In brief, the issue of ground troops was briefly raised in January 1964 and Johnson clearly believed that air power alone would not suffice. He did not press the issue, however, and the focus of policy deliberations turned almost exclusively to the issue of direct military pressure against North Vietnam. On March 17, 1964, the President signed NSAM 288, which considered various alternatives including deployment of US ground forces to secure Saigon and/or a complete US takeover of the war effort. These were clearly rejected because, as McNamara noted: "the possible military advantages...would be far outweighed by its adverse psychological impact." NSAM 288 was a sweeping statement of US objectives, including a classic restatement of the domino theory (which Johnson would subsequently question-- June 9th to the CIA--and which the CIA would largely discount). NSAM 288 was the first real concession that the situation in SVN was bad and getting worse. It proposed four alternatives: (1) negotiations leading to neutralization, (2) overt military pressures against the DRV, (3) deployment of US combat forces to Saigon, and (4) a complete US takeover of command in SVN. As noted above, options 3 & 4 were rejected, as was the first option. Which left the policy of overt military pressures directed against the DRV. This was the policy that would be pursued through 1964 and into early 1965, culminating in Operation Rolling Thunder, the sustained bombing of the north. What NSAM 288 did was provide a detailed discussion of overt military pressure against the DRV beyond the OP-PLAN 34A actions already undertaken (as developed under Kennedy's direction and approved in NSAM 273). NSAM 288 still only authorized measures calculated to improve the short-term situation in SVN without the introduction of US military power (air or ground) but McNamara suggested that contingency planning be undertaken in order that the US "would be in a position at a later date to initiate military pressures against North Vietnam within a relatively brief time after any decision to do so might be made." This was done and these efforts later allowed the rapid "tit-for-tat" response to the Tonkin Gulf incident. When top administration officials met in Honolulu in June, the discussion focused on action against the DRV, not the possible use of US ground troops. Lodge advocated a "selective bombing campaign" against the north and William Bundy offered a 30-day scenario of military pressure culminating in a full scale bombing campaign of the DRV. (NB: the Congressional resolution which later became the infamous Tonkin Gulf Resolution was drafted by Bundy shortly before this meeting). The conferees presented as a basic assumption that "our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept [the] over-running of SEA by Hanoi and Peking." There was no effort to reassess the basic premises of US commitment in SEA, only the focus on the outlines of possible US pressures on North Vietnam. There was also no serious discussion of introducing US ground forces to SVN. The JCS continued to push the case for massive military action intended to destroy Hanoi's will and North Vietnam's ability to carry on the war, arguing that only this strategy could be expected to end Hanoi's support of the conflict in the south. Although the JCS expressed support of some limited "punitive" actions, it is clear they preferred a major campaign against DRV capabilities. When Taylor returned from Honolulu, he gave McNamara his comments on the JCS position and offered his own assessment, to which the Secretary indicated his agreement. Taylor proposed a three-tiered pattern of attacks ranging in order from "demonstrative strikes against limited military targets" as a way of signaling "U.S. readiness and intent" to a "massive air attack on all significant military targets in North Vietnam." He indicated his preference, however, for the second suggested option of hitting a "significant part of the military target system in North Vietnam." But he noted that "political considerations will incline our responsible civilian officials" to chose the lesser option of limited demonstrative strikes. There was no assessment or analysis offered regarding whether such actions might achieve the desired results or what they might lead to in terms of subsequent action; nor was there any attempt to ascertain what the likely public reaction would be.(40) The documentary record indicates virtually no discussion or pressure to consider the deployment of significant US ground forces. On September 7, 1964, the President again met with top advisers in Washington. The overall consensus was that pacification efforts were of themselves insufficient to bring about an improvement in the situation and that "additional efforts within South Vietnam by the U.S. will not prevent further deterioration there." It was generally accepted that some sort of direct pressure against the DRV would be required to reverse conditions in the south.(52) The JCS again recommended a program of air strikes against the north which would be "continuous and in ascending severity." This was necessary, the JCS argued, "to prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in the Republic of Vietnam and Southeast Asia." In their opinion, "continuation of present or foreseeable programs limited to the Republic of Vietnam will not produce the desired result." The Joint Chiefs contended that it was absolutely necessary for the U.S. to undertake reprisals in response to hostile Viet Cong or North Vietnamese actions and that such reprisals be "greater in degree" than the initial provocations. They rejected the concept of "gradual" pressures against the DRV, asserting that only a rapid and intense bombing campaign would have the desired effect.(53) Again, the record indicates no effort to press for ground forces from either the military or the team in Saigon. In early December 1964 Johnson committed to an expanded military effort against the DRV. Although there is no formal NSAM, LBJ's instructions to Ambassador Taylor outlined the suggested strategy and indicated the probable future actions which would be necessary. There is also a draft NSAM prepared by William Bundy on November 30th. Although the draft NSAM did mention the importance political stability in Saigon prior to any major U.S. action, this was probably more as effort to address President Johnson's reservations than in any real belief that reform was either possible or likely.(67) The draft NSAM did not make any mention of introducing American ground forces into South Vietnam and the only discussion on record along these lines, the proposed "multi-national" force to be deployed along the DMZ, was met by coolness on the part of the military. The idea was quietly dropped by mid-January. The President was aware by this time that air strikes against the north were not going to be sufficient to achieve U.S. goals in Vietnam. McGeorge Bundy later noted the importance of the President's cables to Taylor, saying that Johnson was trying "to get attention to well-designed ground action" and that "it shows clearly the temper of readiness to go further inside South Vietnam." Johnson explicitly stated his belief that "this war will never be won from the air," telling Taylor that "what is much more needed and would be more effective is a larger and stronger use of rangers and special forces and marines, or other appropriate military strength on the ground and on the scene." Johnson clearly stated that he was prepared to "substantially increase the number of Americans in Vietnam" if that was necessary. The decision to bomb marked a commitment of American military power which the President knew could ultimately involve American ground forces in Southeast Asia.(69) The conclusion I draw from the documentary record is that it was Johnson himself who realized that air power alone would not dissuade Hanoi, and that if that were the case, we would have to consider more direct involvement on the ground. But Johnson's efforts to draw out the military and other participants in the policy debate on this issue were tentative and produced almost nothing of note. Rather than pressing a reluctant President to contemplate a major commitment of US ground forces, it was a nervous President Johnson who wanted the military and the embassy in Saigon to develop plans for such a commitment if the approved campaign of direct pressure on Hanoi failed. They did not do so, despite the clear indication that Johnson was receptive to the idea.