FROM: Joe Riley, INTERNET:jriley@kendaco.telebyte.com TO: JFK-Conspiracy, INTERNET:JFK-CONSPIRACY@NETCOM.COM DATE: 9/28/95 5:40 PM Re: Alas, Babylon (Part II) Sender: owner-jfk-conspiracy@netcom.com Received: from netcom15.netcom.com by dub-img-2.compuserve.com (8.6.10/5.950515) id QAA10190; Thu, 28 Sep 1995 16:58:06 -0400 Received: by netcom15.netcom.com (8.6.12/Netcom) id NAA24599; Thu, 28 Sep 1995 13:38:15 -0700 Date: Thu, 28 Sep 1995 11:11:10 -0700 (PDT) From: Joe Riley To: JFK-Conspiracy Subject: Alas, Babylon (Part II) Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-jfk-conspiracy@netcom.com Precedence: list Reply-To: jfk-conspiracy@netcom.com Alas, Babylon Planned Preemptive Nuclear Strike and the Assassination of John Kennedy Joseph N. Riley, Ph.D. Alas, Babylon -- code phrase for the start of nuclear war in the novel of the same name. A recent article by Heather A. Purcell and James K. Galbraith , "Did the U.S. Military Plan a Nuclear First Strike for 1963?" [The American Prospect, Fall 1994, pp. 88-96.], provides a new and profoundly disturbing perspective on the assassination of John Kennedy. Based on a recently declassified memo and additional information, the authors demonstrate that in July of 1961, John Kennedy was presented with a plan for a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union and that the strike was to take place in the late fall of 1963. The authors do not assert that the plan was adopted, nor do they link the execution of such a plan to the execution of John Kennedy. The purpose of this article is to introduce this information into the discussion of John Kennedy's assassination and to show that such a plan may be of crucial importance in understanding both the assassination and its subsequent cover-up. It is too soon and too little is known to reach any specific conclusions, but the information is too important to ignore. I. Summary Burris memorandum. The article presents for the first time a recently declassified memo from Col. Howard Burris to Vice-President Johnson . As summarized by the authors: "[B]eginning in 1957 the U.S. military did prepare plans for a preemptive nuclear strike against the U.S.S.R., based on our growing lead in land-based missiles. And top military and intelligence leaders presented an assessment of those plans to President John F. Kennedy in July of l 961. At that time, some high Air Force and CIA leaders apparently believed that a window of outright ballistic missile superiority, perhaps sufficient for a successful first strike, would be open in late 1963. The document reproduced [in the article] is published here for the first time. It describes a meeting of the National Security Council on July 20,1961. At that meeting, the document shows, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the CIA, and other presented plans for a surprise attack." The authors note that there is no official record of what was said at the meeting, but the record shows that the meeting took place and that a presentation by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was made. [There is evidence for planning for a first strike capacity prior to 1957, perhaps as early as 1953. ] The authors present convincing evidence that the meeting had a major impact on administration officials. The authors note that "Numerous other apparent accounts of the meeting exist, though they do not refer to it by name or date. All agree on Kennedy's reaction. But none reveal what was actually discussed." The "numerous other apparent accounts" include statements by Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorenson, McGeorge Bundy, Arthur Schlesinger, and Roger Hilsman. There can be little doubt that the meeting in July 1961 was significant and affected the conduct of the Kennedy administration, if for no other reason than its sobering affect on those who might have to face a decision in the use of strategic nuclear weapons. (For simplicity, the abbreviation NESP will be used to refer to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Plan presented at the meeting and devoted to planning for a nuclear first strike in the fall of 1963. The abbreviation SIOP refers to the Single Integrated Operations Plan which is the detailed and specific plans for implementing nuclear warfare.) II. Was NESP Implemented? The authors are careful to point out that the memo and comments by administration officials do not establish that NESP was adopted. The authors list a number of points consistent with a concern about the implementation of NESP, but there are legitimate alternative interpretations to most of these: (1) An environment from early 1961 to late 1962 in which nuclear war was a realistic possibility; (2) Implementation of policies and procedures for better control of nuclear weapons; "During that summer of 1961, the defense Secretary ordered an overhaul of SIOP carried out by RAND analysts (including Daniel Ellsberg) and quickly approved by the JCS. The Burris memorandum may help to explain both the military's drive for a vast U.S. nuclear build-up, despite the fact that America was already far ahead, and the resistance from JFK and McNamara. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee had offered the Pentagon, the CIA, and President Kennedy a glimpse of the opportunity that lay ahead in the winter of 1963: U.S. nuclear superiority so complete that a first strike might be successful. But it also alerted Kennedy to a danger. American nuclear superiority might then be so complete, that rogue elements from the military and intelligence forces, seeking to precipitate an American first strike, might not feel deterred by fear of Soviet retaliation. What was the dispute over the numbers of landbased ICBMs really about? To be sure, at some level it involved the sufficiency of deterrence. But there may also have been an even graver concern: the offensive capabilities of the nuclear force, at a time when the President could not be sure of his control over the nuclear button." (3) Refusal of JFK to test confrontation over Cuba and implementation of policies in 1963 designed to minimize the threat of nuclear war. (4) Statements by LBJ to Earl Warren and additional statements by Earl Warren about the assassination threatening to cause "forty million deaths." (5) This list is not exhaustive. Major new weapon systems were due to come online in 1963. The appointment of Maxwell Taylor, a strong opponent to exclusive reliance on "massive