The following documents are from files available at the Kennedy Library (with the exception of Document #4, DEPTEL 1219, dtd June 22, 1963, which was obtained through FOIA requests) and reflect Kennedy's thinking and policy actions related the deteriorating situation in Laos during the summer of 1963. The origins of the subsequent US programs against North Vietnam may be clearly seen in these decisions, taken at the highest levels and at the explicit direction of President Kennedy. These documents suggest the importance of viewing USG decisions and policies on a broader basis than can be obtained by a narrow focus on South Vietnam. Further information on these and related documents upon request. dtf (c-serve 71301,527) **************************************************************** **************************************************************** DOCUMENT #1: [declassified 4/20/92] ************** Summary Record of the National Security Council Meeting April 20, 1963 -- 11:10 AM -- U.S. Policy Toward Laos Director McCone read an intelligence summary of the military situation in the Plaine des Jarres. He estimated that the Pathet Lao had a two-to-one military superiority in the Plaine. Kong Le is apparently leaning heavily on international support to get a ceasefire. Latest information indicates that, contrary to some reports, he is not giving up. Mr. McCone referred to a message from Vientiane, a copy of which the President read (copy attached). Secretary Rusk reported that British Foreign Minister Horne had told us that the U. K. Ambassador in Moscow had been unable to see Gromyko to present a demarche on Laos because top Soviet officials were apparently in session with Khrushchev who returned to Moscow today. The British are trying to persuade the Russians to join efforts to halt the attacks on the neutralists in Laos. The Soviet Ambassador in Vientiane, according to our reports, is trying to be helpful in keeping the situation from deteriorating further. Secretary Rusk emphasized that Souvanna is the key to rallying neutralists in Laos against the Pathet Lao. He made five political recommendations which are listed in the State paper attached. With respect to other measures, the Secretary recommended that there be no publicly announced military moves for the next three days. He suggested that the SEATO exercise planned for late May could be used as a cover for U.S. forces moving into the area earlier. The U.S. forces moving into Thailand would await the arrival of allied forces now scheduled to be there in early June. He believed that we should increase the number of U.S. forces in northern South Vietnam in order to be in a position, if Laos falls, to move into North Vietnam. We must avoid being committed publicly to supporting Souvanna with U.S. forces so that if later Souvanna rejects our support we will not be in an awkward position. Ambassador Thompson, who had returned from San Francisco by plane to attend the meeting, noted that the Russians were accusing us of interfering in the internal affairs of Laos, but at the same time were saying that the Geneva Accords should be sustained and that the situation in Laos should return to normal. He felt that any military moves which we should take now should not be publicly announced, but that secret military moves would be useful in persuading Moscow and Hanoi of our seriousness. Khrushchev would not be in a position of publicly backing down in the face of U.S. military pressure in Southeast Asia. General Taylor said the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Admiral Felt, as CINCPAC, call at Bangkok and Vientiane and confer with the military representatives of SEATO. He said a task force consisting of an aircraft carrier and destroyers should sail from Subic Bay to the Gulf of Tonkin. The task force would cruise in the area. No U.S. forces should be put ashore now. The President indicated he did not believe that landing U.S. forces in Hue in northern South Vietnam would be advisable because of the difficulty of removing them at a later time. He felt that if forces were to be put ashore, they should be put in Thailand. He asked what military action we could take against Hanoi. In response, General Taylor indicated that several actions could be taken against Hanoi, such as sinking ships in the harbor, flying reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam, and the bombing of selected places. Secretary McNamara said that an additional action would be destruction of selected rail lines. The President requested that a study be made for his consideration next week of feasible military actions to be taken against the northern Vietnamese. Secretary Rusk asked that the task force not sail out of Subic Bay today, Sunday their time, but rather on Monday when it would be possible to say that the task force was engaging in routine exercises. The President asked whether we should talk to the Thais about U.S. ground forces coming into Thailand now. He approved of Admiral Felt conferring with the SEATO military advisers in Bangkok. Secretary McNamara said he believed that we should talk to the Thais now only about U. S. air units which would be coming there. Discussion of the landing of U.S. ground forces would be initiated if necessary. Secretary Rusk recalled that he had raised the subject of additional U.S. forces for Thailand with the Thai Foreign Minister in Paris recently. U.S. forces moving into the area in the near future could be described as units participating in the scheduled NATO maneuvers. In response to the President's question, Secretary Rusk said the French were not forcefully supporting Souvanna. The