INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY SELECT U.S. HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978 VOLUME III Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 41-372 0 WASHINGTON: 1979 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut District of Columbia CHARLES THONE, Nebraska YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan California CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania Subcommittee on the Subcommittee on the Assassination of Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. John F Kennedy WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman HAROLD E. FORD YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE FLOYD J. FITHIAN CHRISTOPHER J. DODD ROBERT W. EDGAR CHARLES THONE STEWART B. McKINNEY HAROLD S. SAWYER LOUIS STOKES, ex officio LOUIS STOKES, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio (II) CONTENTS September 18, 1978: Page Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel................... 1 Testimony of Sr. Eusebio Azcue Lopez, former Cuban Consul in Mexico City................................................................ 126 AFTERNOON SESSION Testimony of Eusebio Azcue--(Resumed) ...............................147 Testimony of St. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz ...............................173 September 19, 1978: Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel ........................195 Testimony of Insp. Thomas J. Kelley, assistant director of protective operations in Washington, D.C .....................................323 AFTERNOON SESSION Testimony of James J. Rowley ........................................356 September 20, 1978: Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel .......................457 Testimony of James R. Malley .......................................462 Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel .......................512 Testimony of James H. Gale .........................................513 September 21, 1978: Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel .......................559 Testimony of former President Gerald R. Ford .......................561 Testimony of John Sherman Cooper and John J. McCloy ................599 AFTERNOON SESSION Testimony of J. Lee Rankin, former general counsel of the Warren Commission.........................................................612 612 Testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United States ...........................................................642 (III) INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1978 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D. C. The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee), presiding. Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, Fauntroy, Thone, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Michael Goldsmith, senior staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Cuba was an important concern of John F. Kennedy during his brief administration. It prompted the occasion of his "darkest hour"--the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion. In the missile crisis, it also brought the United States--and the world--to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Understandably, therefore, among the many efforts to understand the assassination, those that include a Cuban element have been very prominent. Indeed, no less a figure than President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed his private view that John F. Kennedy might well have been the victim of the Cuban plot. The Warren Commission explored the Cuban element in the assassination of the President from two perspectives. First, it considered the extent to which Oswald "might have been motivated in the assassination by a desire to aid the Castro regime, which President Kennedy so outspokenly criticized." In the months preceding the assassination, left-wing literature to which Oswald subscribed--chiefly "The Militant" and "The Worker"--reflected an extremely critical attitude toward the Kennedy administration's policy toward Cuba. Indeed, much of what appeared in these papers seemingly called for violent solutions to Cuban problems with the United States. The possibility that Oswald may have been influenced by this literature seems real. Apparently in all seriousness, he told Michael Paine, the individual in whose home Marina was then living, that "You could tell what they wanted you to do * * * by reading (1) 2 between the lines." Ultimately, however, the Warren Commission decided that it could not ascribe to Oswald any one motive or a group of motives. Second, the Commission considered the extent to which Oswald's trip to Mexico in late September and early October 1963--a trip during which Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban consulate in Mexico City--may somehow have been related to the assassination. Based largely on the testimony of Sylvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national employed at the Cuban consulate, the Commission concluded the following about the visit. Oswald first visited the Cuban consulate on September 27, 1963. He requested an in-transit visa to permit him to visit Cuba en route to the Soviet Union. He was informed he could not obtain a visa to Cuba unless he first got one to enter the Soviet Union, and he was told at the Soviet Embassy he should not expect an answer to his visa application for about 4 months. He carried with him newspaper clippings and other documents, some authentic and some forged, in an attempt to demonstrate he was a "friend of Cuba." He used these documents, his previous residence in the Soviet Union, and his marriage to a Soviet national to curry favor at the Cuban consulate. He persisted in his demand for a Cuban visa, resulting in a bitter argument between him and the Cuban Consul, Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Eventually, his request was denied, and he left, apparently in anger. Ultimately, the Warren Commission expressed its satisfaction with the Duran account, noting that it had-- Reliable evidence from a confidential source that Senora Duran, as well as other personnel at the Cuban Embassy, were genuinely upset upon receiving the news of President Kennedy's death. It also indicated that- * * * confidential sources of extremely high reliability * * * establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects. The Commission also checked out a number of specific conspiracy allegations stemming from Oswald's trip to Mexico City, most of which alleged that he had been enlisted by Cuban agents in a plot to carry out the assassination. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded: Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, * * * History has not permitted so simple a resolution of the complex questions surrounding the assassination, Cuba, and Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Ironically, too, it was the Premier of Cuba, not the President of the United States, who was revealed and documented in Senate Intelligence Committee hearings in 1976 as the target of deadly serious assassination schemes. Between 1960 and early 1963, the committee concluded, the CIA conspired with known underworld figures to assassinate Premier Castro. Following the missile crisis in October 1962, the CIA-Mafia plots were brought to an end, or so we are told. But other assassination plots continued. Indeed, on November 22, 1963, a CIA case 3 officer was planning the killing of Castro with an official of the Cuban Government. The revelation in 1976 that the Premier of Cuba was the target of an unsuccessful assassination planned by the United States served to fuel the fires of speculation that Cuba had been the perpetrator of the successful effort against the President of the United States in 1963. It was recalled that Premier Castro himself, in an interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker on September 7, 1963, seemed to be warning that U.S. leaders who approved terrorist attacks on Cuban leaders could themselves be vulnerable. The AP story was carried in the New Orleans Times Picayune on September 9. Consequently, it could have been read by Lee Harvey Oswald himself. But the evidence of Cuban intentions may be interpreted in various ways. The Cuban delegate to the United Nations was in contact on September 5, 1963 with William Atwood, a U.S. delegate, to begin talks with the view toward starting the process of normalizing relations. And Jean Daniel, a French journalist, was with Premier Castro on November 22. He described Castro's reaction to the news of the Kennedy assassination as one of genuine surprise and deep regret. The critics of the Warren Commission, too, have persisted in their questioning of its conclusions, offering the theory that Oswald met with Cuban agents and various additional allegations. The most serious is the charge that it was, in fact, not Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate, but an imposter. Critics cite as evidence a photograph published by the Commission and thought by the critics to have been taken by a surveillance camera outside the Cuban consulate. It shows a burly man who bears no resemblance to Oswald, but who was identified as the individual who visited the consulate at the time Oswald was supposed to have done so. Mark Lane, in his "Rush to Judgment," raised the issue of the mysterious photograph and asked, "Was someone posing as Oswald?" Another widely circulated story after the Warren report was published is that Oswald, in a burst of anger on learning at the Cuban consulate that he could not secure a visa to visit Cuba, expressed an intention to assassinate President Kennedy. The select committee has sought to explore a number of questions in connection with Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Committee members and staff made two separate trips to both Cuba and Mexico. The cooperation of the Governments of Cuba and Mexico was sought and secured. The committee and the staff expresses its thanks to each government and those officials and citizens of each country that helped the committee in its investigation. Comment, however, must be made on the lack of cooperation by the Soviet Government. The select committee, both informally and through personal contacts and formally through the State Depart- ment, sought the cooperation of the Soviet Government, not only on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City where he is supposed to have visited the Soviet Embassy, but also in the period of time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. Various documents and files not made available to the Warren Commission but which the commit- 4 tee had a reasonable basis to believe existed were requested. The most important were the KGB surveillance files on Oswald. It was hoped that these files particularly might have been assistance to the committee in the crucial area of trying to ascertain Oswald's motive in the assassination. Ironically the KGB may well have the most complete file in the world on this crucial aspect of Oswald's personality. In addition, a request was made to interview officials and Soviet citizens who had contact with Oswald. The Soviet Government denied any relationship with Oswald or complicity in President Kennedy's death but declined to be of assistance, saying that it would be inappropriate for a great power to put itself in the position of having to defend itself against possible suspicion of complicity in the death of the leader of another country. The committee posed to itself in its investigation in this area, that is, Oswald's trip to Mexico, as the following: Was the man who visited the Cuban consulate in fact the man later accused of assassinating President Kennedy? When did the man alleged to be Oswald visit the Cuban consulate? What transpired at each visit? Who were the Cuban officials who dealt with him? Did he in fact express an intent to assassinate the President? Did the man alleged to be Oswald have any companions in Mexico City? The first witness who had been scheduled to be heard on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City was Sylvia Tirado Bazan, previously Sylvia Tirado Duran. Ms. Tirado was employed in September 1963 as secretary to the Cuban consul in Mexico City. Ms. Tirado was born November 22, 1937, in Mexico City. She is presently employed by the Mexican Social Security Office. Mr. Chairman, I understand that it has not been possible to secure the appearance of Senora Tirado. I understand, however, with your permission, Mr. Cornwell has a short presentation on her testimony. Chairman STOKES. The Chair will recognize Counsel Gary Cornwell. Mr. CORNWELL. I might state, Mr. Chairman, that through the assistance of the Mexican Government, three members of the staff did interview Sylvia Tirado, whose present name is Sylvia Tirado Bazan, on June 6, 1978. The Mexican Government thereafter agreed that she could come to the United States and testify at these hearings today. Mrs. Tirado Bazan also agreed to come. However, an unexpected busi- ness engagement of hers prevented her appearance here today. There is a photo which was made of her at the time of the interview, which is being displayed on the easel and marked JFK exhibit F-433, and we also have a transcript of the interview marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-440A, and a tape recording of excerpted portions of that interview which we have marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-439. Although the tape recording was not made for the purpose of playing it at these hearings--it was simply at the time intended as 5 a record of her statements--the staff has learned over the course of the investigation that it is often possible to gain a better understanding of a witness' testimony if you can hear or speak to the witness. Thus, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this time each of those exhibits be admitted into evidence, and that we play for the committee selected portions of her statement. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point, and you may proceed to play the recording. [The tape recording mentioned above, JFK exhibit F-439, is being retained in committee files.] [The information follows:] JFK EXHIBIT F-433 6 JFK Exhibit F-440A KENNEDY 9/18/78 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Name: Silvia Tirado (Duran) Date: June 6, 1978 Time:______________ Address:____________________ Place:____________________ ____________________ Interview: Cornwell: Would you like to state your name? Tirado: Silvia Tirado Bazan. Cornwell: And where's your present home address? Tirado? Avenida Universidad 1900 Edificio 12 Departmento 402 Colonia Numero De Terrenos Cornwell: For the record, my name is Gary Cornwell, and with me here is Ed Lopez, Harold Leap and Dan Hardway. We represent the House Select Committee on assassinations of the Congress of the United States. Also with us here today representing the Mexican Goverment is Honorio Escondon, Dr. Alfonso Orozco Contreras. Today is June 6, 1978 and the time is approximately 5:45 in the afternoon. Would you tell us what your date and place of birth is? Tirado: 22nd of November, 1937. Cornwell: You speak English so if you like my questions Interviewer Signature______________________________________ Typed Signature: Gary Cornwell Date Transcribed: br 6-19-78 7 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 2. translated we'll be happy to, and likewise, if you'd like to answer in English that would be fine, or if you'd rather answer in Spanish, we'll translate it. Tirado: I try to speak in English. Cornwell: All right. If you have any question about the what I phrase something or you don't understand it, simply ask and Mr. Lopez will translate it for you. Your name in 1963 was what? Tirado: Silvia Tirado de Duran. Cornwell: And your husband at that time was who? Tirado? Horacio Duran. Cornwell: Are you presently employed? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Where's that? Tirado: Social Security. Cornwell: Prior to that, what jobs did you hold? Tirado: A long while, Social Security. I used to write. Cornwell: And any other jobs? Have you held any other jobs? Tirado: No. Cornwell: At one time you worked for the Cuban Consulate. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Is that the only other job you ever held? Tirado: No. 8 Page 3. Cornwell: Well, let's say back since about 1960, could you tell us what the history of your employment is? Have you had many jobs? Tirado: I don't remember exactly, but uh, I used to work for the Olympic Games. I was a translator for two months. And uh, another three months I used to work for the, I don't know, it was an Exhibit of Hispanic Art that was, I don't know he went all over the world and I helped him to choose the pieces and as translator. I was married in 1960. I separate in '68, July '68 and I start working. Cornwell: During 1963, did you hold any jobs during that year other than your employment at the Cuban Consulate? Tirado: No. Cornwell: When did you first obtain the job at the Consulate and how did you obtain it. Tirado: Well, because I was uh, coordinating the Cuban, the Mexican-Cuban institute, the cultural Institute in '62, I think, and that's where I met some people. Yes. Cornwell: That was a private organization, is that correct? Tirado: It's not exactly private I don't know because all the countries have--there is the American Institute, there is the Russian Institute, there is the French Institute. It's cultural relations between the countries. Cornwell: Was that associated with the Mexican government? 9 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 4. Tirado: I don't know exactly, but I think--you know that. (Asks Orozco) (Translation) The objective is to present culturally the different embassies of and consulates that are in Mexico. Orozco Cornwell: What was you job with that organization? Tirado: Coordinator. Cornwell: And in connection with that, did you know any of the employees at the Cuban Consulate? Tirado: Yes, at the Cultrual Attache. Cornwell: And what were the names of those persons? Tirado: Teresa Proenza and Luis Alberu. Cornwell: And who? Tirado: Luis Alberu Cornwell: Did you in any other way know any of t he other employees at the Consulate? Tirado: Yes, well I knew Azcue, Eusebio Azcue who was a consul, and uh, Maria Carman Olivari -- she's dead. Cornwell: She, in the summer of 1963, was a secretary. Is that correct? (If you nod you head, the recorder will not make any record of what your answer is.) Tirado: Yes. 10 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 3. Cornwell: Would you then explain to us how it was that you obtained the job at the Consulate? Tirado: Because my friend Maria Carman, she was dead--she had an accident, and during the funeral I told Azcue that if he wants me to help him, for some people come from Cuba, just to help him. And of course he says yes. They need some people they can trust, and I'd been working in the Institute. So... Cornwell: How was it that you knew Eusebio Azcue by this time? Tirado: I don't remember, because he was uh, he was an Architect and he knew a lot of people, friends of ours, I mean my husband and I. Cornwell: Had he lived in Mexico for a long period of time? Tirado: Yes, yes. Cornwell: And, because of his occupation, he would have known your husband. Is that correct? Tirado: Yeah, more or less. Cornwell: Your husband Horatio was also an architect at that time. Tirado: Industrial designer. Yes, sir. Cornwell: Approximately when was it that you first obtained the job? Tirado: the end of July or August, early August. I don't 11 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 5. remember exactly. Cornwell: And for how long did you continue to work there? Tirado: Three or four months. Cornwell: How long after the assassination of President Kennedy did you work there? Tirado: Only two days. Cornwell: During that period of time what were the hours of operation of the consulate? Tirado: It was about 9:30 or 10:00 to 2:00 and in the afternoon about 5:00 to 8:00 or something. If we have a lot of work, we stayed longer. Cornwell: The hours were 10:00 to 2:00 and then 5:00 to 8:00. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes, that's true. Cornwell: Was the Consulate open for visitors during both of those sets of hours? Tirado: No, it was just in the morning. Cornwell: Would you mind sketching for us what the physical layout of the Consulate looked like at that time? (pause) You have drawn a rectangular shape. What formed the outside of it? Was it a solid wall around the outside? Was the outside of the premises a wall? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: All right. And we'll just mark it the way you 12 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 7. drew it. In the lower left-hand corner, there is a small box you drew. What is that? Tirado: The consular. Cornwell: That's the consulate's office? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: All right. We'll just put a one in that box, so we'll know that's the consulate's office. Then, the door was... where, on the corner?..you remember the name of the streets, still today? Tirado: This is Tacubayo. this is Francisco Marquez. You want me to write it down? Cornwell: If you remember, yes. Tirado: Here were the houses. Cornwell: All right. You've labeled three sides of the building with street names and on the fourth side which on the top of the drawing, you said they are houses. Correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: What is in the long triangular shape on the drawing above the Consular office? Tirado: It was the commercial office. Cornwell: All right. We'll just put a two in there. That's.. Tirado: And here was the cultural office. Cornwell: And behind that, we'll mark it with a three, was the cultural office. In the center of the drawing 13 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 3. is what? Tirado: The Embassy. Cornwell: All right. We'll put a four in that. That's the Embassy. And what's the small box in the lower right-hand corner? Tirado: I don't know how to say it in English. Cornwell: An entryway? Lopez: Housekeeper. Cornwell: Oh, a housekeeper? Okay. We'll put a five in there. What is all the rest of the space inside the premises? Tirado: Garden, it was garden. And here was the entrance for the cars. Cornwell: And where you indicated there was an entrance for cars, we'll mark that seven. And all the interior space which was garden, we'll mark with an eight. Tirado: Down here there was a movie room. Cornwell: Where, behind the...? Tirado: Behind the cultural room? Cornwell: Want to draw that? Tirado: No, because this is the first floor. Cornwell: Oh, it was on the second floor. Tirado: Yeah. On the first floor was a projection...movies 14 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 9. Cornwell: Were the space which we marked one, two, three and also four, were they all two-story? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Okay. And above the space marked one, what was there? Tirado: The Consulate. Cornwell: So it was on two floors. Tirado: No, there was another floor over here but it was belongs to the commercial... Only on the first floor was the Consultae. Cornwell: I see. What would be behind the Consulate on the first floor? In this area marked two? Tirado: I don't remember. Cornwell: You don't remember. So, where we marked two, that was a second story in that area. Correct? Tirado: Warehouse perhaps. Cornwell: Just a storage area or something like that, perhaps, in the lower area marked two. In the space marked number one, which was the Consular's office, who all occupied that area? Tirado: Well, Consul, the Vice Consul and the secretary. Cornwell: Which was you. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: During the time that we're interested in. 15 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 10. The Consul's name of course was Eusebio Azcue. The Vice Consul's name was what? Tirado: I don't remember. Cornwell: All right. Tirado: This was Consulate. Cornwell: All right. You have divided the area that we originally marked number one into two units. The smaller unit indicates where the Consul sat and you sat in a larger reception area in the front? All right. And then, behind the Consul's office, was there another door? You marked that with a heavier area, and that would be where he could walk out into the courtyard. Is that corret. So if you wanted to get into the Consul's office, including the reception area from the courtyard, you needed to walk through the Consul's office. Is that accurate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Now, what kind of a door was at the corner, the lower left-hand corner here, so that if one were to walk from your office to the street, what kind of door was that? Glass, wood, solid, could you see through it? Tirado: No, it was solid. I don't remember exactly, but perhaps I was wood. But it was solid. 16 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 11. Cornwell: You don't remember being able to see out on the street? Tirado: No, no. Cornwell: Okay. Lopez: You enter the Consulate right, in here? Tirado: Uh huh. Lopez: And your office would be right around here. Right? Tirado: My desk was here. Cornwell: You have drawn a small box now inside the larger half of the area we originally marked area number one, that's where our desk was? Tirado: Yes. Lopez: From where you sat to the entrance into the office where you were, where would the entrance into the office be? Not into the whole consulate, but just into your office? Tirado: It was open. Lopez. Okay, it was open. Tirado: You would enter here. Here was the stairs for the second floor, No?--and here I think there were chairs, or something like that. For the people who were waiting. And the desk was here. Lopez: Okay. Where would the entrance to your office be? Tirado: Here, or here. Lopez: Just to your office, not to the Consul's office. 17 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 12. It would be at the same entrance? Tirado: Yes. Lopez: And from where you sat, you couldn't see outside at all? Tirado: No. Lopez: You couldn't see any area in the yard? There was no glass. Tirado: No. I can remember glass, a window, yeah. I can remember windows here, and perhaps here, but I don't remember. Cornwell: Okay. There may have been windows for you to see out in the street? Tirado: Yeah, but I couldn't see outside because perhaps they were very high. Cornwell: While Mr. Lopez was asking you questions, he drew a diagonal line across your office space. Does that represent anything? That line should not have been drawn, is that correct? Tirado: yeah. (Laughs.) Cornwell: Now, did you know a Teresa Proenza? Was she employed at the Consulate or the Embassy. Tirado: The Embassy. She was the Cultural Attache. Cornwell: She would have worked in the area marked number four? Is that correct? Tirado: Well, yes. But this was, this construction was uh, afterwards. This was the Embassy and the Consulate and building was under construction, 18 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 13. constructed. A building. Cornwell: Constructed? Tirado: Later. It was the old building. Cornwell: Did she work there during the same period of time you did? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: At the period where did she work? What area? Tirado: Here. Cornwell: That's the area we marked number three on the diagram. Did you know a Louisa Calderon? Tirado: Louisa? Yes, she was in the commercial... Cornwell: And where would that be on the diagram? In the area we marked number two? Tirado: I think her office was exactly above mine. She was a secretary. And I think it was above. Cornwell: Either above the area we marked one, or the area marked two, but on the second level. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you know the names of any other employees who worked there at the time? Tirado: No, I don't remember. Cornwell. The man named Mirabal, he was to replace Eusebio Azcue, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. 19 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 14. Cornwell: And do you recall aproximately when he arrived in Mexico city and began to learn the job so he could take it over from Eusebio Azcue? Tirado: I didn't understand, what did you say please? Cornwell: Do you remember approximately when he arrived? And began to learn the work from Azcue. Tirado: No, some weeks earlier, I don't remember. cornwell: Would it be accurate to state that your best memory as you told us when we spoke to you informally before we turned the tape recorders on, that he was already there when you met the man you later identified as Oswald? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Now. Tirado: But he wasn't there when I started working at the Embassy, at the Consulate. Cornwell: Okay. So he much have arrived in late summer or perhaps September, or something like that. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Now, were there telephones in the office? Tirado: Here. Cornwell: You had one at your desk? Tirado: this is the desk and here was a little table. I think it was the telephone. Here was the 20 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 15. safe box. And here was the Archivo. Lopez: Archives. Cornwell: So you've drawn two smaller boxes next to your desk. One of them was like a filing cabinet, or for storage of records? Tirado: Yes. This one. The Files. Cornwell: And the other one was a table. Tirado: No, here was the safe box. Cornwell: Oh, a safe. I see, a safe. And there was a phone at the desk? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And did Azcue also have a telephone? Tirado: Yes, it was the same but with an extension. Cornwell: Extension. Tirado: Here was the door. Cornwell: All right. 1963, where were you living? Did you have more than one residence? Tirado: Yes. Constituyentes 143. Cornwell: And during what part of 1963 was that? Tirado: When I moved there? Before i started working, at the embassy. But just a few weeks... Cornwell: So sometime in the summer of 1963. Did you have 21 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 16. a telephone at your home? Tirado: Not at the moment that Oswald came. Because we had just moved. I think we moved in July because we were separated in July, also, July '68 and it is when the contract finished. So perhaps... Cornwell: I see. Your rent contract ran out in July of '68? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: About the same time that you and Horatio were divorced? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you, you say that because of your move, it took some time to get a telephone in your home? Tirado: Yes. cornwell: And do you remember approximately when it was that you finally got that in? Tirado: At the assassination we had, a, let me see, we didn't have telephone--days later. Cornwell: It was sometime after the assassination that you first got a telephone in this residence. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And do you by any chance recall the telephone number at the Consulate? Tirado: Oh, so many times I write it down. Perhaps it was 11-28-45, perhaps? 22 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 17. Cornwell: Could it have been 11-28-47? Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: When were you first advised that we wanted to speak to you? Tirado: Last week. Cornwell: And since that time, of course, last Wednesday, I believe it was, we spoke to you informatlly, and told you basically what we were interested in. And learned most of what you could remember about the events we were interested in. Correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Apart from that, have you had any other oportunities to read anything, or speak to anyone, in order to refresh your memory about the events? Tirado: Yes. In October of '76 some journalist from the Washington Post came to interview me. Cornwell: We are familiar with the story that appeared in the Washington Post at approximately that time. Apart from that have you for instance read the Warren Commission Report? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: When did you last have an occasion to read that? Tirado: Oh, when Horacio told me you were coming, I was writing, and I try to remember exactly and I'm starting saying that again, the nightmare came, and so on 23 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 18. and so on, and I wanted to check the dates. Cornwell: So, last week sometime, you had a chance to read it over again? Tirado: No, not everything just the one little thing. Cornwell: Just the part that dealt with Mexico city and your testimony and that sort of thing. Correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Let me ask you, when you read that, was there any part of it that seemed to you to be inaccurate? Tirado: Inaccurate? Cornwell: Not correct. Tirado: Not correct? Yes, but with the warren Commission, I get angry when I start reading it because they make some afirmacionnes (ph). Lopez: Allegations or conclusions. tirado: Yes. I don't like it. So I tried to erase it. Cornwell: Okay. What specifically about the report was it that makes you angry? Tirado: That I was a--let me see how to say it--, I don't remember exactly, but uh, I did more to Oswald when he was here than was my job, that it was extra. Cornwell: You mean part of the report that suggests that you went beyond your duties at that Consulate, that you exceeded your authority, and you thought that you did not do so. Is that correct? 24 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 19. Tirado: Correct. Cornwell: Is there anything else about the Warren Commission Report's resume of the facts that you felt was inaccurate, that made you mad? Tirado: I cannot answer that because I only read at that time two pages. I didn't read the whole thing. Cornwell: Okay. In addition to looking at that in order to refresh you memory, have you had a chance to speak to any one else? Tirado: No, it was just for checking my writing. Cornwell: What writing was that? Tirado: Well, I was trying to remember everything that happened in the interrogatory. It was not hard, I mean, what I felt, but uh, what the police had done to me, so it was my but I'm writing, I'm writing an autobiographia how do you say that, and this is a chapter. Cornwell: I see. Tirado: (Laughs.) Cornwell: Directing your attention than to approximately late September of 1963, as we learned from you the other day, a man came to the Consulate, a man who you later associated with pictures in the newspaper and a name in the newspaper of the alleged assassin of the President. Is that correct? 25 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 20 Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you remember how many times he came to the Consulate? Tirado: Three times. Cornwell: Do you remember the date or dates upon which those three visits occurred? Tirado: No, I saw the application. You showed me the other day, and in the Warren Commission was September 27, but I didn't remember, of course, until I read it. Cornwell: All right. Do you have a recollection whether it was all on one day or on separate days. Tirado: The same day. Cornwell: On the very first visit, would you describe to us what the man said and did, and what you said in response? tirado: Yes, he, well, he enter and he ask me if I speak english and I say yes, and then he start asking me about requirements to go to Cuba, to get a visa to go to cuba, and I explain it. Cornwell: What did you explain? Tirado: Well, that he needed to, he said that a transit visa so that he needs a visa to the country that he was going, from, if it was a Socialist country, the visa was given, as soon 26 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 21. as he gets the other visa, and uh... Cornwell: When he first asked about the requirements for a visa, did he tell you that his objective was to go to cuba or to another country? Tirado: To the Soviet Union. Cornwell: Did you ever suggest to him that there was any alternative means to acquire a visa other than the in-transit visa requirement which you just described? Tirado: I don't remember, I mean I hardly remember. But what used to say is if you want to go to Cuba, you need or you have to have friends in Cuba, so they may, what do you say, take responsibility, if you get the visa. That was one way, no? And the other way was in-transit. Cornwell: Okay. If I understand then, you don't have a distinct recollection about exactly what you said to Oswald, but you asumed it was what you said to everyone who came in, which was that you explained both processes, that they either must have friends in Cuba or the in-transit visa could be granted if they got a visa from another country. Tirado: No, if only they asked me. Because they usually go there and say, "I want to go to Cuba." But if they say I'm just in transit, then I explain 27 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 22. Cornwell: Okay, then. Let me see if I can rephrase it and get what's in your mind as best we can. Is it your best recollection that you did explain both alternatives to Oswald? Tirado: I don't remember exactly, because I think he immediately says that he wants to go to Russia, and he was in transit to go to Cuba. I think he immediately says so. Cornwell: Okay. So then your best recollection that you may have only explained the in-transit visa process. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornell: But, I gather from the way you have answered the question, there is still the possibility that you also discussed with him going to cuba if he had friends, but you're not sure about that second one. Is that accurate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Now, after this first basic explanation, what if anything did he say or do? Tirado: Well, I don't remember exactly. He show all the paper that he had, when he gave me the application when he came back,... Cornwell: Okay. Wait a minute. Just the first visit. Is there anything else about the first visit? Or, 28 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. did he leave at that time and if he left, why did he leave? Tirado: To have photographs of himself. Cornwell: Okay. So your memory is that on the first occasion you also explained to him that he needed photographs and he left shortly thereafter to obtain them. Tirado: Yes, and perhaps, but I'm not very sure, that, uh, he said that he was a friend of the Cuban Revolution, and when he showed me all the scrap paper that he has. Cornwell: All right. You don't remember if that was on the first or the second occasion. Correct? Tirado: Yeah, I don't remember. Cornwell: Nevertheless, he did leave to go get photographs, and he did return? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did he return with the photographs? Tirado: With four photographs. Cornwell: Four of them. tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Were they all the same? To the best of your memory, was he wearing the same kind of clothes that he was wearing that day in the photographs? Tirado: Yes. 29 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 24. Cornwell: So, from all the circumstances, did it appear to your that he just went somewhere locally and had the pictures made? Tirado: Yeah. I think that I already explained (to) him where he could take the photographs. Cornwell: You told him some locations in town where ge could go? Were there some right in the neighborhood of the Consulate there? Tirado: That I don't remember. Cornwell: All right. But at any rate you knew of some place at the time, mentioned one or two places to him? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Correct?... Did you look at the photos when he brought them back, careful about to be sure that it was the same man who was standing in front of you? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And what did you do at that time? Tirado: I filled out application. Cornwell: You personally typed it, and did you type it in duplicate or triplicate or just one copy? Tirado: Duplicate. Cornwell: And was the second copy a carbon? 30 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. Tirado: Carbon? Cornwell: Did you have it twice or did you type one and make two copies? Tirado: Only one. Cornwell: And made two? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And what did you do with the photographs? Tirado: Stapled them. Cornwell: Stapled them? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: On top of the application. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: The application has a place on it for a date, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you type in the date that was in fact that day? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Let's just talk hypothetically for a moment. Is there any chance that he was at the Consulate on more than one day? Tirado: No. I read yesterday, an article in the Reader's digest, and they say he was at the Consulate on three occasions. He was in Friday, Saturday, and Monday...That's not true, that's false. 31 Silvia's Tirado Interview Page 26. Cornwell: All right. Let's try a different hypothetical. If the one in the Reader's Digest is definitely wrong, is it possible that he first came on like a Thursday, and then came back on a Friday? Tirado: No, because I am positively sure about it. That he came in the same day. Cornwell: Let me ask you then something about just the procedures or the Consulate at the time. Would it have been consistent with your normal procedures for you to have typed the application on his first visit, even though he didn't have a photograph to put on it? Tirado: No. Cornwell: In other words, before you started the process of typing it, you were sure you had everything you needed to make it complete. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did he tel you where he was staying at the time? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did you recall any problem with him not knowing any address, where he was staying in Mexico City? Tirado: No, because he say that he has no time to wait, he was in a hotel and uh, I didn't ask the address, in Mexico City because I mean didn't care. Cornwell: You didn't have a need to know that? 32 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 27. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you recall any problem coming up where he needed to know it? For any other reason? Tirado: Me to know his address? Cornwell: No, for him to know. Did he have any problem, did he have any need to know it himself? Do you remember anything along those lines? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Going back to the second visit, is it your memory that you typed the application in duplicate, you stapled the pictures at the top of each copy, if that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Then what did you do with the application? Tirado: Well, I used to put it in a file, and uh, I used to keep one copy, another to send, the original, we used to send to Cuba. And I think I have another file. Cornwell: Was he required to sign the application? Tirado: He sighned it, yes. Cornwell: Did he sign one or both of them? Tirado: I think both, it has to be. Cornwell: Was there any requirement in the Consulate that he do it in any particular person's presence? Anyone have to watch him while he signed it? Tirado: I don't know, I mean I just don't remember. 33 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. Cornwell: As a hypothetical, did Azcue have to watch people sign the applications? Tirado: No. He was in his office. Cornwell: So you could handle that all by yourself. Tirado: yes. Cornwell: Did he sign it in your presence? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did anything else occur on the second visit, any other conversation, or any other event? Tirado: No, but I told you, it's uh, he said that he was a friend of the Cuban Revolution. He show me letters to the Communist Party, the American Communist Party, his labor card, and uh, he's working in Russia, I don't remember exactly, but he said on his application, his licence number... Cornwell: Marriage license? Tirado: (Spoke in spanish.) Se dice serup los recortes del Cornwell: Okay, we had to pause for a second to turn the periodico tapes over. As I recall, you were explaining the kinds of things he brought with him. Tirado: Yes, it was his labor card, form Russia, his us, marriage pact, yes, that he was married with a Russian, and uh, a clipping that he was with two policemen taking him by his arms, that he was in a meeting to support Cuba. And a card saying that he was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba in New 34 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 29. Orleans. And Cornwell: Do you recall what was said or what occurred that caused him to produce all of these documents about his having a Russian wife and his Fair Play For Cuba activity? Tirado: Just a minute. (Spanish--what means recall?) Lopez: Recordar. He showed me all of these papers to demonstrate that he was a friend of the revolution. Cornwell: But did you say anything to him or did anyone else say anything to him that made him feel he needed to produce this kind of documentation. Tirado: No, I don't think so. What I said is that when he said he was a member of the Party, of the Communist Party, the American, I said why don't they arrange, the Party, your Party with the Cuban Party, and he said that he didn't have time to do it. Cornwell: Did you ask him why hw didn't just have the Communist Party arrange his trip to Cuba? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: the Cuban Communist Party? He just said he didn't have time? Tirado: Yes. Because there was a manner to do it. I mean, we get, for instance, the visa directly 35 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 30. from Cuba and saying give the visa to this people that's coming and somebody say oh, yes, you have you visa here. Cornwell: Do you recall anything else happening on the second occasion? Or have you related all that's in your mind on that? Tirado: No. It was strange. I mean because I you are a Communist and you're coming from a country where the Communist Party is not very well seen, and in Mexico City that the Communist Party was not legal at that moment -- crossing the border with all of his paper, it was not logical. I mean if you're really communist, you go with anything, I mean just nothing, just your passport, that's all. And that was something that I didn't like it but... Cornwell: So, you were a little suspicious of the amount of documentation he brought? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Did you say anything to him about that? tirado: Perhaps I told him, what are you doing with all of this? And he said to prove I'm a friend of yours. Cornwell: Did you discuss your suspicions with anyone else? Tirado: With the consul. Cornwell: With Azcue? 36 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 31. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you remember when that discussion occurred? Tirado: It was afterwards. Cornwell: Was that after his second visit as you recall? Tirado: It was during his third visit. Cornwell: During his third visit. All right. Let's back up again for just a moment. what time of day as best as you recall did he come to the Consulate the first time? Tirado: Perhaps it was eleven o'clock or something like that, ten thirty. Cornwell: And the second time? Tirado: About twelve, or eleven, no, about one o'clock. Cornwell: Okay. The first one was roughly late morning, and the second one was early afternoon. Tirado: yes. Cornwell: And then, when did he leave the second time? Tirado: To get his Russian visa. Cornwell: Would it have been the standard procedure in the Cuban Consulate, to take the application, have him sign it, and have it ready to go in the file if the request was in-transit, for an in-transit visa, even though he did not have the visa from the third country. Or from another country? Tirado: Uh, huh. 37 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 32. Cornwell: All right. Tirado: Yes, I did send it to Cuba. Cornwell: All right. Okay. So, then you sent him in effect, to the Russian Embassy. And it was at that point after he left that you spoke to... Tirado: No. Cornwell: No, you didn't speak to the Consulate at all yet. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Had there been any problem at all yet? Tirado: No. Cornwell: So far, it's like any normal visa appplication. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Would it have been consistent with the procedures in the consulate or you to have allowed him to take one or both of the applications typed up outside the Consulate? Tirado: I don't remember very well if uh, there were only two copies. I mean, one original and one copy, but uh, it could have happened, but I don't remember. Cornwell: Okay. To the best of your memory then, the person who made the application was not permitted to have a copy. Tirado: I don't know. I don't remember. Cornwell: Okay. You're not sure. But your tentative memory is that would not have occurred. 38 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 33. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Would you have ever allowed a person to take all of the applications outside and attach the photos or sign them themselves? Tirado: Yes, because you may come, ask for the application and you may keep it. Cornwell: You, on occasion, would allow someone just to have a blank copy. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. But he was different because he did not speak in Spanish so I have to fill it. Cornwell: I see. If he would have spoken Spanish or professed to having someone with him who did speak Spanish, you might have allowed him to take the applications and fill them out. Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: At least on other occasions you have done that, with other people. Tirado: That's something that I really don't remember. Cornwell: There at least, there was no requirement that you type it there in the office, as long as it got filled out. Tirado: I think I have to type it. I have to type it because I have to make some observations, always. Cornwell: Down at the botton? Tirado: Yes. 39 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 34. And I think that if you fill it in handwriting, I have to type it, for, to send it to Cuba. Cornwell: So, at most, you would allow someone to fill it out and bring it in so you could type it? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: If that procedure was employed, allowing someone else ot fill it out, would you still be required ot check the photograph to be sure it was accurate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Would you still require the person to sign it in your presence? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Just so we can keep out documents straight, let's just mark now on the back a photograph and we'll ask you some questions about it. We'll mark it as Exhibit Number 2. This is a photograph of what would appear to be a visa application. Does it appear to be basically the type of visa application that we have been speaking about? Tirado: Yes. The numbers, I think they're mine. Cornwell: The numbers in the upper right-hand corner which are hand-written? Tirado: I think so. 40 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 35. Cornwell: Those appear to you to be in your handwriting. Tirado: Yeah, because when I file I write in the number, the following number? Cornwell: Okay. And on the very bottom of the application, where it says "para uso de la mision" that means it's filled in by someone associated with the Cuban Government. Is that correct. Or the Consulate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Who, according to the usual procedure, filled out that portion. Tirado: Me. Cornwell: The other day when we talked to you informally, you read through the words in that section. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. I remember. Cornwell: And your memory is that you in fact typed that section on this application. Tirado: Yes. I used to do this with all the applications. Cornwell: And under that, there is a signature. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Are you able to tell whose signature that is? Tirado: No, I was thinking it was Mirabal, but no--I couldn't sign any papers. Cornwell: Okay. So it was definitely not your signature? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you know whether, according to normal procedure, 41 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 36. any particular person routinely placed his name at that location? Tirado: No, only the Consulate. People in the Consulate. Cornwell: What would be the purpose of a signature in the lower right-hand corner? Tirado: I don't know, perhaps to check that it was right as it was written. Cornwell: Did you ever see the Consulate or any other employee routinely sign the applications at the location? Tirado: I don't remember, but what I used to do was put the originals in one packet and that was with a letter to the Minister, de Relaciones exterister (spanish). How do you say that? (Lopez - Minister of Foreign Relations), and I used to give to the Consul so he sign the papers and send it to Cuba. Cornwell: Okay. One copy stayed in the Consulate and one was mailed to Cuba, to the Minister of Foreign Relations. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Is it possible then that the signature in the lower right-hand corner is someone in Cuba? Tirado: Perhaps that one that get it. Cornwell: That receives it in cuba. All right, the stamp, 42 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 37. which appears slightly over the name, the handwritten name, Lee H. Oswald, when did that get laced on the application if you know? Tirado: Perhaps in the moment that he sign? Cornwell: Was that part of the normal procedure? Did you have a stamp as you recall to do that? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And was that a means of authenticating the signature, that you would stamp on top of it like that? Tirado: I think so. Because let me see. This was signed by Cuba, I think because this was October 10. This was the answer, perhaps. Cornwell: So there's a date you just pointed to, around the middle of the application reading 10-Oct. 1963 and you are assuming, I take it, that that was the date placed on the document in Cuba? Tirado: Perhaps but I don't know. I don't know the date of when we send the application. Cornwell: Or it was placed on there when you mailed it? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you know which? Tirado: I don't know. Cornwell: You don't remember which? Could it have been the date upon which the application was received 43 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 38. in the Consulate here in mexico City? Tirado: In return. cornwell: In return? Back from cuba? Is that what you mean? Tirado: Perhaps. I don't know that. Cornwell: Could it have been the date you received it from Oswald? Tirado: No, because it was the same date. Cornwell: Okay. The only date on here of receipt from Oswald was the one near the top, the second line, which reads: 27 Sep. 1963. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: So I guess the best we can do is say that you don't have a distinct recollection of how the 10th of October date would have gotten placed on here. Correct? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: How long normally would it have taken between the receipt of an application and the date that it would have been mailed to Cuba? Tirado: Well, it depends on the flight. We had, I don't remember in that time, if we were three flights from Cuba to Mexico and from Mexico to Cuba and it depends on the work that we have to do, if we have a lot of work we wouldn't have sent it immediately or,--valise diplomatica, How do you say it? Cornwell: Diplomatic pouch. 44 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 39. Cornwell: Would there have been some usual amount of time? How much could it vary? Tirado: The flights were Monday, Wednesday and Friday, I think. And uh, well, we send a bunch if, I think, I don't know, when what day in the week was the 27th? Perhaps if it was Wednesday, we would send next Friday, or next Monday. Or... Cornwell: I have another photograph of just the upper left-hand corner of the same document, which we'll mark as Exhibit 3 on the back, and ask you if, to the best of your recollection, that is a photograph of the man whom you saw on or about the 27th of September? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: I don't understand. A moment ago, did you say that there was a normal time of the week that mailings to Cuba occurred? Tirado: Would you please repeat the question? Cornwell: Was there a usual day, did the mailings to Cuba usually occur on one given day of the week? Tirado: Yes, I don't remember exactly, but I think it was on Friday, perhaps, that we make, we send applications. Yeah, it was one day to send all the applications. Cornwell: All right. So, if we were to tel you the 27th of 45 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 41. Cornwell: What happened? Tirado: Somebody took them to the Consulate. cornwell: Okay. you said the main gate. Was that the area that, on Exhibit one, you marked as beign the door to your office, or some other area? Tirado: He was closed. In the afternoon he was closed. But perhaps he came... Cornwell: The door on Area One was locked up. Okay? Tirado: Yes. And then he was open. Cornwell: Over near Number Seven, is that correct? Where they let the cars in? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: There was a door there too? Tirado: Yes. It was the garage and another door. Cornwell: And the doorman from that area brought him to your office? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: What occurred on that occasion? Tirado: What? Cornwell: What happened on that occasion. Tirado: Well, he came in and he said that he already have his Russian Visa and uh, he want to get his Cuban visa. And I said that that was not possible because he has to be first sent to Cuba and then 46 Sylvia Tirado Interview Page 41. Cornwell: What happened? Tirado: Somebody took them to the Consulate. Cornwell: Okay. You said the main gate. Was that the area that, on Exhibit one, you marked as being the door to your office, or some other area? Tirado: He was closed. In the afternoon he was closed. But perhaps he came... Cornwell: The door on Area One was locked up. Okay? Tirado: Yes. And then he was open. Cornwell: Over near Number Seven, is that correct? Where they let the cars in? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: There was a door there too? Tirado: Yes. It was the garage and another door. Cornwell: And the doorman from that area brought him ot your office? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: What occurred on that occasion? Tirado: What? Cornwell: What happened on that occasion? Tirado: Well, he came in and he said that he already have his Russian visa and uh, he want to get his Cuban visa. And I said that that was not possible because he has to be first sent to Cuba and then 47 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 42. wait for the answer, no, it was necessary that he has to have first a Socialist visa, the Russian visa. And, uh,... Cornwell: Did he show you his passport with a visa in it? From the Russian Embassy. Tirado: No, No. I don't remember exactly but what I remember is he says that he already has his Russian visa and I said I don't see it and well, I don't remember exactly what we discussed in that moment. But, he was very stubborn. So, I say, well, I'm going to call to the Russian Consul, so I called the russian Consul and I said hey, listen, here's a man that, he say that he already got his Russian visa. And he said, yes, I remember it. He came to us for visa but uh, the answer will be in three or four months, that was the usual time. Cornwell: So as you recall, then, the person t the Russian Embassy said in effect, no, he doesn't have it yet, he's only applied for it. Is that right? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Okay. Go ahead. Tirado: And uh, and I told him what the Russian Consulate says and then, he was angry. He age angry. And he insisted that he was a friend of the Cuban Re- 48 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 43. volution, that he has already been in jail for the Cuban Revolution, that uh, oh, that he wanted that visa and that he couldn't wait for so long time because uh, his Mexican visa was finished in three days. So he was insistent and uh, I didn't have time and well, I couldn't make him understand that. So, I went to the Consul's office and I explained to him, and would you please come and talk with him? Axcue came, Misrabel I think he didn't speak English, so Azcue came and told him those things, all the requirements that he needs to fly to Cuba, and he was really angry. He was red and he was almost crying and uh, he was insisting and insisting so Azcue told him to go away because if he didn't go away at that moment he was going to kick him, or something like that. So, Azcue went to the door, he opened the door and told Oswald to go away. Cornwell: Okay. So he went to the door which was in the area we marked 'one,' which was at the Consulate Office? Tirado: Yes...Remember, I was feeling pity for him because he looked desperate. Cornwell: He looked desperate? Tirado: Yes. 49 Silvia Tirado Interview page 44. Cornwell: So, you felt kind of sorry for him? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: At any time during these three contacts, did he indicate to you that he could speak or understand Spanish? Tirado: No. Cornwell: During this period was your normal work week, did it include Saturdays? Tirado Yes. Cornwell Is it possible that, in addition to his visits on Friday, he also came back the following day on Saturday mourning? Tirado: No. Cornwell: How can you be sure of that? Tirado: Because, uh, I told you before, that it was easy to remember, because not all the Americans that came there were married with a Russian woman, they have live(d) in Russian and uh, we didn't used to fight with those people because if you, they came for going to Cuba, so apparently they were friends, no? So we were nice to them with this man we fight, I mean we had a hard discussion so we didn't want to have anything to do with him. Cornwell: Okay. I understand that but I don't understand how that really answers the question. In other 50 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 45. words, the question is, what is it about the events that makes you sure that he did not come back on Saturday, and have another conversation with you? Tirado: Because I remember the fight. So if he (come) back, I would have remembered. Cornwell: Did Azcue work on Saturdays? Tirado: Yes, we used to work in the office but not for the public. Cornwell: Was there a guard, was there a guard out here at the corner near number seven on your diagram on Saturdays? Tirado: Excuse me? Cornwell: Was there a doorman out near the area that you marked as number seven, on the diagram? Tirado: Yes, but on Saturday he never let people ... Cornwell: Never let people in. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Not even if they came up to the doorman and didn't speak Spanish? And were very insistent? Tirado: No, because they could answer or something. They could ask me for instance, no ? by the inter-phone. Cornwell: They could do that on a Friday, though. 51 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 46 Tirado: But what I remember is that Oswald has my tele- phone number and my name and perhaps he show to the doorman (Spanish). Cornwell: When did you give him the telephone number and name? Tirado: In the second visit, perhaps. Cornwell: Okay. Tirado: I used to do that to all the people, so they don't have to come and to bother me. So I used to give the telephone number and my name and say "give me a call next week to see if your visa arrived." Cornwell: Well. Are you saying that based on your memory the guard was allowed to bring people in during the five till eight o'clock at night uh, sessions during the week but not on Saturdays? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you have a distinct recollection with respect to telephone calls to the Russian Consulate, was it just one call or was it more than one call? Tirado: Only one. Cornwell: Just one. The ... I believe I asked you this, but just to be sure, although the application was typed with 52 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 47. a carbon to make two copies with one typing, did he have to sign both independently? Or did you allow them to use a carbon to sign the paper? Tirado: No, no. It was the original. Cornwell: Two original signatures. All right. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Was anything said that you recall at this time which looking back on it indicated the possibility, even on that date, Oswald had on his mind some intension of killing the President of the United States? Tirado: No, I don't think so. Cornwell: Let me read something to you, and ask you if it at all refreshes your memory or if hour have a memory of a conversation similar to this? I don't believe I read this to you before, when we talked the other day, or did I? Did I rea and excerpt from Daniel Schorr's book to you? Tirado: No, you told me. Cornwell: Okay. I'll read it to you then at this time. It's an excerpt from a book called Clearing the Air, written by Daniel Schorr, published in the United States in 1977. And page 177 reads as follows: "In and interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark, Castro 53 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 48 (meaning Fidel Castro) said that Oswald had come to the Cuban Consulate twice, each time for about fifteen minutes. The first time, I was told, he wanted to work for us. He was asked to explain but he wouldn't, he wouldn't go into details. The second time he said he wanted to free Cuba from American imperialism. Then he said something like 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.' Then Oswald said, and this is exactly how is was reported to me, maybe I'll try to do it." Do you recall any conversation like that in either what was said to you by Oswald or that was said by Oswald to Azcue or anyone else that you might have overheard? Tirado: No, I don't remember. Cornwell: Did any part of that conversation occur? Tirado: No, because I don't remember that he says he was to go to work in Cuba because he only that he wanted to go in-transit. That's what I remember. Cornwell: What do you think, well, first let me ask you, do you think that conversation could have occurred and you just forgot it? In other words, is that the kind of conversation which, if it occurred, you would definitely remember it? Tirado: Yes. Because in the fight with Azcue there was shouting and crying and things like that. I could miss something, but not, because even if would say so, I mean, I could have heard, no, I mean 54 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 49 if you kill President you're not going to change the whole system. You see, that's why I give you answer, even Azcue. I mean that's no the, I don't think so, that he had that conversation with anyone. He was arguing. . . Cornwell: Do you remember any part of the conversation indicating that Oswald blaming the United States or President Kennedy for his inability to get to Cuba? Tirado: I don't remember but that could be possible. Cornwell: In other words, if he's frustrated and he comes to the Cuban Consulate, he might feel animosity or anger towards various people. He might be angry at you, or Azcue, or at the Cuban Govern- ment or at the Russian Government or perhaps the United States Government, depending on how the conversation went. What do you recall about that? Who was he angry at when told he couldn't go to Cuba Tirado: He was angry at us. That's why I called Azcue Because he was not a strong man but anyway, I didn't like to fight with him. He was very angry and he was blaming me and Azcue because he thought it was in our hands to give the visa immediately, and he couldn't understand that the visa has to 55 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 50 come from Cuba. Cornwell: You mentioned earlier that you had discussed with Azcue on this, as I understood this, during the third visit with Oswald, the suspicion that you had about the documents. Is that accurate or did I misunderstand? Tirado: No, it was the third time when I told Azcue that there was a man that bother me, that when I told him about. this man, I mean because it was normal, I used to that was my job, to attend people who come in so I didn't have to bother the Consul for every man who came, because there was a lot crazy men from the United States that they wanted to go to Cuba. Cornwell: Okay. So, from what I understand then, when you went in to Azcue to bother him, since you normally didn't do that sort of thing, yo gave him a sort of background resume of your dealings with Oswald. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And was it at that point that you told him of your suspicion about the documents? Tirado: I think so. Cornwell: What was his reaction? Azcue's? Tirado: He was worrying. When he went to my office. 56 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 51 he was very tranquil, hw was very polite, hw was explaining things, very polite. And uh, he was starting to get angry when he saw that he was a stubborn man, that he didn't want to under- stand, and he said uh, I remember now, he said you're not a friend of the Cuban Revolution, be- cause if you are a friend, you have to understand that we have to take care, to be very careful with the people that are going to Cuba, and if you don't understand this, you are not friend of the Cuban Revolution. And he was shouting and, I don't remember how long was this conversation, but uh, they got really angry, both. Leap: May I call you Silvia? Tirado: Yes. Leap: At any time during you conversation with the Consul, did you discuss the possibility that Oswald was a penetration agent? Intelligence agent for a foreign power? Did you discuss that possibility? Tirado: No. I don't think so because we didn't have time. Because this man was in my office and I was in Azcue's office so I couldn't leave him many times alone. Leap: Did you ever have conversations with Ascue out- side of Oswald's presence relative to the issue? 57 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 52 Tirado: Repeat the question please. Lopez: Did you ever have a conversation with Azcue when Oswald was not in the office about the possibility that he was an intelligence agent for some country? Tirado: No, no. I don't think so. We only thought that he was a crazy man, an adventurer, or something like that. Leap: Did it ever enter your mind that that he was a penetration agent? Tirado: Perhaps. Perhaps, because it happened, it happened sometimes that somebody came and say this is a policeman or something like that. Leap: That's all the questions that I have. Tirado: The only thing that I can say, it was that it was strange, traveling with all of his documents just to prove one thing. Lopez: Do you think now, looking back on what happened then, that he may have been an intellegence agent? Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: Did anything else ever come to your attention? That caused that suspicion? Other than just his presentation of the documentation? Anything else ever happen? Tirado: With him? No, no. The only thing that was strange is that if you belong to the Communist Party, 58 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 53 any party. Your French, but French could get Cuban visa but Mexico, for instance, if you're Mexican and you're a member of the party, of the Communist Party, you don't have to go and ask for application visa because the party writes to the Cuban Communist Party, and they arrange everything. That was the strange thing. There's no need. At first, he said that he was a Communist. That was strange. Because it would be really easy for him to get the visa through the Communist Party. Cornwell: At any point in the conversations that you have told us about, did Oswald say anything indicating that he really wanted to stay in Cuba? Tirado: No. He just wanted to go and visit and saw what was the Revolution. Cornwell: Okay. That's sort of what I meant. In other words, he did indicate that he didn't just want to pass through, that he wanted to spend some time there. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: What do you recall about that part of the conversations? Tirado: I told him that he get to Cuba, for instance, at two o'clock, and there was a plane going to 59 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 54. Russia at five o'clock, he has to stay in the airport, in the Cuban airport. That he couldn't go out. Cornwell: Why didn't you tell him that? Tirado: Because he was saying that he wanted to go to Cuba to visit and to see what the revolution had made. Cornwell: Did you ever see him again, after the argument with Azcue? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did you ever talk to him again? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Not in person nor by telephone. Tirado: No, he never call He could have called when I wasn't there, but I used to get the message, if somebody answer, I used to get a message. Cornwell: Did anyone else overhear any of the conversations you have described? Other than the one time in which Azcue was involved? Tirado: Yes. Could be that people from the Commercial Office, could be Mirabal. Cornwell: Was there anyone else physically persent in the Consulate's office during those conversations as you can recall? 60 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 55. Tirado: I can't remember. The only thing that I remember is that it was only Mirabal. Cornwell: And did Mirabal come out in the reception area during the conversations as you recall? Tirado: No, I think he stay in his office. Cornwell: But he could have overheard it at the time. Tirado: Yes, everybody who was passing through, even in the streets, they were shouting, really? Cornwell: Were the windows up as I guess they might have been at that time of year? Tirado: (Didn't understand) Cornwell: The windows would have been up? The windows to the Consulate Office would have been open? Tirado: What? I.. Cornwell: In other words, you're saying people on the street might have overheard it? Tirado: Yes, yes. If you were here and there was always a police here, they could have heard the shouting, the crying. (Lots of background, unintelligible.) 61 KENNEDY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TAPE 2 Name: Silvia Tirado (Duran) Date: June 5, 1978 Time: Address: Place: Interview: Cornwell: You told us previously when we discussed informally with you that you were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution during the early 1960's-- Tirado: Yes. Cornwell Did you ever overhear any conversation either in the Consulate or among any of the people you may have associated with concerning the possibility of killing the President? Tirado: No, because I think the people I used to know during that time, they think like me, and I think the death of a man doesn't make anything good, I mean, you have to change the structures, I mean, it's just like a building, to? The President is like, I mean, for instance, a roof--not the top, but if you take the top, the building still stands. You have to destroy the whole building, not one man. If you kill the man, you make a hero. So, is no good. Cornwell: What were your own feelings towards President Kennedy? Interviewer Signature Typed Signature Gary Cornwell Date transcribed 6-26-78 By: br Form #4A 62 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 2. Tirado: Well, I like him. I mean, he was very nice, he was very intelligent. And I think of the relations with Mexico, as I remember now, they were very good in the commercial area, the cultural area. He came ot Mexico and he was very acclamation. They loved him. They liked him very much. Cornwell: And, what you're saying is, you're describing what you understood to be the basic reaction of the Mexican people? Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Was that feeling the same even among the part of the Mexican people who were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution? Tirado: Uh, translate, please, Ed. I want to be sure of the question. Lopez: Would you repeat the question, please? Cornwell: Was the feeling that you just described as being that of the Mexican people? Lopez: (Translated question.) Tirado: In general. Cornwell: The same with respect to that part of the Mexican people like yourself who were sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution? Lopez: (Translated.) Tirado: Well, yes, more or less. because I mean, if you're uh, how can I explain this, uh, if you're a President 63 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 3. of a country that is against uh, against Latin America, undeveloped countries, you don't love them, of course, but you may see that is different, that he has been a good President, that he was, I think he was ingenious with his Alliance for Progress, that he tried to have more friends, not like Dulles who said we don't have friends, we have interests, things like that. Do you know that phrase? Cornwell: One more time. Lopez: (Speaks to Tirado in Spanish.) Dulles. Tirado: He said once the United States has no friends, they have interests. (Speaks in Spanish.) And Kennedy tried to destroy that phrase, saying we want to have friends. And he was changing the politics of Latin America, Kennedy. Cornwell: So, you're saying that because of President Kennedy's policies towards Latin America, that even the part of the Mexican people who were sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution, they also very much liked President Kennedy? Tirado: I think so. Now, I'm not sure, I mean I-- Cornwell: At least-- Tirado: Yeah, but you make the difference with one President and another. Cornwell: I understood your answer to my question a moment ago but let me ask it one more time, nevertheless. 64 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 4. I asked you if at any time during the early 1960's you had overheard any conversations among among people who were in favor of the Cuban Revolution to the effect that they would consider killing the President, and you answered with a statement on the logic of the situation, that you don't change the system by changing the President. Nevertheless, let me ask you again, more pointedly. Did you, nevertheless, ever overhear any such conversations? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did you ever overhear them within the Cuban Consulate or outside it? Tirado: No. Cornwell: I'm sorry, go ahead. Tirado: No, but I'm Mexican ad I was in Mexico and I was working there and you have to see that uh, even though the Cuban people know I was a friend, they would not say things like that in front of me, of course, no? Cornwell: When the news came over the television and in the newspapers that President Kennedy had been killed, and then you heard the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and saw the picture, I guess you immediately reflected back on your contact, correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: At that time, did anything come into your mind 65 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 3. in connection with those contacts that you could have read as foreknowledge, in other words, did it totally surprise you that that was the alleged assassin, or was there anything about your contact with him which him it understandable? Tirado: No. No, even now I don't think that he would have done it. Cornwell: You still don't think that he killed him? Tirado: No, because I think that he was a weak man. I saw that he could get angry, but uh, for me, he was not a man that could kill the President, because even when I saw him on television and he said all the time, "I'm innocent" and if I kill someone very important, I would be proud. I mean, because even if I'm with police I know that I'm going to be killed or die or something like that, I'd say, "Yes, I killed the President" and I don't think so. Cornwell: So based on all of your contacts with him, you do not think that he killed the President? Tirado: I don't think so. Cornwell: Let me ask you just some miscellaneous questions about the nature of your contact with him. Was there ever any conversations or indications about money problems that he had? Was that ever the sub- 66 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 6 ject of a conversation? Tirado: No. The thing that I remember only that he was very in a hurry because his visa was finished and I think he said, he mentioned that he only had three days to stay here in Mexico City. Cornwell: Did he ever indicate that he hoped the Cuban Government would finance his trip? Tirado: I don't think so. Cornwell: Had you ever done that before? Had the Consulate ever done that sort of thing? Tirado: No, no. We used to do that but they were visitors and we had instructions from Cuba, from the Cuban Government. Cornwell: Only visitors from cuba, is that what you mean? Tirado: No, no. For instance, your--the Cuban Revolutionary Anniversary, they invite people, they do have everything paid. Cornwell: In other words, it was persons that had been invited to go to Cuba by the Cuban Government? Tirado: Yes, yes. Cornwell: Well, even though, then would not have financed this trip, did he ask for such assistance? Tirado: At the time that I was working there, it never happens. Cornwell: Specifically Oswald. 67 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 7. Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did he ask for monetary assistance? Tirado: I don't remember. I don't think so. But I don't remember. Cornwell: Did he ever say anything or did you ever observe anything to indicate that he had traveling companions in Mexico City? Tirado: No, he didn't mention it. Cornwell: Did he ever say anything or do anything that indicated that he knew other people in Mexico City? Tirado: I don't know. I don't remember. Cornwell: To the best of your knowledge he knew no one, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you know when he left Mexico City? Tirado: No. Cornwell: By what form of transportation? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did anyone ever call or come by the Consulate of his behalf? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did they ever deliver anything to the Consulate for him? Tirado: No. Cornwell: There have, let me ask you this--Has any allegation ever been brought to your attention that you met 68 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 8. with Oswald outside of the Consulate? Tirado: No. Cornwell: On--let me show you two books, one of which is labeled photo ident book and has roughly three inch by five inch pictures in it and the other one which is labeled JFK Document 7549 and has smaller pictures in it, and I'll turn the recorder off for a second and give you a few minutes to look through them and ask us, and I will ask you if you recognize any of the people in these photos. Recorder turned off. Cornwell: Okay. We've turned the tape recorder back on and you've had five minutes, maybe ten, I don't know, to look through the two books. In the first book, you only picked out photograph-- Tirado: This looks like Fidel. But no exactly. cornwell: Which one: Number 12? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Who does that look like? Tirado: Fidel but not exactly. Cornwell: All right. Just a little. Tirado: Yeah. 69 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 9 Cornwell: Okay. And you also I believe pointed to number 57 when you went through the book. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And who do you think that is? Tirado: Oswald. cornwell: Lee Harvey Oswald. Now, many of the pictures in the book are not that clear, of course. When you saw him the first time in the book, you indicated that that looked like him except that as you recalled him, he had either blue or green eyes and blond hair. Correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: When you say blond hair, what color is that? Is it very light? Tirado: Light. Cornwell: Let's see if we can find an example. Looking in the second book--that's all you found in the first book, correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: All right. Looking in the second book, uh, take as an example, Number 266 04 268, would that be basically what you recall to be the color of his hair, blond? Tirado: Yes. Here it looks very, very light, not that light. Cornwell: Okay. That would be what you describe as blond but your memory is that it was close but not quite as 70 light as that? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Okay, but the tape recorder was back away from us so just to make sure we got that answer, you picked out in the first book photograph #57. You stated that it looked like the way you recalled the man who came ot the Consulate except that he had blue or green eyes and blond hair. And then we were trying to determine what shade you recall the blond hair being, and I asked you--all these are black and white--if it would be similar to photos #266 and #268 in the book 7549? And you said in those pictures that it looks very light and that it would not have been that light, quite that light to your memory. Is that right? Tirado: Yes. (Long break.) Cornwell: I don't know how, working with black and white photos, we can do much better than that? But-- Tirado: A little lighter than my eyebrows? There's another photo...In the second book, number 26 or 27. You also pointed to those photos when you went through the book. Would the color of that hair approximate the way you remember it? 71 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 11. Tirado: No, because he had very light, almost white... Cornwell: Okay, again, it would be not as light as that? Tirado: No. Cornwell: All right. Then going to the second book, you pointed to photograph #4, when you looked at the book the first time. What is your memory about that? Tirado: He reminds me of Mirabal, he reminds me but not exactly. Cornwell: All right. He looks a little like Mirabal? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: If I skip a photograph you remember looking at, let me know, but I jotted down some notes as you came to 'em when you looked at the book. You next pointed to number 26 and 27. Does that appear to you to be the same man? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And who was that? Tirado: Ernesto Lefel. He used to work with my husband. Cornwell: Ernesto Lefel. And what's the nature of the association between he and your husband? Tirado: He was working with him. Cornwell: In the architectural business? Tirado: Yes, yes. He's a designer. Cornwell: He's a designer? 72 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 12. Tirado: He started working with us. He learned some-- Cornwell: Is he a social acquaintance of yours in addition? Tirado: Is what? Cornwell: Do you know him on a social basis in addition to his being a business associate your husband? Tirado: No business associate. He was working for him, for Horacio. Cornwell: Okay. That's what I meant. He was an assistant. Tirado: Assistant. Cornwell: All right. Tirado: No social. Sometimes he came to our house to dinner, or something like that. Cornwell: Next, you I believe pointed to Number 57. Is that correct? Fifty-seven? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Who does that look like? Tirado: He looks like Gavino Fernandez. Cornwell: What's the first name? Tirado: Gavino. Cornwell: Gavino? And who is he? Tirado: Well, he's uh, dignitary, and he used to go to the Cuban Institute. Cornwell: He was a dignitary of what? Tirado: He was working for the Social Security and he was working, not in this government period, in the last 73 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 13. one, and he was working even with the President. Cornwell: I see, so he was a dignitary of the Mexican Government. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Okay. Tirado: But when he was going to the Cuban Institute, no, he didn't? Cornwell: You also knew him from the Cuban Institute? Tirado: He's an economist. Cornwell: He's a what? Tirado: Economist. Cornwell: Economist. You then pointed to number 65. Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: And that's a face that you're not sure you recognize? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: but looks a little bit like who? Tirado: Solchi Vargas. Cornwell: But looks a little but like who? Tirado: Solchi Vargas. Cornwell: Solchi Vargas? ]Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Okay. And who was she? Tirado: She's Mexican lady who was married with a journalist, he used to work for the Cuban press, and she used to live in Cuba. And now she's at the Cuban Institute. Cornwell: I believe you next pointed to Number 111--- 74 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 14. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And that's a, sort of a three-quarter shot from behind. tirado: yes. Cornwell: Of a man you think you might recognize, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. cornwell: I'm sort of trying to recall the way you stated it when you first looked at the photographs, so if I misstated it, just correct me. Who do you think that man may be? Tirado: The attache, the Cuban Cultural Attache at that time, Luis Alberu. Cornwell: Alberu? Tirado: Alberu. Cornwell: And then I believe you next indicated that you may recognize Photograph 115? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And who is that? Tirado: Luis Alberu. Cornwell: That of course is a front and you can clearly recognize him from that photograph, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Then, you next pointed to Photograph 133. Do you recognize that man? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Who is he? 75 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 15. Tirado: The doorman. Now I don't remember the name. Cornwell: But he's the doorman who left Lee Harvey Oswald into the Consulate on his third visit? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: That's accurat? Tirado: Uh?...I said yes. Cornwell: Okay. And then I believe you pointed to photograph 158? Tirado: Numbers 157 and 158. Cornwell: 157 and 158. Who was that? Tirado: I think that he was working at the Consulate in Vera Cruz? Cornwell: And do you know what his position was at the Consulate? Tirado: I think he was vice Consul but I'm not really sure. Cornwell: And which Consulate is that? Tirado: In Vera Cruz, Cuban, the Cuban Consulate. Cornwell: The Cuban Consulate in vera Cruz. And I believe finally you recognized possibly the center man in the group photograph labeled 275. Tirado. Yes. Cornwell: And who do you think he is? Tirado: An American. cornwell: Do you remember anything more about him? 76 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 16. Tirado: No. cornwell: Do you remember where you saw him? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you think you recognized the photo from a personal contact or from a picture? Tirado: From a picture I think. I think he was an American Ambassador. Cornwell: American Ambassador? Tirado: Or something like that. Cornwell: All right. And you don't have any memory what his name might be? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Okay. Uh... Tirado: But tell me, who is it? (Laughter.) For a change. Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in photo 266? Yes, that's the one I want. 266? Tirado: No. He looks like Russian. Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in 265? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in 213? Tirado: No. You're not going to tell me who's that man? Cornwell: Not right now. (Laughter.) But maybe later. When the assassination occurred, do you remember where you were, when you first heard the news reports? 77 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 17. Tirado: At the consulate. Cornwell: And do you know what you did at that time? Tirado: No, it was almost noon, I mean the lunch hour, about two o'clock, or near two o'clock, and somebody came and said Kennedy was killed, and all was confusion and, uh, well, we were really sorry. Everybody came in and went out and there was confusion. All over. And then I went home to have lunch. Cornwell: Did you speak to Horatio or anyone else prior to going home? Tirado: I don't remember, really. Cornwell: When you went home was he at home? Tirado: We used to have lunch. Cornwell: And? As you recall he was there on that day? Tirado: It was my birthday so he has to be there. (Laughter.) Cornwell: What if any conversation do you recall having with him at that time about the assassination? Tirado: No, I don't remember. I only remember at night. Cornwell: All right. You had a birthday party planned that night. Is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: During the day, prior to the birthday party, had you received or heard as part of the news broadcast the name Lee Harvey Oswald? Tirado: No, only in the afternoon. 78 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 18. Cornwell: In the afternoon, after lunch? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: After you returned to the consulate, is that correct? Tirado: Perhaps. Cornwell: And at that time, did you think you remembered the name? Tirado: It was, I think, at night, because, it was in the afternoon, perhaps when they start saying about Oswald. Right? and, it was at night and uh, I don't know if I call my husband or we were un the kitchen mixing some drinks or food, I don't know, but we were in the Kitchen and I told him, I think this man went to the Embassy to ask for a visa. Cornwell: And at that time, had you heard his name? Tirado: His name? Cornwell: His name, seen his picture, or both? Tirado: No, no. The picture was in the newspapers the next day. cornwell: Okay. So you only thought that you might have recalled the name. Is that correct? Tirado: No, not the name, but when they say Lee Harvey Oswald, married to the Russian woman and he live in Russia, and things like that. Cornwell: Okay. Did you have any other discussion that you can recall with him about it? based on that news 79 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 19. report? About your contact? Tirado: With my husband? Cornwell: Yes. Tirado: I only told him, I think this man came to the Embassy. Cornwell: then, the next morning you saw a newspaper. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Were you sure at that time that that was the man? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you remember who was at the birthday party that night? Do you remember whether or not you discussed these events with any one else at the party? Tirado: Yes, we were talking about it. Cornwell: Whoever was at the party. Tirado: The whole night, yes. Cornwell: What was the time of the party? Tirado: Sorrow. And speculation, what's going on? Because with Kennedy we knew that was going on, but now, what will happen? Cornwell: The next morning what did you do? Tirado: I show the paper to Horatio and told him this is the man that went to the Embassy and I went to the Consulate and I look in the Archivos and I sqaw the application, I saw that it was the man and I went to the Embassy and I talked to the Ambassador and I told him that this... 80 Solvia Tirado Interview Page 20 Cornwell: What was the nature of your conversation with the Ambassador? Just to tell him that that was the man? Tirado: Yes. I think so. Cornwell: What was his name? Tirado: Fernandez Armes (or Hernandez). Cernwell: And, did you do anything else? Did you pull the file on him or make any other attempts to put the facts together? Tirado: I think I leave the file with him. Cornwell: Pulled the file and left it with the Ambassador? Tirado: Yeah, the whole bunch. Cornwell: What would have been in the file besides the application, if anything? Tirado: Another applications. Cornwell: I see, you pulled the whole file which included his application? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did anything else happen that morning at work? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Then, did you go home for lunch again? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And what occurred at that time? Tirado: Uh, my brothers-in-law, servant, maid came and when she saw me, she cried, she started crying, and she said "You're alive?" And I say "why?", because some man 81 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 21. came to the house and says that uh, you had an accident and you were dead and they take away Senor Ruben to identify you." Then we went to Ruben's house and it was full of men and they catch me. Cornwell: They caught you. Okay. And the men were representatives of the Mexican police, is that corect? Tirado: Yeah, but they never told me. Cornwell: What happened when you walked into the house, to Ruben's house? Tirado: I saw my brothers-in-law, wife, and the same thing. She cries, and says "Silvia, you're okay?" "Yes, I'm okay." She was between two men and she couldn't get near to me, but I was walking and I saw in the bedroom, it was Ruben, and full of photographs on the bed and he said the same thing--"Silvia, you're okay, you're all right?" and I say "Yes" and "What happened?" Then I saw the telephone and I try to get the telephone and a man hold my hand and he says you can't call because you are under arrest, and they say, I don't remember, but they say, ah, this is the accomplice of Kennedy. I thought that's what they told but I say I don't remember. They told me, "You're under arrest." I sat down on the bed and I said "You have to show me an order signed by a judge that I am under arrest." Then they hold 82 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 22. me, my hands, and I try to defend myself, and they kicked somebody and they took me-- Cornwell: You were trying to kick them and keep them from taking you with them, right? Tirado: Yes, yes. Cornwell: Who were you going to call on the telephone? Tirado: The police. (Laughter.) Tirado: The police, the lawyer, I don't know. And when they took me out of the house and I was crying, "Call the police, call the police!" and they, he covered my mouth, and they took me to stationwagon that was parked at the corner. There was a man there but I didn't know him and I was quiet, and they say, "Don't cry. Scandalous woman." "Scandalous old woman, shut up. Because where we are going we will see what's going to happen to you." So, in that moment, I said quit. Cornwell: So you were taken to the police station. Tirado: No. It's not the police station. The office where the security, that was where the intelligence agencies were in. But I didn't know that because that building belongs to the State Social Security. Not the one I work for. Cornwell: Then? Tirado: For government employees. 83 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. Cornwell: And who else was taken down there besides you? Tirado: The whole--my brother-in-law, his wife, my sister-in-law, a friend of hers, another woman that was there, and me, but they were taken in another car. Cornwell: And, at the police station what inquiries were made of you? What did they ask? Tirado: Everything. Everything. They asked me my name, where was I born, my jobs, when I married, my status, everything. They have my finger-prints, photographs of myself, everything. And uh, well, they ask me where I was working, if I had been in Cuba, some people that I saw in Cuba, and what I was doing at the Consulate, that there was a tunnel, that makes me laugh, it was a tunnel from the Cuban Embassy to the Russian Embassy, and uh, well, a lot of foolish questions. Cornwell: Specifically, what did they allege that you had done? Tirado: What? Cornwell: Specifically, what did they allege you had done? What did they accuse you of doing? Tirado: Nothing. They never said-- Cornwell: During the questioning on all the subject matters that you had mentioned, did they make a verbatim transcript? Tirado: They used a little machine. They say it is a stenograph or something like that. Cornwell: They made a stenograph record. Tirado: Yeah, and a man was writing. 84 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 24. Cornwell: All the questions and all the answers? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did any of the procedures that we have asked you about cousel you to say anything to the police that was not the truth? Tirado: No, I don't think so. I don't have nothing to hide. So... Cornwell: Everything that you told them was the truth? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: At any time during the questioning did they ever allege that you had met with Oswald outside the consulate? Tirado: Yes. A lot of times. Cornwell: Did they ever ask you any questions about a Negro? Tirado: I don't remember. Cornwell: You don't remember anything about that? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did you ever know, during this same period of time, any Negroes? Tirado: Yes. At the Commercial Attache was a Negro. Cornwell: Anyone else? Tirado: The doorman. Cornwell: Anyone else? Tirado: The wife of the Commercial Attache. And the children. Cornwell: Is that all? Did they ask any specific questions about them? 85 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 25. Tirado: No. Cornwell: What was his name? Tirado: I don't remember. I even don't remember if he was there when Kennedy was shot. Cornwell: Were they from Cuba? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you know any other Negroes from Cuba outside the Consulate? Tirado: I don't think so. Well, this man, the boy at Consulado at Vera Cruz. He was a Negro, not completely, but-- Cornwell: The one you showed us in the photograph? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you know any Negroes who had red hair? None of the ones you described did? Tirado: No, we used to call "Red to a boy who was working there but he was like Spanish; I mean he was white and-- Cornwell: Not even very dark skinned? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Remember his name? Tirado: Rogelio, Rogelio Rodriguez, I think, something like that. Cornwell: After the questioning, first, how did that terminate? When did they finally release you? Tirado: About One o'clock. Cornwell: Did you meet again with your family, your husband? 86 Silvia Tirado Page 26. Tirado: Yes. Well, they were waiting for me and... we went to have lunch, something to eat because we haven't had. And well, we talk about it. Cornwell: Remember where you went? Tirado: No. Horacio told me we went to Sanborn's. I don't remember. I even don't remember when I got home and what happened. Next day everyone know. Cornwell: Did the officers from the Securidad Department ever suggest to you during the questioning that they had information that you and Oswald had been lovers? Tirado: Yes, and also that we were communists and that we were planning the Revolution and uh, a lot of false things. Cornwell: What happened the next day? Tirado: Well, we stayed home and at night a friend of ours came and we didn't say anything. Cornwell: Why was that? Tirado: Why? Cornwell: Why did you not say anything? Tirado: Because these people told me to keep quiet. Cornwell: The police? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Or the officers? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did you then go back over to the Consulate either Sunday or Monday? 87 Silvia Tirado Page 27. Tirado: On Monday. Cornwell: Okay. What happened then? Tirado: When I got there everybody ask me what happened? And I say "Why?" And in the newspaper was the this part of the question that I told you about, Azcue telling Oswald to go away. Cornwell: It was in the newspapers? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: How did the newspapers get that story? Tirado: I don't know. Cornwell: You never had any idea? Tirado: Well, of course. The police gave it to Excelsior. It was the first government newspaper. Cornwell: So you just always thought they got it from the police? Cornwell: But the people at the Consulate said they had read the newspaper and asked you what had happened, right? Tirado: Yes. cornwell: Did you discuss that with anybody that you can remember specifically? Tirado: With the Ambassador. Cornwell: And what was the nature of that conversation? Tirado: I tried to repeat all the questions. Cornwell: Okay. Uh..would that have been a violation of what the police asked you to do? To talk to the 88 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 23. Ambassador about that? Tirado: Huh? Cornwell: Was that a violation of what the police asked you to do? Was that... Tirado: Well, of course, They told me to keep quiet. I never says anything about what happened on Saturday. Never. but when I saw in the papers I couldn't say "Well, nothing happened." It was all in the paper and it was exactly what I said to the police. Cornwell: What did the Ambassador say to you? Tirado: That he was going to write a report and he sent it in the plane. Cornwell: What if anything did you consider doing at the time? Tirado: What? Cornwell: Did you consider taking any course of action at the time? Tirado: Oh. I was going to make a protest to the Mexican Government. We went to, a friend of mine was a daughter of the Chief of Tinetraph and we could reach the President and we were going to ask to explain what happened and you know, there was an illegal (tape stops)... Cornwell: Did in additional to your considering filing formal protest with the Mexican government, did you also consider taking a trip out of the country? Tirado: No. 89 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 29. Cornwell: Did you consider going to Cuba? Tirado: No. Cornwell: What happened after that? Tirado: Well, I told to the Ambassador all that happened during the questioning and I told him also about the protest that we wanted to make and I asked him, "Don't do anything because we are trying to do something here, against these police." And after that, uh, Tuesday, I went to work and Wednesday morning when I was going to have breakfast the police came again, two agents, and they asked me, very polite, if I want to go with them, just to answer some questions. They wanted to know something. And, uh, it was unnecessary to take my car because they were going to take me and bring me back. So I called uh, the Consulate. That's why I remember I already had the telephone and I said I'm coming in late because I'm going to the police station. okay don't worry, we wait for you. And they keep me two days and a half. Cornwell: And why did they tell you that they kept you this time? Tirado: Oh, to protect me. Cornwell: Did they tell you anything in any more detail? Was there a specific threat? 90 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 30. Tirado: No. They were very rough this time. They were very angry with me, the man that I told you, that I kicked him in his balls. He was very angry, and they repeat the same questions but they were more, how you say, how do you say anticipito? Lopez: They anticipated her. Tirado: And they were, wanted to know exactly what I have done in Cuba, the people that I met there, everything. They were asking me questions about all the people that were working in the Embassy and uh, this time I wanted to go to the bathroom and they wouldn't take me and it was longer, because it was about 10:00 from 10:00, I think almost 6:00, they questioned me. Cornwell: Were you afraid during the two periods they held you? Tirado: Yes. I don't know exactly what happened but I was uh, I was innocent. So I said, what am I doing here, no? And uh, the only thing that I have, I had the feeling that I was going to die and I said okay, if I'm going to die, I'm going to die, how you say it, with pride, my child will not be shamed. I remember I do anything that--I was very dramatic in those moments. So, sometimes I lost my temper. I never say no bad words or nothing. I cry sometimes, I shout and things like that but then I sat down again. Cornwell: As I understand it, they tried to scare you, is that correct? 91 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 31. Tirado: Yes. The first time. Cornwell: The first time. Because of that was there anything that you knew that you simply refused to tell them? Tirado: That's what they thought. Because all the time they tell me that I was a Communist and I said I'm not a Communist, but do you believe in Socialism? Yes, I believe in Socialism but I'm not a Communist; and they insisted that I was a very important people for the government, the Cuban Government, and that I was the link for the International Communists--the Cuban Communists, the Mexican Communists and the American Communists, and that we were going to kill Kennedy, and I was the link. For them I was very important. Of course, it was not true. Cornwell: Okay. Even though you were innocent of those charges, you had not conspired to kill the President and were not in the Communist Party. Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Because that was what they were interested in, because that was the nature of the allegation, did you withhold any part of your story? Were you afraid that something you had done, although innocent, they might have misconstrued, misunderstood, so did you withhold any information from them because of the very severe accusations they were making? Tirado: No. I tried to answer it, what they asked me I tried to answer. All the time. 92 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 32. Cornwell: You understand though, the kind of question I'm asking you? (Tirado spoke to Lopez in Spanish, who asked Cornwell to repeat the question.) Cornwell: Okay, let me just ask you a hypothetical. Sometimes, a person has done something completely innocent but then they are confronted with avery severe accusation. They may think that their innocent act will be misunderstood by their accusers so they might withhold the innocent act simply to be sure that they don't get into more trouble-- Tirado: No. Cornwell: Simply to be sure they don't get into more trouble than they apparently are already in. Tirado: No. cornwell: There was no thing that you had done or seen or knew about that you withheld because of that? Tirado: No. No, I explain everything that they wanted to know and uh, I think sometimes they were fools. Cornwell: They were what? Lopez: Fools. Cornwell: Fools. Tirado: Tonto. Fools. Cornwell: After they finally released you, they held you for another two, two and a half days. Did you make any 93 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 33. trips out of the country then? Tirado: No. Cornwell: How long did you continue to be married to Horatio after that? Tirado: Five years. Cornwell: Why were you finally divorced? Tirado: We separate and we divorce eprhaps four years after. Cornwell: Why was that? Tirado: Why? Why we divorce four years after? Because we don't like. Cornwell: Go ahead. Tirado: Because he did not want to get legal problems and he said that it was a lot of problems to get divorced. He was married once so he said that it was nonsense. Cornwell: Why were you separated? Tirado: Because I used to believe in the romantic love, and even we have a very, how you say that, uh, we loved each other very much but it was not the passionate love that I used to believe in, so I thought it better to divorce, get divorced. It is very difficult to explain. (Tirado speaks to Lopez in Spanish.) Lopez: They were incompatible, had incompatible characters. Cornwell: You have not spoken to anybody in the news media or any official investigating body since 1963 about these events, is that correct, except for the 94 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 34. Washington Post and that was approximately a year or so ago, a year and a half ago? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: You indicate that you read some part of the Warren Commission Report recently. Do you recall anything about that that was inaccurate other than what you have already related? The part that you read. Tirado: What? Cornwell: Was there any part of that which was inaccurate that you can recall? Tirado; What I said. That I was exceeding my duties. Cornwell. Had you either done anything or offered to do anything for Oswald other than what you have already described to us? Tirado: No. Cornwell: And was that all within the scope of your responsibility? Tirado: It was...? Cornwell: Was it all within the scope of your authority? Tirado: Scope? (Lopez translates.) Tirado: Yes. (Tirado speaks to Lopez in Spanish.) Cornwell: Did you ever have any of the people at the Cuban Consulate attend parties in your home? Was there 95 Silvia Tirado interview Page 35. a social relationship with any of them? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Which ones? Tirado: Azcue, Maria Carmen, I think Luisa, she went once. Cornwell: Who is that? Luisa? Tirado: Luisa Caldaron, the one you ask me. Cornwell: Okay. Azcue, Luisa, and the secretary who was killed, is that correct? Tirado: Before, before this, before I used to work at the Embassy, uh, and before we move to Constitutyentes we make some parties, for instance, when Armando Hart (Ph.) was here, he was the Minister of Education, and with the Ambassador he was in that time and Organa, who was Director of the Movies Institute. Some people who came from Cuba. We used to invite. Cornwell: Okay. How about Theresa Proenza? Tirado: Perhaps she came. Cornwell: Did you ever receive any indication from them that any of them had ever had a contact with Oswald? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Did Elena or Elinita Garro do Paz ever come to those parties? In your home? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Or in the home of Ruben? 96 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 36. Tirado: Once, but it was, I think it was before that I was in the Cuban Embassy. Cornwell: Would it have been aproximately around '63? Tirado: I don't know because when they came from France... Cornwell: Approximately 1963? Tirado: I only, perhaps, I don't know. Hardy: Did you say that it was when they came from France? Tirado: Yes. Hardway: It was after they returned from France that they came to one of the parties? Tirado: Yeah, to Ruben's house. Hardway: At Ruben's house. Tirado: Yeah. That was the whole family there. I only saw Elensa a few times. One was the day that I got married and another time was somewhere else, I think three times I only saw her. Cornwell: Did you know General Clark Flores? Tirado: Yeah, but not very well. Cornwell: Was he ever at those parties? Tirado: I don't remember. Perhaps once, at Ruben's house but not at my house. Cornwell: Did you know Emilio Carbillido? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did he ever attend those parties? Tirado: I don't remember. 97 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 37. Cornwell: Did Devaci? Tirado: Devaci. Elena's sister. Cornwell: Did she attend those parties? Tirado: No, she went, I think I saw her sometimes at the Embassy. Cornwell: How about Eunice Odio? Tirado: No. I know her, I mean I met her sometime. But, no. She was not a close friend. Cornwell: Over the years, have any of those people ever indicated to you that they had any knowledge of Oswald's trip to Mexico city? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Have they ever professed to have either seen him or heard any stories about any one who did see or meet with him? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Has anyone else ever come to you since 1963 and professed to have knowledge of Oswald's trip to Mexico City? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Would you have any reason to believe that if we spoke to any of those people they could have information of help to us? Tirado: I don't know. Cornwell: Have you ever had any association with any intelligence agency of any country, including our own? 98 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 38. Tirado: Once I met a Russian when I was working at the Press Agency but he was from the Russian Press, and they say that he was from the police, the Russian Police but I don't know. Cornwell: But you just met him one time? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: I don't have any additional questions. Lopez: I have a few questions of Ms. Duran. As normal procedure, when a person came to the Cuhban Consulate, do you explain to them that there are different types of visas? Tirado: No. Lopez: So they would normally come to you and ask you for a special type of visa, and then you would get that kind of application? Tirado: Uh, huh. Lopez: Okay. Tirado: the application was the same. Lopez: Same application. But they were different visas. Tirado: There were only two visas. Transit visa and normal visa. Lopez: You didn't normally explain to people whether there were two different types of visas when they came to you until after-- Tirado: Perhaps. 99 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 39. Lopez: Okay. I just wanted to read to you a couple of sections of what was recorded in the Warren Commission Report. What happened was, there was a report given by the mexican authorities to the Warren Commission and it was published in the report given by the Mexican authorities to the Warren Commission and it was published in the report and let me read you one sentence, okay? The declarant complied with her duties, took down all the information and completed the appropriate application form, and the declarant admittedly, exceeding her responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian Consulate with the intention of doing what she could to faciliate issuance of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald. Is that statement accurate? Tirado: It's that one and I don't like it. The otherone? Lopez: That part about admittedly exceeding her responsibilities? Tirado: Uh, huh. Cornwell: That's the part you had reference to earlier when you told us that you had read something-- Tirado: Yes. Lopez: It says here that you telephoned the Russian Consulate. Tirado: Yes. Lopez: Did he ever telephone you back? Tirado: No. Lopez: Okay. And it says here with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa. Did you ever do anything else to facilitate the issuance of the visa? 100 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 40. Tirado: No, nothing. I couldn't do anything. Lopez: Did you ever explain to him that in order to get a visa he could have a recommendation letter from a fellow Communist or a fellow Cuban citizen, and then if he had that letter, he could get a visa? Tirado: Yeah, that was one of the requirements. Lopez: And then, did you ever send him to anyone, give him the name of anybody? Tirado: No, never. I mean I never did that. Lopez: I see. Okay. Then there's another section here that says: However, they told her (this is the Russian Consulate) that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case. Was that the first time that you explained to Lee Harvey Oswald that it would take him about four months to get a visa? Tirado: Yes, I didn't know it. Lopez: Was that when he became angry? Tirado: More or less. Lopez: More or less. And that would have been on his third visit? tirado: Yes. Lopez: Okay. Then there's one other section here. It says: The Consulate who came out and began a heated discussion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Azcue telling him that if it were up to him he would not give him the visa and a person of this type was harming 101 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 41. the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it. It being understood that in the conversation they were talking about the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban. Is that correct? Tirado: No. Lopez: What is your understanding of that? Tirado: The conversation that he had with Azcue, was exclusively with the Cuban Revolution. Lopez: Exclusively with the Cuban Revolution. I wanted to ask you, in this report here, they don't say how many times Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate. Did you ever tell the Mexican officials how many times he had visited? Tirado: I think so. Lopez: And it was probably taken down by a stenographer. Tirado: Yes. Lopez: Do you consider this report which is about a page long to be completely fair and accurate and complete? Tirado: No, because about exceeding my duties and about Azcue speaking about the Russian Revolution, that's not true. Lopez: But, my question is, they interrogated you from about four in the afternoon until about twelve at night, and in that process you spoke to them for eight whole hours and yet the whole conversation, interrogation, has been reduced to one page. Do you consi- 102 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 42. der this accurate? Is it complete? Tirado: No, of course not. Because they ask me a lot of questions that has not been in the Warren--about my trip to Cuba, about my job atthe Institute, the Cuban Institute, about why I have been Communist, as they say, and i say I'm not a Communist, and it takes hours to explain them. And as you explain you are not a Communist, if you are a member of the Communist Party, things like that, and where did you take your beliefs, no? I say at the University, oh, at the University, and then there's a discussion and uh, the classes I take at the University, and things like that. Lopez: Okay. You do remember telling the Mexican officials when they questioned you how many times Oswald visited the Consulate? Tirado: I think so. And I, they asked me I don't know how many times, the way that I used to give my name and telephone number and they made me write and they take the paper out and then again, they ask me, how do you do this, and I write it down, and I give the paper. I think I did it five or six times. Lopez: And did they ever ask you to describe Oswald? Tirado: Yes. Lopez: Would you do me a favor and describe him for me now? 103 Solvia Tirado Interview Page 43. Tirado: Yes. Lopez: For example, let's start at the beginning. Was he tall, short? Tirado: Short. Lopez: Short. Could you stand up for a minute, Gary? (Laughter.) Would you say he was as tall as Gary? Tirado: Yeah, more or less. Lopez: Would you say he was taller than Gary? Tirado: No, I think just the same. He was about my size. Lopez: About your height? Tirado: Yeah. Lopez: Okay. And what's your height? Tirado: 160. I think 160 or 162. Lopez: Was he skinny? Tirado: Yes. Skinny. Lopez: Could you estimate how much he weighed? Tirado: About your weight, more or less. Lopez: About my weight. We already went over... Tirado: He has stronger shoulders, perhaps, than yours. Lopez: Just for the record, my weight is 199 pounds. You told us before he had a suit on. Tirado: That I don't remember very well. I think he was wearing a jacket but what I can remember is that he was not wearing nice clothers, expensive clothing. 104 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 44. He was cheap, perhaps. Lopez: Do you remember what his nose looked like? Was it skinny? Fat? Tirado: No. He was normal. There was nothing that you may remember. The eyes were small. Lopez: Small eyes. Tirado: Smaller than yours. Lopez: Smaller than mine, for the record. I can't do that. Tirado: If you describe, you say small eyes. Cornwell: Okay. In sum, you identified a picture in the book as being as best as you can remember his face and hair. Was there anything about that which in your memory was different from the picture other than the fact that you do remember his eyes being blue or green and his hair being very light colored or blond but not as light as some of the other pictures look. Tirado: And he has not very much. He was, has few, poco pelo. Lopez: He didn't have very much hair. Cornwell: Is there anything else about that picture in the book which does not look like your memory of him? Tirado: No, but because even when I saw the television when he was shot, I used to remember him. I mean it was the same that I remember.. Lopez: I understand. If you bear with me just a few more minutes--his hair line, was it receding? 105 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 45. Tirado: Yeah, yeah. Quite a bit. Lopez: Okay. And his cheeks, were they high cheek bones or low cheek bones? Do you remember that? Tirado: Well, I remember that he was a little, I don't know what you call it (spoke with Lopez in Spanish.) Lopez An elongated face. Tirado: Uh huh. Lopez: Did he have a long chin? Tirado: No. Lopez: (To Cornwell) : Do you have any more questions about his description? Lopez: (To Duran): Just wanted to ask you a few other questions. Did Luis Aparicio ever attend any of those twist parties that you had, or that Ruben had? Tirado: No, Ruben never, Ruben never have parties for the people at the Embassy. Lopez: Did he ever attend? Tirado: Aparico, he was, I don't remember, where he was, I think he works in the Commercial Office. I don't remember. Lopez: You don't remember if he went to any parties? tirado: No. But he was at the Cuban Embassy. Lopez; Okay. Do you know a person named Eunice Odio? Tirado: Yes. 106 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 46. Lopez: What was your relationship to Eunice Odio? Tirado: It was not close. I know her because she's a poetess and uh, well, I know a lot of painters, things like that, but just hello and..perhaps if I meet her now I don't know if I could recognize or even she recognize me. Lopez: I see. And did she ever attend any of those parties? Tirado: No. Lopez: Do you know a person named Ricardo Guerra? Tirado: Yes. Lopez: And what was your relationship to him? Tirado: Very close. Lopez: Very close. Could you elaborate? Tirado: Well, when I was unmarried I had a lot of friends and his sisters were friends of mine, that's when I met him, before I got married. And when I married, we continued our friendship and uh, he got married with a writer, but I admire her very much, and he was a very close friend of mine, and we continue the relation all the time that we were married. Both. And uh, how was professor atthe philosophy faculty, he was my teacher also. I mean he was a close friend. Lopez: I see. He was a professor, you said. Tirado: Yes. Lopez: Did you ever attend any seminars at the University of Mexico where he was lecturing? 107 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 47. Tirado: No, we used to have in our house. Lopez: What were those seminars about? Tirado: Marxism seminar. Lopez: You never, though, attended any seminars at the University of Mexico? Tirado: No, he was a teacher and I used to take lessons with him. Existentialism, you know? (Spoke in Spanish.) Only two courses. Lopez: Do you know if he ever held seminars at the University of Mexico? Tirado: He had to. Lopez: By any chance do you remember if he would ever hold seminars on Saturdays? Tirado: No. Lopez: No, he did not or no, you do not remember? Tirado: I don't know, I don't know. Hardway: I've just got a few questions that if you'll bear with me... During the three times that you met Oswald, did you ever hear him speak any language other than English? Tirado: No. Hardway: In general, in the Consulate's Office, was it common for any other language other than Spanish to be spoken? 108 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 48. Tirado: No. Hardway: Was Russian ever commonly spoken at the Consulate's Office? Tirado: No. Hardway: Do you remember anyone having spoken Russian in that office? Tirado: No. Hardway: At any time? Tirado: No, I don't think. The only language they speak, it was English and not everybody, just a few of them. Hardway: When Oswald came back the third time, did he tell you that he had a Russian visa or that the Russians had told him that there wouldn't be any problem? Tirado: That he was going to get the Russian visa, that there was no problem. Hardway: Did he tell you that he was going to get it, or that he already had it? Tirado: He said I already got it. hardway: And he told you that he already had it as oposed to telling that they had assured him that there was no problem? Tirado: Yes. Hardway: Could you tell me what Eusebio Azcue thought about John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President Kennedy? Tirado: What he thought? About the assassination? 109 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 49. Hardway: No, about President Kennedy. Tirado: I don't know, I don't remember. Hardway: Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with consul Azcue? Tirado: No, he was not about the assassination but about Kennedy and his policies and things like that. Tirado: No. Hardway. Did you ever hear Azcue discuss it with anyone else? Tirado: No. Hardway: Did-- Lopez: I don't remember if he came. His son came, and I don't remember if he came once to Mexico and he told me about the conversation that he had with Fidel Castro but I told you the other day what Fidel Castro but I told you the other day what Fidel says and all of that and t he way they write a protest to Mexico, to the Mexican Government, but I'm not really sure if he was his son, or if he was Azcue. Lopez: Would you have seen Azcue at any time during the last two years? Tirado: So, I think that I never saw him again. His son, he came, I saw him, but, Azcue, I don't remember. Lopez: Do you know if Eusebio Azcue is still in Cuba? 110 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 50. Tirado: I think so. I don't know. Hardway: Did you ever discuss with Consul Azcue the policies of United States towards Cuba? Or other Latin American countries? Tirado: Perhaps we did, but I don't remember. Hardway: Do you remember by chance what Azcue's views would have been on that? Did you ever discuss Azcue's views on changing that policy? Tirado: What I remember is that during the Blockade (spoke to Lopez in Spanish.) Lopez: The Student Economic Bloc of 1968. The strike, I'm sorry. The economic blockade. Tirado: What I remember but I don't remember exactly if it was Azcue, the Commercial Attache, the Ambassador, but what I remember, it was all the people, they have expectations and they were how you say, trusting, that with Kennedy, the policy of the American Government was changing. They were hoping... Hardway: Did you or anyone else at the Consulate ever offer Lee Harvey Oswald any aid of any kind? Tirado: No. Harday: Did you ever know a person by the name of Guillermo Ruiz? Tirado: No. Hardway: Just for the record, when you were arrested on that Saturday afternoon, what time that arrest was, approximately? 111 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 51 Tirado: About three o'clock. Hardway: Was the interrogation that was conducted at that time transcribed or taped? tirado: It was written and when I sign I read it. Hardway: Was it written out in a summary form or was it written out as you said it? Tirado: They change, because once it was a man with a little machine, and another moment it was a man writing, typing. Hardway: But most of it was taken down literally, as you said it? Or did you sign a summary of that? (Lopez translated.) Tirado: No, no, no. They were typing, all the time. They were typing all the time, even once, I don't know how many times, they told me, slow, because he was writing. But they didn't write exactly what I said sometimes because when I read all of that bunch of papers they say, come on, it's one o'clock, here, sign this. I said, no, I'm not going to sign this if I not read it. And sometimes I said this, I didn't say that. For instance, no? For instance, I'd remember, they say she was very, very glad when Kennedy came. And I say no. I said I like it but I didn't say that I was 112 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 52. very, very glad. Things like that, no? But almost, it was what I said. But they didn't want to change anything. Hardway: Okay. Did you ever discuss the allegation that they made that you had been lee Harvey Oswald's lover with your husband? Tirado: Well, I told him almost all what happened. He told me what they did to him and I told him what they did to me. Hardway: Do you remember specifically talking about that specific allegation with your husband? Tirado: No, it was not important. Hardway: Going back to when you recognized Oswald, the man whose picture you had seen in the paper as the man who had been at the Embassy three times. Were you certain that the man in the papers was the same man, before you checked your records at the archives? Tirado: Yes. Immediately I saw the paper, I told him. This was the man that I want to check. Hardway: To your knowledge, was Horatio ever a member of the communist Party? Tirado: I think that he was, I don't know if he was exactly member, but he was sympathizer and we had a lot of friends that they were members of the Communist Party. Hardway: Uh, to your knowledge, was Horatio ever a member of any intelligence organization? 113 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 53. Tirado: I don't remember exactly. I think he was working for the, how you say that? I think he was in a campaign. Against the drugs. Hardway: Do you know when that would have been? Tirado: No. Hardway: Do you know when he would have been a sympathizer for, with the Communist Party? Tirado: Well, I'm completely sure. Being Communist, being policeman. All of that, it was after I meet him. Hardway: Do you know why-- Tirado: Do you know why they asked you to keep quiet after the first interrogation? Tirado: No, I don't. Hardway: Did you ever attned a party where Lee Harvey Oswald was present? Tirado: The party where Lee, no, I don't know that he attneds some parties. Hardway: The question was, did you ever attend a party where he was present? Tirado: No. Hardway: That's all I've got. 114 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 54. Cornwell: Just two brief matters and I promise we will and this very long questioning session. The questions which were just asked you about which languages he spoke, by Mr. Hardway, when the call was made to the Russian Embassy, what language was spoken there? Tirado: Spanish. Cornwell: Did the Russians speak Spanish too? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Did at any point in that conversation Russian-speaking people get involved? Did anyone at the Russian Embassy speak Russian to you? Tirado: I don't speak Russian. Cornwell: Well. I understand that. Did you at any point put Oswald on the phone and let him talk? Tirado: No, no. Cornwell: The reason I'm asking of course is to try to jog your memory. Did he at any point in that transaction speak Russian? Did Oswald speak Russian that you recall? Tirado: No. Cornwell: The second question, just to be sure that we've got your memory as accurate as we can on it, have you not spoken to Azcue at all since 1963? 115 Silvia Tirado Interview Page 55. Tirado: That's something that I don't exactly remember. If he came once or if he was with his son, but I knew all about Fidel's and Azcue's conversations. Cornwell: So you do remember either talking to Azcue or his son about the Oswald trip? Tirado: Not the Oswald trip, the Fidel, what he says. Because Azcue was called by Fidel Castro in that day when the Cuban Ambassador sent my report. That's what I told you the other day. In the same day they speak to azcue, Fidel, they spoke, they have a conversation, and then on the second day, that Sunday present, they protest to Mexican Ambassador. Cornwell: You described to us earlier hwo the Ambassador filed a report. Did you ever see the report? Tirado: No. Cornwell: Do you know what was in to by any other means? To the best of your knowledge, it would at least have (Tape ends.) 116 Silvia Tirado (Duran) Page 1. Cornwell: Okay. The first part of your memory is that, as I understand it, the Ambassador filed a report within three days or so after the assassination and your arrest, right? Then you mentioned something about Fidel talking to Azcue is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: How did you learn that? Tirado: That's what I don't remember. Cornwell: Okay. At any rate, what can you remember about the nature of the contact. between Azcue and Fidel? Tirado: Fidel asked him what happened exactly that day in the Consulate and Azcue tried to remember everything and he said what he knew, that Fidel was afraid of uh, if I was going to say something false to, because I was threatened by the police, and uh, Ascue says that no, that I was honest and I was not going to do anything false. that that was not the right thing, the truth... Cornwell: Okay. In other words, Fidel was worried about the possibility that you would say something against the Cuban Government? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: And that's because you were a Mexican citizen, is that correct? 117 Silvia Tirado Page 2. Tirado: And I was,...(asked lopez how to translate) threatened. Cornwell: Okay. So he was afraid that the Mexican authorities might threaten you and that you might say something against the Cuban Government? Tirado: Yeah. Because the police many times told me, you have to say the truth. Remember that you have a little child. And...remember, you have a daughter. And remember you have a daughter. All the time they were telling me this. Cornwell: Okay. Did you possess any information that might have incriminated the Cuban Government? Tirado: No. Cornwell: And you can't remember how it is that you learned about this questioning of Azcue by Fidel, is that right? Tirado: Yeah. Cornwell: Then, several years later, you had another conversation with either Azcue or his son, is that correct? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: Do you think it might have been Azcue? Tirado: Could be. Cornwell: Is that when you learned about his conversations with Fidel? Tirado: Yes. 118 Sylvia Tirado Page 3. Cornwell: During that period of time, when you spoke to Azcue two or three years later, what if anything did he have to say about the assassination? Tirado: What did he say? Cornwell: Yes. Tirado: I don't know. Cornwell: When you believed you may have talked to him. Did he have any theories or speculation? Tirado: I don't remember. I only remember the part that they were talking about me. Cornwell: Did he believe as strongly as you apparently do that the person who was on television and in the newspapers was the same man who went into the Consulate? Tirado: Yes. I don't know about television because he was not here. Cornwell: He was not on television here? Tirado: No, no. Azcue was not here. Cornwell: I know, but I mean when you talked to him two or three years later. Did he say anything about that? Tirado: No. I don't remember. Cornwell: Do you think for sure that the man who was on television was the man who came to the Consulate? Tirado: Yes. Cornwell: The man who was killed by Jack Ruby? Tirado: Yes. 119 Sylvia Tirado Page 4. Cornwell: Did you see him being killed by Ruby on television? Tirado: Yes, yes. Cornwell: Was there anything about him that looked different to you? Tirado: No. It was black and white. So I couldn't see the color. But he looks like the one that I met. Cornwell: Guess that's all the questions and thank you again for being so patient with us and answering all of our endless questions. Lopez: It is 9:15 p.m. 120 Mr. CORNWELL. Also there is a diagram which is made reference to in the transcript. We might mark that separately as F-440B, and with your permission, also enter that in the record, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record. [The information follows:] 121 JFK EXHIBIT F-440B 122 Mr. CORNWELL. The early portion of the transcript simply established her present name, that her name in 1963 was Sylvia Tirado Duran, the fact that the tape recording of the interview began at 5:45 in the afternoon, and that her birthday is November 22, 1937. We might ask that those who have transcripts--there were copies provided both for the press and the public and to the committee, if you would turn to page 5, we will begin the tape record- ing at the top of page 5 of the transcript. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. At that point, Mrs. Tirado did make a sketch of the consulate which is now part of the record. We would ask, however, that we now move to page 19 of the transcript and continue her testimony at that point, near the bottom of page 19. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, we would ask that we turn to page 25 of the transcript, beginning near the bottom. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. We next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 45, or 40, excuse me, near the top of the page. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we turn to page 47, near the top portion of the page. [Tape recording was played.] Mr. CORNWELL. I next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 54, toward the middle or slight upper portion of the page. [The playing of the recording was resumed.] Mr. CORNWELL. And the final portion of the tape recording, Mr. Chairman, begins on the following page, which is labeled page 1 of tape 2. [The playing of the recording was resumed.] Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, we also, while we were in Mexico, spoke to Mr. Horacio Duran. That is the man who is displayed in the blue coat, in JFK exhibit F-432, and who was Sylvia Duran's husband in 1953. We also spoke to Ruben Duran, who is Horacio's brother, and who is displayed in the white shirt in JFK exhibit F-431. And to Betty Serratos, the lady on the left in the array of JFK exhibits, numbered F-430, and who was the wife of Ruben. Each of those individuals was, of course, around Sylvia, spoke to her during the traumatic events after the assassination of the President. And each of them provided information to us of substantially the same nature in all significant respects as that which you have just heard in the tape recording of Sylvia Duran. We would ask at this time that those three exhibits be placed into evidence. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 123 JFK EXHIBIT F-432 124 JFK EXHIBIT F-431 125 JFK EXHIBIT F-430 126 Mr. FAUNTROY. Would the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from the District of Columbia. Mr. FAUNTROY. I take it that their statements are also a part of the record, a part of our files. Mr. CORNWELL. They are part of the files of the committee, that is correct. Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Is counsel finished? Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, the next witness to be called is Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. Azcue was the Cuban consul in Mexico City in September 1963 who informed the individual who visited the consulate and gave his name as Lee Harvey Oswald that he would not be issued a visa to Cuba. Senor Azcue is presently living in retirement in Cuba. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Azcue. Chairman STOKES. Prior to calling the witness, the Chair will once again advise that this particular witness, due to security reasons, we are requesting that all persons remain in their seats any time the witness comes into the hearing room or at any time that the witness is leaving the hearing room. We ask that all persons please cooperate with those arrangements with the committee. At this time the committee calls Mr. Azcue. The Chair requests first that the interpreter please stand and be sworn. Sir, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you interpret before the committee will be a truthful and accurate interpretation of the testimony of the witness to the best of your ability? Mr. ANTHONY J. HERVAS. I do. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. I would ask that the witness be sworn. Mr. Azcue, please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? SENIOR AZCUE. [through the interpreter]. Yes, sir. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. Does counsel desire to be heard prior to the witness testifying? Mr. STANDARD. Yes; with the Chairman's permission. My name is Michael Standard of the law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard of New York. Mr. CORNWELL. Excuse me, Mr. Standard. Would you mind moving the microphone so we can make a record of your statement. Mr. STANDARD. For the past 17 years the office has represented the legal interests of the Government of Cuba in the United States. To my immediate left sits Sr. Eusebio Azcue, the witness. To his left sits Sr. Ricardo Escartin, first secretary and consul of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington; and to his left, Capt. Felipe Villa, of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Cuba. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appear here today in two capacities. One, to reflect the view of the Cuban Government that the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 127 was an act of the vilest kind, an act unacceptable by any standards of human and political behavior. Both at the time of the convening of the Warren Commission and today, the Cuban Government has cooperated to the fullest extent in providing what information it has at its disposal to the U.S. authorities investigating the event. Second, to accompany two former consuls of the Republic of Cuba who were present in Mexico City in the period September 1963 through August 1964, both of whom appear today of their own volition, and as a result of the Cuban Government's decision to provide the Congress of the United States with the testimony of such witnesses as may aid in the process of gathering evidence regarding the assassination. On the day following the assassination, President Castro, in a speech televised to the people of Cuba, and devoted exclusively to the implications for his country, said, and I quote: It is in the interest of the American people and all the people of the world that it be known, that it be demanded what is really behind the Kennedy assassination, that all the facts be revealed. On April 3, 1978 members and staff of this committee had an extensive interview with President Fidel Castro in Havana. President Castro made it abundantly clear, and I quote from the transcript of the interview: We are very much interested in having Kennedy's assassination clarified because in one way or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear. There is nothing as important as having your conscience clean--absolutely clean. That's why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather a matter of political, historical interest to have all these problems clarified. It is in that context, and with that hope, that Senors Azcue and Mirabal appear here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. The Chair at this time recognizes Mr. Gary Cornwell. TESTIMONY OF SENOR EUSEBIO AZCUE LOPEZ, FORMER CUBAN CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY [The examination of Senor Azcue was conducted through the interpreter.] Mr. CORNWELL. Would you state your name for the record. Senor AZCUE. Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, you are presently a resident and a citizen of Cuba, is that correct? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir. Mr. CORNWELL. What is your age? Senor AZCUE. 67. Mr. CORNWELL. And where were you born? Senor AZCUE. Havana, Cuba. Mr. CORNWELL. You are presently retired? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir, I am retired. Mr. CORNWELL. In 1963, what was your occupation? Senor AZCUE. Consul of Cuba in Mexico, Mexico City. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, when did you first go to live in Mexico prior to 1963? Senor AZCUE. In 1944. 128 Mr. CORNWELL. What was the basic nature of your occupation between that date and 1963? Senor AZCUE. I was an architect in Mexico before the triumph of the revolution. At the time the revolution triumphed, I was requested to take charge of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Mr. CORNWELL. For how long a period of time or until what date did you hold that position? Senor AZCUE. Until November 18, 1963, though since the month of September of 1963 I had started to turn over affairs to the new consul who was to replace me, Mr. Alfredo Mirabal. Mr. CORNWELL. And on November 18, 1963, when you did ulti- mately turn over that position to Senor Mirabal, where did you go? Senor AZCUE. I went directly and definitively to Havana. Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to direct your attention to an exhibit which has been marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-408. That exhibit is provided in an enlargement form, and a photograph of it in a smaller form has been handed to the witness. Can you tell us what type of document that is? Senor AZCUE. This form is a request that was given to foreigners who approached the consulate requesting a visa to travel to Cuba. Mr. CORNWELL. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman? Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered in the record at this point. [The information follows:] 129 JFK EXHIBIT F-408 130 Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, can you tell us, do you recognize that document? Senor AZCUE. Yes; it is a document that we used at the consulate to be completed at the request of the applicant. Mr. CORNWELL. The document bears the date 1963. Would you tell us what function that document served during that period of time. Senor AZCUE. This document? Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct. Senor AZCUE. We had large amounts of printed forms of this nature, of these applications, and they had to be completed in sextuplicate, that is to say six copies of this document, to which were attached their photographs. They had to affix their signatures, as well as provide all the detailed information that was required to accompany the request. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, this particular document bears the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and the date September 27, 1963. Do you recall the occasion upon which this application was filed with your consulate? Senor AZCUE. Fine. This gentleman wants me to narrate the antecedents of the visits of this individual to the consulate. Is that the nature of the question? Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct. If you recall the occasion on which this specific application was filed, would you describe that occasion for us. Senor AZCUE. Certainly, with pleasure. Yes, this gentleman appeared on the date indicated at the consulate, requesting a visa to travel to Cuba. This gentleman was referred to, as was the usual practice in the consulate, to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, a Mexican citizen, who was responsible for handling these contacts with persons applying for such visas. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, in a previous interview with the staff you stated that the very first occasion to your memory on which you saw this individual was 1 to 2 days before the date on this application. Is that still accurate to the best of your memory? Senor AZCUE. It is something that I cannot state categorically. I cannot state whether it was on the very same day, a day before, or several days before, and I am in a position to explain why. Mr. CORNWELL. Please do. Senor AZCUE. He approaches us. The secretary normally takes care of the case. There is no need for me personally to go out to see him unless he specifically requests that I do so, as a special case, that he requests either my presence or the presence of another Cuban consul responsible. He did so. He requested my presence because when he initially formulated the application with the secretary, the secretary explained to him all of the requirements that he would have to fulfill in order to obtain the visa. And as he was carrying along certain documents which he believed would be sufficient for the visa, and the secretary could not resolve the case, he then calls upon me to see whether I, upon examination of those documents, can proceed to issue the visa immediately. I answered negatively. The documents that he submits are not enough. He is exhibiting or producing documents such as, one, attesting to his membership 131 in the U.S. Communist Party. Also another indicating that he is a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Also another document indicating his residence in the Soviet Union, as well as a marriage certificate to a Soviet citizen. Upon presentation of these documents, he thinks that I will be able to solve his problem and grant him a visa. I at that time tell him that this is not sufficient; that I must request authorization from the Cuban Government. And at that point he agrees to proceed to fill the application out in order to process the visa. At that point, he leaves the consulate, conceivably to look for some photographs. One could think whether he returned on that very same date with the photographs; it is possible that he might have returned on that very same date with the photographs, or that he might have returned the following day. As far as the date that appears herein, and bearing in mind that I received him on three occasions, maybe it would be possible to determine that on this very same date, it is possible, I cannot fully guarantee this, it is possible that on that same day he might have made the first two visits to the consulate; one during the morning very early, and the second one a little later, bringing the photographs in order to complete the application. There is a sufficient time for such a thing. Mr. CORNWELL. Was the first visit of this man that you have just described to us during the normal working hours at the consulate? Senor AZCUE. Yes, without a doubt. The consulate opened at 10 in the morning and closed at 2. Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention, then, to the second occasion on which, as you have just described, the individual returned with photographs which could be attached to the visa application, what occurred on that second occasion? Senor AZCUE. I did not assist. I was not present at the very time when the secretary receives the photograph and fills the documents. That is a function that pertains properly to her. He very probably insisted once again on the need to proceed urgently to Cuba or to transit Cuba. As the amount of time required to process this document by our own Government was one that I could not predetermine, it could be a matter of 15 days, 20 days, or the response could be negative, during this second visit that he makes to me I bring up or note that if he already had a visa to go to the Soviet Union, I would be in a position to grant him a visa to Cuba without the need to consult my Government, in terms of a transit to the Soviet Union. This should have been clearly stated or established during the course of the second visit that he made. Whether it might have been on the same day or 2 days thereafter, I tend to believe that it will have been on the date that appears on the application, that is to say on the 27th. Mr. CORNWELL. So the second occasion that you have just described would have been the date on the visa application, September 27, is that correct? Senor AZCUE. That is very correct. Mr. CORNWELL. At the termination of the conversation on this occasion, what if anything did the individual do? 132 Senor AZCUE. I believe, and this is something I think, that he left or withdrew from the consulate, and we can imagine or conclude that he attempted to obtain a visa from the Soviet Union, because he was a resident of the Soviet Union and he was married to a Soviet citizen, according to what he stated. Mr. CORNWELL. After he left on this second occasion, did you have any conversations with the Soviet Embassy about this routine, in other words, about the possibility of him obtaining a visa from the Soviet Embassy? Senor AZCUE. I don't know whether it was that very same day or on the following day. A few years have gone by since, and it is very difficult to determine or recall exactly the manner in which the events occurred exactly. It is possible to reconstruct a sequence. It could have been that very same day or the following day. But obviously if the first two visits took place on the 27th, the third visit would have had to take place on the following day, because in and during the same day it is not possible to complete three visits that are separated by time, and at the same time to undertake the necessary actions to obtain the photographs we needed. In fact, after he left the consulate, I received a telephone call from the consulate of the Soviet Union. I cannot guarantee whether it was on that very same day or on the following day. But whatever day it might have been, the consulate of the Soviet Union gets in touch with me over the phone. And the consul tells me that apparently the documents that he is exhibiting or producing attesting to his residence in the Soviet Union and his marriage certificate with the Soviet citizen are apparently legal, are correct, and he believes that they are correct. But without a doubt he cannot issue the visa without consulting Moscow. Consequently, I cannot, in turn, grant him a visa to transit Cuba without consulting the Government. That was the content of my telephone conversation with the Soviet consulate. Mr. CORNWELL. After that conversation, did you again see the individual, did he return to the consulate? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir. That was the third and last time I saw him. He possibly thinking that his documents had been legalized orally, verbally, that I would consequently change my attitude and in view of the legality of the document would grant him the visa; these were his hopes. And in addition one noticed that he was very anxious that we grant him the visa, because we never had any individual that was so insistent or persistent, in spite of our refusals which were logical and legal. Mr. CORNWELL. Did all three of these visits occur during normal working hours at the consulate? Senor AZCUE. We never received anybody, any individual, outside these regular office hours. Mr. CORNWELL. As I understood your testimony, the first visit may or may not have been on September 27. The second visit was most probably on September 27. And the third visit would have been most probably on a day afterward, is that correct? Senor AZCUE. That is correct. I believe that on the 27th, that was the day that the application was completed. I have no doubt about it. 133 The first visit, however, could have been that very same day, earlier in the day. And the third visit could have taken place the following day or could have been on the same 27th if the first visit had taken place on the 26th. But my private opinion, the first two visits took place on the 27th and the last one, after my conversation with the Soviet consul, was on the following day, that is to say September 28. I believe this would be the most reasonable thing if one were to analyze it. Mr. CORNWELL. September 27, 1963, was a Friday. Does that mean that the third visit could have occurred on the following Saturday? Senor AZCUE. On Saturday, exactly. Mr. CORNWELL. The consulate was open on Saturday. Senor AZCUE. Saturday morning--not open to the public. Mr. CORNWELL. Would you tell us how the conversation on the third visit ended. Senor AZCUE. He had great hopes that I would grant him the visa in transit. When I told him no, that if the Soviet Union does not grant him the visa as destination of his trip, I cannot grant him an in-transit visa to Cuba without consulting my government. He always had a face which reflected unhappiness. He was never friendly. He was persistent. And he was not pleasant. So on the last visit, when he loses the opportunity to obtain the visa, he gets very worked up. And then in English, which is a language that I have not full command, and all our conversations took place in English, and with great effort on my part because it is a language that I do not have full command of, but I do hear him make statements that are directed against us, and he accuses us of being bureaucrats, and in a very discourteous manner. At that point I also become upset and I tell him to leave the consulate, maybe somewhat violently or emotionally. Then he leaves the consulate, and he seems to be mumbling to himself, and he slams the door, also in a very discourteous manner. That was the last time we saw him around. Mr. CORNWELL. Was he with anyone on any of these occasions? Senor AZCUE. With my colleague, Mirabal, who probably was always with me, because I was together with him. I was the exiting consul and he was the new consul. I am handling this case because I had a better knowledge of the English language than he did. But we were both handling the case, he in order to become more familiar with the situation and I also in order to train him. So this was a colleague of mine who saw him, how many times I don't know, whether on one or two or all three occasions; he was a colleague who was present there, and I know that he also saw him. And in addition to Consul Mirabal, he was also seen by the secretary, because she was the one who took care of his application. The three of us were the only ones who were able to see Oswald, nobody else. He could not have seen anybody else, because the business that brought him to us was one that was of the exclusive responsibility of the consulate. And therein the only ones present were the three of us. 134 Mr. CORNWELL. Was the individual who came to your consulate on these three occasions accompanied by any other persons? Did anyone come with him? Senor AZCUE. I never saw. The private area of the consulate, from this private area it is difficult to observe who comes in from the street. My secretary from the chancery, maybe she was able to see. But whenever I emerged from that area, and to the chancery, I always saw him alone. Mr. CORNWELL. Did he say anything in any of the conversations with you which would have indicated that he either had a companion with him in Mexico City or that he knew any persons who lived in Mexico City? Senor AZCUE. No, never. We did not hold any conversations other than those directly related to the visa. Mr. CORNWELL. If I could direct your attention again to the JFK exhibit F-408, I would like to ask you first, was the document signed in your presence? Senor AZCUE. No. It is not necessary. It is never necessary. This is a document that is provided to him by the secretary. It is filled in by the secretary. She affixes the photograph, turns it over to him, and right there he signs, until it is sent, forwarded to Cuba, through the pouch. Mr. CORNWELL. Would it have been necessary, under the usual custom and practice of your office at that time, for the document to have been signed on the premises of the consulate? Senor AZCUE. This document or this application does not leave the desk of the secretary. She types it out and places the photograph, places the seal, and hands it over for the individual's signature. Mr. CORNWELL. You told us earlier that the normal procedure for the preparation of such applications was that more than one copy of the document was made, is that correct? Senor AZCUE. Yes, six. Six photographs, six signatures, and six copies of the application is complete. Mr. CORNWELL. Do you feel certain about your memory today as to the number of copies that are made or were made in 1963? Senor AZCUE. Yes, absolutely. There was never an exception made. They come already together in a bunch. Mr. CORNWELL. The copies as opposed to the original, the carbon copies, were they signed separately or was the carbon paper used to transfer a signature from one to the other? Senor AZCUE. No, one by one, because the paper is very thick. This is mimeograph-type paper. Chairman STOKES. Will counsel suspend for a moment? I think this would be an appropriate place for us to take a 5-minute recess at this time. The Chair requests that as the witness departs from the room, that all persons remain in their seats please until the witness has left the room after which we will have a 5-minute recess. [A brief recess was taken.] Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. All persons in the hearing room are requested to remain in their seats while the witness is being brought in to the witness table. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Cornwell. 135 Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before we begin again, I believe that we neglected to have the interpreter identify himself for the record. Would you do so? Mr. HERVAS. My name is Anthony J. H-e-r-v-a-s. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. Senor Azcue, I would like at this time to show you JFK exhibit F-407. For the record, that would appear to be a carbon copy of the previous JFK exhibit F-408. The previous JFK exhibit, F-408, is a photograph of a visa application which the staff of this committee took while they were in Cuba this year. It was taken of a document which was provided to us by the Cuban Government in an original form. We were allowed to inspect the original and to photograph it. The exhibit which we just placed on the easel, JFK F-407, is a photograph of a visa application which was provided to the Warren Commission in 1964 by the Cuban Government. As you can tell, the writing on JFK F-407 appears to be somewhat displaced on the lines; part of it sitting directly on top of lines instead of resting over them as you would expect, and otherwise its content appears to be virtually identical to 408. Would the two documents in that form have been expected, based upon the usual procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963? Mr. HERVAS. May I ask a question? Did you say would the two documents have been expected or inspected? Mr. CORNWELL. Expected to be in that form with those type of variations based upon the procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963? Senor AZCUE. Do you have some other copy of the actual size that I could be able to look at or analyze because from this distance it is for me very difficult to see the exhibit on the easel. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, would you like to go to the easel to get a better picture of the blowups? Do the representatives from the National Archives have a small photograph of that document with them here today? OK, we do have a smaller photograph we will show the witness. It is also marked for identification as JFK F-407. Senor AZCUE. As I stated before, the paper on which the application is printed is a very thick or heavy paper. So it is not possible to prepare six copies at one time, not even three in an ordinary typewriter such as the one Sylvia Duran had in the consulate. Conceivably, she prepared them two at a time, an original and one copy, an original and one copy, an original and one copy. So conceivably it is possible that there be some differences between some of them, between three, for instance. Mr. CORNWELL. But at any rate your examination of the two documents would indicate that JFK F-407 is a carbon copy of the original JFK-408; is that correct? Senor AZCUE. I am not an expert on these matters, but any one of you could--and I cannot see very well either and the quality of the copy is not very clear. However, in looking at these two documents I note that the words appear exactly one on top of the other in both documents in the same places. 136 So, consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that the copy, that the second exhibit constitutes a copy of the first one. It would be very difficult to place them in separate. In spite of my limitations, I believe I can affirm that this one is the original and this other one is the copy. One does notice, if one analyzes the margin on the right side, that the text on both copies coincides perfectly one with the other. That is very difficult to do otherwise. Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, the pictures on the upper lefthand portion of each document would appear to be of the same individual; is that correct? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir. Mr. CORNWELL. Do those pictures of that individual appear to you to be the same individual who visited the consulate in Mexico City on the occasions you have previously described to us? Senor AZCUE. Truly, this photograph is one that I saw for the first time when the honorable U.S. committee members came to Cuba in April of this year, and I was surprised that I believe that it was not the same person. Fifteen years had gone by so it is very difficult for me to be in a position to guarantee it in a categorical form. But my belief is that this gentleman was not, is not, the person or the individual who went to the consulate. Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention to the period of time immediately after the assassination, the day of the assassination or the day after the assassination, did you during that period of time have an occasion to see pictures of the alleged assassin in the newspapers or to observe on television the man identified at that time as Lee Harvey Oswald? Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir, not so close to the date, not in the first few days, not immediately thereafter. Some time I calculate approximately-and I say this because I am not a great movie fan, but it was in mid-December approximately--I saw at that time the film in which Ruby appears assassinating the Oswald who was there, and I was not able to identify him and only 2 months had gone by since I had seen the Oswald who appeared at the consulate. And I had a clear mental picture because we had had an unpleasant discussion and he had not been very pleasant to me and I did not recognize when I first saw him. I did not recognize Oswald. The man who went to the consulate was a man over 30 years of age and very thin, very thin faced. And the individual I saw in the movie was a young man, considerably younger, and a fuller face. Mr. CORNWELL. What color hair did the individual have to the best of your memory who visited the consulate? Senor AZCUE. He was blond, dark blond. Mr. CORNWELL. Did the individual you saw in the movie, the person who was killed by Jack Ruby, resemble more closely the individual in these photographs to your memory than the individual who visited the consulate? Senor AZCUE. I believe so. Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to show you JFK exhibit F-434. Do the representatives from the National Archives have the original or a small photograph of that exhibit? 137 While they are looking, Mr. Chairman, I believe we neglected to ask that JFK exhibit F-407 be admitted into evidence. Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into evidence. [The information follows:] JFK EXHIBIT F-407 Mr. CORNWELL. That is a passport. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman, JFK F-434? Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into evidence. [The information follows:] 138 JFK EXHIBIT F-434 Mr. CORNWELL. Did the individual who visited the consulate look like that individual? Senor AZCUE. No. Mr. CORNWELL. What differences were there? Senor AZCUE. Many differences. The individual who visited the consulate is one whose physiognomy or whose face I recall very clearly. He had a hard face. He had very straight eyebrows, cold, hard, and straight eyes. His cheeks were thin. His nose was very straight and pointed. This gentleman looks like he is somewhat heavier, more filled, his eyes are at an angle with the outside of his 139 eye, at an angle with his face. I would have never identified him or recognized him. I believe I can recall with fairly good accuracy the individual in such a way that I could recognize him now in a group of 100, that is better than a photograph of him because obviously during a period of 15 years he might change. I think I could recognize him, and this is not him. Mr. CORNWELL. We would like to show you what has been previously admitted into evidence in this case as Exhibit 194. As you can see, Senor Azcue, the pictures on the right are simply blowups of the same visa application, but I would like to direct your attention to the two pictures on the left which come from photographs taken by the Dallas Police Department. I ask you if that individual looks like the man who visited the consulate? Senor AZCUE. I would have never recognized him as I did not recognize him in the movie where he dies, and I can, however, identify him as or think of him as the person who was killed or assassinated by Ruby. It is a question of personal evaluation on my part. But it is very clearly imprinted. Mr. CORNWELL. The staff of the committee has had an opportunity to speak to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, and during the interview with her she expressed no doubt about the fact that the person who was killed in Dallas by Jack Ruby was the individual who visited the consulate. Do you have any reason to question her memory or the reason that her memory might differ from yours? Senor AZCUE. Categorically, I could not affirm it without any doubt. However, it is possible that she might be more susceptible to impression or more impressionable than I. I remember what I saw on the film and also what I saw on TV later or maybe before. I remember that moment when he was killed and I remember I did not recognize him. I did not have any prejudices or preconceptions. I wanted to recognize, however, only 2 months had gone by. It was between September and November. At that time I was much younger. That was 15 years ago, and I think that because of my own profession I probably had better eyes. And because of the impression that was made by this person who visited the consulate, for these reasons, maybe my version is correct or more correct. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. At this point the procedure will be as follows: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, chairman of the Kennedy subcommittee, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule. The Chair recognizes Mr. Preyer. Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Azcue, it is good to see you again. As I understand it, at the time Lee Harvey Oswald visited the consul in Mexico there were three people who could have seen him: yourself, Sylvia Duran and Mr. Mirabal. Is that correct? Senor AZCUE. That is correct. Mr. PREYER. And you were the consul at that time and Mr. Mirabal was in training to replace you as consul? 140 Senor AZCUE. I would say it was the opposite. The consul who was already functioning as such was Mirabal. From the very time he arrived as a designated consul. When the consul arrives--of course, there could be two or three consuls--but when the consul arrives, he takes over the functions, the responsibilities, and I was turning over the official business of the consulate to him. Mr. PREYER. What I was getting at was, you had been the consul before Mr. Mirabal arrived? Senor AZCUE. Yes. Mr. PREYER. Mr. Mirabal came to replace you as consul? Senor AZCUE. Yes. Mr. PREYER. At the time of the assassination on November 22, you were no longer in Mexico and Mr. Mirabal remained as the consul at that time; is that correct? Senor AZCUE. I had already returned to Cuba and Mirabal had assumed the position of consul there alone. Mr. PREYER. You returned to Cuba, as I understand it, on November 18, which was, of course, after your encounters with Oswald and before the assassination; is that correct? Senor AZCUE. That was the case. I returned on November 18. Mr. PREYER. Did your return to Cuba have anything to do with your encounters with Oswald or did it have anything to do with the assassination of President Kennedy? Senor AZCUE. It was not related to any of those things. I returned to Cuba because all of my family was already there. As of June of that year I had been awaiting a consul to replace me because I already had a son studying in Havana and a son working there and already in June they had given me permission to return permanently to Cuba. I was not able to return before because they were not sending me a consul to replace me, and the reason I did not leave immediately upon Mr. Mirabal's arrival was, first, because I had to train him. He did not have any experience in the handling of consular affairs there, and, second, because there was a meeting or congress of consuls being held at that time and I was asked to stay. This was because of my connections developed over the 5 years that I had spent there. Mr. PREYER. So that it is fair to sum up your answer by saying you were not recalled by the Cuban Government, but, you, at your request, returned to Cuba? Mr. HERVAS. Excuse me, sir, did you say at your wish? Mr. PREYER. Yes, at his wish. Senor AZCUE. I cannot say it was at my wish exclusively. I need the permission of the Government of Cuba, but I had requested my return in June because, as I noted previously, my sons were back in Havana. One was already working. One was studying there. I was then alone in Mexico with my smaller daughter, and I also wanted her to study in Cuba. I wanted to return there. Mr. PREYER. I would like to turn to the visa application, the JFK exhibit F-408, for a moment. In the middle of that document, over on the right-hand side, there is a printed date that says October 10, 1963. I don't believe there has been any discussion about that as yet. Could you tell us what that date is? 141 Senor AZCUE. I will relate the manner in which I believe that appeared. We sent, of the six copies of the application with photographs, five to Havana. Those are distributed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to different organizations in government, different entities, and these receive different copies of the document. Immigration possibly receives two copies. The Interior Ministry receives a copy. Each organization receiving a copy might possibly stamp the date of receipt of the document on such a document. One organization in this case must have stamped that date on the document. On the other document, the organization probably did not have its routine practice to date such document because it was not a rigid requirement. Mr. PREYER. So that this was a date stamped on the document in Cuba. Senor AZCUE. I believe that that is so, because if we received the reapplication on 27th, we never hold on to or retain, in order to protect the interest of the applicant, the document for such a long period of time before forwarding it to Cuba. We will be mailing it in the next mail departure, 2 or 3 days at most, and this date, October 10, corresponds more closely to what I had just indicated, that is, to the distribution of the correspondence to the different entities, where they are supposed to receive copies of this document, that is, 13 days thereafter. Mr. PREYER. So it does not indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico on October 10. Senor AZCUE. No; in no manner. He never returned to the consulate. We never saw him again. This date is completely independent of Mr. Oswald. This is an internal matter. Mr. PREYER. Looking again at this document, the visa application form, doesn't it indicate on this form how long Oswald wanted to stay in Cuba? Senor AZCUE. Here it should be stated. Sometimes we included it, 2 weeks, and, if possible, a longer period of time. Mr. PREYER. Does it also indicate when Oswald wanted to leave for Cuba? Senor AZCUE. Proposed date of arrival in Cuba, September 30, 1963. Mr. PREYER. That was just 3 days after he applied for the visa, and I believe you have testified earlier today that you had never seen anyone so persistent in seeking a visa. Did Oswald tell you why he was in such a hurry to get to Cuba? Senor AZCUE. None whatsoever. He arrived there convinced that with the documents that he exhibited at the time, I would issue the visa immediately, and one can analyze the fact that if he had a great need to go to the Soviet Union, he would have chosen the shortest route, and that was not through Cuba. Mr. PREYER. But he gave you no explanation of why he was in such a hurry, why he was so anxious to go to Cuba? Senor AZCUE. I do not recall it, and it is hard to find a reasonable explanation, because if he is in a hurry, he can go through any other country. Mr. PREYER. Down in the right-hand corner of the visa application there is a signature. Is that your signature? 142 Senor AZCUE. No. Mr. PREYER. Is it Sylvia Duran's signature? Senor AZCUE. It is a signature, and we have been able to check it thereafter, of Alfredo Mirabal, who, as I have already mentioned earlier, he already was empowered as a consul. He had already been named or appointed consul. Mr. PREYER. So it is Mr. Mirabal's signature. Just above that signature there is a section, a printed section, that has the title "Observations." Now you have testified, in general, as to what those observations were, but I wonder if you could read out loud for us, for the sake of the record, what that section says. Senor AZCUE. The applicant states that he is a member of the U.S. Communist Party and also the secretary of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, and that he lived in the Soviet Union from October 1959, that he is married to a Soviet citizen. He showed documents certifying that he was a member of the organizations mentioned, as well as a marriage certificate. He went to the Soviet Embassy in this city requesting that his visa be forwarded to their embassy in Cuba. We called the Soviet consulate, and they responded that they had to obtain, they have to await authorization from Moscow to issue the visa, and that it would take approximately 4 months. This is the very same thing I told the members of your committee in Havana in April without having seen this document before. Mr. PREYER. This section of the application was not filled in by you? Senor AZCUE. No, no, I had never seen it. This was made or prepared by Sylvia Duran, and it was signed by Mirabal, as it appears here. I repeat once again that the first time I saw this document was when the committee showed it to me in April. Mr. PREYER. Is there anything in those observations that would make you think that the person who wrote them believed that Oswald would be given a visa? Senor AZCUE. Probably no, this is something that is written or addressed to Cuba, all of the information that we can provide Cuba, but we do not prejudge what Cuba is going to determine, even if we may have an interest in seeing something resolved. Mr. PREYER. Incidentally, to clear up one point on that, I believe you testified this morning that you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy. No, I'm afraid I have that just reversed. I believe this morning you testified that it was the Soviet Embassy that called you, but in the observations it states you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy. Would you like to clarify that point? Senor AZCUE. It is relatively easy, I believe, if one analyzes it. Conceivably, I was under the impression that the Soviet Embassy had called me because I was told to pick up the telephone. I did not call. It is possible, however, that at Oswald's request, Sylvia might have called the Embassy and then would have transferred the call to me, and thereafter I was under the impression that it was the Soviet Embassy that had called me, and I was always under that 143 impression. But it is possible that she might have initiated the call and thereafter transferred the call to me. Mr. PREYER. One final question. Going back to the observations written on the bottom of the application, written by Sylvia Duran, in your opinion, did Sylvia Duran ever pressure you to grant the visa or encourage you to grant the visa to Oswald? Senor AZCUE. She, the poor woman, was in no position to pressure me. She might have been in a position to make a personal recommendation, and the recommendation was not a personal matter. Yet she might have believed that because of the fact that he was a resident in the Soviet Union and he was a member of the North American Communist Party, she might have believed that we might have been in a position to make an exception, but this is simply as a comment, a possible comment. She did not exert pressure or any such thing. Mr. PREYER. Did she make any personal recommendation or did she evidence any unusual interest in Oswald's case? Senor AZCUE. No; she might have thought that we might be in a position to grant him a visa because of his personal conditions or circumstances, not for any reason of friendship. It wasn't any such thing. She never spoke again about him, nor did we ever speak about him. As in the case of many of the hundreds of applicants who come through a consulate, we see them at that time, and thereafter we never remember them again or discuss them again. And if it hadn't been for the unfortunate incident, I would have by now completely forgotten about this gentleman. Mr. PREYER. After Oswald visited you the first time, that visit ended when you sent him out to have a photograph taken, as I understand it. Was there a place nearby where he could have had the photograph taken? Senor AZCUE. Yes, yes, about four or five blocks away in a street known as Calzada de Tacubaya. There are photographic studios. Possibly Sylvia might have pointed out to him where he could obtain the photographs, or maybe he already had the photos. Mr. PREYER. Well, in the photographs on the application, and also in the passport, Oswald appears to have on a tie and a sweater. How was he dressed when he came to the Embassy, to the consulate? Senor AZCUE. I always imagine him or visualize him as wearing a suit, coat and pants, trousers, with a pattern of crossed lines, not very clear design. Blue, some reddish. I never conceived of him or visualized him wearing a light sweater. When I saw this photograph in April of this year, I also noticed that the clothing he was wearing was not the same. Mr. PREYER. So that the clothing he was wearing in the photographs was not similar to that which he was wearing when he actually visited you in the Embassy. Senor AZCUE. I am almost in a position to assure that. Mr. PREYER. When he returned with the photographs and with his application, visa application form, and his passport pictures, 144 would you have looked at the pictures on the visa application and on the passport? Senor AZCUE. No, I did not see the photograph, nor did I witness the preparation of the form. I did not see the photograph at that time. I only saw this photograph last April, when they came to Cuba. Mr. PREYER. So that at the time of processing his visa and the passport, you never looked at the photographs, you never compared them with the man standing before you. Senor AZCUE. No, I was never present during the preparation of this form nor of the affixing of the photograph. And it is also signed by Mirabal. And in the normal course of business this is a matter that goes to Cuba. It is generally kept until it is prepared for shipment in the next plane, outgoing plane, and there was no reason for me to go back searching for this form. Mr. PREYER. You have indicated to us that you don't believe the man whose photograph appears on the visa application and the passport was the same man who appeared before you in the consulate. Have you ever seen a photograph of the man you believed to have appeared before you in the consulate? Senor AZCUE. Never. I shall explain. The committee brought to me an album with many photographs. I shall try to explain. It is very possible that amongst all of those photographs which were made available to us by those persons who took pictures of every person that went near the consulate or the Embassy and that were contained in those that I was shown, it is very difficult when I consider all of the photos that I saw, that anyone could escape being photographed if he approached the consulate during working hours, that is, escape without having his photograph taken. It would be easy for them, having at hand the photographs and the dates, to facilitate or make available the photograph of the person who went to the consulate, be it the decedent or the dead man or the other person that I think I saw went to the consulate. It is indeed curious that they did not provide that photograph, because if it were the same man, you would have recognized him in that photograph. And if I remembered the face, I would have recognized it amongst those photos. And there was no photo of either. This is very curious, that something like that should happen, especially among individuals or men who are so efficient and who spied on our consulate and our Embassy. Mr. PREYER. I would like to ask if we could have exhibit 437 displayed. Mr. Azcue, I will ask if that is a picture of you in Cuba looking through the album of photographs which the committee made available to you. Senor AZCUE. Right. That is a photograph of myself with the photo album that you provided me. Mr. PREYER. And I believe you recognized none of the photographs in that album as being the man whom you feel you saw in the Embassy. Have you ever seen that man again, the man who you believe you saw in the consulate? Senor AZCUE. No, never. This is what I stated before. Mr. PREYER. I believe you said that the man who signed the visa application did not sign it in your presence, as far as you recall. 145 Senor AZCUE. No; the secretary is the one who takes care of all of this. And we are normally in our private office while she is having the applicant provide the information and fill the forms and attaching the photograph. During all of that time we are in our offices working. Mr. PREYER. If analysis of that handwriting, of that signature on the visa application showed it to be Lee Harvey Oswald's signature, would you still believe that the man who visited you in the consulate was not Oswald? Senor AZCUE. Under such circumstances I would have to accept that I was being influenced or that I was seeing visions. Mr. PREYER. Mr. Chairman, I am at a point now at which there are two other areas that I wanted to ask Mr. Azcue some questions. It will probably take about 15 minutes. Would you prefer to go forward or to recess until after lunch at this time? First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-437 be admitted into evidence at this point. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 146 JFK EXHIBIT F-437 Chairman STOKES. The Chair thinks this is a good time for us to take a recess. Accordingly, the committee will recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon. I request at this time that all persons remain in their seats until the witness has been escorted from the hearing room, after which we will declare a recess. [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m.] 147 AFTERNOON SESSION Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. All persons in the hearing room are requested to take their seats and to remain seated while the witness is being brought into the room and to the witness table. Thereafter you may move about if you please, but then once again, whenever the witness departs the room, you are also further requested to remain in your seats for security purposes. You may bring the witness in. The Chair at this time recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may further consume. TESTIMONY OF EUSEBIO AZCUE--(Resumed) Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-428 be placed on the easel, please. Do we have JFK exhibit F-428? In the earlier testimony that was read to the committee today from Sylvia Duran, mention was made of a newspaper article by a reporter named Comer Clark which appeared in an american paper. This is a copy of that article. I would like to read you about the first five or six paragraphs of that article, Mr. Azcue, and get your comments upon it. I would suggest to the translator that I might read by sections of it and give you a copy of the article and you can translate it directly, in the interest of time. The article reads in the first paragraph, it begins in quotation marks: "Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible that I could have saved him. "I might have been able to--but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect." These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15. "Lee Oswald came to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. The first time--I was told--he wanted to work for us. "He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't. "He wouldn't go into details. "The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.' "Then he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.' "Then Oswald said--and this was exactly how it was reported to me--'Maybe I'll try to do it.' "This was less than 2 months before the U.S President was assassinated." Mr. Azcue, would you comment on that statement? Senor AZCUE. I have already commented to you, in the course of previous conversations, that Mr. Oswald did not see nor could he have seen, either at the consulate or the Embassy, any persons or individuals other than we. He did not have any contact other than contact with us, consul Mirabal, I as consul, and Sylvia Duran as a secretary. He did not mention any such thing to any of us, and much less would we have passed this information on to Fidel. So I see no way in which our Commander in Chief could have been aware of a conversation that Oswald says he held with one of our agents. The only agents present were those three I have mentioned-the two consuls and the secretary. 148 First of all, I would have never tolerated a conversation of that nature because, without any doubt, that would have constituted a provocation, and we do not allow ourselves to be provoked, and our revolution never dealt with anything related to terrorism, much less so the death of President Kennedy. What would become of us should we have intervened? This is ridiculous that we should attempt to walk into the mouth of the lion, and this has been repeatedly asserted by our Commander in Chief. We have never used terrorism. We have never supported terrorism, and we have never even supported terrorism even in those cases in which we sympathize with the views of those who did practice it. Mr. PREYER. So that the man who appeared before you in the consulate did not say these words as set out in the article, nor anything that sounded like those words. Senor AZCUE. I repeat once again that I would not have tolerated it because I would have taken this as a provocation, and our behavior in this context is extraordinarily clear and clean. Mr. PREYER. Moving to another area, Mr. Azcue, Sylvia Duran and her husband often entertained, I believe, in Mexico City. Did you socialize with the Durans from time to time? Did you attend their parties? Senor AZCUE. Yes; in Mexico naturally it is a custom to have social gatherings in the home of one or another friend. They did host them, not as frequently as the question you have formulated would imply, but they did, and I in turn have attended some of those gatherings, and I believe that whenever they did have a party, they always invited me because I was very friendly to both. Mr. PREYER. Do you know if they had any parties in September of 1963; that is, the time when Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico? Senor AZCUE. It is possible, but it is difficult that they would have held such a party without inviting me, a person that was so close to them. And I recall that the last gathering that I attended at the Duran home was one that was carried out in order to bid me farewell in preparation for my return to Cuba, and it was during the month of November, a few days before my departure from Mexico. Mr. PREYER. Do you know Elena Garro de Paz? Senor AZCUE. Yes. I have seen her on some occasions in the home of one of her sisters, whose husband is a Mexican painter, Horacio, whose name is Guerrero Galvan, and who was a friend of mine. Mr. PREYER. I believe her husband is Octavio Paz, the Mexican poet? Senor AZCUE. Yes, Octavio Paz, who was also Mexican Ambassador to Paris and a distinguished poet, was her husband at the time I met her. Mr. PREYER. Elena Garro de Paz was a friend of the Durans and also a friend of yours, I believe; is that correct? Senor Azcue. That is correct; yes. She was related to Horacio Duran. Mr. PREYER. And did I understand you to say that the painter, Guerrero Galvan--is that the way you pronounce that?--was a 149 friend of yours and was married to the sister of Elena Garro de Paz? Senor AZCUE. Exactly. Mr. PREYER. Perhaps I should get the blackboard out and draw some lines to spell out the family tree there. But let me just sum up by asking: You knew Elena Garro de Paz fairly well? Senor AZCUE. Not very well. I have met her on two, maybe three opportunities because she was living at that time in her sister's home, the home of Mrs. Guerrero Galvan, the home that I used to visit with a certain frequency, but we were not intimate friends. It was simply a social acquaintance. Mr. PREYER. Would you describe her as an emotionally stable person? Senor AZCUE. She appeared to me to be a delicate person, a refined person, a cultured writer. Mr. PREYER. Did she have what we might call a vivid imagination about things other than her writing? Senor AZCUE. I believe it is very difficult in the course of two or three visits to be able to fully understand the character of a lady without being a close or intimate friend, and her writings I have only read from the standpoint of literary criticism or review. I would not attempt to make a critical evaluation of her personality or character because I am not a psychologist. Mr. PREYER. Let me put it this way. If she told you a story about something that had happened, would you be apt to believe her? Senor AZCUE. It would depend on the kind of story she would be telling me. Mr. PREYER. If she told you something of a serious nature, would you be apt, likely to believe that she would be telling the truth about it? Senor AZCUE. I repeat once again that it will depend on the subject matter. It depends on the issue itself, not who is telling the story. If it has some viability or credibility, I would accept it. If not, I would not. Mr. PREYER. Did you ever hear that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended one of the Durans' parties when he was in Mexico? Senor AZCUE. No, never, and that is one of the things I would not believe, no matter who would tell me, because I knew the Durans well, and I knew that this gentleman, I know that this gentleman who turned up at the consulate to request a visa had no other activities or purpose while there. He came to the consulate and thereafter we never talked about him or saw him any other time. And I repeat once again that I wouldn't believe that either Sylvia or Horacio would host a gathering during those days without inviting me. Mr. PREYER. Did you know a man named Emilio Carbellido, a Mexican writer, I believe? Senor AZCUE. Yes, of course, very well known in Mexico. He is a well-known writer, and well known in Cuba also, because he has visited there repeatedly. Mr. PREYER. Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with Mr. Carbellido? 150 Senor AZCUE. It is my prior practice not to discuss with anyone outside of my own group, members of my own Embassy, or of our own group, any of these issues of foreign policy or policy of other nations. We are very careful regarding our own views, especially in the presence of a gentleman who was not such a great friend of mine. Mr. PREYER. Would Mr. Carbellido have been at the parties or some of the parties that the Durans gave from time to time? Senor AZCUE. It is possible. I do not recall his presence at any specific one, but it is possible that he might have attended. Mr. PREYER. I have asked you some questions earlier, Mr. Azcue, about Miss Elena Garro de Paz, and as to whether you would be likely to believe a story if she told it to you. Miss Garro has told us that on one occasion she was at a party at one of the Durans' houses, and that you and Oswald were both at the party. She has told us that at another party at one of the Durans' homes she overheard a conversation in which you and Emilio Carbellido were discussing President Kennedy. She says that at the conclusion of that conversation, you stated that there was no alternative than to kill President Kennedy. Would you care to comment on her allegations? Senor AZCUE. Yes; first, because it is not possible or conceivable in my own mind to kill anyone, much less so the President of the United States, and much more so because of the possible implications or effects upon our own revolution, which I would defend with every effort that I could muster. It would be necessary to ask this lady why she makes such statements; it is incredible. Because, I repeat, I have seen her only two or three times in my whole life, and much earlier than the time when this gentleman showed up at our consulate. With some analysis, I could probably even determine the date of these meetings with her. And I know that the last time I saw her was much before Mirabal arrived at the consulate, and Mirabal arrived on September 2. I can almost fix the date. The previous secretary, the one who preceded Sylvia Duran, was a relative of mine who died on July 19. And I clearly recall that the son of Guerrero Galvan, the painter, who was a student of medicine, was discussing with me the unfortunate death of my secretary, who was, in turn, my relative, as a result of a car accident in a Volkswagen, and he was explaining to me how dangerous it was to be in an accident in a Volkswagen because of the shortness of the car and the proximity of the riders to the windshield, and it was a date so close to July 19 that he was telling me that, during that same period, those same days, there had been three fatal accidents similar to the one in which my secretary had died, and that was the last opportunity on which I saw Elena Garro. What did they offer Elena Garro to make such absurd statements or declarations? Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions at this time. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 151 How are you again? Senor AZCUE. Glad to meet you, sir. Mr. DODD. I am not going to speak in Spanish. My Spanish isn't that good. Could you please tell me, Mr. Azcue, how long you had been the consul in Mexico prior to your departure in November of 1963? Senor Azcue. When the revolution achieved its victory, I was appointed consulate the beginning of January 1959. Thereafter they called upon me, thereafter the Government of Cuba recalled me to put me in charge of the reconstruction of housing for peasants in our country, and who were members of the rebel army, and housing that had been destroyed during the course of the war. So at that point I returned to Cuba in June of 1959 and was working in the Sierras, in the mountains, in charge of construction, work, probably until 1960. I do not recall the exact date. Then I returned to Mexico as an attache, a diplomatic attache, to the Embassy, and shortly thereafter I had to take over or take charge of the consulate, and on this occasion until November of 1963. Mr. DODD. Am I to understand, then, that you assumed the duties of consul in 1960, some time early in 1960, the end of 1960? What period of time did you assume those responsibilities? Senor AZCUE. Yes, it was in April of 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. Mr. DODD. Now, did I understand your testimony correctly, that you were not aware of how the photograph on the exhibit, the visa application, you are not aware of how that photo got on that application? In fact, you had not seen the photograph on the application? Senor AZCUE. That is the case. Sylvia Duran was handling that area. She typed in the form, affixed the photo, had the applicant sign the forms. In the meantime there was no reason for us consuls to be present there observing the procedure. We were simply in our private offices. We had a lot of work. Mr. DODD. The reason I asked you that question, is that when several of us had the opportunity to interview you in Cuba a few short months ago, on page 14 of our interview, which I hope you have a copy of, I was questioning you and I asked you: Going back to the physical appearance of Lee Harvey Oswald, apart from having a receding hairline, was there any gray in Lee Harvey Oswald's hair? You responded: You know he had blond hair. It is all very interesting. You see this picture, I really did not study carefully. The picture was taken by the secretary and she applied it to the application. It would seem from your response to my question then that, one, you did see the picture on the application or that you did not see the picture on the application then, but were merely looking at it when it was in front of you, and that you had very specific knowledge as to how the picture got on the application, that in fact Sylvia Duran stapled it to the application. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair will permit the witness to respond to the question. Senor AZCUE. Yes; it is a matter of routine. She is the one who handles all of these detailed operations. I could assure that she was the one who did it without having seen her do it. There was no one, 152 no other person there, that would do that work for her, and neither Mirabal nor I did that work. Mr. DODD. All right, then. May I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, just to proceed and finish this line of questioning, which should take just a couple of minutes? I will try to make my questions brief for the translations. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman may proceed. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Based on the testimony you have given, if we are to believe your testimony with regard to the description of the individual that you said you saw that day, it would vary quite significantly, or significantly from the actual photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald, the one on the visa application and the photograph that you see to your left over here. They would be different than the person that you saw in the Cuban Consulate, isn't that correct? Senor AZCUE. For me, yes. When I saw in April the photograph placed on the application, I was surprised by his looks or similarity with the Lee Harvey Oswald who had been killed. This was my reaction in front of you. You were the ones who showed me that picture. That was the first time that I saw that application completed with the photos and all of the other information. Mr. DODD. But what you saw was someone that was very different looking from the person that you met in the Cuban Consulate in September of 1963? Senor AZCUE. Yes, as different as I found him when I saw him in film. The image I had of the individual who showed up at the consulate was the man in his thirties, maybe 35 years old, and with the very thin face. You will recall that he had very natural lines, very thin straight nose, except for all of the items I mentioned, and this gentleman appeared to me to be much younger and with a much fuller face. That is the evaluation I have with absolute certainty. It is my truth. Mr. DODD. My question is this, after having gone through that, I am left with two choices that I perceive that caused this to occur, since according to your testimony and the testimony of others, there were three people who were working in the consul's section. There was Mr. Mirabal, there was yourself and there was Sylvia Duran. It was either a terrible mistake on the part of Sylvia Duran, who also saw this individual come into the office and who stapled this on here, or there was complicity in placing the photograph on the application at the time. If the two people were that different, then the only people who could have been involved would have been people at the consulate. Would you please help me out with that possible contradiction? Senor AZCUE. Well, I am sure that it was not a case of complicity. It is possibly a matter of what I see as the truth and what she sees as the truth, my image of the individual present there, her image of the individual there, and whether she carefully studied the photo. These types of photographs are not necessarily that precise. They are not as regular passport pictures which have to be very clear. And there is, of course, one other possibility, and I cannot guarantee that this is the case, but it is conceivable that 153 while writing down all the information on the application, that she might not have checked exactly the picture against the individual who was applying, that, occupied as she was, she most probably proceeded to place the photograph on the application without this check. Mr. DODD. In effect suggesting that there was an enormous error. Senor AZCUE. It is a mistake that results very often in the case of the course of one's work, in the normal or ordinary case. Mr. DODD. And that also, if I understood you, the third option being is that you could be mistaken as to separating the identity of the two people. Senor AZCUE. It is possible. We are all exposed to error or mis- take. It is not, however, my view. My view is that I am right. Now I have to say I am not infallible. Mr. DODD. I wasn't suggesting that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the additional amount of time. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just curious. You had been in Mexico from 1943; am I correct in that? Senor AZCUE. 1944. Mr. SAWYER. You were a Cuban by birth and had lived in Cuba before that time, I understand. Senor AZCUE. Yes, many years. Mr. SAWYER. Why had you spent so long a time in Mexico as opposed to being in Cuba? Senor AZCUE. I first left Cuba during the time of the government of Machado in 1931. I lived for about 10 years almost in Europe. At that time I wanted to return to Mexico, to conclude my studies. Because I did not agree or follow the politics in Cuba during the time, I never felt at home with Batista, I never felt well. I preferred to live in a country that offered me opportunities to study and to work, and I built my life there. It was my second homeland, as is the case with so many other Cubans who at that time had to be bouncing around from one place to another. Mr. SAWYER. So then since about 1931, up until about 1959, you were what you might say a political refugee, or political exile, in effect, from Cuba. Senor AZCUE. A voluntary exile. Nobody forced me not to live in my country. I did not find it pleasant because of the political climate in my country to live there. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. THONE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask just one question in line with the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, on which I am a little confused. Chairman STOKES. Certainly. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. THONE. Consul Azcue, did I understand, and I may not have gotten it right this morning, that when you went back to Cuba you saw a film which depicted the shooting by a Mr. Ruby of Lee Harvey Oswald, and at the time you were concerned that this wasn't the same person at all that was at the consul applying for a visa? 154 Senor AZCUE. Exactly. Only 2 months back I had seen the individual who appeared at the consulate. So I had his image clearly engraved in my mind, and I did not recognize him in the movie. Mr. THONE. Exactly. Now my question. Did you report this to the Cuban Government, and if so to whom and what happened on your report in this regard? Senor AZCUE. I reported this to some of my friends in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But in fact, in truth I was aware of the fact that it was testimony of my own, it was of my own imagination. And that the conditions under which I had seen him in the film at the time he was killed, with distorted features as a result of pain, it is conceivable that I might be mistaken. I reaffirmed my view when Attorney Garrison of New Orleans stated that the Oswald who visited or was at the consulate was not the one who allegedly killed Kennedy, because of the date he departed New Orleans and the date he had visited the consulate in Cuba. So that confirmed my own view, and at that point I believed that as being the truth. And then I communicated this. And that was probably filed, recorded. I did not write a report. I made an oral report. But it would be necessary to investigate whether such a report in writing exists or does not. But that was the time when I saw my own views confirmed in my opinion that there were two Oswalds. Garrison shares the same opinion. Mr. THONE. Senor Azcue, I don't want to be too repetitious. But just a quick followup question. Again, to whom in the Foreign Division, or Service, down in Havana, did you report this after you had seen the Ruby film, and at what time? Senor AZCUE. These were colleagues of mine in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But at that time all three of us were working in the National Council for Culture. And it was Mr. Lechuga and Mr. Otero. Mr. THONE. And when did you make that report? Senor AZCUE. Immediately after reading Garrison's statements in the newspaper. Possibly at the end of 1964. That would be something very easy to check out. Or maybe beginning of 1965. Mr. THONE. Last this, and it is probably a question you cannot answer. Do you know what action at all was taken within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on your report in this regard? Senor Azcue. Honestly, I do not know that. Mr. THONE. Because this is quite a startling development here. You would have thought that your government would have done something with the report from the consul who supposedly had three confrontations with the man reported to be Lee Harvey Oswald. And when you came up with this information that this was not the same person that was down there, you would have thought something would have happened. Just a comment. I don't know that it needs a response, Mr. Consul, unless you would have a thought on it. Senor AZCUE. Yes. It is very possible, it is a possibility that they did not believe me at all, that they might have thought that this was simply my own impression or evaluation. And moreover, that 155 it might be with reference to a matter that was not one of immediate concern in terms of current events at that time for us. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time to the Chair. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Azcue, you testified that Oswald produced a document showing his membership in the U.S. Communist Party. To your knowledge was that document valid? Senor AZCUE. I did not concentrate much of my attention on the documents themselves. And I could not see whether they were authentic or not. The person who saw them, or the person who made the notations might have been Sylvia. But she had no way of telling whether they were authentic or not, any of the documents. That is the reason that he addresses himself to the Soviet Embassy, so that they in turn could tell us whether the Soviet documents are or are not valid. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. At your consulate, whose responsibility was it to compare the applicant in person with the picture on the application, or the picture offered to be put on the application, to assure that the photo was indeed the photo of the person applying for a visa? Senor AZCUE. The first one that should have checked that out was Sylvia. And I feel that we also should have checked. But fatally I did not make the comparison or that check. I had not seen that photograph until April of the present year. Mr. FITHIAN. May I direct a question to counsel, Mr. Cornwell. Would the passport, the application that we have on the display board, would we have gotten that from Havana, or the consulate in Mexico City? Mr. CORNWELL. The passport and the passport application came from New Orleans. Are you talking about the visa application? Mr. FITHIAN. I am talking about the visa application that was submitted to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, the large display on the board. Mr. CORNWELL. Two visa applications; No. 408 is the one on the right, that is a photograph of an original visa application which was provided to us for inspection during our trip to Cuba by the Cuban Government. The one on the left, No. 407, is a photograph of a visa application provided by the Cuban Government to the Warren Commission, and would appear to be a carbon copy. Mr. FITHIAN. My question, Mr. Cornwell, goes to the stamping of October 10 on it. Obviously if it were from the Cuban consulate at Mexico City, and it had a date of October 10 on it, that is one thing. It is quite another, obviously, if it is a photo of a copy that has been sent on down to Havana to one of the other bureaus. Mr. CORNWELL. I don't believe there is testimony solving that issue yet. The only testimony I believe we have had is with respect to the exhibit 408, and as I recall, Senor Azcue provided information about his understanding of the date October 10 on that document. He was not asked why there was no similar date on document 407, to my memory. 156 Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. Mr. Azcue, Lee Harvey Oswald was a radar operator in the Marines and was familiar with the U.S. spy plane, the U-2. Did Oswald ever mention to you his service in the Marines or in the military in the United States during your conversation with him as he was trying to get a passport to Cuba? Senor AZCUE. He did not provide any information on his own background other than the presentation of the documentation that he had brought forth in connection with his application. It was clear, and I was able to check out from the first time, that his only intent was to obtain a visa immediately. Therefore his background, especially his nonrevolutionary background, was of a nature that he had no interest at all in communicating to us. He was interested in telling me that he was a member of the Communist Party, that he was a resident of the Soviet Union. In other words, that which he believed would be sufficient to obtain the visa. And our conversations were always extremely brief, because I used to put an end to these conversations, referring to the instructions I had from my government of a need to obtain their prior authorization before issuing any visa, either the final destination visa to the Soviet Union, so that I may be in a position to provide him, without prior consultation to Cuba, with a transit visa, but with the visa of the Soviet Union already affixed to his passport. Everything went around that very issue. He did not speak a single word outside of that issue. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does counsel have anything further? Excuse me. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to pursue one other line of questioning, if I may, and I will try and be brief on it. Could you tell me, Mr. Azcue, what the Cuban surveillance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico might have shown during those days in September 1963? Did you conduct or have photographic surveillance of people who came into your Embassy, or did you keep any sort of surveillance mechanism by which you could keep a record of those people who came to your Embassy or stopped in for whatever business? Senor AZCUE. We were very young, maybe trusting. We did not have great experience. And we had great trust in our neighbors. At first we did not mistrust anyone. Intuitively we might have had certain reasons to be concerned or to fear certain individuals, but we did not take any photographs, nor did we have any mechanisms or systems. We simply took measures to protect ourselves from some possible aggression or aggressive act. But it was a result of our own action. And with some small security protection or guard that the Mexican Government provided outside the premises, and our own colleagues within the Embassy, who might be able to react to outside aggression, but with nothing much other than their own physical ability to do so, with their bodies. Mr. DODD. As I understood your testimony, you were in Cuba on November 22, 1963. You had returned from Mexico. Senor AZCUE. I left on the 18th. Mr. DODD. I presume Once it became--once the knowledge was acquired in Cuba that the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had applied for a visa in your consulate in Mexico, that there was 157 then an investigation in Cuba, that it was then a concern, I presume, of Premier Castro and his government to inquire as to those people who had knowledge of that particular circumstance as to actually what in fact happened in Mexico in September of that year. Is that a fact? Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has again expired. The Chair will permit the witness to answer the question. Senor AZCUE. Immediately, as soon as I saw the name, I communicated it, or got in touch myself with the Foreign Ministry, and after a quick interview with the Minister and with the Chief of the Bureau, I was immediately sent to the person responsible for such matters in the Interior Ministry, and that was Commandante Pineiro. Naturally this event constituted a great commotion for us because we feared that we might be involved in that dirty business. At that time the Commander in Chief, in his speech of November 27, he is already informed in advance of all those points on which I had personally reported, reported to Commander Pineiro of the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore it is in that speech that Fidel comments or reflects and states what 1 have always stated. Mr. DODD. Did you make any effort or are you aware of any effort that was made to also talk to either Sylvia Duran, Mr. Mirabal, anyone else that could possibly shed any light as to what actually happened in the consulate in Mexico, other than talking to yourself? Senor AZCUE. Our colleague, Sylvia Duran, was arrested by the Mexican Government in order to obtain from her clarification or other types of statements from her. Regarding other possible investigations on the part of the Cuban Government, I am not aware of them, because I am not an intelligence agent of the Cuban Government. I provide the information I hold so that it might be processed or acted on. Mr. DODD. So am I to understand that you gave oral testimony, there was no written statement, there was no tape recording or any stenographer that took your statement at the time? Senor AZCUE. No. Commander Pineiro and I were alone in his office. But a few days thereafter I heard the speech of Fidel and I realized that the Commander in Chief was fully informed of all points. So the precise report summarized in brief form is incorporated in the speech of Prime Minister Castro. All of the information is contained therein, and consequently printed in the press and televised and transmitted through radio. Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask whether or not we as a committee have asked the Cuban Government for any and all documentation which they may have prepared or have at their disposal as a result of their investigation of this particular aspect of the case at the time that they became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application in Mexico. Have we made that request, and, if so, have we had a response? Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Dodd, we have indeed asked the Cuban Government to provide us with any written reports filed at that time by either Mr. Azcue or any of the people with whom he dealt. And they have informed us that this was handled orally; that no written reports were made at that time. 158 Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Azcue, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, the witness is entitled, under the rules of this committee, and of the House, to have extended to him 5 minutes in which he may comment upon the testimony he has given before our committee, and I would extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose at this time, if you so desire. Senor AZCUE. Thank you very much. I will use the 5 minutes or possibly less. First, I want to thank you for the good reception that we have had in this visit here during our trip, for all attentions extended. It has been more than we could have expected. And at the same time I want to state or express that it is in our greatest interest that this entire issue be clarified to the utmost, and that we have always cooperated, and that you must have been able to note it as a result of statements made by our own Prime Minister reflecting our sincere cooperation, without holding back any information, an attitude which we have consistently maintained. We have the greatest interest in seeing that the issue is clarified, possibly an interest equaling your own interest in having it clarified. At any and all times we are available to you and at your disposition within the context of our possibilities. We have always played with clean decks, with clean cards, as has always been our custom. Once again, thank you very much. Chairman STOKES. Mr. Azcue, I want to also say to you it is nice to see you again. We enjoyed the visit we had with you in Cuba, the testimony we took from you at that time. And on behalf of the committee, we want to also thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee and for you voluntarily appearing here today as a witness. So on behalf of the committee and the House of Representatives, we thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee. You are now excused. Senor AZCUE. [in English]. You are welcome, Mr. Stokes. Can I go? Chairman STOKES. Yes, you may go. All persons are requested to remain in their seats until the witness has departed from the hearing room. Mr. STANDARD. Mr. Chairman, if I may, for a moment. Chairman STOKES. Yes, counsel. Mr. STANDARD. The witness has made reference today to two speeches of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of November 23 and November 27, 1963, and I ask they be incorporated as part of this record. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, your request is granted. JFK exhibit F-684 may be entered into the record at this point. [The exhibit follows:] 159 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 160 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 161 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 162 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 163 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 164 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 165 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 166 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 167 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 168 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 169 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 170 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 171 JFK EXHIBIT F-684 cont. 172 Mr. STANDARD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have one other request, if I may. Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. Mr. STANDARD. Congressman Thone addressed himself to what in fact happened to the discussion which Senior Azcue had, and I would refer him to what I believe is part of the interviews of your committee and your staff with Mr. Otero, which is not yet part of this record as far as I know; and second to the transcription of the 4-hour interview with President Castro, which I understand will be made part of this record by reference when the witnesses have completed their testimony. Chairman STOKES. That is correct. The full transcript of the statement with President Castro will be made and incorporated into the entire record. Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. At this time, Mr. Azcue, you are excused. All persons are requested to remain in their seats while the witness leaves the room. Mr. STANDARD. Mr. Chairman, the witness would like to remain in the room; if I could provide a chair for him, I would. Chairman STOKES. Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, in light of the questions raised as to the identity of the man who visited the Cuban consulate, that is whether or not he was Lee Harvey Oswald, the committee decided to test by handwriting analysis the authenticity of the signature on the visa application. The committee was advised by the Cuban Government that the visa applications had to be typed in duplicate and that the applicant had to sign both copies. In 1964, one of the forms allegedly signed by Mr. Oswald was turned over to the Warren Commission. In 1978 the committee obtained the second copy, which has been incorporated in the record, in Havana. Consequently, there are two checks to be made in a handwriting analysis of this question, one, to determine that both visa application forms were signed by the same person, and two, to determine if possible whether the signatures were in fact or are in fact identical with the other writings attributable to Lee Harvey Oswald. For the purposes of verification, the committee asked its handwriting experts to compare the signatures on the two forms which are part of the record with two other writings. Those other writings were the signature on Oswald's fingerprint card at the time of his arrest in New Orleans in August 1963, and his passport application dated June 24, 1963. Mr. Chairman, the committee's panel of handwriting experts have in fact made that analysis, and a representative of it will be with the committee on Monday to report in full on those findings. In essence, however, it is that Lee Harvey Oswald signed both of the visa applications. That representative of the handwriting panel will be Mr. Joseph P. McNally. The committee will recall that Mr. McNally has already testified before the committee and will be available again on Monday to be fully cross-examined on this and several other issues that have arisen in the handwriting area. 173 At this time, Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to note that another member of the Cuban consulate staff who was present when Oswald allegedly applied for a visa was Senor Alfredo Mirabal Diaz. Senor Mirabal succeeded Senor Azcue as Cuban consul in Mexico City. Senor Mirabal was born August 11, 1923. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Mirabal. Chairman STOKES. Will the witness please stand. Raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God. [The testimony of Senor Mirabal was given through the interpreter.] Senor MIRABAL. I do. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. TESTIMONY OF SENOR ALFREDO MIRABAL DIAZ, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. HERVAS, INTERPRETER FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes counsel, Michael Goldsmith. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mirabal, when did you assume your position as Cuban consul in Mexico City? Senor MIRABAL. September 2, 1963. Mr. GOLDSMITH. How long had you worked in that capacity? Senor MIRABAL. Eleven months. Mr. GOLDSMITH. What hours of the day was the Cuban consulate open to the public? Senor MIRABAL. Ten in the morning to two in the afternoon. Mr. GOLDSMITH. And what days of the week were these hours observed? Senor MIRABAL. Monday through Friday. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was the consulate open to the public on Saturdays and Sundays? Senor MIRABAL. No. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, while you were Cuban consul in Mexico City, did you ever see Lee Harvey Oswald? Senor MIRABAL. Twice, on two occasions, when he was at the consulate processing his visa application. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did anything unusual happen when Oswald was applying for his visa? Senor MIRABAL. Yes; since he first came for the visa, I must note that I do not know English, and therefore it was my colleague Azcue who took care of him, though he had in fact concluded his responsibilities in the position. When I arrived, he stayed on to help me out and he, together with the secretary, took care of this visitor. From inside my private office I could hear loud voices, and I came out of my office several times to see what was happening in the area where the secretary worked. I asked my colleague, Azcue, who was taking care of the visitor, I did not know who the visitor was. But my colleague Azcue told me that the visitor was in need 174 of an urgent visa, that he was in a great hurry to travel to Cuba. However, as our own procedures dictated, and as our instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Relations provided, we were not authorized to issue a visa, and therefore the visa was not issued. He continued in this discussion. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did Mr. Oswald get involved in arguments with Mr. Azcue on both occasions that he, Oswald, visited the consulate? Senor MIRABAL Yes; on both occasions there were discussions or arguments to such an extent that from the very first moment it appeared to me as if this instance could be a case of a provocation. I sensed that there was an intent to create some kind of a scandal, of a disturbance. That was my feeling. The second time the same thing happened. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Approximately how long did these arguments last? Senor MIRABAL. Today I could not be exact or precise; 15 years have gone by since then. Some time, 15, 20 minutes. Mr. GOLDSMITH. And you had occasion to see Mr. Oswald on both of these occasions? Senor MIRABAL. Yes. I had an opportunity to see him. But it was from my private office where I stuck my head over and had a look at him from that vantage point. Mr. GOLDSMITH. How far away from you was Mr. Oswald during these two visits? Senor MIRABAL. About 4 meters away. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall when Mr. Oswald made his visits to the Cuban consulate? Senor MIRABAL. It was at the beginning or shortly after my arrival. Mr. GOLDSMITH. At this time, Mr. Mirabal, I would like to refer your attention to what has been marked as JFK exhibit F-408. That is the second exhibit from the right. And I believe you have just been handed a copy of that exhibit. Mr. Mirabal, does the date on that application refresh your memory as to when Oswald visited the Embassy? Senor MIRABAL. Yes; it is close to the date of my arrival. Yes, in addition the visa applications are filled in at the very time that they are being requested, and this would be on the second occasion. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, please look at the picture that appears in that application. Is the person whose picture appears in this visa application the same Lee Harvey Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate requesting a visa? Senor MIRABAL. I really did not observe him with any great deal of interest. He for me was one of many who visited the consulate. The image that I have of him, I believe that the answer is yes, that he is the same person. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, after the assassination of President Kennedy, was there ever any discussion at the Cuban consulate or Embassy concerning whether the Oswald arrested in Dallas was actually the same person identified as Oswald who visited your consulate requesting a visa in September 1963? Senor MIRABAL. Yes; on the day following the assassination it is my own secretary that communicates this information to me in the morning when I arrive at the consulate. At that point, she advises 175 me of the fact that the assassination has occurred. Later, and I cannot recall exactly how late or how soon thereafter, she communicates to me the fact that the alleged assassin is the same person that came to the consulate. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, at this time I would like to read to you a quotation from Comer Clark's article. He attributes the quotation to President Castro. I believe that Mr. Hervas has been given a copy of that. "Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. "The first time--I was told--he wanted to work for us. "He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't. "He wouldn't go into details. "The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.' "Then he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.' "Then Oswald said--and this was exactly how it was reported to me-- 'Maybe I'll try to do it.' Mr. Mirabal, do you recall Mr. Oswald making the remarks that are allegedly attributed to him? Senor MIRABAL. I feel that what has just been read is totally absurd, it is incredible. In addition, it is completely false, it is a lie, and it is impossible to imagine that that has been stated. Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal. I have no further questions at this time. Chairman STOKES. Does any member seek recognition? Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Mr. Mirabal, let me just follow up the one line of questioning I had for Mr. Azcue, and that is with regard to how the photo on the visa application got there. Can you enlighten us at all as to how that photograph got on the application, what either the normal operating procedures were or if there were any unique operating procedures in this case which would explain how that photograph ended up on that visa application? Senor MIRABAL. The entire matter of the processing of the paper work relating to the application was entrusted to the secretary. I did not participate in any manner. She was most efficient, and we trusted her in this task. Mr. DODD. In other words, you never saw the visa application when it was in the consulate in Mexico. Senor MIRABAL. Yes, I did. In fact, there is a footnote with a series of remarks or a remark or observation that I included or I made. Mr. DODD. Do you recall that photograph as the photograph of the man that you saw, granted not all that clearly, during the 30 minutes or so, the total period of time that he was in your office back in September of 1963? Senor MIRABAL. I know that this was the photograph that was affixed to the request of the application, but at no point did I verify whether this photograph was in fact that of the person who submitted the application, because this was not a matter that I took care of. It was the secretary who was responsible for this, and when she brought these documents to me, I assumed that everything was in order. Mr. DODD. Fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 176 Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. Yes, I just have one question. You stated that the statement attributed to President Castro as to the statements made in the consulate by Lee Harvey Oswald were not correct and were a lie or something to that effect. At that time, I understood you could not speak English and did not understand English; is that correct? Senor MIRABAL. Yes, it is true. I did not speak English at that time. However, my colleague, Senor Azcue, and the secretary would, without any doubt, have informed me if he had stated anything of such a nature. I have complete trust in my colleague, Azcue, and in the secretary, and obviously because of the unusual and extremely alarming nature of any observations or statements of that kind, I feel sure that they would have advised me had they heard them. Mr. SAWYER. I just wanted the record to be clear that you are repeating what the other two told you rather than stating an observation as to what he said yourself. You are nodding your head yes. Senor MIRABAL. Yes; I don't understand English. Even if I heard it in English, I wouldn't have understood it--yes, it was my colleague, Azcue, and the secretary who took care of the application submitted by Lee Harvey Oswald. It was also them who provided me with all of the information that enabled me to add the observation contained in that footnote to the effect that he was requesting at the same time a visa to go to the Soviet Union. In fact, I noticed that he presented a card or credentials as belonging to the Communist Party of the United States. I understand, or it is also my understanding, that the Communist Party of the United States stated that he never belonged to the party. I was surprised by the fact that the card seemed to be a new card. I must say that I also have been a Communist for a number of years and that generally we do not use credentials or a card to identify ourselves as members of the party. Rather, we are identified to ourselves as Communists by our own behavior and by our own ideas. I was surprised by his unusual interest in using identification as a Communist. I would think it would be interesting to know how he obtained the card. It did have his name, and it did coincide with the same name that appeared in the other document. And, as I indicated, it was my colleague, Azcue, who brought all these documents and all this information to my desk for my report. It is then that I talked with the Soviet consul, and when I mentioned this to him, he told me that Oswald had in fact requested a visa for the Soviet Union but that he had been told that it would take about 4 months to obtain a response, and that is the reason that I included that information in the footnote that was to be sent to Havana. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Mirabal, was it standard operating procedure for an applicant to affix his signature to the application in the presence of a consulate official? Senor MIRABAL. That was normal. And it was always applied in that manner. 177 Chairman STOKES. Were there ever any occasions when an application form would be signed in blank? Senor MIRABAL. During the 11 months that I was there, that was never done. Chairman STOKES. And under the procedure as you knew it, were applicants ever permitted to take the application forms out of the consular office? Senor MIRABAL. To my knowledge, no. The ministry did not allow that to be done. I could not authorize it, and as far as I know, it was never done. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Mirabal. Is there anything further? The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could I get Mr. Mirabal to describe Mr. Oswald's demeanor, please? Senor MIRABAL. What I recall, and this, of course, is not only an image that time has eroded, but also I looked at him without concentrating great attention on him. At that time his appearance was not a cause of concern, but rather the events that were taking place at that time, the loud conversation, et cetera. As I recall him, he was a rather small man, medium height or somewhat less, narrow shoulders. I believe he was wearing a coat, short hair. I do not recall him having a moustache. He did have a serious expression on his face. He appeared hard or tough, someone who is upset or unhappy. That is the image that I retain of him. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Is there anyone else seeking recognition? Mr. Mirabal, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before our committee, he is entitled under the rules of this committee and of the House to address the committee for a period of 5 minutes in the event he desires to in any way clarify his testimony or expand upon it or explain it. I would at this time extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire. Senor MIRABAL. Thank you. I would like to state to the members of the committee that in connection with this entire process of the two visits that he made to the consulate, my impression from the very first moment was that it was in fact a provocation. He insisted on the urgency of his need for a visa. He indicated that he was being persecuted. He indicated that he could not stay long in Mexico, that he had an urgent need to travel to Cuba and therefrom to go to the Soviet Union. On the first day he was not given the visa because he did not fulfill the necessary requirements, requirements that are asked of all individuals who are visa applicants. On the second time he came to file the application, and yet he insisted that he needed to have it processed rapidly with great urgency. It was because of these demands of his that the argument with Mr. Azcue and with the secretary followed, and in fact during the argument he accused us all of not being true revolutionaries, of not being sensitive to the fact that he was being persecuted. I must say that from the very beginning I considered this a provocation, and I assured that in the manner in which we handled the case we followed the directives of the Foreign Ministry in the 178 sense that all individuals have to follow certain procedures in order to obtain a visa. I would also like to say personally that as far as I am concerned, it is a source of great satisfaction to be present here before the committee because in the first place I consider this a very important investigation in itself and also because we are very interested in its successful outcome. I am individually--and my government wants to insure--that things will be perfectly cleared up as a result. We feel that there have been efforts at making propaganda, at conducting campaigns, and Cuba has been, attempts have been made to link Cuba to this horrendous assassination. From the reports that have been read here, apparently even I had been linked to this event, and I can assure that neither Cuba nor I in any manner whatsoever participated in something that we very strongly repudiate, as was clearly stated by Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal. We also want to thank you for having volunteered to be here today and to testify before this committee, and we are deeply appreciative for your appearance. Does counsel have any statement to make? Mr. STANDARD. Just this, Mr. Chairman. In anticipation of your incorporating in this record the 4 hour approximate transcript of the interview with President Castro, I ask that you incorporate into the record and make it a part of it a series of articles which are referred to but not with specificity by date or name. First, a series of three articles by the French journalist, Jean Daniel, one which appeared in L'Express in French and two articles which appeared in the magazine, The New Republic. Second, in the course of the interview several references are made to Ambassador William Atwood. Those statements describe his role in contacting the Cuban Government at the behest of President Kennedy. And I ask that those be included as well. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, counsel's request is hereby granted. JFK exhibit F-685 may be entered into therecord at this point. [The information follows:] 179 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 180 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 181 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 182 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 183 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 184 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 185 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 186 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 187 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 188 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 189 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 190 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 191 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 192 JFK EXHIBIT F-685 cont. 193 Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Because of the lateness of the hour, it will be the plan of the committee to make the presentation tomorrow morning of the interview with President Fidel Castro in Cuba. For that reason I would like to make some other remarks at this time. This committee made two trips to Cuba, one on March 30, which extended from the 30th of March to the 4th of April. The second trip was from August 24 to August 29. Prior to going to Cuba on both occasions, it required a great deal of preparation and a great deal of contact between this committee and the Cuban Interest Section in the Cuban Government. I want to acknowledge the presence here today at the witness table of one of the gentlemen who was extremely helpful and cooperative to this committee in terms of both of those trips, Senor Ricardo Escartin, who is the Consul and the First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section. It was necessary for Mr. Escartin and other members of the Cuban Interest Section to meet with me on many occasions and also with Professor Blakey and members of this staff. We spent a great deal of time and received a great deal of cooperation from him on every occasion. Also, in Cuba, Senor Senen Buergo, the American Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was extremely helpful and cooperative with this committee. I also want to acknowledge the presence here at the witness table today of another gentleman who was extremely cooperative with us, and that was Senor Felipe Villa, Captain of the Ministry of the Interior, and during the course of both of our trips he extended a great deal of cooperation and help and assistance to this committee. I would like also to mention two very talented and able Cuban translators who were extremely helpful to us, Ms. Juanita Vera Nellie and Ruiz de Sarade. Others who gave cooperation and hospitality to this committee were Dr. Mondo Torres Santrail, the Minister of Justice; Oscar Fernandez Mel, the mayor of Havana; Jose Raimond Fernandez, Minister of Education, all of whom were extremely helpful and hospitable to us on our stay in Cuba. In addition, we want to express our deep appreciation to President Fidel Castro. On the first trip we made to Cuba, President Castro spent in excess of 4 hours being interviewed by the chairman of this committee and other members of the committee and staff. The entire transcript will be put into the record at some point tomorrow. During that period of time, the President made it very clear that it was the purpose of the Cuban Government to make it very clear that their government had nothing to do whatsoever with this very tragic occurrence in this country. It was the intent of their government to do everything possible to cooperate and see that the Cuban Government did everything in its power to clear up whatever it could around a tragedy of this type. So we are indeed grateful for the kind of cooperation that this congressional committee has received, and we want to thank each of you gentlemen for the assistance you have given us in this very important matter. 194 If there is nothing further at this time, I might also say that we are once again indebted to the U.S. Marshall Service for the security arrangements here around the distinguished witnesses who have appeared here today. We also would like to thank the interpreter from the State Department, Mr. Hervas, for a very efficient job he has done here today. At this time the chair will request that everyone remain seated until our witnesses have departed from the hearing room. Thereafter, we will adjourn these hearings until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. Thank you, gentlemen. You are excused. [Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Tuesday, September 19, 1978.] INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1978 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar. Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Leodis Matthews, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In late March and early April of this year, three members of the select committee--yourself, Congressman Preyer, and Congressman DODD--as well as three staff members, traveled to Cuba. It was the first of two trips in which the committee sought firsthand information about Lee Harvey Oswald's alleged visit to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, as well as other evidence about the Kennedy assassination. During the trip to Havana the committee representatives were given an opportunity to interview President Castro himself. In a 4-hour session, which was tape recorded, President Castro denied that he or any official of his government had anything to do with the death of President Kennedy or with Lee Harvey Oswald other than the visit to the Cuban consulate in September of 1963. The committee asked President Castro a series of questions. First, the committee asked him to recount whatever details he had learned and could recall regarding Oswald's two visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City in September 1963. Mr. Chairman, I ask that JFK F-429A, a photo taken during the interview of President Castro, be displayed and entered into the record at this point. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this place and displayed. [The information follows:] (195) 196 JFK EXHIBIT F-429A Mr. BLAKEY. In addition, may a tape of that interview, JFK F-429B, and a transcript, JFK F-429C, also be included in the record at this point? Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point. [Tape referred to above is retained in committee files.] [The information follows:] 197 JFK EXHIBIT F-429C INTERVIEW OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ PRESIDENT OF CUBA ------------ STAFF REPORT of the SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION September 18, 1978 198 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Ninety-Fifth Congress LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio WALTER E. FAUNTROY, District of Columbia STEWART B. MCKINNEY, Connecticut YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California CHARLES THONE, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICHIGAN HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania STAFF G. ROBERT BLAKEY, Chief Counsel and Director GARY CORNWELL, Deputy Chief counsel Kennedy Task Force EDWIN JUAN LOPEZ SOTO, Researcher 199 Table of Contents Page I. Introduction...............................................1 II. Excerpts: A. Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City.....................2 B. Comer Clark's Allegation............................8 C. Use of Assassinations as a Political Weapon.............................................11 D. Statements made by Fidel Castro at the Brazilian Embassy on September 7, 1963..................................17 III. Transcript of an interview of Fidel Castro Ruz of April 3, 1978 by Congressmen Louis Stokes, Richardson Preyer, and Christopher Dodd, Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell, and Researcher Edwin Juan Lopez Soto...............................................19 200 INTRODUCTION This Staff Report contains an interview held with Fidel Castro on April 3, 1978. It is President Castro's story as told by President Castro, about major areas of the Committee's concern. President Castro's words have been transcribed from the contemporaneous translations of Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. Their translations have been used so as to provide as accurate a transcription as possible. It is based solely on statements made by President Castro; it does not rely upon or cite other source material, or evidence the Committee has uncovered. It is based on an interview conducted by the Committee and staff with President Castro in Havana, Cuba. This interview, released today in its entirety, will also be published as an appendix to the Final Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations. This staff Report should not be reas as "implying" that the Committee believes or disbelieves the statements made. The Committee is currently analyzing and investigating all aspects of the subjects raised in this interview that are related to this investigation. The Final Report will contain a complete analysis of the subjects discussed during the interview related to the investigation. The Final Report will also incorporate all the material that the Select Committee has acquired as a result of its investigation. 201 Page Two EXCERPT A Lee Harvey Oswald's Visits to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City Stokes: Mr. President, did it come to your attention shortly after the assassination that Lee Harvey oswald, who was the accused assassin, had had contact with your Embassy in Mexico City? Castro: Yes. In fact, it was after Kennedy's death that he caught my attention. Because here nobody receives news about anyone filing applications for a visa. These things are always solved through the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. So it never is taken to the government. You know, it is not necessary. This is normal routine work. None of us has anything to do with visas. Some officials knew about it when somebody in particular filed an application there. But tens - or maybe hundreds of thousands of people file applications. But when Kennedy was assassinated and Oswald's actions were published in the newspapers, the officials who had handled visa applicaitons realized that this Oswald could be the same Oswald who had gone to the Consulate in order to apply for a visa. That is why we had news about it, you know? After Kennedy's death we learned that a man by the name of Oswald had gone to the consulate and filled out an application for a visa - that he had been told that we did not normally give an intransit visa until the country of destination granted one. And, 202 Page Three then we were told that a person had gotten very upset and had protested in an irate manner because he could not receive a visa. This was the news I had, more or less. the rest you know. Stokes: We were wondering your... Castro: There is something I would like to add in that connection. You see, it was always very mcuh suspicious to me--that a person who later appeared to be involved in Kennedy's death would have requested a visa rom cuba. Because, I said to myself - what would have happened had by any chance that man come to cuby - visited Cuba - gone back to the States and then appeared involved in Kennedy's death? That would have really been a provocation - a gigantic provocation. Well, that man did not come to Cuba simply because that was the norm -- we rejected visa applications...like that. In those days the mechanism was very rigid because, of course, we had suspicions of anyone who tried to come to Cuba. People in charge of granting visas asked themselves: Why does (this applicant) want to come to Cuba? What kind of counter-revolutionary activity could he carry out in cuba? Maybe the people thought that the person was a CIA or FBI agent, you know, so it was very difficult for a north American, just from his own wishes, to come to Cuba - because systematically we denied the visas. So, I think that there could always be an exception, but in those times it was very, very difficult to have anyone from the United States come into 203 Page Four Cuba because there was a tremendous suspicion and because in general permits to (travel to cuba) were denied. Now, if it was a transit visa going toward another country - let's say -- had the Soviet Union granted the visa, you may be sure that our Consul would have granted the transit visa because the person would not be coming to Cuba only, but would be going to another country. The person would have to come (here) and if the Soviets would have granted the visa, then that would have accredited the person..like, you know, the person would have been given a transit visa because I feel that if the Soviets had granted the visa, then he would have come here. (In that era) it was not so crazy (that he tried) to come to Cuba because if he had obtained the visa from another country, it would have been for certain that our Consul would have granted him the visa to stop here. Now, can you imagine if that person had been to Cuba in October and then in November the President of the United states would have been killed? That is why it has always been something -- a very obscure thing -- something suspicious -- because I interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to link Cuba with Kennedy's death. That is one of the things that seemed to me very strange... 204 Stokes: Let me ask you this question, Mr. President. One of the persons that we have talked with since we have been here in Havana has been your former Consul, Mr. Azcue, who was produced at our request by your officials here. He told us that with reference to the man who appeared at your Embassy and who filled out an application for an intransit visa, that the photograph which appears on the visa application is the photograph of the man who died in the United States as Lee Harvey Oswald, but, that this man was not the individual who had appeared at your Embassy in Mexico City. And, my question would be in two parts: One, have you had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Azcue? And secondly, from all the information available to you, would this be your opinion also--that the man who appeared at the Embassy was an imposter? Castro: Actually, I don't have an opinion about that. I wouldn't be able to say whether I've met Azcue once. I don't remember now. I have no recollection at present of having met Azcue. Because I had been given the information about all that, I myself did not know whether he was in Mexico or here. It is very likely that I have seen him some time; however, I don't recall having met Azcue those days. Secondly, about the idea of an imposter, I have no special theory on that. As far as I have understood, Azcue has an 205 Page Six idea on that. I've heard those comments before -- comments about the possibility of a difference, that he noticed the difference between the person who appeared requesting the visa and the person known as Oswald. But, I don't have a theory on that. It is likely that there could be two different people. But, now I am thinking -- if the person had obtained the visa, would he have visited Cuba? That is a hypothesis. What did he want the visa for? From my point of view, the individual could have come to Cuba and compromised us. He would have us compromised. It seems to me that to apply for the visa had the purpose of having the individual come to Cuba. Now, we would have to enter into many conjectures to reach a conclusion on that. Because where did he get the passports? Where did he find the passports that he was taking there? Where was Oswald's passport? What became of Oswald's passports? Those papers should be somewhere. I don't know what could have been the sense of sending another man, but I wouldn't dare deny that posibility. Actually, we would have to know what would have been the purpose. Why would another person have been sent? I don't know whether you would have a theory about that. Personally, I don't have a theory. Villa: About the possibility of an imposter, in public sources we have read that the possibility exists that there could be a double that carried out some actions that the real Oswald did not on some occasions in 1963. 206 Page Seven Castro: There is something that I can guarantee. The Cuban government believes that Azue is a serious and honest man; and that he has never said something differently from what he said the first time. He has more or less kept his story -- as far as I know. I mean, he is a person you can trust. He is a trustful man. That is all I can say about Azcue. But, I amy say that if many people have elaborated theories, I am not among them. 207 Page Eight EXCERPT B Comer Clark's Allegation Cornwell: One passage reads as follows: An interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark...do you have the translation of it there? Villa: Yes. Castro: Let me see it. I have it here. Pause: (Approximately one minute while President Castro reads it.) Castro: This is absurd. I didn't say that. Cornwell: Did the interview ever occur? Castro: It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? It's a lie from head to toe. If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying create provocation or a trap, and uh--we would have denounced 208 Page Nine him. Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our embassies saying that--and that never happened--in no part, as far as I know. Escartin: That refersto the interview you spoke about in the beginning. Castro: But how could they interview me in pizzeria? I never to to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented rom the upper to the bottom. I do not remember that. And, it is a surprise for me to se because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? Not the one that wrote that book, but the origin of that version. You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related--and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about about that journalist in that newspaper? Villa: He was in Cuba and tried to carry out an interview with you. Castro: Let me tell you. of every one hundred interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because 209 Page Ten if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but twenty-four hours of my life to have interviews. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited three years for an interview--just almost three years. And even that of Moyers. I didn't want to have that Moyers interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent form the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. I granted one. There are a lot of interview. I granted one. there are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria. Dodd: I don't even give interviews in a pizzeria. Villa: Another element commander. That interview was published in a sensationalist or yellow press from the United States. It is a non-serious newspaper. Castro: Especially at that time, a lot of barbaric things were published--a lot of lies. 210 Page Eleven EXCERPT C Use of Assassinations As a Political Weapon Castro:...................It was really something inconceivable - could have the idea of killing the President? First, because that would have been a tremendous insanity. The Cuban Revolutionaries and the people who have made this Revolution have proven to be intrepid and to make decisions in the right moment. But, we have not proven to be insane people. The leaders of the Revolution do not do crazy things and have always been extremely concerned to prevent any factor that could become a kind of an argument or a pretext for carrying out agression against our country. We are a very small country. We have the United States 90 miles from our shore which is a very large, powerful country economically, technically, militarily. So, for many years we lived concerned that an invasion could take palce..I mean, indirect and at the end a direct aggression. We were very close to that. Yet look at the conclusions we draw. If the elections of 1960 had not been won by Kennedy, but Nixon instead, during the Bay of Pigs, the United States would have invaded Cuba. We mean that in the midst of the fight that Kennedy followed the line that had been already traced. 211 Page Twelve There is no doubt that we appreciate very highly the fact that Kennedy resisted every kind of pressure not to have the Marines land in our country. Because, there were many people who wanted the Marines to land here. Nixon himself was in favor of that. Had Nixon been President during the Bay of Pigs invasion, a landing by the military army of the United States would have taken place. We are absolutely convinced of that. However, Kennedy resisted all the pressures and he did not do that. What would that have meant for us? The destruction of the country? Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of deaths? Because, undoubtedly the people would fight. The people I am absolutely sure about. An invasion of Cuba by the United States would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, maybe millions of lives. We were aware of that. We have an American military base in our territory, by force. And, it is not assumed that anyone is going to have a military base on someone else's territory, if it is not on the basis of an agreement. However, the United States has military bases in many places of the world, but here, it is by force. From that base, many provocations have been carried out against Cuba. There were people wounded..there were people killed. What did we do? We brought our guards away from the lines, from the fence. 212 Page Thirteen We never shot at them. Why? Because we made every possible effort so that an incident of that kind would not become a pretext to be attacked. So, we have followed the policy. We had an American boat just three miles away from us for years, a warship full of electronic communications equipment and never a hostile action was carried against that warship. So, there are many events that have proven how careful Cuba has always been to prevent the perpetration of an invasion. We could have died heroically - no doubt about it. Now, that would have been a victory for our people. They're willing to be sacrificed and to die. Yet, it would have been just another page in history..nothing else. So, we have always been very much aware to not give The United States the pretext..the possibility..for (an invasion.) What was the cause of the missile crisis? The need we had to seek protection in case of an (invasion) from the United States. We agreed on the installation of the (stategic) missiles, because undoubtedly that diminished the danger of direct aggression. That became a danger of another kind, a kind of a global danger we became, but we were trying to protect our country at all times. Who here could have operated and planned something so delicate as the death of the united States President. That was insane. From the 213 Page Fourteen ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane..absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. The United States had U-2 air surveillancing for almost fifteen years. The planes flew over our territory every day. The women said that they called not go over their terrace naked for the U-2 would have taken a picture of them. That thing we could not allow to happen, you know, because it was demoralizing. So, there were, you know, those flights just fery close to the soil. Those kind of flights was really demoralizing for our people. It was impossible to let 214 Page Fifteen them continue to do that, so we had to shoot at them. On the following day after the missile crisis, we had the need to shoot at those planes, because to have allowed that would have created a demoralization among our people. And, I say that if we allowed that, you wouldn't have been able even to play baseball here. Because those planes came just twenty meters from here, so it was really demoralizing. See, the U-2 came very high, you know, and I tell you, Cuba has been characterized by following a firm policy, a policy of principles. Our position was known after the missile crisis. We were not in a position to make any concessions. That is a known position, but Cuba, the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, have never made that kind of insanity, and that I may assure you. And the biggest kind of insanity that could have gone through anyone's mind here would have been that of thinking of killing the President of the United States. Nobody would have thought of that. In spite of all the things, in spite of all the attempts, in spite of all the irritation that brought about an attitude of firmness, a willingness to fight, that was translated by our people into a spirit of heroism, but it never became a source of insanity. I'll give you practical reasons. Apart from our ideology, I want to tell you that the death of the 215 Page Sixteen leader does not change the system. It has never done that. And, the best example we have is Batista. Batista murdered thousands of our comrades. If there was anyone in which that kind of revenge was justified, it was Batista. However, our movement did very difficult things, but it never had the idea of physically eliminating Batista. Other revolutionary groups did, but never our movement. We had a war for twenty-five months against Batista's army and spent seven years under Batista's dictatorship with thousands dying. But, it never came to our minds..we could have done it, very well, but we never thought about that, because it was different from our feelings. That is our position. That is why we are interested. That is why I was asking you whether you are really hopeful to give serious conclusions on this. On your part, if there is something we could give you, we would, without any kind of precondition. The information we have offered you is not conditioned to anything. In spite of the fact that the problem is thorny, that doesn't stop this Committee here from giving the impression that we are being judged here, that we are being tried. 216 Page Seventeen EXCERPT D Statements Made By Fidel Castro At the Brazilian Embassy on September 7, 1963 Castro:...................Then a journalist asked me...and the purpose I had...I don't remember literally what I said, but I remember my intention in saying what I said and it was to warn the government that we know about the (attempted) plots against our lives. I mean, in one way or the other to let the United States government know that we knew about the existence of those plots. So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent, a very serious one -- that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions...but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that..not in the least..but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent..something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never 217 Page Eighteen meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known that there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know, but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. I do remember about being in the Brazilian Embassy at that time..that I did make a statement in that sense...in the sense that I was informed of the plots and that that was a very bad precedent to form the various principles in relation to.. 218 KENNEDY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Name: Fidel Castro Ruz Date: April 3, 1978 Time: 6:30 p.m. Address: Havana, Cuba Place: Presidential offices Interview: Present were President Fidel castro and his interpreter, Senorita Juanita Vera, Captain Felipe Villa, Senor Ricardo Escartin, Zenen Buergo, and Alfredo Ramirez (representing the Government of Cuba). Also present representing the Government of the United States were Congressmen Louis Stokes, Richardson Preyer, Christopher Dodd and staff personnel of HSCA: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, Gary Cornwell, Deputy Chief Counsel and Edwin Lopez, Researcher/Translator. The meeting opened and President Castro stated: Castro: Do you have the supposed statements that I have made? I have tried to remember. There is an individual who says that he interviewed me in a restaurant. That is very strange. I tried to recall him, you know. I tried to recall (the proposed) interview and on one occasion (he) said that it was in a (pizzeria). I just reached a conclusion not only because of the circumstances in which he says the interview was made, but also because of the content of the interview...or the alleged interview. I am absolutely certain that that Interviewer Signature___________________________ Typed Signature_________________________________ Date transcribed: Started July 10, 1978 219 Fidel Castro Interview Page two interview never took place. Now, I will have to check that about the (alleged interview at the Brazilian Embassy) because that is true. I mean it's true that I went to the Brazilian Embassy. I've been trying to remember, and I recall the following: It is not that I found out that an attempt was being plotted. Villa, when did the interview occur? Villa: On September the seventh, 1963. You spoke about the topic with Bill Moyers. castro: Then I had know for a long time. It was not recent because the attempt against our lives started to be planned here a long time before that. I could say that from 1959 that was known to us. We were constantly arresting people trained by the CIA and being provided equipment by the CIA that would come to the country with explosives, with the telescopic target rifles, even bazookas -- every kind of weapon. Here they organized, since very early, plots at Grantanamo base. So, that was very well known to us. Then a journalist asked me..and the purpose I had...I don't remember literally what I said, but I remember my intention in saying what I said and it was to warn the government that we know about the (attempted) plots against our lives. I mean, in one way or t he other to let the United States government know that we knew about the existence of those plots. So, I said something like those lots start to set a very bad precedent, 220 Fidel Castro Interview Page three a very serious one--that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions...but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that..not in the least..but rather, like warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent..something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known that there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday like. I do remember about being in the Brazilian Embassy at that time...that I did make a statement in that sense...in the sense that I was informed of the plots and that that was a very bad precedent to form the various principles in relation to...I remember (another nefarious precedent) was that of the hijacking of planes. The first planes hijacked in this area were Cuban planes, and the hijacking of the planes was encouraged by the United Stated government. Even an amount of money was offered as a 221 Fidel Castro Interview Page four reward to the people that hijacked a Cuban plane. And later what happened? well, it was all the way around -- terrorist elements and insane elements and every kind of people. (Once) the precedent was established, these people started to hijack planes. And that is what I may tell you is part of that experience. And I repeat again that if a similar situation would come about, I could say just the same words -- I could say just just same. Now, I cannot guarantee because I don't have the exact recollection. I don't have the exact copy of what I said literally. And, of course, one always has to be careful with the versions even on a given statement. But that he had interviewed me in the restaurant, and writing the things he wrote? There was a deliberate purpose -- of creating confusion, of planting confusion and trying to have Cuba involved in these events. Stokes: Mr. President, as a result of the statements or the conversation you had with this gentleman at that time, did you ever hear from President Kennedy? Castro: I am trying to recall the date. I can tell you that in the period in which Kennedy's assassination took place Kennedy was changing his policy toward Cuba. I mean by that he was not adopting measures, not in fact. The whole style and aggressive measures against Cuba existed for many years. First of all, the Bay of Pigs; then the 222 Fidel Castro Interview Page five missile crisis; then the pirate attacks -- those attacks which were organized in central America and Miami, at a time at which they sent the mother boats to attack the refineries, the warehouses, boats, merchant ships, port installations and even the (innocent) population was also attacked in those days by these people. It has been known later - more or less - for how long these actions lasted. Now at that time, Kennedy was starting to question all these things. One of the facts, one of the events, was that an American official from the United Nations called my house. I don't speak English, so he spoke to one of my comrades who was with me there. After that, I've been able to go with more accuracy through those things. And, I think it was Atwood. I think it was Atwood because later he was appointed Ambassador to Guinea, and that was very significant because it was the first time such a thing happened - - the first time such a gesture came about. And, you could see undisputably that a new trend was coming (into) existence in the sense of established contacts. So, it was a sort of a change (in) policy. I don't recollect exactly what month it was. Have you been able to reconstruct the time at which Atwood (phoned me) at my house? Escartin: We have been able to reconstruct that date around (inaudible). Castro: Well, that was after the missile crisis, I think. That was after the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis. I was of the opinion that the only man who could change that policy was Kennedy himself, because it seemed to me that at 223 Fidel Castro Interview Page six that time it was not a time of the Bay of Pigs. At that time he had more experience. And, he had much more authority. Maybe after the missile crisis, he had much more influence. I was convinced that Kennedy was the man with enough talent and enough courage to question and change that policy. And, people started to (feel) about it. And I felt that a positive act was that famous speech he made at the American University. It was a speech about the need for peace, the need for prevention of war, the destructions that Hitler's invasion on the Soviet Union had caused. (He expressed this) in terms that he had not used for a long time -- that had not been used in the American theory for a long time. I have read all over that speech again. I cannot say that that's a perfect (speech), I feel that it had some gaps, but if you bear in mind what he said, at the moment he said it, in the midst of the cold war, there is no doubt that those statements were of a tremendous value. Now, in addition to that, the unfortunate circumstance happened that in the days previous to Kennedy's death a french journalist visited our country -- Jean Daniels. Then he told me..he said that he was interested in having a discussion about a special topic with me. I remember that I took him with me to Veradero. Then, in the morning -- it was the morning on the way to Verado and also at the beach he was explaining to me his purpose. We were taking about all this. 224 Fidel Castro Interview Page seven And, I would say that he was bringing a kind of message from Kennedy. In substance, as far as I remember now, he himself has spoken about this on several occasions. But, the most important thing was he told me that Kennedy had explained to him the great danger that existed during the missile crisis, and that Kennedy asked himself whether I (also) was aware of the whole danger that was announced at the time of the missile crisis. But, he was (somewhat) traumatized with all the remembrances of those days. When Kennedy found out that this journalist was coming to Cuba - he had a long talk with this journalist. (He asked the journalist to talk with me, and then return to Washington with a response). We were just talking in those terms. He had to finish explaining to me everything he had talked about with Kennedy and I had to give him an answer about all this. But then at lunchtime or after lunch -- I don't remember quite well -- the first news started to arrive by radio that an attempt against Kennedy had taken place and that he had been seriously wounded precisely at the moment that we were having that talk and that came to be another symptom, that Kennedy was questioning the policy that had been followed so far. Maybe he was elaborating some formula in order to have that policy changed. (From our) point of view, Mr. Kennedy was the only man that at that point had the authority and enough courage in order to bring about the change in that policy. 225 Fidel Castro Interview Page eight That was my opinion at that time. Stokes: Do you remember the name of the journalist? Castro: Jean daniel -- a french journalist -- very well known -- enjoys prestige. He (had) met with Kennedy for some time, and he was well impressed with Kennedy and he was precisely letting us know (about) the whole interview with Kennedy, and the things that he had talked about with Kennedy regarding Cuba. It was assumed that I had to tell him something so that he would go back and convey it to Kennedy. But, before we had just finished with our conversation, the news arrived of the attempt against Kennedy's life. Actually, we were very much concerned and immediately we suspected that an effort could be made in order to try to link us...to link that death attempt with the Cuban problems. Because immediately, you know, it seemed to (us that) also within that atmosphere of a cold war, some people could try to have us linked with Kennedy's death -- to the point that we were very concerned and we thought about the measures that we could take in the face of a danger of that sort. Stokes: Mr. President, I think perhaps in that respect that it might be good for you to tell us what your reaction and that of the Cuban people was to the assassination of President Kennedy. Castro: I have no objection in telling you my reaction. It was a natural and logical reaction. Actually, I felt sad about it. I received that news with bitterness. Reasons? 226 Fidelo Castro Interview Page nine First, I think an event of that nature always produces that reaction even when it is a political adversary. It's kind of a repulsion, a rejection. In the second place, I think I have said before that Kennedy was an adversary that we had sort of become used to. I mean that political, a strong political struggle existed. But, he was a known adversary. He was somebody we knew. We had (undergone) the Bay of Pigs, we had had the missile crisis -- so many things had happened. And, at least he was an adversary we knew about. And all of a sudden, you have the impression that something is missing...that something is missing. (Thirdly,) on the basis of very deep political feelings, I think the first thing I learned from Marxism was the idea that situations, societies and social processes do not depend on men, but rather that there is a system; and the system cannot be changed by changing the men even on the basis of an old controversy. For the very past century among revolutinaries, between these who thought that the Czar should be eliminated or that the emperor had to be eliminated because they were the chiefs. That was the theory of dictatorships. Marxists always have been opposed to the idea of killing or having a person killed. That was a very much debated topic among the Marxist (elements). That is one of the first things the Marxists learned; and that it doesn't make sense to kill the political leaders...to such an extent 227 Fidel Castro Interview Page ten that in our own experience here (in Cuba) it never came to our minds the idea that Batista's regime could be eliminated by eliminating the person. We attacked a regiment with 120 men...over 120 men...one of the strongest regiments of the country...in order to take hold of the weapons and to start a struggle against Batista. And, it never came to our minds the idea of killing Batista. If we had wanted to eliminate Batista, we would have been able to. Later 82 men came back to the country from Mexico in a boat that was barely 60 feet long. We traveled 1500 kilometers. We started a war in Sierra Maestra and it never came to our minds the idea of eliminating Batista physically. (Some) people thought that killing Batista would change the system. And finally, maybe one of the things that I regretted the most was that I was convinced that Kennedy was starting to change, himself. And, I was going by the (impression) that I was here talking to that man who was bringing a message from him. Actually, I was sad. I was very badly depressed. The impression I got was very bad. I was very sad about it. He was an adversary; a man with his personal characteristics..being intelligent..you may always have the adversaries, but you have an assessment of them as a person, as an intellectual, as political leaders. To a certain extent we were honored 228 Fidelo Castro Interview Page eleven in having such a rival. He was not mediocre. He was an outstanding man. And, that was my reaction. Stokes: Mr. President, did it come to your attention shortly after that assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was the accused assassin, had had contact with your Embassy in Mexico City? Castro: Yes. In fact, it was after Kennedy's death that he caught my attention. Because here nobody receives news about anyone filing applications for a visa. These things are always solved through the Office of The Minister of Fieign Affairs. So it never is taken to the government. You know, it is not necessary. This is normal routine work. None of us has anything to do with visas. Some officials knew about it when somebody in particular filed an application there. But tens - or maybe hundreds of thousands of people file applications. But when Kennedy was assassinated and Oswald's actions were published in the newspapers, the officials who had handled visa applications realized that this Oswald could be the same Oswald who had gone to the Consulate in order to apply for a visa. That is why we had news about it, you know? After Kennedy's death we learned that a man by the name of Oswald had gone to the Consulate and filled out an application for the visa - that he had been told that we did not normally give an intransit visa until the country of destination granted one. And, 229 Fidel Castro Interview Page twelve then we were told that a person had gotten very upset and had protested in an irate manner because he could not receive a visa. This was the news I had, more or less. The rest you know. Stokes: We were wondering your... Castro: There is something I would like to add in that connection. You see, it was always very much suspicious to me --that a person who later appeared to be involved in Kennedy's death would have requested a visa from Cuba. Because, I said to myself - what would have happened had by any chance that man come to Cuba - visited Cuba - gone back to the States and then appeared involved in Kennedy's death? That would have really been a provocation - a gigantic provocation. Well, that man did not come to Cuba simply because that was the norm -- we rejected visa applications .. like that. In those days the mechanism was very rigid because, of course, we had suspicions of anyone who tried to come to Cuba. People in charge of granting visas asked themselves: Why does (this applicant) want to come to Cuba? What kind of counter-revolutionary activity could he carry out in cuba? Maybe the people thought that the person was a CIA or FBI agent, you know, so it was very difficult for a North American, just from his own wishes, to come to Cuba -- because systematically we denied the visas. So, I think that there could always be an exception, but in those times it was very, very difficult to have anyone from the United States come into 230 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirteen Cuba because there was a tremendous suspicion and because in general permits to (travel to Cuba) were denied. No, if it was a transit visa going toward another country - let's say -- had the Soviet Union granted the visa, you may be sure that our consul would have granted the transit visa because the person would not be coming to Cuba only, but would be going to another country. The person would have to come (here) and if the Soviets would have granted the visa, then that would have accredited the person..like, you know, the person would have been given a transit visa because I feel that if the Soviets had granted the visa, then he would have come here. (In that era) it was not so crazy (that he tried) to come to Cuba because if he had obtained the visa from another country, it would have been for certain that our Consul would have granted him the visa to stop here. Now, can you imagine if that person had been to Cuba in October and then in November the President of the United States would have been killed? That is why it has always been something -- a very obscure thing -- something suspicious -- because I interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to link Cuba with Kennedy's death. That is one of the things that seemed to me very strange. (The facts of the events) seemed very strange also. As it was published, Oswald would have shot several times at a car that was moving with a telescopic (rifle). (I remember) when he trained in Mexico in order to come to Cuba to make revolution we had 231 Fidel Castro Interview Page Fourteen several guns like that and it could be that we learned almost everything that could be learned about telescopic pistols, even the differences between different pistols; a normal pistol with a trigger, an automatic pistol and a telescopic (rifle). It is much more practical if you use a normal sight...when you try to focus a moving target and you (do it) more accurately..with that kind than with a telescopic sight. A telescopic sight view gun should be used against a fixed target -- not a moving one -- It is very difficult. And, I tell you it seemed very strange that he used that weapon and that those shots could have been made with that kind of weapon. Because, when you shoot the first charge you have to take the weapon away from your face to (focus) it again, to try to find the object again..the target..and you lose time -- it is quite difficult. I don't know whether later things were technical proof - technical tests were made to see whether - just a normal shooter at that distance and at that speed of the car could have (accurately made such shots). That was something else that was very suspicious to me. But, as far as we are concerned, what was most strange was Oswald's attempt to visit Cuba. Stokes: Realizing, Mr. President, the enormity of the appearance of Oswald at your Embassy and realizing the significance that it had relative to the assassination itself, was it 232 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifteen important enough that you summon individuals who would have knowledge about his appearance to talk with you or to submit written reports relative to this matter? Castro: I think what happened was the following: Nobody knew that. The comrades who had news of that, after the events took place, they reported it, I think, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. So, the only thing we did was when the Warren Commission was created and it requested information bout this, it was agreed to send all the information we had at that time...I recall that we were consulted with something about the visa application and we were willing to offer all the information they wanted. Now it was assumed that they were conducting the investigation. If they had wanted some additional action on our part (material from us), they should have (requested) it. But, they did not request any other (information) since...as far as I have understood...here we spoke with the people (our people) who had been in Mexico and our people went into the details of what really happened. And, that was very well clarified. Beyond this, there was not much more that we could do. You can imagine there was not much that we could contribute. As far as I have understood, the Mexican lady who used to work at the Consulate was later the object of many pressures -- even some kind of persecution. Villa: She was arrested by the Mexican police with the purpose of finding out what he had said at the Consulate. Castro: All that they said -- it was assumed that they wanted her 233 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixteen to say that also while at the Embassy he had made reference to killing Kennedy. So the Mexican police had the purpose of having the Mexican declare that. Villa: Exactly. Castro: And, who were the people interested in that? Who could be the people interested in that? Villa: To us that is very clear. Castro: But, that is something worth to be taken into account. Why would that lady become the object of that oppression? What do you know about this lady now? Villa: She lives in Mexico at present. She used to work in the Consulate and she was sympathetic of the Cuban revolution. Castro: She, of course, has a very high meritand that after that, knowing how these things are, a person that did not enjoy the diplomatic immunity could have been coerced. She could have been blackmailed and she could have been submitted by fear, you know, in order to have her make a statement that would be against Cuba -- harmful to Cuba. So, it was a tremendous merit that this Mexican lady did behave the way she did because you know how the people are in some countries of the world. They take a helpless woman without any kind of protection and then she can be forced to say anything. One question I would like to raise with you because we are speaking about that topic about which we are very pleased to give you all the opinions and all the cooperation that you might request that is in our hands. Now, do you think you are going to be able to bring out something really clear on the whole work you're 234 Fidel Castro Interview Page seventeen doing? Do you think you are going to be able to reach a clear conclusion? Stokes: Mr. President, that is the precise reason why we are here in your country. One of the things we said to your top officials Friday morning at our first session was that we came to your country without any preconceived ideas or notions or conclusions of any type. We have tried to pursue the entire investigation in a fair and objective manner, searching only for the truth. The assassination of President Kennedy was a traumatic experience for the American people. And in addition to the trauma which was incurred by them, we found that a Gallup Poll in January of 1977 revealed that 81% of the American people believe that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. Only 19% believe that he was a lone assassin. Consequently, the mandate given this Committee by the House of Representatives was for us to investigate all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Precisely, it is our job to ascertain who killed the President. Did such a person have help either before or after that assassination? And then to ascertain in that respect whether there was or was not a conspiracy to kill the President. Additionally, we are charged with the responsibility to ascertain the performance with the responsibility to ascertain the performance of our own agencies in the United States; that is, the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, all of the American agencies 235 Fidel Castro Interview Page eighteen that participated in some way in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission. And then lastly, our mandate is to make recommendations to the United Stated congress based upon our findings as a result of the total investigation. So we have approached the investigation in that way -- hoping that we will be able to ascertain the truth of these facts and then be able to put to bed the theories, the rumors, the speculation that presently exists around the assassination of President Kennedy. Castro: Have you had a broad access to all the pollible sources of information? Stokes: Yes, we have. If you have reference to our own agencies and our own files, the answer is yes, we have. Castro: Are you optimistic about the fact that you'll be able to reach a sound conclusion on this problem? Are you optimistic about it? Stokes: We are optimistic that even though the job is an awesome responsibility for the eleven men and one woman who are members of this committee, along with the staff of 115 people, all of whom we feel are dedicated to this task, our final report will be one that will be a highly professional and competent job. Castro: Any other question that you would like to raise I would be pleased to answer. Stokes: Could we for a moment, Mr. President, go back to the moment you learned about Lee Harvey Oswald having been at your Embassy in Mexico City? Do you recall a speech that you made on the 23rd of November? 