retaliation" may be viewed in a new light. There are reasonable alternative interpretations of these points, and without the existence of the memo, there is no intrinsic reason to interpret them as related specifically to a nuclear first strike by the United States. The most compelling evidence that NESP may have been at least partially implemented is the almost inexplicable change in civil defense policy that occurred between 1961 and 1962. The inference drawn by the authors is both logical and chilling: "With the Burris memorandum, the reasoning behind the fallout shelter program now begins to fall into place. As a civil defense measure against a Soviet nuclear attack, the flimsy cinderblock shelters Americans were told to build were absurd. But they could indeed protect those in them, for a couple of weeks, from radiation drifting thousands of miles after a U.S. preemptive strike on the Soviet Union. It is known that Kennedy later regretted this program." Though the shelter program is described in general terms only, the available facts support the authors' conclusion. Even at the time, the apparent flaws of the shelter program were recognized. For example, the Encyclopedia Britannica yearbook for 1962 contains a long and, in context, extremely skeptical description of the new civil defense plan. The increase in civil defense spending in fiscal 1962 to 300 million dollars represented a five fold increase in funding from the previous year. Three points emphasized in the article deserve attention. First, despite the dramatic increase in funding, the shelter program appeared to be designed to deal with nuclear attacks where the total "megatonage" would be less than 5,000 megatons, an extremely optimistic expectation. Second, the article characterizes the civil defense plan as optimistic about the damage resulting from a nuclear exchange. According to the article, the civil defense plan seemed predicated on the survival of a relatively intact infrastructure, with minimum disruption of transportation systems, communications systems, and the means of production. Finally, the article asserts that although government sources have stressed that the Soviet Union had embarked on a massive program of shelter construction, foreign correspondents report no evidence or signs of major shelter construction. Equally disturbing, and not mentioned by Purcell and Galbraith, are statements originating within the administration. In January 1962, shortly after the SIOP (not to be confused with the NESP, but containing "counterforce" provisions ) discussed in the memo was adopted, Robert McNamara made the first official reference to the counterforce elements in the plan: "A major mission of the strategic retaliatory forces is to defer war by their capability to destroy the enemy's warmaking capabilities." And on February 17, he stated: "We may have to retaliate with a single massive attack, or we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he has time to launch his second salvos...." But the most ominous words are those of John Kennedy in March of 1962: "Krushchev must not be certain that, where our vital interests are threatened, the United States will not strike first." There is simply not enough information to determine if NESP was implemented. A number of programs and events are consistent with implementation, but there are reasonable alternative interpretations. The dramatic increase in civil defense funding between 1961 and 1962 is particularly disturbing. A dramatic increase in funding might be explained by the increase in international tensions and elevated threat of war, but those factors do not explain the nature of the civil defense plan. The adopted civil defense program makes little sense as a means to survive a nuclear exchange, both in terms of the megatonage and the destructive and disruptive effects on the surviving infrastructure . It is, however, a realistic program if the purpose is a temporary sheltering from fall-out from a nuclear strike restricted largely to the Soviet Union. III. Relevant to the Assassination? Purcell and Galbraith do not assert any connection between NESP and the assassination of John Kennedy, nor is the assassination discussed explicitly, but it is hard to imagine that they were unaware of at least possible connections. The discussion in the remainder of this paper about the assassination is based on premises with which reasonable people may disagree: that Lee Oswald was not the sole assassin of John Kennedy and that there was a systematic effort to prevent a full and effective investigation of the crime, generally and appropriately referred to as "cover-up". It is important to emphasize that this new information should be evaluated carefully and calmly. The existence of a plan that can only be characterized as mass murder on an incomparable scale is in itself disturbing, but enlightening in describing the context and environment that contributed to the abuses of the Cold War. The incomprehensible horror of such a plan invites intemperate and irresponsible speculation and accusation, but the issues involved are too important to ignore. It is equally important that the issues not be discussed simplicity. There need not be a direct connection between NESP and the assassination for the plan to be important. For example, it is possible that knowledge of the NESP could have been exploited to manipulate the investigation of the assassination, or even that knowledge of the NESP by official Washington could have affected the initial response and conduct of the investigation. Given these qualifications and cautions, what emerges in the following discussion is far more disturbing: the assassination of John Kennedy as an element in implementing a plan for a preemptive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union can explain what has been until now inexplicable. Unanswered questions about the assassination of John Kennedy abound, but the unasked questions and unaddressed issues may be equally important. For example, seldom addressed is the question, why public execution? If the purpose of the assassination was simply to remove JFK, there were many easier routes to either political or physical destruction. However, public execution as part of a plan to initiate a preemptive nuclear strike is chillingly logical. As an instrument of such a plan, public execution serves a number of purposes. First, it removes a leader who has demonstrated an