President thought we should make our views very clear to the French, recalling that Souvanna was their man. Secretary Rusk said he could recall to the French de Gaulle's comment to him that if Souvanna got into trouble, we would have to help him. We wanted the French to encourage Souvanna to take a firm stand in defense of his Government, to get the King involved in the current situation, to strengthen the French military mission, and to use appropriately the French mission resident in Hanoi. Secretary Rusk, commenting on the proposed visit of Governor Harriman to Europe, suggested that he should leave for London immediately and then go to Paris. His further trip to Moscow would depend on the kind of response the British got to their demarche to Gromyko. Governor Harriman said he felt he could take a very firm line with French Foreign Minister Couve because Couve had earlier made commitments to us when he was persuading us to support Souvanna originally. Secretary Rusk suggested, and the President approved, a Presidential message to Khrushchev to be carried by Harriman in the event he goes to Moscow. Ambassador Thompson recommended that Harriman go Moscow alone rather than accompanied by a British representative. Secretary Rusk agreed that Governor Harriman could appropriately go alone in view of the fact that his mission consisted of discussing Laos with the two co-chairmen of the ICC, the British and the Russians. Ambassador Thompson restated his view that we take military missions now but not make them public. The President authorized the sailing of a task force from Subic Bay to the Gulf of Tonkin. Secretary Rusk asked that the task force not sail north of the demarcation line lest we appear to be threatening action which we are not yet prepared to take. Secretary McNamara said the task force would take some time to get to within two hundred miles of the Vietnamese coast. The President asked why we need to follow such a careful policy toward Cuba in view of the fact that the Russians appear to be prepared to see the Geneva Accords destroyed. He approved the proposed U-2 flights over the supply routes in North Vietnam. He agreed that we should be prepared to move U.S. air forces in Thailand, but suggested that we consult the Thais about our plans only after we know Khrushchev's views concerning the current situation in Laos. Director McCone said that our latest information was that the remaining twenty-three American prisoners would probably be leaving Cuba on Monday. He had reports that these prisoners were being moved from the Isle of Pines to Havana............................. ...................................................... The President commented that with the prisoners out of Cuba, we might be in a position to act against Cuba if Khrushchev made no move to halt the deterioration in Laos. He asked what action we could take against Cuba. Director McCone said we should fly low-level reconnaissance missions which were necessary no matter what happens in Laos. He said we need to have pictures of Soviet convoys.......................... ......................................................... ........................................................ ............................................ Ambassador Thompson pointed out that a U.S. bombing raid on Pathet Lao forces in Laos would be easier for Khrushchev to accept than U.S. action against Cuba. Mr. Bundy asked whether, in light of the Laos situation, we should hold up the joint U.S. /U.K. demarche to Khrushchev on disarmament. Secretary Rusk said he did not think we should. The Soviet leaders are undoubtedly discussing all subjects, including disarmament. Mr. Bundy asked about the proposal to brief the North Atlantic Council on the U.S. /U. K. demarche on disarmament. The present line is to say no more than that we are delivering to Khrushchev a message concerning disarmament. We do not think, however, that the demarche will remain secret. The President expressed reservations as to why this was necessary, but he did not specifically oppose the North Atlantic Council briefing. He did comment that he did not see how we could talk to the Russians about anything if the Geneva Accords are breaking down. ********************************************************************** ********************************************************************** DOCUMENT #2: [declassified 4/19/92] ************** NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECORD OF ACTIONS April 20, 1963 , 512th NSC Meeting NSC Action 2465 U.S. POLICY TOWARD LAOS a. The Council discussed the deteriorating situation of the neutralist military forces in the Plaine des Jarres and Its effect on the Geneva Accords. b. The President approved the following political actions: (1) Ambassador Unger will discuss with Souvanna military measures which the United States is prepared to take in support of him and the neutralist forces, including airdropping arms and supplies and action by Meo guerrillas. (2) ............[approximately 7 lines deleted]................... (3) Ambassador Kohler will raise the subject of Laos with Khrushchev during his April 24 interview on another matter, subject to other arrangements which may be made in connection with the Harriman visit. (4) ............