "KEEN [my emphasis] operational interest in Oswald's activities during the eight weeks" immediately prior to the assassination. Mr. Newman fails to provide ANY support for a "keen" interest at any time. Indeed, what he includes shows there was at best a slight passing interest in Oswald. Mr. Newman goes on to assert again, without any support, that Oswald "had been involved in a very sensitive CIA operation." It seems Mr. Newman wants to show Oswald was a major participant in CIA activities in Mexico City without any evidence, so for Mr. Newman it must be true. This is like what Mr. Newman's discussion of Oswald at Atsugi. Using three released cables inre Oswald's visit to Mexico City, Mr. Newman makes a very stupid evaluation going to the extent of claiming CIA was engaged in deliberate deception. But it is Mr. Newman who engages in deception and, to be kind, apparently from ignorance. He opens his discussion with the CIA cable sent from Mexico City six days after Oswald left that has information that is in error. How could that happen? Newman, to promote his tale, advances the false thesis that it indicates an Oswald impersonator. An intelligence officer with any real experience in, and understanding of, operations, that Mr. Newman apparently lacks, would KNOW from reviewing all the documentation that surfaced later, that someone in Mexico City goofed. They had two pieces of information--phone conversation transcripts, and a picture of an individual (since correctly identified). It was wrongly concluded by the Mexico City station the photo was Oswald, the same person whose coversations had been transcribed. The CIA cable from Mexico City that Newman finds so important was sent routine on October 9th. Oswald has DEPARTED Mexico City on October 3d, six days before the cable was sent. It would appear Oswald's visit did not generate any excitement or a "keen" interest with anyone in the Mexico City station. For the benefit of those unfamiliar with cables, there are five levels of precedence (order in which sent) for cables that is determined by the urgency of the material. There are official versions of the meanings, but rather than use bureaucratese I will present the way they are seen in the practical sense. The highest precedence is "FLASH" showing the sender is hitting the panic button. Hostile action has begun or is about to begin as the hostile power's intentions are obvious. Cables from Gulf of Tonkin when the skippers thought they were under attack by North Vietnamese were sent "FLASH." Traffic bearing this precedence is sent and delivered to addressees like now. Next in order is "OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE." This is used when circumstances require a quick response because of unfolding events. It is a precedence I once set for a cable. Third in order of precedence is "PRIORITY" used when the sender believes the information deserves early attention but with no need to receive extra attention. A response may be expected, but not necessarily so. Next is "ROUTINE," used for matters of general interest to be handled in the normal course of business that could generate a response. The lowest precedence is "DEFERRED." Anything sent thus is sent after all other cable traffic has been moved. It is filler with general information or a request for support a recipient would find nice to have, but it would make no difference how soon sent or delivered. Now to return to Mr. Newman and HIS deception. He notes CIA took the information from the Mexico City cable on Oswald that could be of interest and resent it by cable, after removing internal CIA markings, to the FBI, State, and Navy Intelligence. Why to those? Oswald was known to be an American citizen, thus his visit to Soviet and Cuban embassies would be of FBI interest. He had been in a naval service, the Marine Corps, so Naval intel gets a copy, and lastly State as the visit occurred in a foreign country, had not checked with the U.S. Embassy and Oswald had been a defector in the USSR. Internal CIA cables are not disseminated outside the agency. So to provide information for offices outside the CIA the cable has to be rewritten deleting CIA material. It was unnecessary on the basis of the precedence of the Mexico City cable and the delay in information it contained to provide the information to the added recipients on other than a ROUTINE basis as was done. Meanwhile someone, it is not clear who, discovered a different description of Oswald, the defector, in the CIA files provided by another agency. CIA headquarters decided for some reason to inform the station of the real description of Oswald's physical characteristics. About this Mr. Newman declares "[t]his description PROVES [my emphasis] that the CIA knew Oswald's true physical characteristics and therefore that the cable to the FBI, State, and Navy was deliberately misleading." Mr. Newman provides no basis for this conclusion. This statement is false on its face. The Agency had received a description of an apparent American from Mexico City they believed should be passed to other possible interested organizations that the Mexico City station had mistakenly tied to Oswald. No one knew at the time why the station had done this, and obviously did not think it was worth the effort to find out. The assassination of JFK was still almost 8 weeks away. Meanwhile with a real description in the files, CIA headquarters chose to notify the Mexico City station of it. Further, in spite Mr. Newman's stupid statement about the latest knowledge of Oswald in a CIA file, no effort was apparently made to note his return from the USSR. What difference would it have made, anyway, to tell the Mexico station about his return as Oswald was long gone from Mexico? The routine cable with the information describing Oswald to the station required no action. Even from this brief discussion, can one be faulted for believing Mr. Newman had a book contract in which he proposed to tie Oswald to the CIA. Failure to do so would not be welcome by the publisher. Thus Mr. Newman engaged in creative writing, using deception, distortion, and cultivating suspicions about events to come close to meeting the presumed aim of the contract. In addition, he had already committed himself to an organization, COPA, whose goal is to promote the view President Kennedy was killed as the result of a conspiracy involving the government. This follows the advice given by Mr. Newman to Oliver Stone in which his previous book was used to provide the motive for the assassination as presented in the movie "JFK."