unwillingness to use military force when there were alternative policies. Second, the assassination can serve as a justification for war. A nuclear strike "without cause" would likely cause the American public to react against the military following such a strike. However, if the assassination were linked to the Soviets, a confrontation could escalate to the point of war. It is bitterly ironic that the assassination in such a scenario provides a dramatic provocation by removing the person most likely to resist implementation of a preemptive nuclear strike. In addition, the implications of execution cannot have escaped the attention of public officials in positions of authority and privy to NESP.. Teleology of Dealey Plaza. The Official Story of a lone gunman in Dealey Plaza was developed so quickly and maintained so rigorously that many have concluded that such a story was intended by the perpetrators of the assassination to hide their crime. But if one concludes that the evidence indicates more than one shooter (a view accepted by the author), that conclusion conflicts with the assumption that the lone assassin story was intended as the sole "cover story". The mechanics of the assassination are more consistent with an obvious conspiracy than with an attempt to disguise the assassination as the work of a "lone nut." It is a matter of judgment and evaluation rather than a resolvable argument, but in the author's view, it is virtually inconceivable that the assassination as a "black op" could have been designed exclusively around the single assassin story. Only if one invokes sinister forces capable of controlling all subsequent investigation does exclusive reliance on a lone assassin story make any sense. Even then it is difficult to imagine that the risks involved in accidental exposure to an unseen camera or unknown witness would not have been considered. It is at least conceivable that the lone assassin story did not originate with the conspirators. Cover Up: Through the Looking Glass? There is compelling evidence of a deliberate and systematic cover-up of evidence in the assassination. It was swift, effective, and enduring. If the concept of cover up is granted, it is also clear that Lyndon Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover were principal initiators, and it is not irrational to question their motives. It becomes increasingly difficult, however, to question the motivations of many who appear to have participated in a cover up but by all reasonable standards were devoted to John Kennedy's administration and to the principles of the Constitution. Without discussing particular individuals, many of those closest to John Kennedy, including Robert Kennedy, were silent or actively supported the lone assassin story. Regardless of the validity of the lone assassin story, there is no way that at the time suppression of conspiracy speculation began that it could have been known that there was but a single assassin . Unless one invokes sinister motives in an irrational and irresponsible manner, the most reasonable explanation is that some individuals acted because there was an immediate need, or they believed there was an immediate need, to suppress that information. If NESP was connected to the assassination, or was believed to be connected, the perplexing actions are understandable and honorable. [It would be naive and simplistic to assert that all actions are explained by "higher motives"; obviously, complex interactions are possible. What is explained, however, is why those who perverted the record in their own self-interest were allowed to do so by those with the authority and power to prevent it.] In addition to understanding the behavior of individuals, such a scenario could explain an organized and systematic effort by the government to suppress the information surrounding the assassination. In the author's experience, some who support the lone assassin story do so in part because they find it, literally, inconceivable that there could be a highly organized effort to hide the truth. Such a view is understandable (and with which the author can sympathize). However, if the assassination was related to a plan to make a preemptive nuclear strike, suppression of that information is not only understandable, but imperative. Under such conditions, an organized cover up of the truth would be a logical and rational act, not the imaginary product of a paranoid fantasy. At the same time, this new perspective on the assassination should give pause to those in the critical community. It may indeed be that things are not what they seem. There are no conclusions argued here, nor is there any claim made to special insight. The purpose of this paper is to introduce information found by others and to suggest that it may be of crucial importance. Certainly it is worth considering and exploring. The painful paradox is that as powerful as such a connection is in predicting and explaining the assassination and surrounding events, the price is that possibilities far darker than previously imagined must be entertained. What we do know is that the United States had a specific and concrete plan for mass murder, the President was murdered, and the government he led did not want the truth to be revealed. Can anything be unthinkable? It is appropriate to end with the summation by Purcell and Galbraith: "One meeting, even in the White House, does not establish that first-strike was in fact the nuclear policy of the United States. Kennedy's recorded response, moreover, indicates his personal determination, shared by his civilian advisers, that it never become so. But we do know, from Howard Burris's notes, that a first strike plan had authors close to the decision center. How close, in the end, did they get? Civilian control of nuclear forces was no sure thing in 1961. Was it secure when the window opened, if it did, in 1963? Kennedy's actions and Johnson's eerie remark are consistent with the possibility that the calendar and risks of a first-strike window remained in the minds of both men as late as November, 1963 and possibly in Johnson's mind for a good deal longer." ============================================================================== Assassination related files available from Executive Action via anon. ftp: ftp ftp.netcom.com cd pub/xa/xaction "If we start assassinating Chiefs of State, God knows where it all will end?" -- Franklin Roosevelt to OSS chief William Donovan, 1944