[approximately 8 lines deleted]...................... (5) Secretary Rusk will call in today the Ambassadors of the ICC member states to discuss the current situation. c. The President approved the following military measures: (1) A carrier task group and Marine battalion afloat will be ordered to sail tomorrow from [Subic Bay] into waters off South Vietnam, remaining south of the 17th Parallel. The task force departure is not to be announced, but it is intended that it will become known indirectly to the Russians and the North Vietnamese. The task force will sail earlier if the Russian response to the British demarche in Moscow is unsatisfactory. (2) Admiral Felt will visit Bangkok, confer with the military representatives of SEATO, and, as the situation develops, may extend his tour to Vientiane. (3) .................[approximately 3 lines deleted]................... (4) .................[approximately 3 lines deleted]................... (5) Plans for possible military action against North Vietnam are to be prepared for the President's consideration next week. ************************************************************************* ************************************************************************* DOCUMENT #3: [declassified 11/5/92] ************** June 19, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Laos Planning The President met today with Secretary Rusk. Secretary McNamara, Governor Harriman, General McKee, Messrs. McCone, Hilsman, William Bundy, Colby, and General Clay, Jr. at 11.30 a.m. in the Cabinet Room to discuss the Memorandum dated June 17, 1963 on Laos Planning. The President asked whether it was wise to strike North Vietnam before U. S. troops into Laos. He asked how much damage air strikes could really do. General McKee said there were over 200 selected targets in North Vietnam, and a great deal of destruction could be wrought against them. Governor Harriman explained that Phase 1 of the plan contained in the Memorandum of June 17, 1963 was ready for approval by the President at this time. Basically it provides for an increase in logistic support for Kong Le and Phoumi. Governor Harriman suggested that the President approve Phase 2 for planning purposes. He suggested that Phase 3 be given further study. In the ensuing discussion it was brought out that Admiral Felt took a gloomy view of the situation in Laos. Although Mr. McCone felt the situation was not as bad as Admiral Felt described it, nevertheless he agreed it needed very close watching. Secretary McNamara observed that all the actions taken in Phase 1 would probably not cause the Communists to reconsider their activities; therefore it might be important to move into Phase 2 rather quickly. The President approved Phase 1 for action and approved Phase 2 for planning purposes, but did not wish any of the steps in Phase 2 to be put into execution without his further approval. Phase 3 needed further study, and the President again raised the question whether it would not be wiser to put a limited number of U.S. troops in Mekong River towns before moving into Phase 3. The President further directed the Department of State to consult with the French and British before embarking upon the program outlined in the Memorandum. Specifically, he suggested that we review with the French and British the situation in Laos and ask them for their opinions on what should be done. After having received their observations, we should inform them of what we intend to do. The President also recognized that we would have to approach Marshal Sarit on several points in Phase 1 and 2; but he suggested that the entire 3 phase program not be divulged to Sarit, but rather that we get his point by point agreement as the steps requiring his consent are taken. Michael V. Forrestal ************************************************************************* ************************************************************************* DOCUMENT #4: [declassified 7/19/94 - FOIA] ************** ************************ OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State Jun 22, 1:10pm '63 ACTION: Amembassy VIENTIANE 1219 INFO: Amembassy BANGKOK 1895 " LONDON 6945 " PARIS 6102 " SAIGON 1261 CINCPAC JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE High level meeting on Laos June 19 resulted in USG decision to begin implementing immediately certain courxes of action (A below). These are aimed at redressing military situation and building up non-communist strength generally. If these measures prove unsuccessful in stopping military deterioration our plans permit us to move quickly to stronger actions (B below). A. Following is guidance on actions we wish begin implementing immediately: 1. Accept FAR and KL forces at present levels, without further demobilization, and provide additional funds as necessary to support FAR and KL forces through MAP and AID programs. Necessary steps being taken here for collateral increases in FY 1963 and FY 1964 MAP and AID programs. Dollar limits will be furnished later but will be adequate to carry out actions listed (A and B). You should begin programming on this basis. 2. Step up flow of heavy weapons and replacement of worn-out equipment on a selective basis. Objective is to provide such equipment as FAR and neutralist forces can use effectively and which will strengthen their capability vis a vis the PL/VM. Additional types of weapons not excluded if they meet foregoing criteria. CT recommendations requested. 3. Establish direct US contact with neutralist forces and pro-Western tribal tribal elements; encourge improved liaison, coordination, and military planning among these forces and FAR. Recognize problems you describe Embtel 1955 but in view USG decision to establish continuous liaison and to increase effectiveness of other military support measures we are taking you should reconsider augmentation attache staff with combat adviser types and forward your recommendation on this [several words deleted] soonest. 4. Improve intelligence capabilities: (1) Increase intelligence reconnaissance and patrol activity in Southern Laos by South Vietnaese-led tribal teams; (2) Provide additional third country intelligence and communications training with a view to increasing intelligence team activity in central Laos and the Bolovens area, and initiating such activity in northwest Laos. Will be covered separate message, 5. Increase air re-supply of arms on.a selective basis to Kong Le, pro-West tribal groups, and FAR outposts in Pathet Lao territory. Means of supplementing measures being taken under Action 7 below, such as additional aircraft for RLAF, may be appropriate. CT recommendations requested. 6. Expand tribal group program in non-Pathet Lao-held territory; intensify tribal group activity against communist forces and supply lines in present areas of operation. Will be covered separate message. 7. Augment Souvanna's airlift capabilities. Current CT efforts are appropriate and may be supplemented if you so recommend. 8. Encourage FAR forces to take positive action to gain firm control over areas not now controlled by tke PL. In addition, encourage FAR in eliminating PL in areas now generally controlled by FAR. FAR must not only hold firmly territory it now controls but should move forward with well-planned counteractions within FAR-held (or formerly held) areas. 9. Provide T-28 aircraft and armament to FAR in Laos to conduct reprisal strikes. Arrangements for early transfer to RLAF and completion of training should be expedited. Please inform your estimate earliest date these planes can enter action in Laos. Necessary funding actions for replacement of aircraft for Thais, maintenance, training being taken here. 10. Commence a combined social, political, and military effort through a strategic hamlet program in the Mekong Valley area. Program promised Embtel 1906 for adaption USAID rural development proeram to take great account of problem physical security in rural areas and PL infiltration might be starting point. Request your recommendations. 11. Expand the use of highly mobile South Vietnamese border patrols in Laos to interdict entry into South Viet-Nam and to gather intelligence. Separate message. B. Following is fuller list of later stage operations.which may be instituted on a selective basis if situation continues to deteriorate. Request you begin planning on actions applicable to Vientiane in light of actions to be undertaken under A above and forward comments: 1. Resume US aerial reconnaissance of Laos. 2. Expand US military advisory role to FAR and KL forces. 3. Encourage selective offensive action by PAR/KL forces. 4. Encourage selective offensive use of T-28's and T-6's 5. Consider the re-entry into Thailand of selected US combat forces now scheduled to be withdrawn in the near future. 6 . Expand the use of PARUs (Police-aerial Reconnaissance Units) [several words deleted]. 7. Expand the use of highly mobile SouthVietnamese border patrols in Laos to conduct guerrilla operations in.Laos Corridor. 8. Further enlarge pro-Western guerrilla units in Laos and.expand operations in enemy held territory. 9. Support third country Special Forces units in.active operations against Pathet Lao, primarily SVN [words deleted]. Encourage third country encadrement. 10. Provide, sanitized combat aircraft and contract American or third country pilots to the Laotian forces and authorize their use against the Pathet Lao concentration and supply points. 11. [One line deleted] 12 Move US Air Force units into Thailand. 13. Move US naval carrier task force off South Viet-Nam. 14. Take selected Category II actions against North Viet-Nam. (Category II: Overflights, high and low altitude reconnaissance of Laos and North Viet-Nam; harassment of DRV shipping. 15. Take Preparatory measures for the implementation of CINCPAC OP Plan 32-63. 16. Request SEATO members to prepare to deploy forces to the area. SCP-2 End RUSK ************************************************************************** ************************************************************************** DOCUMENT #5: [declassified 7/15/77] ************** ***************** THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON June 25, 1963 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 249 TO: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Central Intelligence Agency The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT: Laos Planning 1. At a meeting on June 19, 1963 the President considered the Memorandum addressed to him from the Department of State dated June 17, 1963 ("Memorandum"). 2. The President approved Phase 1 of the plan outlined in the Memorandum and authorized that the steps outlined therein might be taken at such time and in such manner as the appropriate officials concerned might direct. 3. The President directed the Department of State to consult with the French and British before initiating any action under the Memorandum. He wished to obtain their suggestions for action in Laos in light of the deteriorating situation there. 4. The President approved Phase 2 of the Memorandum for planning purposes, but directed that none of the steps outlined in Phase 2 be put into final execution until after further consultation with him. 5. The President directed that the steps described in Phase 3 of the Memorandum be further refined and reviewed and he asked that the question be explored whether additional U. S. actions should be taken in Laos before any action be directed against North Vietnam. Carl Kaysen cc: Mrs. Lincoln Mr. Bundy Mr. Forrestal Mr. Johnson NSC Files Copies furnished: Governor Harriman General McKee Mr. Colby General Clay Dispatched 6/26/63