236 Fidel Castro Interview Page nineteen Castro: This is on the twenty...the speech on the 23rd. Did we have the data at that time that Oswald had been at the Embassy? Villa: No. No. Castro: So very likely we did not have it. I think I learned about that some days later and not immediately. Villa: You mentioned that in the speech on November the 27th. Stokes: 27th - all right. Then my question would be firstly in two parts. One, if he remembered the speech he made on November 27th, and then secondly.... Castro: But, you should not confuse the man with the system. Stokes: Yes, right, right. That's what you told us earlier, right. Castro; That would be a negative fact for the interest of humanity. These ideas I've always had about this. Stokes: And with reference to the second part of my question regarding the matters which occurred at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City which you referred to in the November 27th speech. Do you recall from whom you learned what had transpired at your Embassy? Castro: I cannot recall. It should have been through foreign Relations or maybe the Minister of the Interior. Somebody reported to me. We were just reported to about the facts -- that a gentleman had appeared at the Embassy requesting a visa by the same name as the man accused of having assassinated Kennedy. I don't remember how it was told to the American authorities. I remember the 237 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty Warren commission requested through the Swiss Interest Section all the information we had about it. And, immediately, we put at their disposal all the materials we had. Because of course, we were interested more than anyone else in those events being clarified. We were more interested than anyone. At the first moment we were somewhat, you know, uncertain about what was behind this -- whether there were some people that wanted to use that in order to promote an aggression against Cuba. We had many reasons to suspect that because tremendous things had happened in that sense. We thought that maybe some very reactionary element could have wanted to eliminate Kennedy and just on the way try to eliminate Cuba, you know. That's why we were observing the whole development of events. But, some days later it started to be clearly seen that it was not a campaign orchstrated against Cuba. But, I'm not - I have no doubt in the least that if they had had the least evidence to link Cuba, that would have been done. A tremendous campaign would have been made and a very dangerous situation would have been created for us. But, now you have to bear in mind, at least to the extent that we know, that the Warren Commission did not make any charge against Cuba, nor did it conduct any effort in that sense. We were under the impression though, that they were working objectively or that if they were able to discover something, they would handle it. They would expose it. But, we thought that the danger 238 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-one that we were concerned about in the very first moments were then no longer so bad. The fact that somebody went to the Embassy was what brought about the suspicion that somebody had tried to link Cuba. The other theory is that this individual decided himself just because of his initiative -- to visit Cuba - with what purpose? That nobody knows. You would have to have good doses of naivete to think that he was the one who planned the trip to Cuba -- that he planned the trip to the Soviet Union himself. Actually, all of that is very strange, you know, very rare -- that he tried to go to the Soviet Union; that he tried to go through Cuba -- no other place, but through Cuba; because to go to the Soviet Union you don't have to go to Cuba necessarily. And to this we could add the further event that this individual who could have been able to clarify all because who could have shed more light on this than he himself - Oswald - 24 or 48 hours later. How many hours after the event? Villa: 28 hours. Castro: He was killed 28 hours after the event. And the only explanation given by the assassin was a sentimental reason. As far as I recall from what I read at that time he said that he had seen Kennedy's widow crying and seen the whole drama. He decided to take revenge with his own hand. And later on it was known that he was not a kind of a sentimental man; I mean to say he's a psychotic character and in the very face of the policemen - 239 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-two killed the supposed author of Kennedy's death. Because, who could have verified that better? Why was this man killed? I do know that you have more information than I do -- much more information than I may have on Jack Ruby's personality..and, if Jack Ruby for a kind of strictly sentimental reason would have gone there to the very police station and in the face of the policemen killed the supposed author of Kennedy's death. All this seemed to us very strange. And that is why we have such importance to the effort he made in the Cuban Embassy. It was a kind of an attempt by somebody to have Cuba involved in the whole affair, in the whole issue. Another reasonable fact which I think deserves attention, a fact that deserves attention - and that is something that was known after wards when the Senate Committee conducted their investigations was that practically the same day that Kennedy was killed, a CIA agent was going to have an interview. I do not know whether he had planned that interview with an important agent (Cubela) in order to assassinate me. I felt that a poison was going to be given to that person who was supposed to kill me. So, that is another element which is very suspicious. The same day Kennedy is killed, well about those same days, I get an attempt, a very urgent attempt by an individual with a plan to assassinate me. The Senate (Intelligence Committee) did not give his name, but we know who he was. And, there is no doubt that if one 240 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-three person had the possibility to carry out that attempt, it was that person. Because, he was a man who came from the revolutionary ranks and he had very much good relations with us. So, I would say that among the very many attempts, plans, plots, collaboratins of the CIA, this was one that had many possibilities of success because that individual had access to us. And that visit practically coincided -- that's a very suspicious coincidence with the Kennedy assassination - very..We did not learn this until the Senate Committee investigation was conducted. Now, in connection with this Embassy, what were you interested in-- in connection with the Embassy and the visit? Stokes: Let me ask you this question, Mr. President. One of the persons that we have talked with since we have been here in Havana has been your former Consul, Mr. Azcue, who was produced at our request by your officials here. He told us that with reference to the man who appeared at your Embassy and who filled out an application for an intransit visa, that the photograph which appears on the visa application is the photograph of the man who died in the United States as Lee Harvey Oswald, but, that this man was not the individual who had appeared at your Embassy in Mexico City. And, my question would be in two parts; One, have you had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Azcue? And secondly, from all the information 241 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-four available to you, would this be your opinion also -- that the man who appeared at the Embassy was an imposter? Castro: Actually, I don't have an opinion about that. I wouldn't be able to say whether I've met Azcue once. I don't remember now. I have no recollection at present of having met Azcue. Because I had been given the information about all that, I myself did not know whether he was in Mexico or here. It is very likely that I have seen him some time; however, I don't recall having met Azcue those days. Secondly, about the idea of an imposter, I have no special theory on that. As far as I have understood, Azcue has an idea on that. I've heard those comments before -- comments about the possibility of a difference, that he noticed the difference between the person who appeared requesting the visa and the person known as Oswald. But, I don't have a theory on that. It is likely that there could be two different people. But, now I am thinking -- if the person had obtained the visa, would he have visited Cuba? That is a hypothesis. What did he want the visa for? from my point of view, the individual could have come to Cuba and compromised us. He would have us compromised. It seems to me that to apply for the visa had the purpose of having the individual come to Cuba. Now, we would have to enter into many conjectures to reach a conclusion on that. Because where did he get the passports? Where did he find the passports that he was taking there? 242 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-five Where was Oswald's passport? what became of Oswald's passports? Those papers should be somewhere. I don't know what could have been the sense of sending another man, but I wouldn't dare deny that possibility. Actually, we would have to know what would have been the purpose. Why would another person have been sent? I don't know whether you would have a theory about that. Personally, I don't have a theory. Villa: About the possibility of an imposter, in public sources we have read that the possibility exists that there could be a double that carried out some actions that the real Oswald did not on some occasions in 1963. Castro: There is something that I can guarantee. The Cuban government believes that Azcue is a serious and honest man; and that he has never said something differently from what he said the first time. He has more or less kept his story -- as far as I know. I mean, he is a person you can trust. He is a trustful man. That is all I can say about Azcue. But, I may say that if many people have elaborated theories, I am not among them. I have not operated on a theory like that. I just see many strange things that are not logical. It started with the very attempt of the person to come to Cuba; the calibre of weapon used, the absolutely abnormal way in which those people behaved. I mean there have always 243 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-six been many strange things that made me (suspicious) about other people. I tell you, I read the book. I read that book "The death of the President" written by Manchester. Manchester had the theory that this man acted alone and he argues a lot. He makes a kind of psychoanalytical (study) of Oswald and he defends the (lone assassin theroy). Many people have a different theory. So, I have not been able to elaborate -- I wouldn't dare elaborate a theory -- for with me, everything would be speculation. On our account and because of our interest, some time ago we started gathering elements in order to have a better founded idea, you know. And, that is why our people started to gather materials and information. A group of comrades has been working in this direction. But, I am very much aware that we don't have access to (sources: of information which are fundamental. We have no access to the CIA archives or the FBI archives. We don't have access to the Warren Commission's files. How could we do something really well founded? When the Cuban government saw the senate Committee Report, it was something real and it was that that individual who was the man to be given the weapon to kill me in Paris. This man never spoke about that. He was tried and was sentenced on account of the attempts, the plots against our lives. Those plans (had been continuous) and he sent weapons to Cuba until he was discovered. He confessed and told us the truth, but he never spoke about 244 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-seven that interview in which he was going to be given the weapon to kill me and that was published by the Senate Committee. He never made reference to that. That person is alive because I had to request some leniency. I mean, because his crime was very serious. It was a tremendous betrayal. It was treason, and at that time to participate in such an action was very severely sanctioned. And, following a tradition with individuals that had participated in the revolution, whenever it has been possible to prevent drastic measures, we have done so. This gentleman had been a revolutionary leader. He had been a good revolutionary fighter, and the public opinion was very irritated about it. His crime was really very serious. I wrote a letter to the Cuban Tribunal morally condemning him (but asking for leniency). I did it for the public opinion...That is Cubela's case. We learned that later when the Senate committee report appeared. But, all these elements made us think about the advisability or organizing some investigation on our account. We had hoped that being in contact with your Committee could give us some elements of judgment for our own information. But, as far a I know, you don't contribute many elements of judgment because -- as I have been told -- you cannot make use of most of the information you possess. 245 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-eight I have been told that one of our hopes was to receive some information. We are giving as much information as we have and we are receiving nothing. Stokes: One thing I would like to say and I think you ought to know is that many Americans are ashamed of the CIA and the degrading attempts that they've made on your life. And, that's something that disturbs many, many decent Americans and I think you ought to know that. Mr. President, with your permission I'd like to defer to my other colleagues, if they have any questions, if that is agreeable to you. Castro: Yes, please. Stokes: Mr. Preyer? Preyer; Mr. President, you mentioned that you believe that you could transfer power of chains of government without killing the head of the government. That is the tradition of our country also. I speak personally and not forour government, but I join Chairman Stokes in saying that when I read about AMLASH, Cubela and the church Committee reports I was shocked and outraged. I am confident that is the overwhelming reaction of the American people. I am convinced that the President did not know about that; the head of the CIA, John McCone, did not know of that; or our other high officials; and that this was an aberration of small group and that it would have 246 Fidel Castro Interview Page twenty-nine shocked our high officials just as it shocks me if they had known of it. The fact that the Church Report on AMLASH came from the Agency -- from the government itself rather than being leaked through a newspaper story or something of that sort. Interpreter:Excuse me, I didn't get that last part--I am sorry. Preyer? Well, the fact that the information on AMLASH and Cubela was revealed by our government agencies themselves and was now brought out against their will through a leak or newspaper story, I think, indicates the strong feeling in our government that this kind of thing must never happen again. And, we have set up now a House Intelligence Committee and a Senate Intelligence Committee, both new, to insure that it does not. On the question of our not giving information, but receiving it, let me say we have a common interest in arriving at a final answer, a clear answer, to the question of the assassination of President Kennedy. We are seeking your help in that and your officials have indicated to us they are willing to continue working to help on that. Our Committee goes out of existence at the end of this year. When we file our final report, there will be a great deal of information in it. Castro: Is it going to be public? Preyer: It will be public -- which will be orf interest to you. Until that time, because of our different jurisdictional problems, there is some evidence which does not belong 247 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty to us which we cannot release. But in the final analysis, the full report will make available much information of interest to you and may answer many of the rumors. In the meantime, one reason we press so hard for information is that this is the last opportunity that will probably be made in our country to reach a final answer. The last chance where an official body of Congress -- an official governmental body -- will make a judgment on this question. That is why we hope that any information that bears on this subject that may come up in the next few months and any effort that could be made, even strenuous effort, would be justified because this opportunity may not come again. And I hope very much that we will be able to give clear answers to the questions. Your help will assist very much. Castro: I think you are right in what you are saying. When I spoke about the hope of obtaining some information, it was not but a hope. It is absolutely our curiosity, you know. But, it is absolutely evident that we have the duty of handling over all the information we may gather. We are very much interested in having Kennedy's assassination clarified because in one way or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear. 248 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-one There is nothing so important as having your conscience clean -- absolutely clean. That's why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather a matter of political, historical interest to have all these problems clarified. It is also true that the fact that the United States has conducted an investigation on the (attempts on our people) and the fact that (it) has been made public is a very correct thing to do -- very right. Of course, I (hear) that in that publication many names were not disclosed -- on reasons of safety. When we conduct an investigation, in general, we publish everything because..anyway..but I would have liked for the Senate report to have been more complets. It should have not protected so many people in the interest of the national security because that, you know, diminishes its moral value. It diminishes the moral value of the publication. However, I coincide with you that the fact that the investigation had been conducted and that all those materials were released is something highly positive. Now, you see, I was recalling Bill Moyers' report. Bill Moyers made a very important report of all these attempts -- all these logs on terrorist groups. Now, then, there is one point in which an intimation is made that Kennedy's death could have been a result of all these attempts against our lives. It is to say to a certain extent -- 249 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-two -- Moyers' report -- which has many positive things -- can leave the doubt that Cuba could have had some participation in that because there is a Representative of Congress speaking -- I thing I spoke later, and at the end a senator spoke that said that he had no doubts about that topic. So, we are very much..we are highly interested in that party being satisfied. Because, even when the Senate Intelligence Report was released, in some people the idea could have become stronger that Kennedy's death could have been our revenge for all that had been planned against us. If Cuba had something to do with Kennedy's death, it would have been indirectly because many people were trained in hanling weapons and many things that were not normal were done, and under the shade of these irregularities, terrorism (arises and) develops, so (that) all these acts become the (norm). It was precisely in that sense that I said that it was a nefarious precedent. Can you imagine that in the (entire) world I was one of the naive people who thought that these things could not happen. Not in the Middle Ages, but now in this era in which the whole apparatus of the government can remain very quiet and promote the killing of leaders of other countries? What is to happen to the world in the nuclear era if that becomes a practice? Now we are lucky that all those plans were a failure. 250 Fidel Castro interview Page thirty-three We have not had to (regret the) death of any comrade leader of the revolution. Our attitude is not given that of hatred or resentment. On very rare occasions do we talk to visitors about these problems. That belongs in the past. It happened a long time ago and still the prints exist--still the poor things exist. You have to see he terrorist attack against a Cuban plane in flight -- a plane that exploded. Before that plane fell down, all the people got burned alive. Seventy-four people died. Who perpetrated that crime but people who ere trained by the CIA? We suspect that some CIA agent had to do with that terrorist act. It's very strange, because that happened after Angola. The United States had adopted a very violent attitude towards us and Nixon made forceful statements against us. One of the individuals who was recently arrested in Miami because he was involved in the preparation of terrorist activities was just declared non-guilty in a trial and he defended himself by saying simply that he had been in the White House. He said who he had spoken with and who gave him the weapons, and precisely those facts, those events, took place a week before the attempt -- before the sabotage on the cuban plane in flight. And, he is just defending himself by saying that in the trial. He is one of the persons that was in the group who perpetrated the 251 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-four sabotage. Now, I am going to tell you something. I think that now Carter is - I don't know what Party you belong to - and it is not interesting to the part of what I'm going ot say, if I hurt someone's sensitivity I apologize for that, but I would have not trused Johnson. I may say sincerely, I sincerely believe that Johnson would have followed that line, of the attempts against people's lives, terrorism, subversion. I have no doubt that Nixon was a man without scruples. I was always under a bad impression. I was convinced of that. But now, I see that this President of the United States would not be capable of resorting to that kind of action. There are two things in this connection: One, I think there is an attitude in the public opinion as to that Watergate affair, and the Senate investigations have contributed to create a sort of consciousness. I also think that the politicians have taken that into account, and I think also that personally Carter is a man of a differently mentality. If I am asked whether I think Carter would be capable of plainning these kinds of actions, I would say no. I would say I don't think him capable of doing such a thing. I am quite convinced. In that sense, we feel more relaxed. We had to defend ourselves from these actions for many years. You should not think that I like to be surrounded by people. I think you have to be alone. I would like to have a 252 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-five normal life. We have taken many measures in all these years preventing attempts with different kinds of explosives and weapons, attempts with poison, and actually we are not saying all. I will tell you something. I would even say that I underestimated the CIA somewhat because I thought them capable of many things, but when I read the Senate Committee Report, I confess that I had not thought so much. because, all that from bacterias, viruses, poisons, a shell with explosives, I don't know how many tremendous things. But it was not only that. I want you to know that if we would have been careless, they would have brought a microphone and put it over there in one of the ashtrays and one mike over there in that seat and everything. There were not only subversive activities, but also espionage. There were many activities related to espionage. I remember that around the day in which the sabotage against our plane took place, the CIA asked in a question, to one of their agents here, whether I was going to travel to Africa, whether he could find out what place I was going to visit, what means of transportation I was going to use, I mean, a whole set of investigation which was not political, but rather that could be used for anything else. Now, going back to this topic, one of the things I've gone into recently with some people, is why Cuba - it was realy something inconceivable - could have the idea of killing the President? 253 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-six First, because that would have been a tremendous insanity. The Cuban Revolutionaries and the people who have made this Revolution have proven to be intrepid and to make decisions in the right moment. But, we have not proven to be insane people. The leaders of the Revolution ot not do crazy things and have always been extremely concerned to prevent any factor that could become a kind of an argument or a pretext for carrying out aggression against our country. We are a very small country. We have the United States 90 miles from our shore which is a very large, powerful country economically, technically, militarily. So, for many years we lived concerned that an invasion could take place. I mean, indirect and at the end a direct aggression. We were very close to that. Yet look at the conclusions we draw. If the elections of 1960 had not been won by Kennedy, but Nixon instead, during the bay of Pigs, the Unites States would have invaded Cuba. We mean that in the midst of the fight that Kennedy followed the lined that had been already traced. There is no doubt that we appreciate very highly the fact that Kennedy resisted every kind of pressure not to have the Marines land in our country. Because, there were many people who wanted the Marines to Land here. Nixon himself was in favor of that. Had Nixon been President during the Bay of Pigs invasion, a landing by the military army of the United States would have taken place. We are absolutely convinced of that. 254 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-seven However, Kennedy resisted all the pressures and he did not do that. What would that have meant for us? The destruction of the country? Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of deaths? Because, undoubtedly the people would fight. The people I am absolutely sure about. An invasion of Cuba by the United States would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, maybe millions of lives. We were aware of that. We have an American military base in our territory, by force. And, it is not assumed that anyone is going to have a military base on someone else's territory, if it is not on the basis of an agreement. However, the United States has military bases in many places of the world, but here, it is by force. From that base, many provocations have been carried out against Cuba. There were people wounded..there were people killed. What did we do? We brought our gruard away from the lines, from the fence. We never shot at them. Why? Because we made every possible effort so that an incident of that kind would not become a pretext to be attacked. So, we have followed the policy. We had an American boat just three miles away from us for years, a warship full of electronic communications equipment and never a hostile action was carried against that warship. So, there are many events that have proven how careful Cuba has always been to prevent the perpetration of an invasion. We could 255 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-eight have died heroically - no doubt about it. Now, that would have been a victory for our people. They're willing to be sacrificed and to die. Yet, it would have been just another page in history..nothing else. So, we have always been very much aware to not give the United States the pretext..the possibility.. for (an invasion.) What was the cause of the missile crisis? The need we had to seek protection in case of an (invasion) from the United States. We agreed on the installation of the (strategic) missiles, because undoubtedly that diminished the danger of direct aggression. That became a danger of another kind, a kind of a global danger we became, but we were trying to protect our country at all times. Who here could have operated and planned something so delicate as the death of the United States President. That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane..absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of 256 Fidel Castro Interview Page thirty-nine the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United states? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. The United States had U-2 air surveillancing for almost fifteen years. The planes flew over our territory every day. The women said that they could not go over their terrace naked for the U-2 would have taken a picture of them. That thing we could not allow to happen, you know, because it was demoralizing. So, there were, you know, those flights just very close to the soil. Those kind of flights was really demoralizing for our people. It was impossible to let them continue to do that, so we had to shoot at them. On the following day after the missile crisis, we had the need to shoot at those planes, because to have allowed that would have created a demoralization among our people. And, I say that if we allowed that, you wouldn't have been able even to play baseball here. Because those planes came just twenty meters from here, so it was really demoralizing. See, the U-2 came very high, you know, and I tell you, Cuba has been characterized by following a firm policy, a policy of principles. Our position was known after the missile crisis. We were not in a position to make any concessions. That is a known position, but Cuba, 257 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, have never made that kind of insanity, and that I may asssure you. And the biggest kind of insanity that could have gone through anyone's mind here would have been that of thinking of killing the President of the United States. Nobody would have thought of that. In spite of all the things, in spite of all the attempts, in spite of all the irritation that brought about an attitude of firmness, a willingness to fight, that was translated by our people into a spirit of heroism, but it never became a source of insanity. I'll give you practical reasons. Apart from our ideology, I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that. And, the best example we have is Batista. Batista murdered thousands of our comrades. If there was anyone in which that kind of revenge was justified, it was Batista. However, our movement did very difficult things, but it never that the idea of physically eliminating Batista. Other revolutionary groups did, but never our movement. We had a war for twenty-five months against Batista's army and spent seven years under Batista's dictatorship with thousands dying. But, it never came to our minds..we could have done it, very well, but we never thought about that, because it was different from our feelings. That is our position. That is why we are interested. That is why we are interested. That is why I was asking you whether you are really 258 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-one hopeful to give serious conclusions on this. On our part, if there is something we could give you, we would, without any kind of precondition. The information we have offered you is not conditioned to anything. Inspite of the fact that the problem is thorny, that doesn't stop this Committee here from giving the impression that we are being judged here, that we are being tried. Stokes: We certainly don't want in any way to convey that, in fact, uh,... Castro: No, no, no. I mean not you. I am not thinking of you. I mean that some people could see it that way; that cuba has been investigated by the Committee. Stokes: Well, Mr. President, one thing we have done in that respect, we even said to your Cuban Interest Section in Washington when we first began that we wanted to come down here and do this part of the investigation very quietly without any fanfare, without any publicity, and this is the overall way we have tried to conduct our whole investigation.. everything is being done quietly in executive session until such time that we compile all he data so that we don't in any way declaim or degrade anyone. Then, hopefully, at the end we can come out with a report that everyone will respect. Castro: There is something which is not secret. 259 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-two If I may ask you, is there anything true, or how much could be true about those publications which state that many people who could have had a part in Kennedy's death have died in accidents and things like that? Stokes: This is one of the difficulties of attempting to conduct an investigation thirteen years after the event has occurred. Obviously, there are people who in the normal course of the investigation we would have wanted to talk with, we cannot talk with because they are now deceased. This is one of the difficulties that we face. I yield to Congressman Dodd. Dodd: Mr. President, I won't take much time. I think most of the questions have been asked. I wish we had... Castro: I have time. Please don't mind about my time. I made no other commitment today, so I would have time. Nobody is waiting for me. Dodd: I wish we had an evening just to talk about the Peace Corps, but we will save that for another time. A tape is played? There are a couple of things here. The question you asked of Chairman Stokes----the one regarding the optimism we have over reaching a final conclusion in regard to this effort is one that I think we all ask ourselves almost every day. It is the question that is very important in the minds of many, many people, not only in government, but also of course, the American 260 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-three people are concerned about our efforts. I said today in one of our meetings that I strongly suspected that your grandchildren and my grandchildren will be reading books about the assassination, just as we read them today about the assassination, just as we read them today about the assassination of Lincoln, another historical figure that had been assassinated, and where the suspicion of conspiracy has existed. I think we would be fooling ourselves if we tried to suggest that at the conclusion of our hearings we were going to end once and for all, all of the speculation for all time. I don't think that is possible. But, what we are going to try and do, and I think that what we have done successfully over the past year and a half, is to approach this case with an open mind and not prejudge the case. And, the temptations are great to do that. For every day we almost see a new theory. But, we are determined to proceed through this process listening to all sides and then using that evidence that we are able to collect, to reach as definitely as we can, regarding those points that have been nagging at the consciences and minds of the people all across the earth. Two other points: One is that we intend not only to publish our hearings and the conclusion that we reach. We also intend to use every available means of communication in the United States, hopefully television, radio, to conduct open public hearings, not only showing our conclusions, but how we arrived at 261 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-four those conclusion. We suspect that many, many people do not want to read a boring report, but would rather be better informed by radio and television and newspapers. We intend to hide nothing, to release all information without any fear whatsoever as to where that information leads or what our conclusions would be. I think, I know I can speak for myself, and I'm sure I can speak for everyone else on this Committee. I wouldn't serve on this committee if I didn't think in the end that I could say to my constituents that I had done an honest and thorough job and that I wasn't hiding anything from them. And, my last point is, Mr. President, that had some of your government officials not mentioned it today, we would have, but it was very encouraging to hear it come from them, that they would like to continue to keep the lines of communication open between themselves, your government and our Committee. And, as that old Chinese proverb goes - a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. And I think this is a good beginning and I want to just say here and now that I have been deeply impressed by your statements. I find your logic compelling and I gurantee you that we will do the very best job we can, including the final report. Castro: How many legislators do your have on this committee? Stokes: There are twelve in all, one lady and eleven men. 262 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-five Castro: Don't you all have to be involved in elections at the end of this year now? Stokes: Uh huh. Yes, we do. Castro: And how would you be able, how would you manage to carry out all this work, and take care of the election campagins at the same time? How would you? Dodd: He doesn't have any trouble at all. (About another Congressman.) (Laughter) Castro: And you work personally in the campaigns, don't you? I mean, with all this? The twelve, I mean the twelve people on the Committee work together, perticipate in all hearings and all the interviews and all that? Stokes: The committee...I have been in Congress ten years, Mr. President, and I serve on several other committees in the House. And, I know in general they are hard working committees. but, I have never seen twelve people who have worked together the way this committee has. We work extremely long hours, we have worked into the night when the occasion necessitated it. We have worked Saturdays and Sundays when it was necessary and remained in Washington to work on Committee matters. We just have twelve people who are dedicated to the fact that this is an opportunity to do something of historic nature and they are dedicated to devoting the time that it requires. In addition to the twelve Members of Congress, we have a staff of 115 people. The staff is 263 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-six headed up by Professor Blakey. You might be interested in knowing that we spent three months searching for a director of the staff. And, we were extremely concerned that we get a person of the highest professional ability, along with integrity that cannot be compromised in any respect, and one who would direct the staff in a way that we would let the chips fall where they may in the final analysis. And to that degree, I am sure... Castro: Now he as to continue working while you run the reelection campaign. (Laughter) Stokes: But, when we go home he has to keep on working right here. Castro: You would have to go to meet your constituents and then..that would be the most important moment of all these efforts, you know? The moments to draw the conclusions...Would it be possible for you to finish up the report when due? Don't you need more time? Stokes: We promised the House of Representatives (laughter) that there would be no further requests for time. I am not worried about time; it is the money part. The House is appropriating about five million dollars over the two-year period forus to complete this investigation...and Castro; And only 115 people? 264 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-seven Stokes: Well, Mr. Barber of Maryland who watches the purse strings of the House says it involves a lot of money. We have had to face that kind of opposition on the floor of the House of Representatives. Blakey: Mr. President, I have no questions to ask of you, but less we as guests only asked questions and did not respond to any of yours, let me answer at least in part that question you asked. You expressed some interest in what we call the mysterious death projects. The literature about the Kennedy assassination is filled with instances of people who have in some way been connected to the assassination and have themselves died under mysterious circumstances. We are looking into those deaths and seeing whether there are sinister explanations for them. Let me comment on one of them: Now, this is not from our investigation, but from my own information, and he may be a man of some interest ot you. Let me put it in context for you. I cannot comment on many of the facts in the investigation. As you put it, much of the information is limited by matters of national security. For example, in our country, it has never been officially acknowledged that AMLASH was Rolando Cubela and nothing that we say here today should be read as an indication on our part that that is true or not true. But to continue..Sam Giancana, who was a Mafia leader 265 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-eight in Chicago, who according to the Senate Intelligence Report, directly plotted on your life, was a person who was under investigation by myself in the department of Justice and ironically on November 22nd, 1963, I was with the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, in a meeting of the Organized Crime session and among the subjects taken up at that time was the Attorney General's personal interest in my work in seeking to prosecute Sam Giancana. I bring this to your attention for two reasons: First, to express to you the feeling of one who has spent a great deal of his life working to see to it that members of the Mafia in the united States consistent with due process receive justice. I know from personal knowledge that Robert Kennedy shared those concerns. He would never have been knowingly involved in using those people to plot an assassination of you. And, while I cannot speak of personal knowledge of the President of the United States, there was not difference between them. I say that to express my sense of shame and outrage that members, according to the Senate intelligence Report, of the CIA were involved in that. Those people who were in charge of our government at that level in my judgment had no knowledge. But to respond more particularly to your question, it is unlikely that Sam Giancana died be- 266 Fidel Castro Interview Page forty-nine cause he testified before the Senate Intelligence committee. As I indicated to some of the members of your staff, Mr. Giancana was responsible for the death of hundreds of people in Chicago, and the remarkable thing is not that he died then, but that he had not been killed much earlier. Stokes: The last gentleman here, Mr. President, is Gary Cornwell. Gary is the deputy Chief Counsel for the Kennedy Subcommittee and he would have direct responsibility in terms of the final work product related to the Kennedy investigation. I separate out the Kennedy assassination because as you know we are investigating also the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Two murder investigations are going at the same time. Castro: The five million dollars is for both? Blakey: You ought to also know, Mr. President, that this is the budget attributable to the Committee itself. In fact, the United States Senate, particularly the people who were responsible for the Church Committee investigation, have been helping this Committee. The Federal Bureau of Investigation ahs a relatively large staff devoted to getting their foles made available to us. We have actually received cooperation form the Central Intelligence Agency. Some members of the staff would say not as fast and as full as we might like, but the final report is not in. The police departments in Dallas 267 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty and in Memphis have been helping us and if you consider the work that was done in 1963 and 1964, the actual available resources in the United States devoted to these investigations are considerable more than five million dollars. Castro: May I suggest something? Why don't you investigate also Oswald's personality in one sense, whether Oswald was also a member of any intelligence agency in the United States? Blakey: That is among the issues that we are looking into. Castro: I think that is a very important thing. Because, for me, Oswald's personality - it's a mystery..that first he was in the Army, the Navy, and later he appears in the Soviet Union. He married a Soviet citizen. He came back to the States. I still get the impression that this individual's personality is that of a spy. It is the typical way you recruit a spy and send him to another country. This seems to me very important. I think it is very important to go very deeply into his past, to see if at any time it was possible to really know about his personality. That would be very important. Blakey: Of all the questions I think we will answer, that I feel with a degree of certainty, we will. I should also add, Mr. President, that if you consider the resources that your staff has also devoted to this 268 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-one organization and the time and effort they have put into it, the five million dollars grows even more.(laughter) Castro: Sure, they have been working. But as you know, our contribution is very modest because I think that the fundamental things for the investigation could be conducted only in the United States. And, what we can do is very little, very little. But from the first moment we made the decision to make available anyone you wanted to talk with. I think that your task is a hard one. Hard, because your prestige is at stake with the investigation. You face a task of tremendous responsibility and in that sense I think avery hard job has been assigned to you. Stokes: We share your feelings on that, Mr. President. Blakey: Their job is harder. They are politicians. They must run for reelection. I can always go back and teach. Castro: Will the report be many volumes? (Laughter) How big is the Warren Committee Report? When will the Warren Committee Report be published? Blakey; The Warren Commission has already been published. Castro: Warren Commission? Blakey: Commission. Yes. Castro: Warren Commission, what was it? 269 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-two Villa: It was twenty-six volumes. We had two copies of the summary, but we have not seen the twenty-six volumes. Castro: Have you read all that? Villa: Yes, we have. Castro: We have to say that the Warren Commission was objective. They did not try to commit Cuba. You were a Federal Judge. Then, are you the man with the most experience in this kind of business. Preyer: Well, in the federal courts we didn't have to deal with anything as complex as this with so many remors and so many facets to it. Usually, we had a narrow question, so this is really a new experience for me. Castro: They would give their lives to discover something decisive, you know? (Laughter) Is there anyone else you would like to meet? Villa: Piniero. Piniero worked at the Ministry of Interior at that time. They are interested in speaking to Piniero because he met with Santo Trafficante in the early sixties and gave him 24 hours to leave the country, and also because he met with Ascue. Castro: We did not even have a Ministry of Interior at that time. He worked as some kind of investigator, but at that time we did not have a Minister of Interior. I think it was for the Army. Some things we have now that w e did not have then. They were created, you know, in the course 270 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-three of the years. The first year everybody did whatever they wanted. There was chaos, you know. The state was not organized, so the people came in and out, absolutely free. There were not the controls that existed later, that were created later, especially in the first year of the revolution. I recall a social problem. All the casinos were closed and thousands of people were unemployed without a solution to the problem. So, we had to take back that measure to gain time to find an economic solution for the people who would remain unemployed when the casinos were closed. So, the state had to cover the salaries of all the people who worked there. And, I want to tell you something else: As you know, recently there was a television conference where efforts were being made in order to have the Cuban government involved in drug traffic, smuggling drugs. That is very curious, you know. I don't know why that theory is expounded now. It is a very recent invention. It happens that we are the one country in this hemisphere that has cooperated the most with the United States without any purpose, I mean, we have no intention of doing the United States a disfavor. but, anyway, on the basis of Cuba's belief with regard to drugs, very severe measures were implemented to prevent them. We have become the number one cooperators of the United States in this area. You don't know how 271 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-four many boats we have captured here that come along Cuban coasts carrying drugs. You don't know how many planes we have taken here carrying drugs and, of course, over the past twenty years the individuals who have been involved in drug traffic have always been sentenced, always. These were not people that could affect us. They were just going and coming from South America and Central America to the Untied States. And, they just happened to come here by chance. Dozens of people have been searched on account of drug traffic, on account of the international drug traffic laws. We have eliminated drug use in cuba and I myself wonder why it is we have to cooperate with the United States if when the embargo was imposed on our country we could have planted ten thousand acres of marijuana and become the largest supplier of marijuana to the United States in combination with all those people. We did not do that since we were blockaded and knowing that in the United States there is a market for marijuana even though the government in this country has fought the most against drugs. Besides in Cuba we don't have drug problems, but we had to even uproot the last plants of marijuana planted in the mountains. And actually, look at how we're being paid back now; they pay us back by trying to link us into the drug traffic. It's incredible, you know. We can say it like that; this is the government that has fought the most against drug traffic in this hemisphere. No 272 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-five discussion about it. And, we are lucky that we don't have that problem ourselves because unless the State imported cocaine and marijuana, that problem has almost disappeared. Laughter. Translator left; said she would be around. Second translator arrives. Castro: Well, we have almost finished. Escartin: Who was the one who made that impeachment about the drug problem where Reprsetative Wolff participated? He was the head of the Committee. Castro: Why did he do that? Do you know the address, because I am going to write them a note. Laughter. Castro: And, I am going to ask a budget for stamps and paper. I'm going to sabotage the next election. Escartin? Even though he made some political statements with a certain prestige, he is deceitful. It seems that there are some statements made by him on the basis of an investigation and that this man used them as he wished trying to attain certain political objectives of propaganda because you have explained our stand regarding that. And, there is something strange there: A Cuban Counter-Revolutionary was mentioned who made an operation with Columbia which seems to have serious drug problems...and they tried 273 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-six link him with us. Afterwards, Hernandez-Cartaya who was a Counter-Revolutionary, particiated in the Bay of Pigs. He made some declaration saying that he was anti-Castro and that he had nothing to do with this. Castro: Just two old friends down there defended me. The President of Columbia defended me also, so I have to thank some two persons who defended me. Escartin: It is interesting that Hernandez-Caraya was retained there by the FBI. It seems that somebody is trying to solidify this story...that's the situation. Stokes; Mr. President, before we continue, Gary Cornwell, I think, has a couple of questions to ask you. Cornwell: Mr. President, there was a book published by Daniel Schorr called "Clearing the Air". If you haven't read the book, I would like to read one passage. Castro: I haven't read that. You know about that book? Villa: I haven't. Cornwell: One passage reads as follows: An interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark..do you have the translation of it there? Villa: Yes. castro: Let me see it. Yes, I have it here. This is absurd. Pause: (approximately one minute while President Castro reads it.) Castro: This is absurd. I didn't say that. Cornwell: Did the interview ever occur? Castro: It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? 274 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-seven It's a lie from (head to toe). If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh...we would have denounced him..sure, a person coming here or even in one of our embassies saying that..and that never happened..in no part, as far as I know. Villa: That refers to the interview you spoke about in the beginning. Castro: But how could they interview me in a pizzeria? I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented from the upper to the bottom because you asked me about the Brazilian Embassy and I have no obligation to that and never said it was true. That in the Brazilian Embassy I talked about this problem of the attempt. That was true. I could deny it, but I don't because it was strictly the truth. I didn't remember who the journalist was nor...but I 275 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-eight have the idea that something like that was discussed and that there was a declaration at the Brasilian Embassy. I can't assure it because I don't remember it, but it probably occurred...Later on they tried to present it as a threat and I didn't do it with that intention. Of course, I didn't do it with that intention. But, not that other interview. I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? Not the one that wrote that book, but the origin of that version. You should have to find who he is and why we wrote it, and with whom he is related....and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper? Villa: He was in Cuba and tried to carry out an interview with you. Castro: Let me tell you. Of every one hundred interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the inteviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but twenty-four hours of my life to have interviews. 276 Fidel Castro Interview Page fifty-nine I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited three years for an interview..just almost three years. And even that of Moyers..I didn't want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria. Dodd: I don't even give interviews in a pizzeria. Villa: Another element commander...That interview was published in a sensationalist or yellow press from the United States. It is a sensationalist newspaper. Castro: Especially at that time, a lot of barbaric things were published. They are still being written. Yesterday I was reading an English paper, I don't remember its name, speaking about Angola, and saying that we in military operations against the blacks killed thousands of women and children and so forth. And, I also mentioned before the declaration of that Representative about the drug traffic. Previous to that incident they tried to implicate us in that. If there is somebody in this world that has accustomed himself to listen to the worst things without losing sleep, it is us. 277 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty The campaigns that were carried out, directed campaigns that were carried out throughout the world - in western continents and also in the United States - against Cuba and all of us had no precedents. There are a lot of people that are badly informed about Cuba, and we have nothing to hide, nothing. They have spoken about tortures in Cuba, and that was a tradition from the war..during the Revolutionary War. We never put a finger on another person because we created an awareness in our people. We condemned torture and I can assure you that this is a principal that knows not a single exception in our country, because it would have the repulsion of all the world..Why are our policemen so efficient..especially the security policemen who protected all of us? Do you know why? Because, it was precisely a police which did not carry out torture. There are a lot of countries where they apply torture and they never discover anything. They never became policement in themselves. Now our people couldn't be able to receive any information by means of torture, and they develop intelligence, and the technique of investigation and of prevention. There is a time in which we had more than one hundred counter-revolutionary organizations and all of them were penetrated. We knew more than the counter-revolution armies when a person was arrested because there were some things that he didn't 278 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-one remember: who he met, which places and so forth. I'm going to tell you, there was a time in which penetration of our people increased so much that in turn they became the heads of some of those counter-revolutionary organizations. The police wouldn't be able to develop a technique of investigation and they wouldn't have investigated anything if they just took one person and tried to destroy him. That tradition will never serve. A true police is one which is developed and that will seek intelligent ways of obtaining information. Batista's policement tortured and didn't discover anything. And, for us there is no problem. Security has a lot of advantages because all of the people are militants within the Revolution - country people, children, neighbors, students, peasants and the women. Everybody is organized and, that is why. Through the agents we know everything that is going on. Let me tell you something. One day a parrot was lost. In Havana, we told this to the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution - about trying to find out where this parrot was, and they found the parrot. Some other time, a woman was at the hospital. She had a daughter. Her daughter was robbed from the hospital, so we had to find the girl. Everybody assumed that it was a mental case of somebody. Of course, that was not published in the newspapers. 279 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-two Why not? We did not want any panic. We called up all the CDRs and forty-eight hours later, the girl appeared. One person in one place had a child and they hadn't seen that she was pregnant. That woman was obsessed about having a child and she went to the hospital dressed up like a nurse and she took the girl. And, after forty-eight hours, they found her. There was something else: Here we never have a political kidnapping. Here we never have a terrorist activity. We find out earlier. There were some counter-revolutionaries. But, there is something. The greatest part of them went ot the United States, especially the wealthy people. The social base of the counter-revolution was transferred to the United States. The United States wanted to take from us the doctors and the professions - they got half of the doctors. Out of six thousand doctors, they got three thousand. But then that forced us to concentrate on a school of medicine. Now we have twelve thousand doctors - almost one thousand are abroad in different countries working. We have thirty-five hundred students at the Cuban Medicine School. By 1985 with the new facilities now in progress we will enroll some seven thousand students every year. We are going to train thirty-three thousand students at the University. Our doctors are distributed throughout the country, and before they 280 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-three were all located in the Captiol. So, if the United States wanted to take our professional personnel, they forced us to develop a new system. Fortunately, they didn't take only technical people, but also wealthy people, deliquents, pimps... (Laughter). and exploiters of vices such as drugs, gangsters and all that type of people. They went to the United States. They opened the doors because before the Revolution they had a limit. The United States couldn't receive more then ten thousand and there were a lot of people who wanted to go there trying to find some jobs or social programs. Then, when the Revolution triumphed, the United States opened its doors. Can they repeat that procedure with some other countries? No, they can't. What would happen if the United States opened the way for all those Mexicans who want to go to the United States trying to find jobs? What about all the Brazilians, Colombians, Peruvians..? They opened the doors and they took the social ground work of the Counter Revolution. So, they left the houses. Those houses were turned into schools and dwelling houses for humble people. You understand? And all those who left here, they left these houses for humble people..and, in the country, the most humble people stayed. You understand? What resources they need to carry on 281 Fidel Castro Interview Page sixty-four the Revolution and what social ground work they need for making Counter Revolution, they don't have. That is why the country is defending itself. And that is why we were able to depend on intelligence, and not torture. Thousands of times, they have sid that in Cuba we torture. It is like that, but people of all nations know how things were and are in Cuba. We never had any persons disappear. It wasn't a new invention. We would never have that. We never found a dead man in the street. We were forced to legisate tough laws, but nobody was ever sanctioned except through the courts and through previous law. Since we were in the Sierra Maestra, we started making the first law. We said to the people..Well, the assassins and torturers are going to be punished. Nobody will take revenge in their own hands. That was a promise we made to the people. The torturers were punished and also the criminals, who generally are not punished. You can see now that things are going on in Chile and in some other countries. They are doing unbelievable things. Sometimes I have heard some stories about things going on there, and they are unbelievable. That is why we are not in agreement with their thinking. We have been accused of denying a man his human rights; that is to say that things are worse here then in Chile, Brazil and so forth. Who are they going to tell that story in this case? But, in spite of it all, we have survived. And the campaigns did not manage to destroy us. REST OF INTERVIEW CONSISTS OF PERSONAL REMARKS 282 Mr. BLAKEY. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like now to play the recording of President Castro's answer to that first question. Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. [Tape recording played.] Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, the committee's next question was more specific. It dealt with an account published in 1967 in the National Enquirer claiming that Oswald while at the consulate had voiced an intention to assassinate President Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I note that JFK F-428 has already been displayed and ask that it be entered into the record. It is a reproduction of that National Enquirer article. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, so ordered. [JFK exhibit F-428 follows:] JFK EXHIBIT F-428 Mr. BLAKEY. It is probably also appropriate to note that that article has had wide circulation. For example, Daniel Schorr repeats it in his book, "Clearing the Air." President Castro, according to the story in the National Enquirer, had admitted to being told of the threat, though he had taken no action in response to it. The tape of this portion of President Castro's remarks is not suitable for playing in a public room. Consequently, I will read his response. President Castro said: This is absurd. I didn't say that * * * It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that? It's a lie from (head to toe). If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty 283 to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh * * * we would have denounced him * * * Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our Embassies saying that * * * And that never happened. No part, as far as I know . * * But how could they interview me in a pizzeria. I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented. I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? * * * You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related * * * and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper? Let me tell you. Of every 100 interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but 24 hours of my life to have interviews. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited 3 years for an interview * * * just almost 3 years. And even that of Moyers * * * l didn't want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria. Mr. Chairman, the author-- Chairman STOKES. Would you suspend for just one moment? Mr. BLAKEY. Certainly. Chairman STOKES. I think I misunderstood you. There was some reason you explained for reading that. Mr. BLAKEY. Yes; the tape unfortunately, as has been my experience, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure yourself in trials, that any effort, when you have a mechanical device inevitably they fail at least once out of three, and while we made an effort to enhance the quality of that portion of the tape, in which President Castro responded to this particular question, we played it and it just simply was not suitable for playing in a public auditorium. It was not audible. Consequently, it was thought best to read it rather than to play the tape. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. Mr. BLAKEY. We really did the best we could. Mr. Chairman, the author of the National Enquirer story was a British freelance journalist named Comer Clark. He died in 1972. Nevertheless, the committee, while conducting other investigations in England, made an effort to explore Mr. Clark's background and reputation for veracity. Frankly, it was not good. Apparently, he wrote extensively for the sensationalist press in England. His articles include such items as "British Girls as Nazi Sex Slaves," "I Was Hitler's Secret Love," and "German Plans To Kidnap the Royal Family." On the other hand, even though there may be considerable doubt as to the fact of Clark's interview with President Castro, the committee has been informed that the substance of the Clark article is supported by highly confidential but reliable sources available to the U.S. Government. Apart from the reliability of the source, whether or not this source may have provided reliable information in this instance is of 284 course an issue that the committee will have to consider in December. In this connection the Cuban Government has suggested to the committee that the circulation of this story represents a disinfor- mation effort by the Central Intelligence Agency designed to discredit Cuba and to implicate her in the assassination. Mr. Chairman, President Castro also discussed the general subject of assassination as a means for achieving political change. His thoughts on it are pertinent to the investigation. It would be appropriate, then, to play his response to that question, which fortunately is clear enough to play in a public proceeding. Chairman STOKES. OK. [Tape recording played.] Mr. BLAKEY. Finally, Mr. Chairman, President Castro commented on the specific so-called threat reported in the New Orleans Times Picayune of September 9. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to play the last excerpt. Chairman STOKES. You may proceed. [Tape recording played.] Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would note for the record that President Castro was of course speaking in Spanish, and the simultaneous English translation was provided by Juanita Vera. Mr. Chairman, in August, during the committee's second trip to Cuba, the Cuban Government made available to the committee one Rolanda Cubela, who identified himself to the committee as AMLASH, on the basis of his reading of the 1976 Senate report. It would be appropriate at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record and to display JFK F-424, a photograph of Mr. Cubela. [The information follows:] 285 JFK EXHIBIT F-424 Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record and displayed accordingly. Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Cubela indicated that he had been prosecuted and convicted by the Cuban Government for plotting against Premier Castro. He said that during that prosecution he did not inform the Cuban Government and the Cuban Government did not learn that his plot had the support of CIA personnel. The Cuban Government affirmed Mr. Cubela's assertion. He also indicated that he had no evidence on which he could say that any official of the U.S. Government or of the CIA higher than his case officer was aware of the assassination aspects of his plot. The Cuban Government suggested that the AMLASH plot in operation on November 22, 1963, as outlined in the Senate report, could not, therefore, have served as a provocation by the U.S. motivating Cuban retaliation against President Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, another aspect of the committee's investigation of Oswald's trip to Mexico had to do with any associations Oswald may have had while he was there other than those at the Cuban consulate and the Soviet Embassy. The Warren Commission concluded he had Done, that he kept to himself throughout his stay. It turns out, however, that 11 days after the Commission concluded its investigation and issued its report in September 1964, a Mexican woman came forward with quite a different version of Oswald's activities in Mexico City. Her name is Elena Garro de Paz. Though now divorced, she was at the time the wife of Octavio de Paz, the noted poet and Mexican diplomat. Elena Garro herself is an accomplished author. 286 Ultimately, Elena Garro's story came to the attention of American intelligence services. As far as it is known, no service initiated a full-scale followup investigation. One reason might be that Elena Garro's credibility is controversial. This committee has been told, on the one hand, that she is absolutely trustworthy, while others have claimed that the same vivid imagination that has made her a literary success has also tended to color her perception of actual events. That being said, Elena Garro's story is interesting, as is the way it has unfolded in this investigation. Elena Garro says that along with her daughter, Elenita, and her sister, Deba Galvan, she was invited to a party at the home of her cousin, Ruben Duran Navarro, then the brother-in-law of Sylvia Tirado Duran. She first said that the party was in early October 1963, though, after inspection of her personal calendar for that period, she adjusted the time to late September. There were three young American men at the party, she says, the guests of Sylvia Duran, and one of the Americans was Lee Harvey Oswald. She describes one of his companions as tall and slender with long blond hair, a gaunt face, and a protruding chin. The other was tall also, with short, light brown hair. In 1964, Elena Garro became a friend of an American foreign service officer named Charles Thomas, and, over time, she related her story to him in detail. She explained that when she had gone to the American Embassy in October 1964 and told her story, the man she talked to seemed to believe little of it. She told Thomas that Oswald was wearing a black sweater at the party, and that he stared at the floor a lot. She said the three Americans stuck together rather than mix with the other guests. She said that Eusebio Azcue, the Cuban consul, was also at the party. Elena Garro told Thomas that on the day of the assassination, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted, "assassins." This she claimed was before she saw a newspaper photo identifying Oswald as the suspected assassin. After she and her daughter returned home on November 22, 1963, a man she thought was an agent of the Mexican Ministry of Government came to her house and told her and Elenita that they were in danger of being harmed by the Communists. He took them to a "sanctuary", a small hotel called the Vermont, where they remained for 8 days. It was after getting to the hotel that Elena Garro first saw a picture of Oswald and realized she had seen him at the Duran party. This man, who must be referred to here as Mr. X, advised Elena Garro to beware of the American Embassy, that it was staffed by Communists. Elena Garro also claimed that several months after the assassination she was visited by two Communists who warned her not to tell her story. Shortly after the assassination, Elena Garro told Thomas, an American woman came and spent several days at her home. This woman, who must be referred to here as Ms. Y, was told the story one evening by Elena Garro's sister, Deba Galvan, who had been 287 drinking. Ms. Y urged the two women to tell their story to American authorities in Texas, not in Mexico. Failing that, Ms. Y offered to arrange a meeting with a high-ranking American official in Mexico. It never transpired, because Elena Garro and Ms. Y had a falling out. Ms. Y did, however, send the first report on Elena Garro and her story to American authorities in 1964. Charles Thomas, the American service officer, was concerned about the Elena Garro story and reported her account in memoranda that were circulated in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Nevertheless, when the reports reached Washington, neither the CIA nor the FBI showed any interest. No investigation was ordered, even though, on October 10, 1966, it was learned an Elena Garro had indeed been registered at the Hotel Vermont over the period she claimed she was there in 1963. Charles Thomas returned to Washington in 1967 when his tour of duty in Mexico ended and he was "selected out" of the foreign service in 1969 for failure to be promoted. In 1971, having had some 2,000 job applications rejected, he committed suicide. In 1974 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, having determined that his dismissal was a mistake, had through an act of Congress Mr. Thomas posthumously reinstated. Mr. Chairman, the committee on Friday of last week received permission from the State Department to make public a group of previously classified documents dealing with Mr. Thomas and Elena Garro de Paz' story. While they have been declassified, there are certain privacy aspects of them that would make it inappropriate to include it in this record now. Nevertheless, I would ask that they be marked as JFK F-403 and inserted in this record at this point after they have been duly edited. Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be done. [The information follows:] 288 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 289 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 290 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 291 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 292 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 293 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 294 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 295 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 296 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 297 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 298 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 299 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 300 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 301 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 302 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 303 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 304 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 305 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 306 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 307 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 308 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 309 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 310 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 311 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 312 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 313 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 314 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 315 JFK EXHIBIT F-403 cont. 316 Mr. BLAKEY. The committee has also tried to locate Mr. X and Ms. Y to no avail. The committee also sought to interview another individual who was employed in the Cuban Embassy in 1963. Although the interview had been prearranged, he left Mexico City suddenly the day committee investigators arrived, and returned the day they were scheduled to depart. The investigators, having decided to stay an extra day, contacted the former employee by phone, but he refused to speak with them. The committee has learned that Mexican authorities had been requested not to allow the committee investigators to interview the employee. Members of the Duran family were questioned about Elena Garro's allegations. They denied that they socialized with the people she said were at their party, although Sylvia Duran did recall that Elena herself may have been at one or two parties at her home in the fall of 1963. Sylvia Duran denied that Oswald had been there. Another Mexican has claimed to have been in contact with Oswald in Mexico City. Oscar Contreras Lartique told an American foreign service officer (not Charles Thomas) in 1967 that as a student at the University of Mexico in 1963 he had met Oswald as he was leaving a roundtable discussion at the School of Philosophy. Contreras, who described Oswald as "strange and introverted," said he spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the following day with Oswald and some other students. He said Oswald told them he had come to the university looking for Castro students who might help persuade the Cuban Embassy to grant him a visa. Oswald told them, Contreras said, that he was from California and was a member of a pro Castro organization in New Orleans. Contreras was later reinterviewed by American authorities. He refused to identify other students who had met Oswald, because he said they were still active revolutionaries. Contreras stated that originally Oswald was suspected of being an American intelligence agent, that he never mentioned President Kennedy or assassination, and that he repeatedly expressed a wish to get to Cuba promptly. Mexican authorities have reported to the committee that there was indeed an Oscar Contreras Lartique registered at the University of Mexico in 1960, but not in 1963. They also reported that Oscar Contreras had once signed a manifesto written by a pro-Castro student group, but that the group ceased to function in 1962. Nevertheless, the committee placed some significance in Contreras' story because it has been learned that a professor from the University of Mexico held philosophy seminars at the Duran home. The philosophy professor, a close friend of the Durans, was a well known Marxist at the university. The committee tried to arrange an interview with Contreras through Mexican officials, but when its investigators arrived, Contreras disappeared. In summation, Mr. Chairman, I must frankly state that the committee has, with the exception of certain witnesses made available by the Cuban and Mexican Governments, largely been frus- 317 trated in its attempts to investigate the nature of Lee Harvey Oswald's activities and possible associates in Mexico City through personal interviews with those persons who purportedly have first hand knowledge of such matters. The only other theoretical possibility for resolving these issues was, of course, physical evidence, either documents or photographs. In this regard, the Cuban Government has suggested that photographic evidence should exist, at least as to Oswald's alleged visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Such photographs might well include, of course, the identities to the companions, if any, who were with him on those occasions. In fact, the Cuban Government has provided several photos to the committee. They are reflected in JFK F-438 which, Mr. Chairman, I ask be displayed and entered into the record at this point. Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 318 JFK EXHIBIT F-438 Mr. BLAKEY. To support its claim that there was a photographic surveillance site across the street from the Cuban consulate in 1963, the Cuban Government, Mr. Chairman, has indicated that the top left of the photograph represents a diagram of the Cuban consulate on the left and on the right of the building that is displayed immediately to the right of that diagram. It is from that building that they suggest that photographic surveillance took place. 319 The three bottom photographs on the exhibit illustrate examples of their ability to photograph the photographer, during the course of his surveillance of the Cuban consulate. Mr. Chairman, I would indicate that the committee has conducted an extensive investigation to determine who, if anyone, was responsible for the surveillance outlined in this exhibit in the periods of time during which that surveillance was in operation. It has also sought to identify and personally interview those individuals who may have conducted the surveillance and to obtain, if possible, all relevant photographs. Once again, however, I have to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the committee's efforts have met with frustration. No photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald or of any other person who can be said to be an associate of his have been located. Mr. Chairman, that ends today's presentation on Cuba, Mexico and the assassination. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Professor Blakey. Before you proceed to the next section, once again I think it appropriate for me to indicate for the record the kind of cooperation that was necessary for this committee to obtain in order to do the extensive type of investigation that we have done in this particular area. I acknowledged in the latter part of yesterday's hearings the kind of cooperation we had gotten from Cuban Government officials. But I might appropriately note at this time that to my knowledge and to the knowledge of the members of this committee, it is unprecedented for a head of a foreign nation to subject himself to interrogation by a congressional committee. Not only did President Castro spend in excess of 4 1/2 hours with this committee, but he made it clear and apparent to us that in every respect his officials were to give us complete cooperation. I think the final record in this case will indicate the voluminous documents and witnesses that we interviewed in this area and virtually every request made by this committee was complied with, even to the extent of the fact that the committee when it went there conducted itself in the same way we have attempted to do our work here and that is to work quietly and without any type of fanfare. And for that reason, we made the same type of request in Cuba that our work there not be announced, that we be accorded the opportunity to work privately and quietly and to that extent the President and his officials afforded us the kind of housing that we needed in order to remain out of public view. So I think that the record ought to appropriately acknowledge the fact that this committee was given extensive cooperation by President Castro and his officials and we are grateful for that cooperation. Professor Blakey? Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate now to shift the focus of the hearing somewhat from Cuba, Mexico City and the assassination, and begin today and in the days that follow an examination of the performance of the agencies. The first agency whose performance in 1963 and 1964 will be examined is the Secret Service. 320 Of all of the Federal agencies that were in any way involved in protecting President Kennedy or investigating his assassination, the Secret Service has come in for the most scathing criticism. Within hours of the tragedy in Dallas, press accounts were pointedly suggesting that the agency had been derelict in its duty to provide Presidential security. The more obvious questions were first raised. Why had the motorcade been routed through Dealey Plaza, an open, park-like area surrounded by tall buildings? Why wasn't there more physical protection for the President--why, for example, were there no agents in the limousine itself, forming a human shield? Why was the limousine moving at such a slow speed? And why were agents in an open car directly behind the limousine so slow to respond at the sound of the first shot? The Warren Commission was quite blunt in its admonishment of the Secret Service: The Commission has concluded that at the time of the assassination the arrangements relied upon by the Secret Service to perform this function were seriously deficient. And, the Commission adds in its final report: The Commission believes that the facilities and procedures of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service prior to November 22, 1963, were inadequate. The approach of the Warren Commission seems to have been (a) to document the conduct of Secret Service agents physically present at the assassination scene; and (b) to record the perceptions of supervisory personnel as to Secret Service performance on the trip to Dallas and to reforms called for to improve the protective operations of the agency. The select committee, while not disregarding the performance of the Secret Service on November 22, 1963, has attempted to go one step farther. It has assembled data on threats against President Kennedy from Secret Service files, in an effort to establish a basis for a fair, objective analysis. This has enabled the committee to scrutinize the extent to which Secret Service protective measures reflected the agency's grasp of potential danger to the President during the Kennedy years. In other words, was the Secret Service in part to blame for the assassination because it failed to gather sufficient information on security problems in Dallas, or because it failed to analyze that information for its full significance? The questions this committee posed for itself were these: 1. How skillfully did the Secret Service acquire information about threat activitity around the country? 2. What was the quality of the insight used to analyze the information? 3. Did protective operations in the field reflect a thorough awareness of threat activity? Before we get to testimony bearing on these questions, it would seem useful to consider for a moment the historic background of the Secret Service and its evolving role in Federal law enforcement. It is worth noting that the Kennedy assassination was the first and only event of its kind since the Secret Service was assigned to full-time protection of the President in 1901, as a result of the 321 assassination of William McKinley. Originally, when it was formed in 1865, the Secret Service was not given responsibility for Presidential protection, even though that was the year Lincoln was murdered. The primary purpose of the Secret Service at the outset was to deal with counterfeiting which had become a national outrage in the period before 1862 when a standardized national currency was adopted. By the end of the 1860's the new agency had all but eliminated the problem. For the balance of the 19th century, the Secret Service engaged in various criminal detection activities. It investigated the Ku Klux Klan in the 1870's, Spanish espionage in the 1890's, organized crime in New York City in the eighties and nineties, and syndicated gambling in Louisiana at the turn of the century. Even with the assignment of Presidential protection as its primary role, the Secret Service was not guaranteed, however, necessary annual appropriation to carry out the task. It wasn't until 1908 that the agency's mission was clarified, and, at that, for an ironic reason. When the Secret Service exposed the participation in land fraud schemes by Members of Congress from several Western States, legislation was passed restricting the operations of the agency and creating a new Federal law enforcement body which ultimately became the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So, the original FBI men were eight agents transferred from the Secret Service. The law limiting the Secret Service's responsibilities left it with two concerns: Treasury matters, or counterfeiting, and protection of the President. On occasion, however, it was given exceptional assignments. During World War I, for example, it went after German saboteurs, and in 1921 it was the body that investigated the roles of Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall and Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty in the Teapot Dome Scandal. From about 1930 on, the Secret Service was an anticounterfeiting agency with the additional assignment of protecting the President. For the latter function, on only two occasions before November 22, 1963, was the agency tested by an actual assault on a President: In February 1932, the car in which President Roosevelt was riding was fired on in Miami, killing the mayor of Chicago, Aaron Cermak. In November 1950, members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party tried to force their way into Blair House, the temporary home of President Truman. It ought to be clear, therefore, that the best way to evaluate the performance of the Secret Service at the time of the Kennedy assassination is to look at it not so much in the context of history, but rather in the context of the climate in 1963 and how well the Secret Service appreciated that climate, especially as it might have been evident in Texas. President Kennedy posed a problem for the Secret Service from the start. As a policymaker, he was liberal and innovative, perhaps startlingly so in comparison with the cautious approach of President Eisenhower. His personal style was known to cause agents assigned to him to tear their hair. He traveled more frequently than any of his predecessors, and he relished contact with crowds 322 of well wishers. He scoffed at many of the measures designed to protect him and treated the danger of an assault philosophically, if someone wanted to kill him, he reasoned, it would not be very difficult to stop him. On at least one occasion, President Kennedy was literally "lost" by the Secret Service detail guarding his hotel room. Indeed, on the very day of the assassination, Presidential Assistant Kenneth O'Donnell is reported to have told a Secret Service agent, "you are not at fault. You can't mix security and politics. We chose politics." The core of the Presidential security arm of the Secret Service is the White House detail, which in 1963 was composed of 36 special agents. In addition, there were six special agent drivers, eight special agents assigned to the Kennedy family, and five special officers detailed to the Kennedy home in Hyannisport, Mass. On the trip to Texas, there were 28 special agents in the Presidential entourage. In all, out of 552 employees in November 1963, there were 70 special agents and 8 clerks--17 percent of the total Secret Service work force--assigned to protecting the President and Vice President directly or to the Protective Research Service, a preventive intelligence division charged with gathering and evaluating threat information and seeing that it is usefully disseminated. In addition, there were 30 employees in the office of the Chief of the Secret Service, plus 313 agents and 131 clerks in 66 field offices, all of whom were on call to assist in Presidential protection. The time of need for the most manpower was in 1963, as it is now, when the President traveled and was exposed to crowds of people in open spaces. Then, the Secret Service called on municipal, county, and State law enforcement agencies for personnel who assisted in the preparation of large-scale protective plans. In planning a Presidential trip, a set of procedures was customarily followed. It is expected that they will be detailed in testimony today, along with answers to certain specific issues stemming from the Kennedy assassination, such as securing buildings along a parade route and liaison between the Secret Service and other agencies, Federal as well as State, county, and local. From the beginning of its investigation of the Secret Service, the committee realized the great importance of the Protective Research Service. PRS is the memory of the agency, and it is responsible for analyzing threat data. By reviewing PRS files and interviewing its personnel, the committee has sought to clarify just how much the Secret Service, as an agency, knew about the sort and degree of the dangers the President faced in the fall of 1963, and to learn what protective tactics had been devised in response to them. The committee was at pains to make a valid distinction between major and minor threats to the President in order that it could concentrate on the followup action to the significant ones. A threat was considered major if (a) it was verbal or communicated by a threatening act, and (b) if it created a danger great enough to require an in-depth and intense investigation by the Secret Service or other law enforcement agency. The committee examined all threat profile investigations from March to December 1963, 313 of them in all, and it incorporated 323 into its analysis information on some major threat activity back to December 1962. The committee also considered the following questions in its investigation of Secret Service threat activity files, questions raised by the Kennedy assassination itself: One: Was there an indication of a conspiracy to harm Secret Service protectees? Two: Was there information developed in investigations of earlier threats that might be useful in the investigation of the assassination? Three: Was the pertinent information in the Secret Service files made available to the Warren Commission? The first witness today will be Inspector Thomas J. Kelley. Inspector Kelley was assigned to represent the Secret Service in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. Inspector Kelley served as Secret Service liaison to the Warren Commission. Inspector Kelley received a B.A. from Providence College and an LL.B. from Georgetown University Law School. He has been the special agent in charge of the Philadelphia Field Office, an Inspector in the Washington office, the Assistant Director of Protective Intelligence and Investigations in Washington, D.C., and he currently is the Assistant Director of Protective Operations in Washington, D.C. Inspector Kelley is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and he has served as consultant to several Far Eastern police agencies, as well as consultant to the Dominican Republic on protective matters. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Inspector Kelley. Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Inspector Kelley. Sir, would you raise your right hand and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? TESTIMONY OF INSPECTOR THOMAS J. KELLEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. Inspector KELLEY. I do. Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Leodis Matthews. Mr. MATTHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelley, at this time are you retired from the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, in February 1978. Mr. MATTHEWS. In 1963 you were a member of the Secret Service inspection detail? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your duties and responsibilities? Inspector KELLEY. The duties of the inspector from the Chiefs office at that time were to conduct the field investigations of the activities of the Secret Service both in the field, at headquarters, and on the protective details, to make periodic inspections of the offices. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you concerned about the performance of the agents in those investigations? 324 Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of inspection did you conduct of the agents' performance? Inspector KELLEY. In the field office? Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. Inspector KELLEY. Their productivity, the manner in which they conducted their cases, the number of arrests, the kind of investigations they conducted, their relationship with outsiders, their relationship to their own people, and generally the conduct of the requirements of the job. Mr. MATTHEWS. I want to call your attention to an exhibit, JFK F-423. Are you able to see the exhibit from where you are, Mr. Kelley? Inspector KELLEy. Generally, yes I can. Mr. MATTHEWS. This exhibit purports to be an organizational chart of the Secret Service as of November 13, 1964. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. To your knowledge would that have been basical- ly the same organization of the Secret Service in 1963? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. [The above referred to exhibit follows:] JFK EXHIBIT F-423 Mr. MATTHEWS. In your position as inspector would you report to the Director of the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir, report to the Chief Inspector who reported to the Director or the Chief. Mr. MATTHEWS. In the chart there is an indication about halfway down at the righthand side of the White House detail? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. 325 Mr. MATTHEWS. As an inspector, did you also have occasion to inspect the performance of the White House detail? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, during an inspection of the White House detail we would review the performance of the detail. Mr. MATTHEWS. What considerations would you give in evaluating their performance? Inspector KELLEY. The general conduct of the people on the detail, the carrying out of their assignment, the connection they had with their superiors and their fellow agents. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you also have conducted performance reviews of the Protective Research Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you focus on the quality of investigation by the field offices in the Protective Research Service, whether they complied with the guidelines and procedures of the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, that was part of the inspection procedure. Mr. MATTHEWS. I want to call your attention to November 22, 1963. At that time you were in Louisville, Ky.? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you received a communique from Chief Rowley? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. What were the contents of that message? Inspector KELLEY. The chiefs office directed me to proceed to Dallas, Tex., to assist Mr. Sorrels, the agent in charge of the Dallas office, to assist him in finding out what had happened at Dallas, what were the events surrounding the assassination, and to coordinate any investigation that might be conducted by the Secret Service concerning the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you arrived in Dallas, Tex., that evening? Inspector KELLEY. That evening. Mr. MATTHEWS. Upon your arrival, did you understand that your responsibility was to conduct a criminal conspiracy investigation? Inspector KELLEY. No. Actually, at that time it was to find out exactly what happened and what the role of the Secret Service had been in that tragedy there. Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your first actions? Inspector KELLEY. I first met with Mr. Sorrels and we went to the police department where Oswald was being interrogated. I sat in on, I think it was the second interrogation of Oswald. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now in total you were present for at least four interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Why did you feel it was necessary to be there? Inspector KELLEY. We were, of course, attempting to find out what had happened, whether he was the assassin, whether he had accomplices, whether there were other problems that the Secret Service might be facing in connection with assassination of other people. It was just generally to find out what had happened. Mr. MATTHEWS. The Warren Commission has indicated that there were several people present at the time. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. In my opinion, there were too many present at the time of the interrogation of Oswald. The interroga- 326 tion of Oswald by Captain Fritz of the Dallas Police Department was conducted under something less than ideal circumstances. Mr. MATTHEWS. What effect would those circumstances have had upon the interrogation itself? Inspector KELLEY. In my opinion, it made the interrogation of Oswald by Captain Fritz, who at that time had the primary jurisdiction of handling Oswald, made it very difficult for him to conduct the kind of interrogation that should have been conducted. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you engage in any conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the nature of that conversation? Inspector KELLEY. I had asked Oswald if he had assassinated the President. I told him who I was. I said that the Secret Service had the responsibility for protecting the President, that he was in custody accused of assassinating the President, and we wanted to know whether he had done it, and if he hadn't done it, to let us know; if he had done it, to admit it. He indicated that he would talk to me later on. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you also present at the time Lee Harvey Oswald was shot. Inspector KELLEY. I wasn't in the immediate vicinity. I was upstairs in the police office. We had just left Oswald in the police headquarters. The police took him down to the basement to transport him. Mr. Sorrels and I remained upstairs. When we heard that he had been shot, we immediately went down to the basement. Oswald was still in the basement. The ambulance had been backed in to take him to the hospital. I attempted to enter the ambulance with Oswald to go to the hospital. I was prevented from getting into the ambulance by the Dallas policemen who got into the ambulance with him. Mr. MATTHEWS. During the time between your first conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald and the time the shooting occurred, did you make any attempt to ascertain what his background had been? Inspector KELLEY. Let me have the question again. Mr. MATTHEWS. What investigation did you conduct into the background of Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. The investigation that the Secret Service conducted personally was, the interviews with Mrs. Oswald, with Marina. We had put a detail with Marina after Lee Harvey's assassination and we attempted to get as much background as we could on Oswald from her. There was a great deal of information coming to us in the Dallas office at that time from the other agencies who had information on Oswald. The FBI had information on him. The agency apparently had some information on him and had furnished it to our headquarters. The Dallas police had some information on him and the State Department had some information on him in connection with his trips to Russia. The military was supplying information to our headquarters and it was being provided to me at Dallas. All of this information was coming down to Dallas to me. 327 Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any attempts personally to obtain information from the Secret Service files about Lee Harvey Oswald's background in connection with the Cuban organizations? Inspector KELLEY. Well, the inquiry we made of the Secret Service files was whether the Secret Service had anything on Oswald prior to the assassination, and we had none. Mr. MATTHEWS. Based upon your investigation in Dallas in the few days right after the assassination, did you develop a background in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald which you communicated to the field offices of the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Not an entire background. We were putting all the information together, but I don't know that we put it in any one document. It was in the series of documents that accompanied records we were preparing. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, when you were in Dallas conducting the investigation, were you the person in charge of the assassina- tion investigation on behalf of the Secret Service? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you request the field offices conduct investigations of suspects who they thought may have a connection with the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the assassination? No; I don't know that we sent any requests, that I sent any requests like that out. You must remember, that there was a coordinated investigation being conducted by the protective research section in Washington and our offices were furnishing us information that came to their attention from other agencies subsequent to the assassination and furnishing that to us at headquarters and to me in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you request that the Chicago field office conduct an investigation in connection with the rifle found in the Texas School Book Depository? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. Who did you talk with in the Chicago office? Inspector KELLEY. I don't recall now who I talked to, but I talked to someone in the Chicago office and asked them to run this lead out that we had. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, you were aware of an investigation concerning special agents who were alleged to have been drinking the night before and the morning before the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. I am aware of the inquiry; yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. To your knowledge, were any of those agents found in violation of the Secret Service rules? Inspector KELLEY. I don't think they were found in violation of any Secret Service rules warranting any action. It was an area of poor judgment, I presume, but there was no specific violation of any rule. Of course, the inquiry indicated that their action the night before had nothing, no bearing, on what happened in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have occasion to review the performance of the agents at the time of the Kennedy assassination, the shooting episode in Dealey Plaza? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; the agents that were in Dallas. 328 Mr. MATTHEWS. What conclusion did you reach with respect to their behavior? Inspector KELLEY. Well, I felt that none of the agents could be charged with any dereliction of duty in connection with the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have any conversation with the driver of the Presidential vehicle? Inspector KELLEY. No; I did not. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review his conduct? Inspector KELLEY. I reviewed his conduct. Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you understand his instructions were? Inspector KELLEY. Well, his instructions were, to see that the car was driven safely, that the safety of his passengers was paramount, that he was to assure himself that the car was in condition to move properly, just to keep in mind the safety of the passengers. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he have any specific instructions that he was to take in anticipation of harm to the President? Inspector KELLEY. The general instruction, to the agents in a situation where the President is considered to be in danger is to get the President out of there, to evacuate the President. The Secret Service does not consider it necessary for the Secret Service to stand and fight in any situation. That our primary duty is the security of the President and to remove him from any dangerous situation. So that generally the instructions to the drivers of the cars are to be prepared to get the President away from any dangerous situation. Mr. MATTHEWS. Had the driver of the vehicle received any training in defensive driving or evasive driving? Inspector KELLEY. Not in a formal sense. However, Mr. Greer who was driving the President's car at that time and the other agents who were assigned as drivers had long practice and history of driving the Presidential vehicles and the security vehicles. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there any tests available at the time to gage or measure the reactions of those persons who were responsible for the close physical protection of President Kennedy? Inspector KELLEY. I presume there were tests available. I am not certain that any were given to the particular agents that were involved at the time of the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. You reviewed their performance? Inspector KELLEY. But I reviewed their performance? Mr. MATTHEWS. You did review their performance? Inspector KELLEY. I did review their performance. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have a recollection that any such tests were available to give them? Inspector KELLEY. I have no recollection that any tests were given. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, the special agent in charge of the White House detail testified before this committee that he had been removed from his position, that he had considered his conduct a demotion. Did you have occasion to review his performance? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; that man, of course, was not at Dallas. I had occasion to review his performance at other times, but he was not present in Dallas. 329 Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review his performance in connection with selecting agents to go to Dallas and making the arrangements for the trip? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. What, if any, conclusions did you draw with respect to his performance? Inspector KELLEY. His performance was normal under those circumstances. The selection of agents was a rather routine performance at that time. Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did you remain in Dallas? Inspector KELLEY. I can't tell you the exact date, but I returned to Washington some time before December 15, probably the first week or 10 days of December. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now in the week following the assassination, did you receive any reports from the field offices, reporting results of their investigation or whether there were any subjects, or other agents connected with the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; we received several reports. At that time there were several rumors going around that Oswald had been seen in various places and Oswald had connections in various cities. And these reports were coming to us and being evaluated. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the nature of those reports generally? Did they identify any particular organization? Inspector KELLEY. They were generally running out rumors concerning Oswald being seen with certain people in other cities. There was a report coming to us from New Orleans that Oswald had been seen in New Orleans, had been arrested in New Orleans, and had been participating in some pamphleteering activities in New Orleans. Mr. MATTHEWS. You were aware during the time you were in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald had been a member of the FPCC, Fair Play for Cuba Committee? Inspector KELLEY. That came out of New Orleans. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you were also aware of the fact that one of the Secret Service agents had interviewed Marina Oswald shortly after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. During the course of that interview she had indicated to him that she was a strong Castro supporter? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any requests to any of the field offices to determine if there were any Cuban organizations or groups which had threatened, or presented a threat to, the President? Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't make any particular requests on that matter, but there were at that time, prior to the assassination, several investigations going on in the Secret Service office concerning groups that had in their rhetoric indicated that they were a danger to the President or had threatened the President or had been reported to threaten the President. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, I call your attention to a report that was written by a special agent in Chicago, a synopsis of which indicates that an informant advises that he had been in touch with 330 a group of Chicago Cubans who may be involved in the assassina- tion of the late President Kennedy. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Can you state whether or not you were aware of that investigation while you were in Dallas? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I was. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you file a report in connection with that matter? Inspector KELLEY. No; I didn't file any report that I recall. It was information coming to us. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you receive any other information that tended to support or corroborate that investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Not that I recall. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall receiving any reports from the Miami area focusing in on an investigation connected with the Chicago investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, there were several reports coming out of the Miami area. The Secret Service had been very interested in the Cuban activity in the Florida area, the Miami area particularly, prior to the assassination because of the visits of President Kennedy to Miami and to his home in Florida. We had frequent trips to Miami with our protectees. And we were concerned with the Cuban activities in Miami and we received several reports concerning them. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall receiving a report from a special agent in Miami, a Miami investigation, mentioning a person by the name of Quentin Pina Machado? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your recollection about that report? Inspector KELLEY. That report was one of a series of reports that we received concerning the activities of the pro-Castro and antiCastro groups in Miami. He was alleged to be an activist, a radical and a dangerous man. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, I refer to JFKF-419, the report that I have discussed with you previously, a synopsis of which indicates that information had been received from an informant indicating that if the assassination of the President involved an international plot or conspiracy and that if there was evidence connecting Fidel Castro, the person who would have been responsible for carrying out any action on the part of Fidel would be Quentin Pina Machado, a Cuban terrorist used by Castro to carry out any Castro action. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any determination to investigate the authenticity of that information? Inspector KELLEY. We did not make a separate investigation by the Secret Service. This matter was under investigation by the FBI and by the agency. We were receiving information and exchanging information with the two agencies in connection with Machado and several other Cuban radicals in the Miami area. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now with the exception of the memorandums you received from Miami, the memorandums you received from Chicago indicating the possibility of Cuban involvement in the 331 assassination, was there any other evidence of a conspiracy that you were concerned with? Inspector KELLEY. There were other memoranda coming and information coming into headquarters concerning the activities of other groups, some of whom had been alleged prior to the assassination as having an interest in the President, having threatened the President actually. Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of groups would those have been, what affiliations? Inspector KELLEY. These were some of the white rightist groups, the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan, several of the right wing groups. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you read all the reports that the Secret Service generated in connection with your investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you have been the only person reviewing those reports? Inspector KELLEY. No, there were several people reviewing the reports; the Protective Research Division, Mr. Sorrels was reviewing some of them in Dallas, several people. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did the Secret Service actively become involved in determining whether or not there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy soon after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. We were interested and we were certainly involved in attempting to answer that question. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there any restrictions on the scope of what areas you were to investigate? Inspector KELLEY. The research that was done was done by the Protective Research Section in connection with what information we had and then asking for what information any other of the agencies had, the intelligence-gathering information. The Secret Service was not in the business of gathering intelligence. We were in the business and are still in the business of evaluating the intelligence we receive. So we were dependent and depending a great deal on the other intelligence agencies to furnish us information. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, the FBI was in Dallas at the same time conducting an investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. At some point you received an indication that the FBI would conduct the conspiracy investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. When was that? Inspector KELLEY. That was shortly after I got down there, probably 2 or 3 days after I got down there. I received information from our headquarters that the Government had indicated that the FBI would be in charge of the investigation of the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. As near as you can remember, what date would that have been? Inspector KELLEY. I would say it would have been about the 24th or 25th. I really can't be certain after this length of time. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any effort to discuss with the FBI what areas that the investigation should focus on? 332 Inspector KELLEY. Not really. I had several discussions with Jim Malley who was my counterpart from the FBI in the Dallas office. There was an occasional question from Malley as to what we were doing in this area or that. We resolved those inquiries among ourselves. I was there to see what had happened in connection with the Secret Service's responsibility, to see what this assassination meant to us in connection with our other protectees whether this was an ongoing conspiracy where President Johnson might be assassinated or some other Government official. We were interested in that in those few days where there was a great deal of confusion as to what had happened. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you formulate any plan or course of investigation to determine whether, in fact, there was a conspiracy? Inspector KELLEY. No, except the general plan to find out what happened, what went on. Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you do with the information that you received from Chicago and Miami? Inspector KELLEY. I merely read it and, of course, a copy of that information went to the protective research section who, of course, would evaluate it as to what it meant to us, along with myself. Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of evaluation would they conduct? What were they trying to find out? Inspector KELLEY. They would ascertain whether--their original request, of course, was to ascertain whether this had anything to do with the assassination in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did they have the responsibility of drawing connections between the various information that was coming in from the field office? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And they were to apprise you of what connections, if any, there were? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, and, of course, I was free to make my own judgment down there, too. Mr. MATTHEWS. What person in the intelligence division did you talk with in connection with that? Inspector KELLEY. Bob B-o-u-c-k. Mr. MATTHEWS. And he was aware of all the reports that you had? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now how was your liaison process with the FBI working? Was there a free exchange of information? Inspector KELLEY. At that time in Dallas? Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I felt there was a free exchange of information. We were getting some information that was not available to them through our contacts with Marina. Of course, our agents were picking up information on the street as they do. People were coming to us at the local level in Dallas. I felt there was a free exchange of information. There certainly was between myself and Mr. Malley. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, when you were in Dallas, you received information from an Agent Patterson that he had talked with an 333 FBI agent regarding some top secret information in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And he indicated to that agent that he could not tell him what the information was, but that it would be exchanged at the Washington level? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Specifically, he mentioned the fact that the agent had had contact with Marina Oswald some 10 days before the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you later learned that that agent was James P. Hosty? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever find out what top secret information he was referring to? Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't find out any top secret information he was referring to, but, of course, the information came to us shortly thereafter, perhaps at the same time, that the FBI had contacts with Oswald and had contact with Marina to find Oswald and to talk to him. In discussing what this information was later, I think that it referred to the fact that Oswald had been in Russia. Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you say you think; did you ever discuss that with Inspector Malley? Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever find that the agent who, in fact, had contact with Marina had been special agent James Hosty? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I learned that as a general piece of information, that Hosty was the control agent for Lee Harvey Oswald and that in that connection he had contacted Marina. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever learn about what has become known as the Hosty note? Inspector KELLEY. No; that never came to my attention. Mr. MATTHEWS. When did that first come to your attention? Inspector KELLEY. I think I read that in the press a year or so ago or whenever it became public. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you were receiving information from the FBI in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And you learned that while Lee Harvey Oswald was in New Orleans he had contact with Carlos Bringuir, a member of the Cuban group known as the DRE? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you send that information on to Mr. Bouck in the intelligence section? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. Bouck got that information about the same time I did in the reports that came from New Orleans. Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there ever anything developed from the Secret Service file in regard to whether there was an assassination attempt or plot involved? Inspector KELLEY. A plot? Whether there was a plot involved in the assassination of President Kennedy? 334 Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes; based upon the Secret Service investigation after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. No; there was not. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review all that information? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, you have become aware of a September 7 speech given in 1963 by Fidel Castro at which time he indicated that he was aware of the CIA attempt to cause the Cuban leaders to be assassinated? Inspector KELLEY. I have heard of it; yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And that he would respond in kind. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you hear that? Did you know about that during the course of the Secret Service investigation in 1963? Inspector KELLEY. I am not too sure when I became aware of that. I really don't know. I don't think so. I think this information was brought to my attention later after I had returned to Washington. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would that have been a type of information that the Secret Service would be interested in. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS [continuing]. For intelligence purposes? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. It didn't come to my attention until later, since the thing happened before the assassination. It is not the sort of thing that would come directly to my attention anyway. It would come to the protective research section. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now later when you returned to Washington, you became the liaison person with the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you the principal person in the Secret Service responsible to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your responsibilities? Inspector KELLEY. I had a responsibility to assist the Warren Commission in any way we could, to furnish them any information we have in connection with the assassination, and to generally see that the Commission got everything it needed from the Secret Service. Mr. MATTHEWS. Who would make the determination of which and what type of information was supplied to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. That would come from--well, Mr. Rankin would request what information he wanted. I would make the determination as to what information I thought the Commission would want from it. But generally what happened was that if the Commission heard something from some other agency that perhaps they thought the Secret Service might have something on, they would ask us for it. If we had it, we would give it to them. If we didn't, we would tell them. When the Commission was formed, we sent up a great deal of documents, which included everything we had done in Dallas, all the information that had come to the Dallas office while I was there, all the reports and the statements made by the people which were involved. So it was one massive turning over to the Commission of everything that they thought they 335 wanted at that time, and then subsequently, as their deliberations went on, they asked for other material. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any independent suggestions to the Warren Commission of what areas they should or ought to investigate? Inspector KELLEY. Not really; no. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you discuss with them concepts of conspiracy? Inspector KELLEY. Oh, yes, I have discussed with some of the staff the things that we had going at the time of the assassination, the kinds of threats we have. Mr. MATTHEWS. You discussed with them the information that you have received from the field offices? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. And did you supply them all the reports in connection with that? Inspector KELLEY. We supplied them with all the reports that we thought were pertinent to the assassination. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you also became involved in examining certain parts of the Secret Service operation and performance before the assassination with the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. You considered, for instance, whether it was feasible to establish certain buildings on the motorcade route, if there is any more danger than others? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we furnished the Warren Commission with the kind of procedures we were going through at that time. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now subsequent to that, you were involved in investigating and determining whether or not there were certain things on the motorcade route that should be particularly noted by the advance agents? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. You considered warehouses as being a building of particular concern? Inspector KELLEY. Empty buildings, empty warehouses, or warehouses that were partially occupied, yes. Every building is a security risk, but there are certain types of buildings in which there is a lot less control than there are in others. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you also became aware of the threat made by Joseph Milteer? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I was aware of that investigation. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was that investigation? Inspector KELLEY. That was an investigation of members of the Ku Klux Klan and white rightists, wherein information had been received that one of the people had made a threat against the life of the President, against President Kennedy. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you specifically remember the nature of that threat? Was it that the President would be in the Miami area on November 18, and that it would be possible to assassinate him from a high building with a rifle? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. What, if anything, did the Secret Service do to respond to that? 336 Inspector KELLEY. These organizations that were involved, these people involved were continuing investigations that had been going on by the FBI, we exchanged information with the FBI as to where these people were, what they were doing, and there was just an attempt to evaluate this threat which was a similar threat, we had received others like it throughout the year, whether it really meant something that the Secret Service would have to take some action on, specific action on. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now the threat was for November 18, 1963, and it was that there would be an attempt to assassinate the President from a high building with a rifle. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there any effort made in Dallas to check any of the buildings? Inspector KELLEY. Whatever effort was made was a request by the advance man with the Dallas police to see what they could do about a route survey. Now in those days, the Secret Service's resources were extremely limited. We depended a great deal upon the local police departments for this type of backing and I don't know specifically what the Dallas police were asked to do or what they did on the survey route. I can recall what the advance report suggested they do. Mr. MATTHEWS. When you reviewed the performance of the advance agents, did you give any special consideration to the Milteer threat, whether or not they knew about it? Inspector KELLEY. The information coming at that time on a threat like that would go from the Protective Research Section to the White House detail. They were furnished with this kind of information. I can't say what they did with this particular piece of information. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether the advance agents who went into Dallas were aware of that particular threat? Inspector KELLEY. I don't know personally whether they were. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, we have reviewed a series of reports that have been identified as JFK F-414 through JFK F-418, the caption of which reads Cuban Plot to Assassinate the President. The details of the investigation began in November of 1962 until August of 1963. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you had occasion to review those reports? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you give the committee a brief summary primarily of what those reports contain and what the investigation was? Inspector KELLEY. This was an investigation of Cuban activity in the Miami area. It resulted from the interception of two letters to an address in Miami. The letters contained information of a threatening tenor to the President, against President Kennedy. I don't recall the exact text of the letters, but they were of sufficient importance to us to conduct an investigation and to ask information from the FBI and the agency as to what they knew about the particular people involved. Mr. MATTHEWS. And the letters were mailed from where? 337 Inspector KELLEY. I don't recall. They were from outside the country. Mr. MATTHEWS. Havana, Cuba? Inspector KELLEY. From Cuba, yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. According to the exhibit, the investigation established that the address and the person who mailed the letter was authentic. Inspector KELLEY. Was what? Mr. MATTHEWS. Was authentic. Inspector KELLEY. The person who mailed the letter, the name was authentic, yes. However, there was an opinion by the intelligence people that these letters were perhaps sent to be intercepted. There was an indication by the intelligence analysts in our own shop and in the other agencies that perhaps the way these letters were addressed they were meant to be intercepted. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now Quentin Pino Machado was mentioned as one of the persons involved in that investigation. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there ever any attempt made to connect this information to the later information you received about Quentin Machado? Inspector KELLEY. Not by us, and I am not familiar with what followed in the investigation, mostly because we never made any connection between this investigation and this threat with the Oswald matter, with the assassination in Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. Now during your time that you were with the Warren Commission, did you ever personally review this material in connection with the assassination investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we sent some of this information up to the Warren Commission. They were aware of this investigation. Some of their staff people, of course, were in Miami and followed up something of that. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time. Mr. FITHIAN. At this time the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may consume. Following that, we will proceed to the 5-minute rule. Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to ask counsel, Mr. Matthews, if copies of the different exhibits have been given to the witness, specifically JFK F-420, also F-415 and F-418. Would you give that to the witness at this time? Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes, Mr. Congressman. Mr. FORD. We will get back to that in a few minutes, Mr. Kelley. Mr. Kelley, your position as an inspector included evaluating the performance of the agents; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Did you evaluate the reaction of agents in Dealey Plaza to the sound of gunfire? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I considered it and thought about it. Mr. FORD. You thought about it? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Governor Connally testified before this committee that as an experienced hunter, there was no question in his mind that 338 the first sound was rifle fire. The evidence before this committee so far has indicated that in all probability the first shot missed. The medical and autopsy testimony has indicated that the third shot was definitely the fatal blow. We have had experts to establish that time between the first and the third shot was over 7 seconds. I want to ask you, Mr. Kelley, what consideration did you give to the reaction between the first, second and third shot of the two agents riding the Presidential limousine? And also the agents immediately behind the limousine? Inspector KELLEY. It is very difficult to second-guess what a person should have done in a crisis like that or just what he knew had happened. I think from talking to the agents, I don't think that any of them knew they were under fire until they saw the President so badly wounded. The agents, of course, in the follow-up car were some distance away from the action. Their training and what their responsibility was, of course, was to look at the crowd. They were not looking at the President. Their instructions are that they ought to be looking away from him, to see what was going on. The two people in the car, of course, were facing the other way. I don't think any of them realized at the time the first shot went off that they were under fire. We had a parade situation with motorcycles alongside of you, the crowd cheering, people making a great deal of noise, as is usual in a political motorcade of that type, and in summary, I just don't think the agents knew they were under fire until much too late to do anything about it. Mr. FORD. Yes, but what training did the agents receive? Inspector KELLEY. Well, the training, the agent had extensive training as to how to handle a crowd and how to attempt to keep themselves, between danger and the President's body. They have a great deal more training now than they had then, but even in those days there was specific training procedures that the agents went through, the recognition of gunfire, a very difficult problem for anyone I think in those situations. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, Mr. Maurice Martineau, the special agent in charge of the Chicago field office, testified before this committee that before the assassination, the field offices did not call on other Federal agencies for assistance. Would you tell us why, the Secret Service never contacted law enforcement agencies for assistance in those areas where threats had been received, for instance, Dallas, Miami of other areas? Inspector KELLEY. Well, we could call on any of the local police agencies for assistance and not only could but did. There was some restriction on us about calling on FBI agents for physical protection, to assist in the physical protection of the President. We had access to any government agency for information, for intelligence information. We were not prohibited from calling on other Federal agencies, if we considered it necessary. We could get assistance and bodies. It was not easy but it could be done if we had a situation where we thought we needed them. Mr. FORD. Well, Mr. Martineau said in his testimony: "I think it was a matter that tragically and unfortunately took an assassination to bring it into sharp focus the need for further steps which the Secret Service previously did not authorize." 339 My question: During your tenure with the Secret Service, did you find that to be true before the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. I think that the Secret Service did not have all the resources it needed to conduct this important protective responsibility. We were shorthanded. We did not have the number and kinds of people and training that this serious responsibility called for. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, soon after you arrived in Dallas, you requested that the Chicago office determine whether Alex Hidell had purchased a rifle from the Klein's Sporting Goods Store; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. If you will recall, when the Secret Service agents arrived, FBI agents had already been there; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. And in fact instructed the manager not to talk to anyone else; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Were the Secret Service and the FBI investigating the case independently, and, what, if any, attempts did you make to prevent this duplication of investigation? Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't think we were investigating the matter independently. I think at that time, in those very early days of the investigation, we were attempting to investigate it jointly. The rifle had been identified as having been used, the alcohol and tobacco people had identified it as having been purchased in Chicago by Oswald using his alias of Hidell. We got that information and I just sent it out to Chicago to ask that it be verified. The Bureau apparently had the same information a little earlier than we had and did the same thing. I saw no problems with the duplication of effort in the first few days of Dallas. There was a great deal of confusion going on. We just did what we thought we had to do to get the information that we were trying to seek as to what was happening, what the assassination meant to us in our protective efforts. Mr. FORD. Were you in contact with the FBI--- Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD [continuing]. During this period? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Were there any recommendations, Mr. Kelley, to the Warren Commission that they focus upon the conspiracies which the Secret Service at one time were concerned about? Inspector KELLEY. I don't think there had been a special focusing on any one particular activity that we were doing. I think they focused on the entire range of possibilities. Mr. FORD. Were you aware that there were significant questions of Oswald's connection and association with Castro's government and the Cuban groups in the United States during this investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, well, we were aware of Oswald's trip to Mexico. It became known to us after the assassination. We were aware of his activities in Dallas with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. We received no indication of any link with Oswald 340 with organized radical groups among the Cubans except the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Mr. FORD. But you did have information of his involvement with the pro-Castro---- Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. What reasons did you have for not thoroughly reviewing all the files in the Secret Service to supply the Warren Commission with any reference that would assist the Commission in the investigation, Mr. Kelley? Inspector KELLEY. Oh, I think we supplied the Warren Commission with anything that was pertinent to the assassination, anything they asked for, and anything that we, in our opinion, thought would be interesting to them. We held nothing back from the Warren Commission that I know of. It was my job to see that we didn't, and I don't think we did. Mr. FORD. When the FBI began to focus its investigation on Lee Harvey Oswald, did you gain any impression that the conspiracy investigations conducted by the Secret Service was being ignored at that time? Inspector KELLEY. No, no, sir. Mr. FORD. Were you aware of what other information was? Inspector KELLEY. I was aware of the information we had, I was also aware that much of the information contained in our files concerning these Cuban activities was coming from the Bureau, and there was a free exchange of information between the Bureau and ourselves in Miami and at headquarters concerning these alleged plots. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, there was a group of Secret Service personnel who reviewed the assassination investigation conducted by the various field offices of the Secret Service; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, in the Protective Research Section. Mr. FORD. Who were the people in that group, Mr. Kelley? Inspector KELLEY. There were people in the Protective Research Section and some others who were brought in from the field who had been in the protective research area, and of course I was involved in it. Mr. FORD. During the meetings, did you ever discuss whether there were any credible investigations to be done in the conspiracy area? Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the Oswald matter? Mr. FORD. The Oswald what? Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the assassination, you mean, or generally in the threat area? Mr. FORD. Well, in connection with the assassination, prior to the assassination, or the assassination itself--- Inspector KELLEY. Prior to the assassination it would have been done by the Protective Research Section, by Mr. Bouck, who has discussed these matters with the head of the White House detail, with the Deputy Director, the Deputy Chief at the time, and the Chief of the Secret Service concerning important, what we considered important plots that came to our attention, either came to our 341 attention directly or perhaps came to our attention through the FBI or the agency. Mr. FORD. Did this group determine what files should or should not be given to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. No, I think the decision as to what files should be given to the Warren Commission was pretty well handled by myself. Mr. FORD. Were any recommendations given to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Recommendations by the Secret Service? Mr. FORD. No, by this group, from this group we are discussing. Inspector KELLEY. No. Mr. FORD. As far as conspiracy? Inspector KELLEY. No, we made no recommendation to the Warren Commission. Mr. FORD. No recommendation? Inspector KELLEY. No. We merely supplied them with information we had. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, the agent in charge of the intelligence function for the Secret Service testified before this committee that he had no knowledge of the substance of Fidel Castro's September 7, 1963, speech in which Castro voiced what had been interpreted as a direct threat to the Kennedys. What consideration was this threat given in deciding to investigate any persons who were strong pro-Castro supporters? Inspector KELLEY. I don't think any consideration was given to investigating pro-Castro supporters. With the resources we had at that time, we were pretty well confining ourselves to threats made against the President. Domestic security was the responsibility of the Bureau. Mr. FORD. Did it occur to you at that time to investigate all pro-Castro persons that would have been in the Secret Service intelligence files? Inspector KELLEY. If they were in the Secret Service intelligence files, of course they did get a periodic review. Mr. FORD. They did? Inspector KELLEY. They got a periodic review as the matters in the Protective Research Section were reviewed. Mr. FORD. I mean during, right after the assassination of President Kennedy? Inspector KELLEY. Right after that, all the information we had in the Protective Research Section was pretty thoroughly reviewed. We were looking for some information that we had that might go back to Oswald. Mr. FORD. When the FBI took control of the assassination after December 9 I think you said, you mentioned earlier that you were contacted through a White House order, did you release all of that information at that time to the FBI, including the intelligence files? Inspector KELLEY. No, we didn't release it to them. The information, we reviewed the information, and the information we had on the Cuban conspiracies and the Cuban groups we found was all information that the FBI had. As a result of the assassination and the review, we received a great deal more information that the 342 Bureau had on these groups than we had had heretofore which the Bureau previously did not think that we were concerned with. Mr. FORD. But do you recall whether you went through the files to investigate all of the pro-Castro persons immediately after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Not for the purpose of investigation, merely for the purpose of whether we had them, how many we had and that had any relationship to Oswald. Mr. FORD. Would Castro's statement together with Marina's statement to the Secret Service agent, shortly after the assassination, have strongly indicated that such persons should have been investigated? Inspector KELLEY. Not by the Secret Service, we don't feel. The Secret Service out of necessity, because of their resources, confined themselves to direct threats that we had received. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, Quentin Machado was known to the Secret Service even before John F. Kennedy's assassination--Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. [continuing]. As being an associate of a person who had threatened the President and was investigated as part of a Cuban plot to assassinate President Kennedy? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Yet all of the information in the Secret Service files were not supplied to the Warren Commission stating this? Inspector KELLEY. No, that isn't quite true, Mr. Congressman. In the first group of reports that we sent to the Warren Commission, a report on Quentin Machado was sent to the Warren Commission. That report had a file number on it reflecting that there was a great deal more information in the Secret Service files on this particular situation. We have, since this matter came up with us in the investigation, we have been attempting to ascertain whether this group of papers, which is F-415, ever went to the commission, and we cannot say that it did or did not, but we can definitely say that the report on Quentin Pino Machado containing the same file number as this information did go to the commission, so the commission had access to this file and had access to the information. I also know that the commission, did an intensive inquiry concerning the activities of the Cubans in the Miami area, which involved this investigation. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, let me get to my real question here. I am concerned. Were you of the opinion that the Warren Commission was open to the possibility of the conspiracy? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Did you consider this information pertinent and rele- vant to their inquiry during this time? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, I have just a few other questions here. I would like to call your attention to JFK F-415 through F-418. Do you have it there? Inspector KELLEY. I have F-415 and F-416. Mr. FORD. As I understand it, these reports contain information regarding the Secret Service's investigation into a Cuban plot to assassinate President Kennedy; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. 343 Mr. FORD. The Secret Service was aware of this information during the course of the Warren Commission; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. But never actually gave the commission these reports during their investigation; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Not these particular reports, but we did give the Warren Commission information concerning these plots, and it was the Secret Service Report No. 206 that we sent to the commission, and it is in the commission file, mentioning Quentin Machado, containing the file number under which these reports are filed. Mr. FORD. At the time, Mr. Kelley, were these reports considered by the Secret Service to be secret documents? Inspector KELLEY. They were so classified, yes. Mr. FORD. Sir? Inspector KELLEY. They were classified as secret. Mr. FORD. Is that a rationale for not giving them to the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. No. We gave other secret documents to the Warren Commission. That wasn't the rationale why they were not given. As a matter of fact, I don't have it before me, but I think the memorandum we also gave to the Warren Commission was classified. Mr. FORD. You know earlier, it might have been when Mr. Matthews was talking with you, you mentioned that you were to supply them with relevant and pertinent reports. Did you consider the investigation of this plot a concern of the work of the Warren Commission? Inspector KELLEY. Not really. In hindsight and with what happened during the Warren Commission recommendation there, in my opinion this investigation that was conducted in Miami had no relationship to the Oswald assassination. It was, however, one of the things that the Warren Commission was reviewing, Oswald's connection with pro-Castro groups, and I just feel that this information was available to the Warren Commission; that so much of it came from other agencies that they probably had the same information from the Bureau and the CIA in connection with it. It may very well have been that some of the staff people in the Warren Commission came and reviewed these reports that we had since they had a referenced file number, knowing that we had information on these plots. But our records do not show that we transmitted these to the Warren Commission. Mr. FORD. But you are saying that you reported to them a file number; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Would there have been anything in the reports you provided to the Warren Commission which would have given them a clue as to what information the number might have referred to as a file number? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I think the memorandum we sent to them, Memorandum 206 that we sent to them, would have supplied that information. Mr. FORD. It would have? Inspector KELLEY. It would have. 344 Mr. FORD. The FPCC, Mr. Kelley, or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, is mentioned in the reports, and a member of that organization is alleged to be a part of the plot to kill the President. Would there have been anything in the files and reports you provided the commission to indicate the presence of this group in that investigation? Inspector KELLEY. Not in the report, not in the particular two-page report we sent to them in connection with this case. That report dealt mostly with Machado. Mr. FoRD. The two-page report? Inspector KELLEY. I referred that we did send to the commission in this area. Mr. FORD. And the Warren Commission had the two-page report? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. FORD. Let me ask you this: Were you aware at the time that Lee Harvey Oswald had been a member of the same organization in the New Orleans area, the pro--anti-Castro----- Inspector KELLEY. Subsequent to the assassination? Mr. FORD. Yes. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we learned of that subsequent to the assassination. We didn't have anything on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Kelley, earlier today counsel for the committee Matthews asked you about the conduct of the Secret Service prior to the assassination. Relative to that, he asked you whether they had broken any rules or regulations of the Secret Service, and your answer was that they had not. Knowing, however, of their conduct on the previous evening, was it ever evaluated in terms of performance? Inspector KELLEY. We would have preferred that they had stayed away from the places they were at. We would have preferred they had gone to bed earlier. But in the whole review of what had happened, there was no indication that that activity the night before had any effect on their performance the next day or that it had any effect on the assassination that happened. Chairman STOKES. Well, have you ever had a chance to review the Zapruder film? Inspector KELLEY. The Zapruder film? Yes, sir. Chairman STOKES. And referring back to the question posed to you by Congressman Ford with reference to reaction time, did you study the film from the viewpoint of whether the reaction time the of agents was in accordance with what you felt would be top performance? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and it was reviewed, we reviewed it very thoroughly with the agents who were involved. The motorcade was moving. You can recall in the Zapruder film the very great difficulty Clint Hill had in even reaching the car to assist Mrs. Kennedy, and the agents were just not able to get up to that car in time. 345 Chairman STOKES. When you review the film, you can clearly see the reaction that Governor Connally had, with reference to the first shot. What reaction do you see in terms of the Secret Service agents? Inspector KELLEY. Well, in the film, of course, there is no apparent action that is being taken by Mr. Kellerman, who is in the front seat. The driver at that time apparently was unaware of anything that happened, apparently through the concentration of his responsibility of driving the car, and there is no apparent reaction on the part of the agents. Chairman STOKES. But doesn't your investigation reveal that in the Vice Presidential car there is a reaction on the part of Agent Youngblood immediately? Inspector KELLEY. When the caravan in the motorcade begins to move out, there is, when it was apparent that the motorcade had been fired on, and it was apparent that the motorcade had been hit, and the motorcade begins to move out from the area is when there is the reaction. Chairman STOKES. Well, the apparent real first reaction we see on the part of agents then is at the point where someone says "Let's get out of here." Inspector KELLEY. "Let's get out of here." That was Mr. Kellerman's instructions to the driver, "Let's get out." Chairman STOKES. That is only after the third shot. Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Chairman STOKES. What did your investigation reveal in terms of the activities of the agents the night before? Inspector KELLEY. The night before? Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir. Inspector KELLEY. It is a long time ago. This was an after-hours club where they had apparently--where drinks could be served. It was also a place, the only place open at the time in the area where the agents could go and have something to eat, and they went to this place for that purpose. Chairman STOKES. Do you recall what place you are talking about? Inspector KELLEY. I beg your pardon? Chairman STOKES. Do you recall what place you are talking of? Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't recall it. Chairman STOKES. How late were these agents about, that night? Inspector KELLEY. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman. I don't recall. It was late in the morning. It was after midnight. Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us how late after midnight? Inspector KELLEY. No, I am sorry I can't. I don't recall the details of that investigation. It was done by another inspector. Although I reviewed it, my memory on it isn't that good now. Chairman STOKES. Would the time 2 a.m. refresh your recollection? Inspector KELLEY. It was in that area, yes, sir. Chairman STOKES. So that we understand, so far as you are concerned, with all that you know about their activities the previous evening, in terms of relating it to their performance the following day, you don't find that it in any way affected their performance? 346 Inspector KELLEY. No, sir. Chairman STOKES. Now one other question: I am not an expert in security, but it would seem to me that common sense would dictate that high buildings would afford an assassin a greater opportunity than a lower spot, if I were planning an assassination. Can you tell me to what degree the Secret Service covered the high buildings in the area or made any kind of investigation as to whether or not this could afford someone the kind of opportunity that was afforded that day? Inspector KELLEY. At that time, in that time period? Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir. Inspector KELLEY. The Secret Service had to depend upon the local authorities to assist them in this kind of a route survey. We have a parade route. There are hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows that a parade route goes down in a political situation as it was in Dallas. It is usual to go to the police and find out what buildings along the route are not occupied and then who occupied them. If possible, the police put somebody at the particular buildings that perhaps are not occupied. Then they ask for the cooperation of the people who occupy the buildings to look out for strangers and to see that the people who are asked to get into the buildings are people that are known to them. That is about the extent of the route survey that could be conducted in those days. A building like the Depository, the same thing would apply, that you would go to the manager and ask him to be concerned about strangers coming into the building. There would be no, for instance, review of every employee in the building to find out who he was. Chairman STOKES. You don't place any agents in those buildings or anything of that sort? Inspector KELLEY. We do now, depending upon our resources, or police are asked to do it. But in those days there weren't that many people available. Chairman STOKES. DO you do it now as a result of the fact that it occurred then? Inspector KELLEY. Well, we do it now because we have the resources to do it. The Congress has given us the resources to do it. We do it now whenever we can. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. My time has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Inspector Kelley, you served how many years in the Secret Service before you retired? Inspector KELLEY. I came in in July of 1942. Mr. DEVINE. You retired when? Inspector KELLEY. February 28 of this year. Mr. DEVINE. You were a special agent in charge of the Philadelphia office and an inspector at the time of your resignation? Inspector KELLEY. No, sir, I was the Assistant Director for the Protective Forces at the time of my retirement. Mr. DEVINE. But you were an inspector at the time of the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. 347 Mr. DEVINE. One of the mandates of this select committee is, after having conducted the investigation hearing, to make recommendations to the Congress. You will recall that at the time of the assassination the offense apparently was against the peace and dignity of the State of Texas and not a matter necessarily of Federal jurisdiction. Do you in your capacity as a long time Secret Service employee have any suggestions or recommendations as it relates to an offense of this nature? Inspector KELLEY. Well, as you know, that deficiency has been taken care of by the Congress. It is now a Federal crime to assassinate the President, that is S: 1751, title 18 U.S.C. Hopefully, it will never happen again, but if it does, the jurisdictional lines have been a lot better drawn now. Mr. DEVINE. Yes. Well, again, at that time it was an offense against the laws of the State of Texas and the FBI intervened at the specific direction of the then President Lyndon Johnson? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. I guess the degree of cooperation then between your agency and the Bureau was satisfactory, was it not? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. And your primary responsibility was to protect the life of the President and the President's family? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. Who makes the decision prior to a motorcade on whether or not the motorcade route will be publicized? Is that by the Secret Service or--- Inspector KELLEY. Usually it is by the staff. Mr. DEVINE. Whose staff?. Inspector KELLEY. The President's staff. Mr. DEVINE. The Presidential staff? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. DEVINE. Does the Secret Service have the right of veto of that decision? Inspector KELLEY. We have the right to suggest that perhaps it is not a good idea or that we have no problem with it. Usually in these areas where there is a political connotation to the motorcade the route will be published and usually has to be published. As a matter of fact, there is activity to get a crowd out so it has to be published. Mr. DEVINE. Apparently the Secret Service was not overly concerned in this instance, but had you received information that the President's life was in danger, did you have an absolute right of veto of publicizing a motorcade route or canceling a motorcade? Inspector KELLEY. We have no legal right to veto them, but with the cooperation we have with the staff and the rapport that we had with the President's staff, if we had a serious consideration that the President's life was in danger, I feel sure we can persuade the President's staff to accept our recommendation. Mr. DEVINE. You in response to a question from Congressman Ford said that on that date and at that time that the Secret Service was "shorthanded," that you did not have the resources available that were needed. 348 Now why was this, because of lack of funds, lack of personnel, or poor planning? Inspector KELLEY. Well, we like to think it was merely the lack of funds. The ability to do many of the things that we have now was not present at that time. We didn't have the numbers of people to do the proper route surveys. We didn't have the number of people to access and evaluate the kinds of information we should have been getting. There just was not enough people to do the job. Mr. DEVINE. I think you said you felt it was probably due to lack of funds? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. DEVINE. Of course, it is easy for this select committee and everyone else to second-guess a situation like this and I think we all recognize that it is just totally impossible and impractical to expect that any agency such as the Secret Service or any other can totally guarantee that they can protect the life of a President when he is exposed to large crowds in a downtown area; isn't that accurate? Inspector KELLEY. That is true, Mr. Devine. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. Mr. PREYER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Inspector, I wanted to pursue additionally Mr. Devine's line of questioning. Now, taking advantage of your 36 years of experience and the fact that the assassination of President Kennedy was not the last nor the most recent attempt on the life of a President, we have the example recently of President Ford and others. What can be done in your estimation, if you were writing the law, what can be done legislatively to improve the protection of the President of the United States? Inspector KELLEY. Legislatively, I am not too sure I have the answer to that, Mr. Fithian. We have been, of course, supported by the Congress ever since the 1963 incident. We have additional resources now. The requests for resources that we get are now being handled. Mr. Devine suggests, you know, another pile of money isn't going to do it. In the kind of society we have and the kind of contact that our President and the other people that we protect have with the public, it is very difficult to isolate them from the public. And, of course, the contacts with the public is where the danger lies, as we saw with Mr. Ford. There are an awful lot of disturbed people on the streets that I don't think we can do very much about. Mr. FITHIAN. Some have suggested that the requirement be put into the law that in motorcades such as this that you have to have a bubbletop vehicle or something of that nature. Others have said that the President speaking from a podium, the crowd of people that have not been prescreened or selected, that some kind of glass shield be a requirement. Realizing that you cannot insulate and totally remove the danger, are there things that you would recommend if you didn't 349 have to satisfy anybody else and your job was to safeguard the President of the United States and you wrote all the rules and regulations for that? Do you have any recommendations to make to this panel? Inspector KELLEY. Strictly on security grounds, of course, the riding of the President or a dignitary in an open car down a parade route is a very dangerous procedure. Walking along a fence at an airport shaking hands with a campaign crowd is a dangerous procedure. There may be someone in the crowd who thought he would never get a chance to get that close to the President, but when he finds he is that close, he does something to him. The people who have assassinated Presidents of the United States have a characteristic running through them. They are all these loners, these people who have a grudge, with a mental history. Oswald fit that category exactly. The closest thing we had to a political assassination was, of course, the attack on Blair House, but there, again, the people that attacked it had mental problems. The isolation of the President in our society I just don't think is feasible. If he is going to do a parade route for a political purpose, he wants to be seen and, of course, this was the objection you get by some of the protectees with the people standing around him, the agents who surround him. You get complaints about that that they come out to see the President and all they can see is a group of agents standing around, they never get to see the President, either in a standing situation or in a motorcade. The cars are equipped to give him that kind of protection, to furnish him that shield between himself and the crowd, but frequently we were not able to use them. Mr. FITHIAN. It could be made a law, though, that that is the only car. That is just the way you build the car, I suppose. Inspector KELLEY. Yes, that is the way we build the car. Mr. FITHIAN. I mean, it could be made a law that the bubbletop, the glass protection is required. Would you recommend that? Inspector KELLEY. On strictly security grounds I would recommend it. I have very little faith that that could be or would be provided to the President or that the President would accept it. Of course, he would accept it if it was the law, but not that he would want it. Mr. FITHIAN. One other question: Do you have any recommendations to make as to ways to improve the coordination between the law enforcement and security personnel, not only the Secret Service and the FBI but the Secret Service and local police departments? Do you have any recommendations in that area? Inspector KELLEY. The Warren Commission made some recommendations concerning the kinds of information that the Secret Service should ask these organizations to furnish them. We, of course, were and are in the business of protection. These people are in the business of gathering intelligence. They made recommendations that we followed. And I think the arrangements we have with the local and the Federal agencies who are assisting us in this gathering of intelligence are first rate. There is, of course, in the last number of years, 350 and I was--I had some experience with it in the last 2 years of my years with the Secret Service since I was in charge of the Protective Forces, and that is in the kind and the amount of intelligence that we are now getting from the intelligence-gathering agencies, the guidelines to the Bureau, for instance, concerning the kinds of activities they will engage in now in connection with radical groups has cut down tremendously the flow of information we have from the Bureau about groups. There has been a very significant decline in the amount of information we receive since those guidelines. They are having problems with the Freedom of Information Act, they are having problems with the Privacy Act, as to just what kinds of information they can collect. It has cut down considerably the amount of information available to the Secret Service for evaluation, it is our job, not their job, to evaluate this information and how it affects the safety of the President. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Kelley, I was riding in a Presidential limousine in Hartford, Conn. with President Ford when we were hit by a car. I am sure you read about it, everybody did. A Hartford policeman just simply forgot to block off a street. If you look at this picture over here, you see the President's limousine wide open and the only protection on either side is a policeman on a motorcycle, the very same situation we encountered in Hartford. Do you feel that the Secret Service should be given more men and more equipment and should they be doing the side running rather than the local police in a community? Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't think, Mr. McKinney, that would solve too many problems. I think the kinds of activities that the police engage in everyday are not the kinds of activities that the Secret Service engage in and that it is not necessary for us to have our own motorcycle people, our own crowd control people. The uniformed presence, of course, in a crowd is a great deterrent. Trying to quantify what prevention does is, of course, very difficult. We don't know how many assassins we have discouraged by the fact that we have people around the President or whether if we didn't have any around him, whether it would make a difference. So I think the resources we have been given when we requested them have been adequate for it. Mr. MCKINNEY. I would agree with you. I guess they are great at that. But when they are not standing in front of a green light, they are not too good. The bubbletop was not bulletproof, as I understand it it was simply plexiglass. Inspector KELLEY. At that time, that is right. Mr. MCKINNEY. But there is a possibility that it could have deflected the bullet or a possibility that the smashing of the bubbletop by a bullet would have brought about a faster reaction. Who made the decision whether or not that top was going to be 351 Inspector KELLEY. I am not the best witness on that I think. I think Mr. Rowley will appear before you later and I think perhaps he is the best witness on that. I have heard various interpretations of why. Of course, what you say is perfectly true, if we had a bubbletop there would have been some obfuscation of the assassin's view. It is a deterrent. Mr. McKINNEY. The other question I would ask is: Even though the bubbletop was not on, I assume it had to be there in case it rained so it could be put on in speedy notice? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, it was in the back of the car. Mr. McKINNEY. Since the bubbletop was not on, why was no one assigned to riding the back of that car? It seems that two men standing on the back of the car holding on to those hand grips would not have obstructed the view of the President from either side of the parade, but they certainly would have obstructed the assassin's clear line into the rear of the car. Inspector KELLEY. Well, the information 1 was given on that subject was the President didn't want them there. Mr. McKINNEY. OK, that is all the questions I have. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelley, I notice from some briefing materials that we have in our booklets that you were present during several interviews by Captain Will Fritz of Lee Harvey Oswald; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. EDGAR. Can you indicate for us why none of those interviews were taped? Inspector KELLEY. The Dallas police didn't have a tape recorder and I didn't have one with me, and apparently no one else had one. They didn't have a tape recorder for Captain Fritz anyway. Mr. EDGAR. Wouldn't it have been a logical thing in 1963 for-- Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. EDGAR [continuing]. For an investigative person like yourself from the Secret Service to demand or request or require a tape recorder be present when interrogating such a sensitive witness? Inspector KELLEY. Well, I didn't feel when I was allowed to come into the interrogation room that I had the right to insist on a recordation of it. I was there as a guest of the Dallas Police Department and Captain Fritz was handling it. On hindsight, I should have wired myself before I went in there. But it was just my own position that I did not think I should insist on a recording of it. Mr. EDGAR. You used the phrase "you didn't think you were allowed", or you were given permission to go in and listen in on the interview. Was there a breakdown in lines and chains of command that made you feel as though you didn't have full or equal opportunity with the captain of the Dallas Police Department to interrogate this witness? Inspector KELLEY. No, there was certainly no lack of cooperation between the Dallas Police Department and ourselves and Captain Fritz and me. As a matter of fact, when we first went in to do the interviews, I didn't know whether they had a recording or not. I 352 guess I just assumed they had, but I did find out later that the interview was not being recorded. Mr. EDGAR. In your conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald, what did he say to you? Inspector KELLEY. He indicated to me that he was a Communist but not a Marxist. The only other things he talked to me about, or I talked to him about, was the fact that he had been accused by the police department as being the assassin and we were concerned about whether he was or whether there was somebody else that assassinated President Kennedy and I would like to talk to him about it, and he indicated, I will talk to you later. Mr. EDGAR. Did he indicate to you at that time that you were the first Secret Service agent to talk with him? Inspector KELLEY. No; I don't recall that conversation with him. Mr. EDGAR. Had he encountered any other Secret Service agents prior to your conversation with him? Inspector KELLEY. No; he hadn't. Mr. EDGAR. In his alleged leaving of the Texas Book Depository, did he run into any agents at all? Inspector KELLEY. No; he did not. We didn't have any agents there. Mr. EDGAR. It also indicates in our briefing material that you were placed in charge of the protective detail around the Oswald family; is that correct? Inspector KELLEY. Well, I was not in charge of it. I formed it. I selected the people and supervised it. Mr. EDGAR. Did you ever have occasion to talk with Marina Oswald? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I had several discussions with her. Mr. EDGAR. And that was through a Russian-speaking Secret Service interpreter? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; Agent Gopadze. Mr. EDGAR. What were your impressions of Marina Oswald in the few days and weeks after the assassination? Inspector KELLEY. My impression of her was that she was terribly frightened that something would happen to her, either that the U.S. Government was going to do something to her or that people would. She was frightened of being assaulted and attacked. Mr. EDGAR. Did she indicate to you who she was frightened of specifically? Inspector KELLEY. Well, the government, the U.S. Government would retaliate against her. Mr. EDGAR. Did she indicate whether that was the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, the Dallas Police Department? Inspector KELLEY. She didn't indicate specifically anybody. She did not get along with the FBI agents that had previously contacted her. Mr. EDGAR. I have a great many additional questions in that area, but because of the time, let me just ask one final question: When we were putting together the Select Committee on Assassinations after its rocky history, one of the first things that we did under our new chief counsel was put together an investigative plan for both the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. 353 Was there at any time a sit-down discussion with the FBI, the Secret Service, and/or including the Dallas Police Department, of an investigative plan along the lines of, gentlemen and ladies, let's sit down and decide where we go from here in investigating each of the aspects of this tragic assassination? Inspector KELLEY. No; not to my knowledge, and I certainly did not participate in any such plan. I did have several discussions with Mr. Malley as to what we were doing and why we were doing it, the kinds of things we were interested in and the kinds of things that were coming to our attention, either from the streets in Dallas or from our field offices. Mr. EDGAR. As a non-policeman and a non-lawyer and someone who comes to this kind of experience in kind of a new way, it seems to me that that was an oversight on the part of the investigative agencies or that that was not a practice--- Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired, but the Chair will let the witness answer. You may proceed. Inspector KELLEY. The order had come down that the FBI would take full responsibility for the investigation of the assassination, so there was really no problem then concerning ourselves and the FBI. The Dallas Police Department also understood that their role in the investigation of Kennedy's assassination had been taken over by the Bureau. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. Yes. Did, at that time, the Secret Service have specific contingency plans, like the military does, on hypothetical things happening, a specific plan to be put into effect by the agents on the scene? Inspector KELLEY. Well, the specific plan, of course, in all the protective procedures was that if something untoward happened in a protective situation, the only plan was to get the protectee out of there, out of the dangerous situation. Mr. SAWYER. Was there any specific plan of how to do that that was laid out in advance? Inspector KELLEY. Yes; the agents, of course, were to surround the President if he was in a vehicle. The vehicle was to be moved out directly regardless of convoys or motorcycle and to merely remove the President from the dangerous area. Mr. SAWYER. Is it presently just as vague as that or do they lay out specifics? On a parade route, let's say, if things happen, where they go, what they do, and with how they get there? Inspector KELLEY. It is much more improved now and there are practice runs of what to do in a specific area of attack. Mr. SAWYER. So that the agents know specifically if they are in a certain area of a parade route where they are going to go and how they get there? Inspector KELLEY. Exactly. Mr. SAWYER. They didn't do that then? Inspector KELLEY. Well, it was not a practice to practice these situations in getting out of them. There was a lot less sophistica- 354 tion in those days as to how to handle an emergency than there is today. Mostly because of resources. Mr. SAWYER. I presume, then, at that time that individual agents didn't know specifically what they, themselves, were supposed to do and where they were supposed to take a position or this kind of thing? Inspector KELLEY. Oh no. I think the positions in a parade and the positions of who will stand where when the car stops or what each agent will do when the car is moving is spelled out and was spelled out at that time. Mr. SAWYER. I see. I don't mean that there was no arrangement made for this sort of thing, but it was a lot less sophisticated than it is today and the agents did not have the opportunity to practice in those situations that they have today. Also, along the line of the questioning of Chairman Stokes, I, too, was impressed in watching the Zapruder film at how rapidly Governor Connally reacted to that first shot and all through the series of three shots there was no visible reaction by any of the agents that were in the pictures. Do they receive any training in recognizing by sounds the sound of rifle shots or pistol shots? Inspector KELLEY. They do now. They receive formal training in it. In those days, the young agents that were on the detail, the trained agents that were on it, all had a great deal of physical attributes. There was no formal training in the recognition of shots before that. Mr. SAWYER. There is now? Inspector KELLEY. Agents are always qualified with pistols. They were qualified with their firearms and the use of shoulder arms, but there was no specific training on the recognition of pistol shots or rifle shots. Mr. SAWYER. What also surprised me about that reaction by Governor Connally and the nonreaction by the agents through that time frame of say 7 or 8 seconds is that the agents, I would think, would be alert for exactly that kind of thing, be concentrating on it much as a sprinter might concentrate on listening to the starting gun, whereas Governor Connally would have had other things on his mind. And yet their reaction, for being there for that real purpose, is surprising, their total lack of reaction to it for such a long time frame. Inspector KELLEY. Mr. Congressman, you know, Governor Connally was hit with a bullet. Mr. SAWYER. Not at that first shot. He turned to see where the shot came from and testified here and it is perfectly obvious in the picture that he recognized this rifle shot and spotted pretty much where it came from and he was hit by the next shot. Well, anyway, aside from that, one other thing that impressed me when I was in Dallas and looking at this was the so-called grassy knoll location, that we were told no one had either checked out or even stationed as much as a Dallas policeman there. If you are familiar with that situation, the fence runs along the top of the grassy knoll, a solid fence with trees overhanging, and 355 there is nothing behind it at all but a big, unoccupied gravel parking lot and railroad tracks and a perfect escape situation. Apparently, it was somewhat of a hangout for bums since there are wine bottles and everything else laying around back there. I am just amazed that the Secret Service would not have been alert to that kind of a situation because you could have killed the President from there with a handgun. Inspector KELLEY. Well, along that parade route, from the airport there were a number of those same hazardous situations on a parade route of that length. There were, of course, some police in the area. There was nobody on the grassy knoll. There were some police in the area of Dealey Plaza as it went into the underpass. Mr. SAWYER. Today would the Secret Service check out places like that and insist that there be some policeman behind that fence or somebody to cover that kind of a situation? Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we do a great deal more of that than we did before. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Kelley, I just have one question: Do you feel that the Secret Service and/or the FBI failed in its pre-assassination investigation? Inspector KELLEY. No, Mr. Devine. When you look at the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, a number of government agencies had information on him. No one government agency had it all and the Secret Service had none. However, if we had, if we knew the totality of his background and if we knew that he was working in the bookstore at that time, I feel that the Secret Service would have done something to insure that we knew what Lee Harvey Oswald was doing at the time of the parade. We would have seen that he was at work or we would have seen what he was doing in the bookstore if we knew the totality of it. He turned out to be the kind, as I say, of the typical assassin, the typical assassin of Presidents, a loner, a man with a history of mental problems, a bitter man, a man who felt himself a failure. In talking to Marina, he was a very disturbed man. To predict human behavior to that extent, I think was just an impossibility. We have a great many people in this country who have these same tendencies who never turn out to be assassins. I think the ability to predict that kind of human behavior is still beyond us. Mr. DEVINE. So it gets right back, then, to the impossibility to totally protect any President isn't that right? Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Kelley, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes in which he may comment upon or explain or in any way amplify or expand upon the testimony he has given before this committee. On behalf of the committee, at this time I extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire. 356 Inspector KELLEY. Just a minute Mr. Chairman, to expand on some of the discussion we had with Mr. Edgar as to the kinds of information we are now getting or not getting from the intelligence agencies that are responsible for the gathering of intelligence. We have found, or I have found just before I retired, a very serious declination in the number of reports we get from the Bureau and the kind of reports that we get from the Bureau that I think we should have. We got after the Warren Commission's recommendation up until 1974. We have had a great many of them and they are failing off predictably every month. Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley. We appre- ciate your appearance here. At this time you are excused. Inspector KELLEY. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. The committee will recess for the noon hour and we will therefore have recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon. [Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.] AFTERNOON SESSION Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The next witness to be called this afternoon will be former Secret Service Chief James J. Rowley. Chief Rowley was Director of the Secret Service from 1961 until his retirement in 1972. As Director of the Secret Service in 1963 he exercised general supervision over President Kennedy's trip to Dallas. Chief Rowley entered the Secret Service in 1938 as a special agent. He received a master's degree in law from St. John's University in Brooklyn, and in 1939 he was transferred to the Presidential Protective Division. He was named special agent in charge of the division in 1947, a post he held until he was appointed Director of the Secret Service in 1961. Chief Rowley has served six Presidents during his career with the Secret Service--Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Chief Rowley. Chairman STOKES. Would the witness please stand and raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Chief ROWLEY. I do. TESTIMONY OF JAMES J. ROWLEY Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. The Chair recognizes Counsel Leodis Matthews. Mr. MATTHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rowley, in 1963 where were you at the time of the John F. Kennedy assassination? Chief ROWLEY. I was at the Treasury law enforcement training school's graduation luncheon, a restaurant in Washington, D.C. I was summoned to the telephone and was informed by Mr. Behn, who was at that time agent in charge of the White House detail, 357 that the President was shot. I immediately notified Mr. Bob Wallace, who was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in attendance at the luncheon, of the nature of the telephone call, and both of us immediately proceeded to the East Wing of the White House, where Mr. Behn's office was located. Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you do in regards to assigning responsibility for the assassination to anyone in the Secret Service? Chief ROWLEY. I spoke to Paul Paterni, the deputy chief, and asked him who was the nearest inspector to Dallas, Tex., having in mind that time was of the essence. He reported back that Inspector Kelley was just leaving Louisville, Ky. We were able to reach Inspector Kelley at the airport and told him to proceed immediately to Dallas. Mr. MATTHEWS. At the time you made that assignment to Inspector Kelley, did you give him any specific instructions of what he should do when he reached Dallas? Chief ROWLEY. I did not speak to him, but I am quite sure that Deputy Chief Paterni did. Paterni told him to take charge of the investigation, which was also my thought at the time we decided to send him there. Mr. MATTHEWS. Soon after Inspector Kelly arrived in Dallas and began his investigation, you received a communique through the mail, an office report, indicating that there had been a Chicago investigation of some Cubans? Chief ROWLEY. I did not get that. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Rowley, let me just call your attention to JFK F-419, a document I believe that I have supplied you earlier. Chief ROWLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you had occasion to read through that report? Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. That report indicates that you received it shortly after the assassination. It was entitled, "Possible Involvement by Quentin Pino Machado in a Conspiracy to Assassinate JFK." Did you review that report? Chief ROWLEY. I do not think I reviewed that report. I did not see my initials on it, so therefore I have to assume I did not review it. Mr. MATTHEWS. 1 also call your attention to JFK F-422, a document which you also have in your possession, entitled, "Chicago Investigation of Cuban Groups Alleged To Be Involved in the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy." Do you have any recollection of having received and reviewed that report? Chief ROWLEY. I think my initials are on that report which would indicate that I did read it, but I have no immediate recollection. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you receive any report about the agents' performance in Dallas? Chief ROWLEY. We did receive reports from time to time on Dallas, but which specific report are you referring to? Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, did you receive a report indicating how the agents had performed at the time that the shooting episode occurred in Dealey Plaza? 358 Chief ROWLEY. The report indicated that they performed adequately under the circumstances. The action of Agent Clint Hill, that he was attempting to take some action, is indicative of the agent's response. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you play any role in supervising the investigation itself? Chief ROWLEY. No, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. I want to call your attention to what has been marked as JFK F-423, "Secret Service Organizational Chart," off to your right. In your opinion, would the Service have been organized in substantially the same manner in November of 1963? Chief ROWLEY. Yes. Mr. MATTHEWS. Would Mr. Kelley's position on the chart have indicated that he had authority in the field office to direct that the agents conduct whatever investigation he felt was necessary? Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir, he had that authority. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever establish any other panel or reviewing board or authority for the Dallas investigation? Chief ROWLEY. Offhand, I do not recall any review panel, unless you have in mind what I heard this morning, that Mr. Kelly conducted a meeting in which they discussed the intelligence aspect of the Service. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did that meeting occur in Washington? Chief ROWLEY. I believe it did. It would have, been at the PRS office. Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the purpose of that meeting? Chief ROWLEY. Mr. Kelley described it in this morning's hearing. I was not aware of it at the time. Today is the first time I became aware of the meeting. Mr. MATTHEWS. At the time of the assassination, had the Secret Service established any procedures for the handling of physical evidence? Chief ROWLEY. I think basically they handled the physical evidence as they would any other evidence, particularly evidence in the criminal field. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley mentioned that there was some confusion as to what the scope of the Secret Service investigation was. What authority did the Secret Service have to participate in the investigation? Chief ROWLEY. We were involved in the investigation in that we had the responsibility of protecting the President. The reason for my dispatching Mr. Kelley to Dallas was to supervise the investigation, to ascertain the facts as quickly as possible. Mr. MATTHEWS. The Chief of the intelligence branch of the Secret Service testified before this committee that he was removed from his position for what he interpreted as the failure of his mission. Were you responsible for his removal? Chief ROWLEY. In the course of reorganizing the protective research division itself, and because of the infusions of additional agents into that division to handle and evaluate the many reports from the C/A and FBI that we were receiving at that time which required considerable supervision, we assigned an inspector to supervise the whole operation until the workload became less demanding. 359 Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any effort to close off the Texas-Mexico border? Chief ROWLEY. My first reaction was to ask the Immigration and Naturalization to close off the border between Texas and Mexico. Mr. MATTHEWS. And at the time you made that request,, what thoughts did you have as to what should be done? Chief ROWLEY. At that time, because of the proximity of the border to Dallas, I thought that there might be the possibility of someone escaping via that route. Mr. MATTHEWS. In your own mind, in discussions with the persons convened on your staff to discuss the Secret Service role in the assassination, were there any thoughts that perhaps a person of international character may have been involved in the assassination? Chief ROWLEY. There were those thoughts, and that was one of the reasons why I asked Immigration and Naturalization to close the border. Mr. MATTHEWS. When the Warren Commission was established, you selected Mr. Kelley to be the liaison person? Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MATTHEWS. Why did you make that selection? Chief ROWLEY. Why? Because it was a natural selection, inasmuch as he was in Dallas to conduct the investigation, and would be familiar with what might be required by the Warren Commission, and therefore would be of great assistance to them. Mr. MATTHEWS. As Chief of the Secret Service, did you ever make any attempts to meet with the person in charge of the FBI and formulate a strategy for investigation? Chief ROWLEY. I did meet with Mr. Hoover and, we reaffirmed the longstanding cooperative relationship between our two agencies. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have any input on a strategy of investigation for the Warren Commission? Chief ROWLEY. I think we did prepare something for the Warren Commission. Specifically I do not recall, but I have in the back of my mind such a report. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley has already testified to some exhibits I would like to identify for the record which you have a copy of: of JFK F-414, of JFK F-415, of JFK F-416, F-417, and F-418, a series of reports which his testimony has indicated involved the Secret Service investigation of the Cuban plot to assassinate the President. Were you aware of those reports during the course of the Warren Commission investigation? Chief ROWLEY. No, I have no recollection of them. Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have any recollection of having reviewed those documents? Chief ROWLEY. No, sir. You mean at that time, or recently? Mr. MATTHEWS. At the time that the documents were generated. Chief ROWLEY. No. Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you work out any agreement as to which files would be supplied to the Warren Commission? Chief ROWLEY. That was left up to Inspector Kelley, since he was the one most familiar with what documents. In fact, he was direct- 360 ed to comply with all the requests that were made by the Commission to the Secret Service for reports. Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there any restraints on his authority to produce reports? Chief Rowley. There was no restraint on his authority. Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would move for the admission of JFK exhibits F-419 through F-422, and request the chairman's approval to make a subsequent submission. Chairman STOKES. Without objection they may be entered into the record at this point. [The information follows:] 361 JFK EXHIBIT F-419 362 JFK EXHIBIT F-419 cont. 363 JFK EXHIBIT F-420 364 JFK EXHIBIT F-420 cont. 365 JFK EXHIBIT F-420 cont. 366 JFK EXHIBIT F-421 367 JFK EXHIBIT F-421 cont. 368 JFK EXHIBIT F-421 cont. 369 JFK EXHIBIT F-421 cont. 370 JFK EXHIBIT F-421 cont. 371 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 372 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 373 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 374 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 375 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 376 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 377 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 378 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 379 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 380 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 381 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 382 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 383 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 384 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 385 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 386 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 387 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 388 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 389 JFK EXHIBIT F-422 cont. 390 Mr. MATTHEWS. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. At this point the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5- minute rule. Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rowley, when you became aware of the assassination, you requested that the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Texas border be alerted. Could you tell us why? Chief ROWLEY. I just tried to explain that it was a natural instinct or reaction, if you will, to do that, thinking that there might be some avenue of escape in that direction. Mr. FORD. Were there any thoughts on your mind at the time that there might be an assassin from a foreign government who would then attempt to escape to Mexico? Chief ROWLEY. No, not at that time; no, sir. Mr. FORD. You mentioned a minute ago to the counsel that you met with the Director, Mr. Hoover, and in talking with him, did you ever discuss the line of investigation and the exchange of intelligence? Chief ROWLEY. That was worked out right after the assassination, Mr. Congressman, but we already had their cooperation to the extent that they were able to provide us with intelligence information prior to that time. Mr. FORD. You mentioned earlier that you assigned Inspector Thomas Kelley--- Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. Ford [continuing]. To Dallas for the investigation. Again for the record, why did you assign Mr. Kelley, dispatch him to the Dallas-Fort Worth area? Chief ROWLEY. I assigned Mr. Kelley because he was the nearest inspector to Dallas at that time. As I explained previously since time was of the essence, I wanted to send an inspector as quickly as possible, and Mr. Kelly was the closest one. One of the responsibilities of an inspector is to do precisely what Mr. Kelly did in Dallas, direct the investigation and the activities. Mr. FORD. Was he there to investigate who may have been involved in the assassination or to review the performance of the Secret Service in connection with the assassination? Chief ROWLEY. He was there to become involved in the investigation to determine the facts surrounding the assassination. Mr. FORD. Mr. Rowley, you testified before the Warren Commission June 18 of 1964. At that time in your testimony you were asked by Senator Cooper the following questions, and I quote: Do you have any information based upon any facts that you know based upon any information given to you by persons who claim to have personal knowledge that there were persons engaged in a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. And your response was, "I have no such facts, sir." He then asked you the following additional question, and I quote: I address the same question as to whether you have any information that the killing of President Kennedy had any connection with any foreign power. Your response was, and I quote: 391 I have no such information. We have heard testimony from Mr. Kelley indicating that there were assassination plots investigated by the Secret Service in early 1963. Were you aware of those investigations at the time of your testimony before the Warren Commission? Chief ROWLEY. I would have to look at the reports themselves, Mr. Congressman, to see whether my initials were on them. In the reports that you speak of, it was established that there was not any activity directed against--or of interest to us as it affected the President of the United States. Mr. FORD. Going back to the first question, you said, "I have no such facts, sir." " The second question you also said, I have no such information." I am asking now, were you aware of those investigations at the time you appeared before the Warren Commission? Chief ROWLEY. Well, if I made that statement, then I was not aware of those facts. Mr. FORD. I would like counsel to give the witness JFK F-416, F417, F-418, and ask the witness whether his initials appear upon the face of these reports. Chief Rowley. Yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Chief Rowley, why did you not call it to the Warren Commission's attention back in 1964 when you appeared before the Commission? Chief Rowley. This information at the time was handled either by the PRS or through Mr. Kelley, and I can only assume, Mr. Congressman, that these reports were furnished to the Warren Commission. Mr. FORD. The reports in your hand were reported? Chief ROWLEY. That is right. It was an ongoing investigation, as I see it, in which case there would be a relationship with the FBI and the CIA, and in the ultimate I would think that the report itself would establish whether or not it affected the safety of the President of the United States. Mr. FORD. But you had initialed these reports or documents prior to the June 18, 1964 appearance before the Warren Commission; is that correct? Chief ROWLEY. That is correct, sir. This was a year before the assassination. We are talking about 1962. Mr. FORD. Thank you very much, Chief Rowley. At this time I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman, and yield back the time. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rowley, were you here this morning when Mr. Kelley was speaking? Chief Rowley. Yes, sir. Mr. EDGAR. I had asked him about the process of taking over an investigation such as the assassination of a President of the United States and asked about the investigative plan, whether or not Secret Service would have sat down to put together such a plan. To your knowledge, was such an investigative plan put together to coordinate the FBI and the Secret Service and other investigative agencies' analysis of the assassination? 392 Chief ROWLEY. No, sir. Mr. EDGAR. In your meetings with J. Edgar Hoover, wouldn't it have been logical for you as Chief of the Secret Service and he as head of the FBI to determine what strategy or plan you would have to investigate this death? Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir. Your earlier question was that before there was an opportunity for anybody to sit down, the President of the United States directed that the FBI to conduct the investigation and that the Secret Service would cooperate with them in any manner and phase that we could. Now I did indicate to the Director at such meetings that we would cooperate with them. They had their own strategy as to how they would investigate it. Mr. EDGAR. But wouldn't it have been appropriate for you as Chief of the Secret Service to say, Mr. Hoover, I understand that the President has designated you as the lead agency in this important investigation, but we have a role to play as well because it was our agents who were attached and assigned to the President for his protection and we have an agent in Dallas by the name of Mr. Kelley and there are others involved who have information. How can we sit down to make sure that the information that we have in our Secret Service files as well as the ongoing and continuing reports that are coming in from our field offices can be analyzed in an appropriate place in your investigative plan? Wouldn't that have made some sense? Chief ROWLEY. It would have made some sense, but I think it was all developed subsequently by submitting such reports by both agencies to the Warren Commission and eventually evaluated by their legal staff. Mr. EDGAR. But in hindsight--and I know it is difficult in hindsight-looking at a situation where there was information available to you, at least out of your Chicago office and your Miami office, relative to threats on the President's life in the files of the Secret Service and that information was available to you prior to the death of President Kennedy, shouldn't you have that information with the FBI as well as the Warren Commission? Chief ROWLEY. I think Mr. Kelley indicated, and if he hadn't, I will say it now, that the FBI was in on that operation as well as the Agency. So we were exchanging information in the entire thing. I think you will find in the ultimate that we have found that there was no particular jurisdiction on our part, and that there was nothing of interest to us. Mr. EDGAR. Let me talk about Mr. Kelley's arrival on the scene in Dallas. If you would have put yourself in Mr. Kelley's place, arrived in Dallas and went to the Dallas Police Department, sat in on several interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald yourself, would you have tape recorded that conversation? Chief ROWLEY. I don't know whether we had tape recorders, but I think you must recognize under the situation at that time that Mr. Kelley was rushed down there and even if he had the funds to rent a tape recorder, I don't think he would have had the time to do so. 393 Furthermore, I don't think that he would have anticipated the type of confusion that he encountered as he described it to you, nobody would have. Mr. EDGAR. Would you have insisted that word for word, verbatim be taken down by a court reporter? Chief ROWLEY. If you could obtain one, I suppose you could. But in the confusion, no one had an opportunity to ask questions because in addition to the people that he described there, there were also the press right beyond the perimeter trying to ask questions. Mr. EDGAR. One of the reasons, Mr. Rowley, that I am pursuing both the investigative plan and the activities of the immediate investigation, it just seems to me that the Secret Service and the FBI and the Dallas Police Department, someone should have had their wits about them enough to say, let's sit down and before we interview and before we go running in 1,000 different directions, let's analyze what we have on our hands, tragic as it is, and make sure that the press is secured, the corridors are secured, the alleged assailant is secured, that the information that we receive from that assailant is taken down for possible use in the investigation. I don't get that sense from looking at the materials that are available to us. The sense that I get, and maybe you can correct me if I am wrong, is that there were three agencies who felt that they either had some jurisdiction or no jurisdiction, that they had some information or no information, and that they had their agents on the scene but not necessarily talking and coordinating with each other and that no one strongly was in charge from the Federal point of view. Is that a misreading of what actually took place? Chief ROWLEY. Captain Fritz was in charge, but whether or not he had the command of the situation, I can't say. But that is all very nice if you can lay it out in advance knowing that there would be an assassination, knowing that you would arrest a certain individual and then be able to take him into custody and then set up the guidelines as you just enumerated. But here was a situation where they arrested Oswald, took him into the police station, photographers, television cameramen, reporters and all were descending on the police headquarters trying to get to the man, trying to obtain his picture, the reporters trying to listen into the conversation and so forth. This is what Mr. Kelley described to me at the time. In addition, you had the situation with the Dallas Police Department. The State had the responsibility initially. So that as Tom Kelley indicated this morning, you know, they were the host, so therefore you had to respect their jurisdiction. To carry this a bit further, the FBI kept after me to try to get our man in charge in Dallas, Vernon Sorrels who was the agent in charge, and had a rapport with the Chief of the Dallas Police Department, to get them to release the rifle so that it could be flown to Washington and for ballistic tests. This is the process that I had to go through at the time in order to get them to release it. So I give you that for what it is worth that there was confusion and difficulty. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDGAR. I thank the gentleman. 394 Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKINNEY. No questions. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Ohio. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry floor business prevented my being here during the key part of Mr. Rowley's testimony. I do want to welcome you here. I know we have pulled you back from retirement at the beach to testify this morning. I am sure it is not a very pleasant experience to have to go through all these things. You did testify before the Warren Commission, didn't you? Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. DEVINE. Did you testify before any congressional committees in connection with this matter? Chief ROWLEY. Yes. In 1976, in February, I testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee chaired by Senator Schweiker. Mr. DEVINE. Do you as the former head of the Secret Service have any thoughts that you would like to impart to this committee inasmuch as the mandate of the House is that we make recommendations to the Congress in the area of possible legislation as it relates to assassinations? Do you feel that you would have been in better shape to have your agency handle it better if you had had more laws at your disposal or more funds or did you have the authority you felt was necessary to do what was necessary to protect the President? Chief ROWLEY. I think within the framework of that period, we didn't have the manpower or the equipment that we would have liked to have had. But I must say that since then we have the manpower and the equipment. Mr. DEVINE. Have you given it any thought, Mr. Rowley, about whether any further Federal legislation is necessary to make your organization more effective or to make the security of the President more effective? Chief ROWLEY. Well, in all honesty, Mr. Congressman, since I am retired I haven't given that much thought. I would have to say that my successor, Director Knight, undoubtedly would have some views on that. I am quite sure that there have been considerable improvements in all phases of the Secret Service in the past 5 years under his leadership. Mr. DEVINE. That is all. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one final question. Mr. Rowley, would it be your opinion that the evidence of possible Cuban involvement was never fully investigated by the Secret Service? Chief ROWLEY. I don't think I could say that, Mr. Congressman. For one thing, we investigated to the extent we could with the cooperation of the information we got from the CIA and the FBI on the individuals that were earlier mentioned. Then, further, I would not be privy to what the Warren Commission legal staff did in the course of their investigation to establish something like that. 395 Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. There is just one or two questions. I am interested really in what current procedures are. Do I understand correctly that they now do actual practice runs on this kind of an emergency if it comes up so that everybody knows in advance just what kind of a game plan they have if something extraordinary happens? Chief ROWLEY. That is now part of the training, Mr. Congressman. We have out at Beltsville an outdoor range and training facility in which we are able to train the agents under all types of conditions and possibilities. Now whether they have improved that within the past 5 years, I don't know. But I know when I left we had that kind of training. Mr. SAWYER. Do they start out with a kind of a premise that such a thing is going to happen on each motorcade so that they are mentally attuned to not being caught unexpected but actually expecting this on each time? Chief ROWLEY. It has greatly improved by 100 percent. We have alternate routes which are patrolled by our agents and the police. There are communications on different channels so that they don't conflict with the main motorcade. We have men posted on roofs and places that were selected as vulnerable places by the advance agents. We have a certain number of advance agents who are supervised, who are assigned certain particular things such as buildings along the route and the type of traffic that runs through the city, et cetera. The other factor is that there is constantly a helicopter flying above, checking ahead with communications with all the posts on the roofs to advise them of what they see here so that they can take immediate action. Mr. SAWYER. As I said to a previous witness, I have been very impressed in watching the Zapruder film, the slowness of the reaction of the agents compared to the reaction of Governor Connally. I think for anyone watching that, it is perfectly obvious that they were not really alertly attuned to the possibility of some catastrophic event like that happening. I just wonder if there has been some effort to in effect instill an approach that instead of it being the unexpected, it is the expected, and they are just waiting for it to happen which might have increased their reaction time and might have saved the President? Chief ROWLEY. Well, I think there is an exhibit from the Warren Commission that shows that one of the cars had the door swung open apparently after the first shot in which two agents are attempting to get out at about that time which may not have been in the Zapruder film. But to bring you up to date, the men are trained in precisely the manner that you have indicated, the response, the reaction, et cetera, and where their position is on the car when an incident of that kind happens. Chairman STOKES. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. SAWYER. Yes, certainly. 396 Chairman STOKES. On the point Mr. Rowley just made with reference to the fact that there is an exhibit, during the recess I had discussed with Professor Blakey my concerns and your concerns about this reaction time. At the appropriate time he says he is prepared to show us this particular exhibit which does denote some reaction time which I will ask him to do at the appropriate time afterward. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, they were pretty much out of range of being any help to the President in this kind of a circumstance anyway. But the two agents in the car, by just jamming the accelerator on that first shot, might arguably have done some good. Yet it wasn't until the third shot, which I guess spans a time frame of 7 or 8 seconds, which while it might not sound like a long time, is time enough for somebody to run 75 yards if they are a sprinter, they could have wheeled that car, it seems to me, a lot quicker than they reacted. I recognize that if you are not expecting a thing, it takes you a little while to gather your wits about what is happening. But if your mental attitude is, as I said before, a sprinter on the starting blocks waiting for the gun, if you are attuned to that, your reaction time is much quicker. Chief ROWLEY. You have to consider the scene, Mr. Congressman. The driver is concerned, and incidentally it was an armored car which carries considerable weight. Mr. SAWYER. But with no top. Chief ROWLEY. No top, no, but it is still heavy in the body. When you are involved in one of those motorcades and there are people shouting and acclaiming the individuals and the motorcycles, you know, at times they slow down and then they have to kick the motor in and it explodes and so forth, these agents have been used to that. So that when this first or second shot was fired, they assumed, because their concentration in the meantime is on the public and the people there, and they are oblivious to what the noise is that is going on, in other words, it was difficult to distinguish between a backfire and a rifle shot. So that these things have to be considered when one attempts to evaluate whether there was a reaction in sufficient time or not. Having been through those exercises many times myself, I recognize the problem that they had at that time. Mr. SAWYER. Well, I am only comparing it to Governor Connally who probably has heard a lot of backfires, too, and he immediately reacted to what he recognized, according to his testimony and quite obviously in the film, as a rifle shot where there was no comparable reaction by the agents for two additional shots. Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. I wonder because of the concern that both Mr. Sawyer and I have had in this area, Professor Blakey, if while Mr. Rowley is still here, you would display that exhibit and comment upon it. Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the clerk display F-126. This exhibit, Mr. Chairman, has already been entered in the record. It is a photograph taken, according to the best evidence in the record, at approximately the time, according to the acoustics, of 397 the second shot which would be approximately 1.6 seconds after the first shot. I wonder if the clerk would use the pointer. You can see the Secret Service agents in the followup car have turned their heads. You can see four Secret Service agents. Two of them have turned their heads and are beginning to look back at the depository. If you look back at the third car, the white car behind the President's limousine, the doors are opening. The evidence in the record would indicate that it is from that car that Secret Service agents came in an effort to protect Lyndon Johnson, the Vice President, who was following the President's car. So that if the acoustic evidence is correct, the first shot was fired and apparently missed, and 1.6 seconds later, the approximate time of this photograph, you do have the beginning of reactions by Secret Service agents. In the followup car they are turning around and in the white car the doors are beginning to open and they are making an effort to come out. The acoustics evidence indicates there is approximately 5.8 or 5.9 seconds between the second and the third shot, and then if the acoustics evidence is to be believed, there would have been a fourth shot five-tenths of a second later, which would make it approximately 7 seconds from the beginning of the process. My time on that may be a little off. The record would have to speak for itself. So it is approximately 7 seconds between the first shot and the shot that hit the President and surely killed him. Chairman STOKES. What about in the Presidential car? Is there any reaction being shown to anyone there? Mr. BLAKEY. The reaction in the Presidential car in this photograph, if you point at the windshield you can just begin to see the President's hand moving up. At least my inspection of this exhibit does not indicate that there has been any reaction by the Secret Service agents in that car. This is 1.6 seconds after the first shot had been fired. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. Would there be any further comment on your part, Mr. Rowley, on the explanation given by Professor Blakey? Chief ROWLEY. When you talk about the two men on the right side, they are covering their span. The front man is just finishing his span so he will come back and the other fellow behind him is covering his span back that way. The others on the other side are finishing theirs. This is when Mr. Hill started off that running board to catch up to jump on the back pedal of the Presidential vehicle. That was a difficult thing to do, to run around in front of the followup or Secret Service car and then jump on that pedal. You may have read where Mr. Hill missed the step but was able to cling to the hand guard and to pull himself up. They were about to take off as Mr. Sawyer indicated to get out of the area. And he pulled himself up in time to do that, and having done so he was able to push the First Lady back into her seat. Chairman STOKES. That would have been standard procedure with reference to those two men. While one scanned the crowd in one way, the other would be doing it in the opposite way? Chief ROWLEY. That is right. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. My time has expired. Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman? Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar? Mr. EDGAR. 1 just have one question. Looking back at the information that you provided to the Warren Commission, was there any evidence or information that for any reason that was related to the situation that the Secret Service did not provide to the Warren Commission? Chief ROWLEY. Did not provide to the Warren Commission? Mr. EDGAR. Yes. Chief ROWLEY. We provided them with everything that we had. We had no reason to withhold anything. Mr. EDGAR. So to your knowledge every bit of information relating to the assassination that the Secret Service had was provided to the Warren Commission? Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Is there anyone else seeking recognition? Does counsel have anything further? Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. During the course of these proceedings we have made reference to what has been identified as JFK F-414 through JFK F-418. Mr. Chairman, these exhibits are now classified secret and are in the process of being declassified. We would ask that they may be made part of the record in the condition that they are now in subject to being declassified. In addition, three additional exhibits, JFK F-450, F-451, and F-452, bear upon the testimony today, and we ask that they be admitted into evidence. Chairman STOKES. Without objection they may be so ordered. [The information follows:] 399 JFK EXHIBIT F-414 400 JFK EXHIBIT F-414 cont. 401 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 402 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 403 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 404 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 405 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 406 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 407 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 408 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 409 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 410 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 411 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 412 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 413 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 414 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 415 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 416 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 417 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 418 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 419 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 420 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 421 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 422 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 423 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 424 JFK EXHIBIT F-415 cont. 425 JFK EXHIBIT F-416 426 JFK EXHIBIT F-416 cont. 427 JFK EXHIBIT F-416 cont. 428 JFK EXHIBIT F-416 cont. 429 JFK EXHIBIT F-416 cont. 430 JFK EXHIBIT F-416 cont. 431 JFK EXHIBIT F-416 cont. 432 JFK EXHIBIT F-416 cont. 433 JFK EXHIBIT F-417 434 JFK EXHIBIT F-417 cont. 435 JFK EXHIBIT F-417 cont. 436 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 437 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 438 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 439 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 440 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 441 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 442 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 443 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 444 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 445 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 446 JFK EXHIBIT F-418 cont. 447 JFK EXHIBIT F-450 448 JFK EXHIBIT F-450 cont. 449 JFK EXHIBIT F-450 cont. 450 JFK EXHIBIT F-450 cont. 451 JFK EXHIBIT F-451 452 JFK EXHIBIT F-451 cont. 453 JFK EXHIBIT F-451 cont. 454 JFK EXHIBIT F-452 455 JFK EXHIBIT F-452 cont. 456 Chairman STOKES. Is there anything further? Mr. MATTHEWS. I have nothing further. Chairman STOKES. Mr. Rowley, at the conclusion of a witness testimony before this committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes in which he may explain or comment upon his testimony in any way. I would like to at this time extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose. Chief ROWLEY. I am very grateful for the interest shown by the committee and for the opportunity to meet with you in reviewing the assassination and the subsequent investigation. I have tried to recall facts and activities which took place to the best of my ability. Obviously, time has not helped to make personal recollections clearer and I hope you will understand that certainly my knowledge and recollections are not as precise as they once were. I would like to add, however, that the investigation of the Warren Commission has been most helpful to the Secret Service and throughout my tenure as Director of the Secret Service, the interest and support and recommendations of the Congress were extremely helpful, and I am certain my successor, Mr. Knight, shares this high regard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Rowley. We appreciate your appearing here today and the testimony that you have given to this select committee of the House. With that, you are excused, sir. Chief ROWLEY. Thank you, sir. Chairman STOKES. There will be a meeting of the full committee in executive session at 5 p.m. this evening in H-328. The next public meeting of the committee will be at 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. The Chair now adjourns the meeting to 5 p.m. this evening in executive session. [Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene in executive session at 5 p.m.] INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1978 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 9:18 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman oF the committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, Edgar, Devine, McKinney, and Sawyer. Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel; James E. McDonald, staff counsel; Robert W. Genzman, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk. Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The murder of President Kennedy was probably the most significant crime committed in the 70-year history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the Bureau was called upon to investigate. It is, thankfully, the only Presidential assassination of modern times, and for that reason alone, the FBI was presented in its investigation with a monumental task, one complicated further by a rapid succession of events, including: The fatal shooting of the accused assassin at Dallas Police Headquarters on November 24, 1963; and the establishment of a Presidential commission to learn the facts about the assassination, for which the FBI had primary responsibility to do the investigative work. At the moment word came of the President's depth in Dallas, there was confusion in Washington over the FBI's role m the investigation. It was not at that time a Federal felony to assassinate a President, though to threaten harm to him or to conspire to injure any Federal officer, while he was discharging his official duties, did fall within the Bureau's jurisdiction. Originally, the FBI's entry into the case was predicated on a statute covering an assault on a Federal officer, though there was considerable debate at FBI headquarters over the basis for the investigation. The problem became moot, however, when President Johnson ordered the FBI to enter the case in the interest of national security. (457) 458 It would be instructive, given this early legal dilemma as well as the controversy that developed over the FBI's investigation, to trace the history of the Bureau from its inception in 1908. Up until that time, Federal agencies and departments were responsible for their own investigations, and the Department of Justice was primarily a prosecutorial body, although it was given statutory authority to perform investigations in 1871. In 1907, Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte proposed an investigative force in the Department of Justice and went ahead with it despite the objections in Congress. His successor, George Wickersham, named the force the Bureau of Investigation. By the end of World War I, the Bureau was firmly established as the main law enforcement arm of the Federal Government, its size increasing fivefold from 1916 to 1920. The two major influences on this growth were (1) the war itself, which confronted the Bureau with the task of enforcing President Wilson's alien enemy proclamations and with the problems of draft evasion and enemy espionage, and (2) the Mann Act, giving the Federal Government jurisdiction over certain interstate criminal activities, making a marked increase in the demands on the Bureau, as well as calling for additional appropriations. After the war--in the period 1919 to 1924--two successive Attorneys General abused the power of the Bureau of Investigation. A. Mitchell Palmer, in his campaign against Bolshevist radicals, acted with questionable legality. After the bombing of his home in June 1919, Palmer created the General Intelligence Division of the Bureau to deal with radicalism, and he named a young Justice Department attorney, J. Edgar Hoover, to head the division. The division used covert as well as overt means to gather information on suspected radicals. In 1920, Attorney General Palmer also directed the wholesale deportation of members of the American Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party. This led to the controversial "Palmer raids," which, though they diminished the standing of American Communists, came to symbolize for many the abuse of police power for a political purpose. Then came the Harding administration, which saw Harry Daugherty, the President's campaign manager, named Attorney General. Daugherty, in turn, appointed his friend, William S. Burns, of the detective agency, to run the Bureau. Burns was antiradical and antilabor, as well, and be continued the questionable practices of unlawful wiretapping and illegal surreptitious entry in investigative work. Although the primary target continued to be Communists, the Bureau is credited during this period with having dealt a heavy blow to the Ku Klux Klan. Harlan Fiske Stone, a New York attorney and civil libertarian, was appointed Attorney General by Calvin Coolidge in 1924. Stone was a reformer, and he named Hoover Director of the Bureau of Investigation with a clear mandate to clean it up. Hoover created a structure and a set of policies that would endure for nearly 50 years. He also established the independence of the Bureau within the Department of Justice. 459 The Bureau stayed out of the limelight until the 1930's when the emergence of a resourceful criminal underworld, feeding on public response to prohibition, became a national concern. The Bureau was recognized then as the single law enforcement agency in the country that could cope with crime of such interstate dimensions. Public outrage over the kidnaping of Charles Lindbergh's infant son led to enactment of the so-called Lindbergh Law in 1933, adding kidnaping to the list of interstate crimes that came under the jurisdiction of the Bureau. Then, in 1934, there was a major expansion of Federal criminal laws when Congress passed a package of nine new statutes. They dealt with such crimes as killing or assaulting a Federal law enforcement officer, fleeing across a State line to avoid apprehension or prosecution and extortion involving interstate commerce. That same year, Bureau agents were granted authority to go beyond general investigative power and to serve warrants and subpenas, to make seizures and arrests, and to carry arms. The Bureau was renamed in 1935, becoming the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and by the end of the decade, it was able to point to an array of important accomplishments, for example: a Division of Indentification with central fingerprint records; an FBI laboratory with up-to-date scientific law enforcement techniques; and a National Police Academy for training State and local law enforcement officers. The Bureau then had no internal security or counterintelligence functions until they were established, beginning in 1936, by a series of Presidential orders coupled with a secret oral agreement be tween Hoover and President Roosevelt. The FBI was authorized to store intelligence information collected by Federal agencies. In 1939, a written directive was issued providing that the FBI take charge of investigative work relating to "espionage, sabotage, and violations of neutrality regulations. Subversive activities were not specifically mentioned until 1950, in an Executive order by President Truman. The FBI's primary responsibility during World War II was enforcement of laws dealing with espionage, sabotage, and conscription. It also conducted the apprehension of enemy aliens, but Hoover opposed the relocation of Japanese citizens as a violation of their civil rights. The FBI also conducted foreign intelligence in South America, attempting to gather information on activities detrimental to U.S. interests. After World War II the fear of communism was such that internal security activities against it was acceptable to most Americans. The FBI's actions were based on a series of statutes that covered membership in the Communist Party, including the Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist Control Act of 1954. J. Edgar Hoover himself defined as disloyal any acts that could pose a threat to the Government, and even after the anti-Communist fervor of the McCarthy era had subsided, the internal security operations of the FBI continued. By 1960, Hoover had developed a force of agents who employed sophisticated investigative techniques and enjoyed unusual inde- 460 pendence. Hoover himself had become a formidable figure who deftly handled Presidents, Attoneys General, and Members of Con- gress, as he groomed his image as an extraordinary crime fighter. FBI appropriations would pass without serious opposition in Con- gress after only pro forma hearings. J. Edgar Hoover's three distinct priorities in those years were the fight against communism, statistics that reflected FBI progress and the positive image of the Bureau. He also had, according to some, two glaring crime spots in the area of civil rights and orga- nized crime that put him at odds with the Kennedy administration. It has been documented that little priority was given by the FBI to requests by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Not all would agree with his choice of words, but his point was widely shared. Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his recent book, "Robert Kennedy and His Times," writes that Hoover had "the racist instincts of a white man who had grown up in Washington when it was still a southern city." By 1964, under pressure from the Kennedy Justice Department, the FBI was beginning to alter its stance, but before then, Schle- singer noted that: "For reasons of policy as well as prejudice, Hoover succeeded in withdrawing the FBI almost completely from civil rights investigations. Internally he preserved it as a lily-white agency." Hoover was also reluctant, according to some, to allow the Bureau to join Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's all-out fight on organized crime. Indeed, as late as the early 1960's, Hoover himself had been quoted as saying that no national coalition of underworld figures dominated organized crime. On that, Schlesinger wrote: Kennedy had determined to stop the drain of power in America to obscure forces beyond moral and legal accountability. In insisting on the spreading threat of organized crime, he offended J. Edgar Hoover doubly--by dismissing the cherished Red menace and by raising a question the Director had done his best for 40 years to ignore. The FBI priority here too came under sharp challenge during the new administration. Turning to the investigation of the assassination itself, the Bureau's investigation was of a magnitude unsurpassed in the annals of American law enforcement. In all, 80 FBI personnel were on the scene in Dallas within a few hours of the fatal shots and by the time it was over, 2,300 reports consisting of over 25,000 pages based on 25,000 interviews had been filed, most within weeks of the assassination itself. The quality of the investigation, however, has been the subject of mounting criticism over the years. At first, taking potshots at the Bureau was an exclusive avocation of critics of the Warren Commission. Eventually, however, doubts and misgivings were being expressed by committees of both Houses of Congress, by former high-ranking officials of the FBI itself, and by members and staff of the Warren Commission, which had relied on the Bureau for its fieldwork. There are four principal issues that the select committee has considered in its assessment of the quality of the FBI investigation. Not necessarily in the order that they will be discussed in the hearing today, or their relative importance, they are as follows: 461 One, did the FBI's early conclusion that Oswald alone was the assassin, that he had assistance from no one, hamper the thoroughness of the investigation that followed? In 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report in which it noted that within 3 weeks of the assassination, just as the Warren Commission was beginning its investigation, the FBI prepared a position paper, "concluding that Oswald was the assassin and that he had acted alone." The Senate committee went on to note, "The Bureau issued its report on the basis of a narrow investigation of the assassination focused on Oswald, without conducting a broad investigation of the assassination which would have revealed any conspiracy, foreign or domestic." Two, did senior FBI officials, wanting to close the case quickly, compromise the proficiency of Bureau field personnel? Make no bones about it, this charge has been leveled at the late Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, and against a few of his close personal associates. Evidence of Mr. Hoover's position has been cited from a statement he is said to have made by telephone to President Johnson just hours after Oswald had been shot down by Jack Ruby: "The thing I am most concerned about * * * is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin." In a memorandum dated November 29, 1963, relating a conversation that day with President Johnson: "I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation wrapped up today, but probably won't have it before the first of the week." Three, was the FBI investigation internally mismanaged? Just such an allegation has been made by a former Assistant Director who supervised major aspects of the investigation. The criticism has also been directed at the organizational structure of the probe. It was divided between two FBI divisions. The Central Investigative Division was assigned the task of assembling the facts of the assassination itself, because this is the division that is customarily put in charge of murder investigations. The actual work was supervised by an official who headed the bank robbery desk, because the manual of operations designates that desk to handle assaults on Federal officials. The Domestic Intelligence Division was assigned the question of possible conspiracy, as well as other aspects of subversion. Domestic Intelligence was also given the job of piecing together the background puzzle of Lee Harvey Oswald, his activities, associates, motivations, and so on. A source of a lack of confidence in the FBI investigation that has developed since 1964 is the realization that 20 members of the Domestic Intelligence Division, including an assistant director, were secretly censured by Director Hoover for their mishandling of a preassassination investigation of the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald. Four, was the FBI investigation conducted in such a way that the Bureau's specialists on Cuba and organized crime did not actively participate? The FBI had, prior to the assassination, considered Jack Ruby sufficiently knowledgeable about "criminal elements in Dallas" to contact him as a potential informant on nine separate occasions, and questions have been raised about the failure to probe his 462 known connections with gangster elements in Chicago, Dallas, New Orleans, Havana and elsewhere. In addition, the Bureau had specialists on Cuban and Cuban exile activities. They were not called on in the assassination investigation, even though both Oswald and Ruby had suspected ties to Cubans or Cuban exiles. Mr. Chairman, a former official of the FBI is here today to testify about the investigation of the Kennedy assassination. He is James R. Malley, who joined the Bureau as a special agent in 1937. Mr. Malley was an inspector in the General Investigative Division and principal assistant to Director Alex Rosen. He played an important role in putting together the Bureau's four-volume report on the assassination given to the President in December 1963. Subsequently, as the FBI liaison officer to the Warren Commission, Mr. Malley was in a position to closely observe the key role in the assassination investigation played by the FBI. Mr. Malley retired from the FBI in 1971. It would be appropriate at this time to call him. Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Mr. Malley. Mr. MALLEY. Where do you want me to sit? Chairman STOKES. At the witness table right in front of me. TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. MALLEY Chairman STOKES. Please stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. MALLEY. I do. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. The Chair recognizes counsel for the Committee, Mr. James McDonald. Mr. MCDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Would you please state your full name for the record? Mr. MALLEY. My full name is James R. Malley. Mr. MCDONALD. And were you employed by the FBI, Mr. Malley? Mr. MALLEY. From 1937 until 1971. Mr. MCDONALD. And in what capacity did you begin your service with the FBI? Mr. MALLEY. As a special agent. Mr. McDONALD. What was your position in November 1963? Mr. MALLEY. I had been designated as inspector at the time and was working as an assistant or No. 1 man, you might say, to Assistant Director Alex Rosen, in charge of the General Investigative Division. Mr. McDONALD. What did your duties entail? Mr. MALLEY. My actual duties were very broad. I was supposed to try to keep track of everything going on in the General Investigative Division, handle routine matters I did not feel was necessary to send into the Assistant Director, also see all mail that was going to him and, in general, to double check on things that were going on in four different sections in the Bureau's General Investigative Division. 463 Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Malley, let me direct your attention to November 22, 1963. You were employed then as the inspector for Mr. Rosen? Mr. MALLEY. That is right. Mr. McDONALD. That was a Friday. Were you working that day? Mr. MALLEY. I was working that day. Mr. MCDONALD. And when did you learn of the assassination of President Kennedy? Mr. MALLEY. Returning from lunch I turned on a radio that was available while I was sitting in Mr. Rosen's office in his absence. I turned on the radio to catch, I believe it was the 12:30 news. That was the first time I learned anything about it. Mr. MCDONALD. And what did you do in an official capacity? Mr. MALLEY. Before I had any opportunities to do anything, and I can't recall the exact time, I was contacted by Associate Director Al Belmont. Chairman STOKES. Excuse me just a moment. We are having a little difficulty hearing you. Mr. Malley, if you can put that mike a little closer. Mr. MALLEY. I don't think you want me to talk louder; you merely want it a little closer? Chairman STOKES. Right. Thank you very much. Mr. MALLEY. Mr. Belmont was in the same position that everyone else was in. He knew, I knew, that we had no actual jurisdiction. He did indicate to me that he had been in touch with Mr. Shanklin, who was the Special Agent in charge of Dallas, and that he would be back in touch with me as soon as there was more definite information available. That was about it for the time being. Later in the day, and I presume it must have been close to 3 o'clock, I was either told be telephone or asked to come down to Belmont's office, I cannot recall which, at which time he informed me that the General Investigative Division would be handling the assassination case of President Kennedy. Following that, and still not having many details to go on, I started lining up personnel that would be available on a round-the clock basis to handle whatever might develop. Mr. McDONALD. Were you given any specific instructions as to what your role would be? Mr. MALLEY. Not at that time. Mr. McDONALD. And your immediate supervisor was Mr. Rosen? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. McDONALD. Was he present that day? Mr. MALLEY. He was not. He was scheduled to go on annual leave that morning and instead of taking off as he had planned to leave the city, he was ill and did not leave the city at all. He eventually came back to the office sometime the following week. Mr. MCDONALD. Did you have any meetings with Mr. Hoover on that day? Mr. MALLEY. I did not. Mr. McDONALD. What were the next set of instructions you received on Friday afternoon? Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I received any instructions on that particular afternoon. In reading this statement, Mr. Blakey 464 has mentioned that there was a lot of confusion. There was. Because up until around 7 o'clock, if my memory is correct, there was a definite uncertainty as to what jurisdiction the Bureau had. As I understand it, Belmont had instructed the Dallas office to be certain that they stayed in a position where they would know exactly what was going on and what the Dallas police were doing so that possibly nothing would be interfered with in the way of evidence and nothing lost. Mr. MCDONALD. Did there come a time when you proceeded to go to Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. There was. On Sunday, after the shooting of Ruby, I am sorry, of Oswald by Ruby, I heard it on television. I had been at the office all morning and had just gone home around 12 o'clock. My wife heard it on television while I was changing clothes, mentioned there was going to be a rerun. I listened to that and immediately dressed and started back to the office and arrived around 2 o'clock. When I arrived there, Courtney Evans was sitting in Mr. Belmont's office, who had not had time to get to the office yet. He was talking to Mr. Hoover. Following that call I was told that I was on my way to Dallas. Mr. McDONALD. And who is Courtney Evans? Mr. MALLEY. Mr. Evans at that time was an Assistant Director in charge of the Special Investigative Division. Mr. McDONALD. Were you given any instructions on going to Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. There was no time for instructions. I was told to get the first plane that I could and Evans commented that undoubtedly by the time you arrive in Dallas, Belmont will have a number of instructions for you and he probably will be on the phone waiting for you to arrive. Mr. MCDONALD. Did you receive any instructions when you got to Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. I did. As I recall, I arrived in the Dallas office somewhere near 8 o'clock, possibly a little later, and was immediately told to get in touch with Mr. Belmont, which I did. Mr. Belmont informed me that the Director had been in touch with President Johnson, that the President was very upset about the number of comments being made by certain individuals in Dallas, mainly the district attorney, the chief of police, and the sheriffs office. He requested that I contact each one of them and see if I couldn't put a stop to miscellaneous statements they were making relating to the assassination and what investigation was going on. Mr. MCDONALD. Did Mr. Belmont relate to you anything specific as far as what President Johnson wished to have told to these individuals? Mr. MALLEY. To the best of my recollection, it was simply a statement that the President was extremely unhappy and desired that the individuals be requested to stop talking about the assassination. Mr. MCDONALD. And did you in fact relay those instructions? Mr. MALLEY. As soon as I was able to contact each one of them by telephone I did so. I was unable to reach the District Attorney for some time because about 2 minutes before an agent tried to 465 reach him in his office, he had left to appear on television, and again for some time related different things that he felt were important to the assassination. Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, tell us what happened upon your arrival in Dallas and what the status of the investigation was at that time? Mr. MALLEY. In answering you truthfully I couldn't tell you what the status was. I had so many telephone calls when I arrived there that I had to take care of that it was some time before I had a chance to even ask questions. Shortly after contacting the three individuals that I have mentioned to you, I had a telephone call from Mr. Belmont telling me that a detailed memorandum setting forth all information that was known concerning the assassination was to be prepared and be back in Washington on Tuesday morning. I was also requested to have prepared the same type of memorandum relating to the shooting of Oswald by Jack Ruby. It was mentioned that two men from Washington who were familiar with the type of a memorandum that would be necessary would be in Dallas some time that night, probably around 4:30. My instructions were to get hold of the necessary people in Dallas, to accumulate all the data that had been prepared from Friday up to that time on Sunday night, to get it lined up in some kind of sensible order, in order they could start reviewing it and start preparing the two memorandums requested. Mr. McDONALD. Who was directing the investigation in Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. It was under the overall direction of the SAC, Gordon Shanklin. Mr. McDONALD. What role did you play? Mr. MALLEY. I was supposed to oversee the entire thing, to make sure that the Bureau's interests were properly looked after, to make sure that there were no unnecessary delays on anything, and that everything possible was done to find out exactly what the correct facts were. Mr. MCDONALD. You had been working on the case over the weekend prior to going to Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. I had been in the office a great deal. When you say working on it, I saw a great many teletypes, a lot of other information, files were being checked in Washington for any possible helpful information there, and I couldn't tell you right now exactly what I did over that weekend before I left for Dallas. Mr. MCDONALD. Did you in fact convey President Johnson's instructions to each of the three men you mentioned? Mr. MALLEY. I did. Mr. McDONALD. What was their reaction? Mr. MALLEY. The Chief of Police was very cordial, said he would be glad to do it but he didn't know how to go about it, and if my memory serves me correctly, I suggested that he had no problem, all he had to do was either say he had no comment to make or the matter is under investigation and I do not care to discuss it. The Sheriff was extremely cordial and said he didn't recall that he had been making many comments but we would see that he didn't if he had. 466 In speaking with Henry Wade it was a little bit different story. He informed me that he had been a former FBI agent, which I was well aware of, that he had been district attorney for a number of years, that he felt that he was qualified to decide what statements he could make and what ones he should not make. If I remember correctly, I said, you are certainly entitled to your opinion but in this instance the President of the United States is asking you to refrain from such comment, but you do what you want to, but this is what the President wants. That is about it. Mr. McDONALD. Now, you have testified you arrived in Dallas after Oswald was shot by Jack Ruby? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. MCDONALD. When you arrived at the Dallas FBI office, what was the status of the investigation as far as its moving toward completion? Mr. MALLEY. I just answered you, Mr. McDonald; from the time I got there I had so many things to do I would have no idea. It was a number of hours after I was there that I was even able to start asking questions. Mr. MCDONALD. Prior to your going to Dallas, what was your perspective as to the case itself. Mr. MALLEY. I hadn't formed any ideas of any kind. The President had been shot on Friday; Oswald was shot on Sunday; it was much too early to form any ideas. Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Malley, I am going to read to you from a memorandum that was prepared by Walter Jenkins to President Johnson--Mr. Blakey also referred to it in his narration--the memorandum reflecting a phone call with J. Edgar Hoover, and the memorandum is dated November 24, 1963, two days after the assassination. The pertinent paragraph quoting Mr. Hoover states: "The thing that I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin." What would your comments be on that? We are talking about two days after the assassination. This is probably being written contemporaneously with your arriving in Dallas. Mr. MALLEY. Not having talked to Mr. Hoover, I certainly am not in a position to say what was going on in his mind. I can give you my interpretation of what he would have meant by it. That would simply mean that because of such a crime of that magnitude, he was talking to either the President or Jenkins, whichever it was, saying that the public needs to be settled down. As far as saying that Oswald is the man and nobody else, I don't think you can take that interpretation from such a one sentence remark such as that. Mr. MCDONALD. I am looking at a memo dated November 26, 1963, from Mr. Evans to Mr. Belmont and it is titled "The Assassination of President Kennedy," and it says--this is dated 4 days later, "From the facts disclosed in our investigation, there is no question that we can submit in our report convincing evidence, beyond any doubt, showing Oswald was the man who killed President Kennedy." Then at the bottom of this page there is handwriting, which has been identified as Mr. Hoover's. And in the last line Mr. Evans is 467 making reference that a case of this magnitude cannot be fully investigated in a week's time. And Mr. Hoover has written underneath, "just how long do you estimate it will take." Then under that he went on to write, "it seems to me we have the basic facts now." Again, we are 4 days after the assassination. You were in Dallas at the time. Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I was asked by anyone how long it was going to take. If I had been I would have told them I had no idea because of the magnitude of what needed to be done in Dallas alone, not counting anything that might go on elsewhere. The volume of work was such that no one could estimate the time. If I recall correctly, it was either Tuesday or Wednesday following the assassination that I was asked if we had sufficient personnel, and I requested that 40 more agents along with clerical help, stenographic help, be sent into Dallas to assist those who were already there. So certainly I did not feel it was going to be completed within any week. Mr. McDONALD. You were asking for additional agent personnel, and as reflected in these memos, at the top level, at least there was an opinion being formed that the case essentially was wrapped up. Mr. MALLEY. I won't agree with you because I don't know what they were doing in Washington. I know where I was and I know what had been done, and I think you may be interpreting remarks about wanting to get something out to the public to let them know what had been developed up to that time as a misinterpretation of what the Bureau intended to do later. Mr. McDONALD. I will quote one more memorandum to you, and that is dated 29 November 1963, which is found in the Senate Intelligence Committee's, the Church Committee's, Book 5 Report on page 34. In it, the memorandum is by Mr. Hoover, recounting a telephone conversation he had that day with President Johnson. And he says, "I advised the President that we hoped to have the investigation wrapped up today but probably won't have it before the first of the week, as another angle had developed. Again we are getting an example of at the top level the case being in a sense completed. Now, again, from your Dallas perspective does this jibe with what you were doing in Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. Well, again, I say that when people say that they hoped to have it completed and so on, I don't think for a minute they were talking about having every facet fully and exhaustively investigated. I think what they are saying is that, based on the information that was available at that time, the essential facts of the investigation had been developed. It doesn't mean it was over by any means. Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, the memorandums that I have just quoted from have been marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459. I move that they be received into the record at this time. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The above marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459 follow:] 468 JFK EXHIBIT F-457 469 JFK EXHIBIT F-457 cont. 470 JFK EXHIBIT F-457 cont. 471 JFK EXHIBIT F-457 cont. 472 JFK EXHIBIT F-457 cont. 473 JFK EXHIBIT F-457 cont. 474 JFK EXHIBIT F-458 475 JFK EXHIBIT F-458 cont. 476 JFK EXHIBIT F-459 477 Mr. MCDONALD. When you were in Dallas, Mr. Malley, was active consideration being given to investigating the possibility of a conspiracy? Mr. MALLEY. That existed from the minute it happened. I can't say that I saw a memorandum to this effect or a memorandum to that effect or a telephone call, but I do know that it was on everybody's mind, was there somebody else involved. It was an essential part of the investigation to find out. Mr. MCDONALD. These discussions of conspiracy, were they active in the Dallas field office? Mr. MALLEY. You are asking me a question that dates back 15 years ago and I am not in a position to truthfully answer you and say this happened or that happened in the way of some conversation I had. Mr. McDONALD. In light of Evans memo to Belmont with Mr. Hoover's writing, his handwriting, saying essentially we have got it all wrapped up, in your opinion, would that affect the investigation ongoing in the field, if Mr. Hoover was saying that he felt the investigation was essentially closed? Would that have an effect, in your opinion, on the way the Bureau handled the conspiracy aspects to the case? Mr. MALLEY. To start off, I was handling 90 percent of the telephone calls between Washington and Dallas after I arrived, there may be a higher percentage. I know that I never received any comments from Belmont, the Director, or anyone else in Washington indicating that Mr. Hoover was saying that we would have the investigation finished in a few days. So I have to answer you by saying that it would have had no effect on anybody that I knew in Dallas unless somebody else got a telephone call and I was not made aware of it. It certainly had no effect on me. Mr. McDONALD. You stated that you arrived in Dallas after Jack Ruby shot--- Mr. MALLEY. Around 7:30 to 8 o'clock on Sunday night. Mr. MCDONALD. Did this event have any effect on the Bureau's relationship with the Dallas Police Department? Mr. MALLEY. I do not recall hearing of any friction that developed while I was in Dallas and I don't think there was any friction developed later. I think they remained on the same solid basis they were. I could be wrong. Mr. McDONALD. Can you recall after the shooting of Oswald, did you yourself participate in any discussions as to the possibility of whether it was a related event, directly related to the murder of the President. In other words, if it involved a larger conspiracy, the possibility of a larger conspiracy? Mr. MALLEY. Are you refering to other personnel in the Dallas office or what? Mr. MCDONALD. Either in the Dallas office or back at headquarters in Washington? Mr. MALLEY. You gentlemen have had access to the file. I think you will find that teletype, if my memory is accurate, sent by the people at the seat of Government telling the Dallas office to not overlook the possibility and check thoroughly to see whether it could have been any police involvement in the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. 478 Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, I am going to direct your attention to an organizational chart that we have prepared that I showed you before the hearing. If the clerk could display the organizational chart for us. It has been designated JFK exhibit F-456. If you would walk over to the easel we have a clip-on microphone. If you would give us a rundown of the organizational structure in the Bureau at the time of the assassination. [JFK exhibit F-456 was received into the record.] JFK EXHIBIT F-456 479 Mr. MALLEY. In 1963, at the time of the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover, as you heard previously, was the Director. The Associate Director was Clyde Tolson and one of the Assistants to the Director was Alan H. Belmont. Am I talking loud enough so you can hear me? Mr. MCDONALD. Yes. If you would stand on the other side of the easel. Mr. MALLEY. Be glad to either way. Mr. McDONALD. Thank you. Mr. MALLEY. Under Mr. Belmont was the Domestic Intelligence Division, whose Director was William C. Sullivan; the General Investigative Division, whose Assistant Director was Al Rosen, and a Laboratory and Special Investigative Division, and I am not going to identify those people unless you want me to. Mr. McDONALD. No, that is fine. Mr. MALLEY. I failed to mention that under Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover was an Inspection Division whose Director at that time was Mr. James Gale. Under the Domestic Intelligence you had an inspector, No. 1 man in charge, Joseph A. Sizoo, another inspector, No. 2 man, Donald E. Moore, the Espionage Section under a section chief by the name of William A. Branigan, and there were a number of individual agent-supervisors who were assigned to this case. Do you want their names mentioned? Mr. McDONALD. Not at this time, thank you. Mr. MALLEY. In the General Investigative Division, I happened to be the No. 1 man, and as you heard, I was assigned to handle liaison with the, oh, you haven't heard yet, I was assigned to handle liaison with the Warren Commission. There was also a criminal section, whose section chief was James Hanley. An individual by the name of Henry Schutz was a unit chief, under which was bank robberies and a number of other rather important criminal investigations, and there were two individuals that did work quite a bit on this particular case, by the name of Richard Rogge and Fletcher Thompson. Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, regarding Rogge and Thompson, you just said that they worked closely with you on the case. Mr. MALLEY. They did in the early stages. They were the two individuals who were sent to Dallas to write the first two memorandums that I told you about, and we also had a civil rights section, which was under a section chief by the name of Clement McGowan. Does that cover what you have? Mr. MCDONALD. That is fine, thank you. Mr. Malley, in the investigation of the assassination how did the various divisions participate in the case? First of all, which was the primary division to run the case, the assassination case, and who was in charge of that investigation? Mr. MALLEY. As far as the actual assassination is concerned, it was definitely in the General Investigative Division. When you say who is responsible, are you referring to what section it was being handled and what supervisor was primarily responsible? Mr. MCDONALD. Which person was primarily responsible at the top to begin with? Mr. MALLEY. Well, because of what happened when I got back from Dallas I would say that I had to be, 480 Mr. MCDONALD. What happened when you got back from Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. Well, I had been told before I left Dallas, sometime in the afternoon, that the Warren Commission had been established, they would be functioning almost immediately, and that I was to return to Washington on the first plane that I could get out of Dallas. I came back that night, and the next morning I had a little note from the Director that I was to get in touch with Mr. J. Lee Rankin as soon as possible, with the telephone number on it. I didn't succeed for a day or two but I did make an effort continuously for the next days until I got it. I then went up to see him and introduced myself. We had a rather long chat about things in general but nothing concerning any real developments because neither one of us were in a position to talk about it. Mr. MCDONALD. On what date was this again? Mr. MALLEY. Strictly from memory, I think I returned from Dallas on December 12. I may be inaccurate. Mr. EDGAR. Would the counsel yield? Mr. McDONALD. Yes. Mr. EDGAR. Would the witness talk into the microphone? Mr. MALLEY. I am sorry, beg your pardon. Mr. MCDONALD. So you stated that you returned from Dallas on the 12th. On that day you were notified that you were going to be the liaison with the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. MCDONALD. What duties were you to do? What were your duties going to be? Mr. MALLEY. Well, very generally, I was to handle all contacts by telephone or in person with the Warren Commission. I was also to see that every piece of mail that went to the Warren Commission was personally delivered and in that respect I was not only liaison but I was the mailman, and I had specific instructions that nothing was to go to the Warren Commission that I hadn't seen and reviewed thoroughly. Mr. MCDONALD. Now, prior to December 12, the Bureau released its report on the assassination? Mr. MALLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. MCDONALD. Did you play a role in the preparation of that report? Mr. MALLEY. In that report I have to say no. I told you that two memorandums were prepared in Dallas which were returned to Washington the Tuesday morning after the assassination. I definitely reviewed those. I went over material that was being utilized in the preparation of them, and I don't know whether the two memorandums are in existence now. But, if you had read either one of them you would say that you saw the comment, this is the information that is available as of the writing of this memorandum. Mr. McDONALD. When you refer to memorandum you are referring to the report? Mr. MALLEY. I am not. I am referring to a piece of paper similar to this, consisting of around 15 pages, I believe, on Mr. Ruby, I mean on the assassination of President Kennedy and around 8 or 9 on the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. 481 Mr. McDONALD. Well, the report came out in early 1963, prior to the 12th, and the report said in essence that Lee Harvey Oswald killed the President alone. Do you know why this report was put out so rapidly? Mr. MALLEY. I can only tell you that based on what I was told in Dallas, they wanted to put it out much faster than it was put out. Mr. MCDONALD. They wanted to. Mr. MALLEY. It was strictly on the basis of letting the President, the Attorney General and a few others that they felt needed to know immediately what the facts were as of that time. It was my understanding that information was going to be disseminated long before it was. Mr. MCDONALD. Were you aware-- Mr. MALLEY. I do not know what occurred in Washington that delayed it except one telephone call I had. After they had an opportunity to read the two memos, they said how do we know this is completely accurate. I said, if you can't take my word for it, I said, you have to wait until you get reports. There was nothing else I could say. Mr. McDONALD. Prior to your return to Washington, when you learned you were going to be liaison with the Warren Commission, you must have been aware that they were discussing the formation of such a commission. Mr. MALLEY. I don't remember whether 1 ever heard that there was a possibility of the Warren Commission being formed or not. I have no way of thinking back and recalling whether I did or didn't. Mr. McDONALD. Can you recall, as you knew, what the Bureau's reaction to the formation of such a commission was? Mr. MALLEY. I never heard of anything one way or the other until you showed me a memorandum on it. The last time I talked to you I might have indicated to you the Director was unhappy. I don't interpret that memo that way. Mr. McDONALD. So, it is your testimony you have no personal knowledge of what the Bureau's reaction, specifically Mr. Hoover s, was to the creation of the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. I could only give you my reaction when I was called into his office after I returned from Dallas and what he told me at that time. There was certainly no criticism. I was told that the Warren Commission had been established. I was the liaison representative, and he wanted full and complete cooperation with them and no information whatsoever withheld from them. Give them everything. Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Malley, in the overall investigation of the assassination, what was the interaction between the various divisions in the Bureau, specifically general investigative and domestic intelligence? Mr. MALLEY. To the best of my knowledge, there was complete cooperation between all the various people working on the assassination or the domestic intelligence aspect, and in the civil rights angle. Mr. McDONALD. What was your relationship with William Sullivan, the Director of Domestic Intelligence? Mr. MALLEY. Are you referring to this individual case? 482 Mr. MCDONALD. Yes. Mr. MALLEY. I don't think I had very many conversations with Sullivan on this particular case. I usually dealt with the section chief, Mr. Brannigan, or the individual supervisor. Mr. MCDONALD. What was the domestic intelligence section, what were they doing regarding the assassination case? Mr. MALLEY. As you Saw, they had five or six supervisors. To go back and tell you exactly what they were doing at this time, I cannot. I do know that they all had specific assignments in it and one of the fundamentals, again, was to prove or disprove whether there was any possibility that they could come up with of a conspiracy. It was also to develop all aspects of Oswald's personal life, where he had been from the time he returned from Russia, what he did before he went to Russia and anything else that might give us any assistance. Mr. MCDONALD. And this division handled the conspiracy aspect within that division? Mr. MALLEY. There, again, it is difficult to say that they were the only ones doing it. They were primarily, because of their knowledge with various nationality groups, et cetera, and the fact they were looking into his entire personal life, they would have been in a better position to come across something than somebody handling criminal aspects. Mr. MCDONALD. You were in the General Investigative Division? Mr. MALLEY. That's correct. Mr. MCDONALD. Would you have any direct knowledge or supervision over what was being done in the Domestic Intelligence Division as far as the assassination was concerned, considering your role as liaison with the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. Yes, I would, in that every report that was sent to the Warren Commission came to me before it went to Assistant Director Belmont and we both were charged by the Director with reading every word of it. In addition to that, there were literally hundreds of teletypes that came in from the field on various aspects of the investigation. Teletypes, which came into our division, regardless of whether they indicated there was anything to do with work going on over at Division 5, copies were made and sent to them. Mr. MCDONALD. When you say Division 5, what are you referring to? Mr. MALLEY. That's the Domestic Intelligence Division, I beg your pardon. Likewise, any teletypes that came to them, whether it seemed to refer to our work or not, teletypes were sent to the General Investigative Division for information so if there was anything that could be tied in, they could do it. Mr. MCDONALD. Well, I am going to refer to the book 5 of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Church committee report, where they are speaking of a supervisor in Domestic Intelligence Division who was reported to be the leading Cuban expert within the Bureau at that time, and he testified before the Church committee that he was never informed--first of all, he never even knew of any CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro. And this supervisor testified before that committee that he had no recollection of any Bureau investigation of Cuban involvement in 483 the Kennedy assassination. He was asked a question: "Were there ever any meetings that you recall where there were discussions as to whether or not the Cubans were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?" And he answered, "No; I don't recall. I would say no." And they questioned, "Do you know if that possibility was investigated?" Answer: "Well I can't even say that for sure, no, I can't. Question: "Do you recall at any time ever seeing any memoranda or instructions that Cuban sources be contacted to see if there was any Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy?" And he answered, "There were no such communications, to my knowledge, ever sent out from headquarters." And they asked him: "If they were sent out, in all likelihood, would you have known about it?" And he said, "Yes." Now, this was the investigations being conducted, as you say, in Division 5, the Domestic Intelligence, and this is the leading Cuban expert in the Bureau at the time saying that during the assassina tion investigation, he wasn't even contacted to consider this aspect. As liaison to the Warren Commission, and you did know the paperwork that was going on, what would your response be to his comments that he wasn't even involved? Mr. MALLEY. I don't know how good his memory was. I do know that their division had the responsibility for keeping their own people aware of what was going on and if he didn't know what was going on in that section, I would say somebody was remiss. Mr. MCDONALD. I am sorry. Mr. MALLEY. Somebody was remiss in not keeping him aware. I can't possibly answer what went on over in their division on a day-to-day basis. You know, and I know that there was an investigation concerning the possibility of Cuban involvement, if you reviewed the material. It would be impossible for me to think that he wasn't aware of it. Mr. MCDONALD. Is it your testimony the investigation would have been conducted by Division 5, Mr. MALLEY. That part of it. Mr. MCDONALD. And we have this statement given in 1976 that the leading Cuban specialist wasn't involved. Mr. MALLEY. That's his statement. I can't answer for him. Mr. MCDONALD. OK. Turning now to the Special Investigative Division that you referred to on the chart, what was that division's responsibility? Mr. MALLEY. I don't think they had any specific assignment. Courtney Evans, at that time, as I mentioned, was an Assistant Director and he was handling liaison with the Department, primarily with Robert Kennedy and other top officials of the Department. Mr. McDONALD. Was part of their jurisdiction organized crime? Mr. MALLEY. To the best of my memory, yes. Mr. McDONALD. Can you recall, after the shooting of Oswald by Ruby, what consideration was given at that point to the possibility of organized crime involvement, either in the Ruby shooting of Oswald or the overall assassination of the President? 484 Let me ask one question further before you answer that. After Ruby shot Oswald, how long did it take the Bureau to learn about Jack Ruby himself, his background, his associates, the kind of person he was? Mr. MALLEY. Well, from the standpoint of the type of person he was, I am sure that within an hour or so before we ever got near the investigation, the Bureau was probably well aware of the fact that he was running a night club which amounted to sort of a striptease place. And beyond that, I am not able to tell you when we really developed his full background data except that we did start so-called civil rights investigation on the basis that he had been shot while in custody of the police department, and that did give us the basis for jurisdiction. Mr. MCDONALD. So, this investigation was handled by the General Investigative Civil Rights Division? Mr. MALLEY. General Investigative Division in the Civil Rights Section. Mr. McDONALD. What consideration was being given at the time to the possibility of Jack Ruby being involved with organized crime in the commission of either of the shootings? Mr. MALLEY. I can't tell you what they were doing back in Washington because I wasn't there until after December, the 12th I do know that they were under instructions in Dallas to consider all possibilities of involvement to the nth degree of anyone, primarily on the basis that Ruby might have had some assistance. So, I can't answer you any more specifically than that. Mr. MCDONALD. As you pointed out, Courtney Evans was the Assistant Director of that division and he has appeared before this committee in deposition and interview. When he was asked whether his division had ever been asked to render assistance in the investigation of Jack Ruby or any organized crime aspects of the case, he said to us, I am quoting from an interview, "They sure didn't come to me. I know they sure didn't come to me. We had no part in that that I can recall." This committee, in our look at this case, spoke to Mr. Charles Stanley. Do you know who he is? Mr. MALLEY. Yes; I do. Mr. MCDONALD. He was Evans' principal assistant in 1963. And he was asked whether that division was ever asked to participate in the investigation of the assassination. And he told us: I don't think we had one thing to do with it. To my knowledge, we were never brought in on that. I don't recall a thing coming through our division on Ruby or Oswald. And then we spoke to Jack Danahey; do you know who he is? Mr. MALLEY. I believe he was working in New York for many years. I don't know of him ever being in Washington. Mr. MCDONALD. In 1963, he was the assistant special agent in charge in your New York office. Apparently, he is widely regarded as an expert in organized crime. And he was asked if he or any other Mafia specialists in the Bureau were ever consulted on the investigation of Jack Ruby or any other aspects of the Kennedy assassination. And Danahey answered, and this was in our interview with our committee, "I know damn well I wasn't. No one said anything to me." 485 And lastly, we spoke to Mr. Al Staffeld, who is another official in the organized crime section and he was asked essentially the same question and he gave essentially the same answer, that he had no recollection of any involvement or any information or request for assistance coming to that division by those handling the assassination case. With that in mind, could you explain to us how the General Investigative Division would have been handling any organized crime aspects, the possibilities, if there were some, to the assassination? Mr. MALLEY. As briefly as I can, if any name showed up either in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy or in the investigation being conducted by the civil rights section of the shooting of Oswald, there is no question in my mind, and you would have to doublecheck with the supervisors, but if a criminal figure of any known standing had been mentioned or any criminal figure that had a lot of information in the files on him, I don't have any doubt they would have discussed it with the individual supervisors down in the organized crime unit. That would not necessarily have been called to the attention of either Mr. Stanley or Mr. Evans, and it might not even have been called to the attention of Staffeld. If there was any reason to send any memorandum or letters or anything else through them to be initialed by that division, it certainly would have been done. I do know that in the civil section--civil rights section--I was told they were in touch with him many times on individual names that came up in connection with possible criminal figures. Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, after the creation of the Warren Commission, first of all, what was the Bureau's relationship to the Commission, and you being the one essentially in the middle, how would you categorize the relationship? Mr. MALLEY. Strictly a business relationship. No friendliness, no unfriendliness. Just strictly, you have your work to do, we have ours. If we want something from you, we will call you and ask for it. If we want further explanations, we will get them from you. There was never any animosity shown, that I am aware of. At least, it didn't rub off on me if there was. Mr. MCDONALD. Prior to the creation of the Commission, the Bureau was handling the case on its own. The directives were coming out from Washington or Dallas, or wherever, to cover leads. Did this change after the Warren Commission was established? Mr. MALLEY. Not for quite a long, long time. After the Warren Commission had had an opportunity to review the large number of reports that had been sent to them, they eventually started asking a few questions and in many instances, their questions were answered by saying, if you will look at the report of so and so on a certain page, the information is there and you haven't located it yet. In a few instances, they sent us letters or made telephone calls and said we have checked into this aspect; we feel that maybe it would be well to conduct a little further investigation and they would outline what they wanted. As far as directing the investigation, they did not attempt to take over what we were doing. We continued to do our own investiga- 486 tion on everything we thought was necessary the entire time that they were in existence and up until the time I retired in 1971. Mr. MCDONALD. And you are saying that the Bureau continued its own investigation, you did not respond only to leads from the Warren Commission; is that what you are saying? Mr. MALLEY. That's what I'm saying. We did our own work. Whenever they had any questions, we tried to answer them for them. They did not give us directives, you do this, you do that, you do this. When they had specific items they wanted to check on, they did tell us. Mr. MCDONALD. You stated you were in Dallas when you were told to meet with Mr. Rankin, the general counsel of the Warren Commission. Excuse me, you came back to Washington and were told you were going to be liaison. Mr. MALLEY. I can't say I was told before I got back from Dallas, when I was told, I was going to meet with Rankin. I do know I was told in Dallas I would be handling liaison. I think I told you that I had a memorandum or something on my desk saying I was to get in touch with Rankin as soon as possible after I got back. Mr. MCDONALD. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Hoover was involved in the, I guess we could say, the blocking of the first choice for the Warren Commission general counsel, a man by the name of Warren Olney. Were you aware of that situation? Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I was ever told that. Mr. McDONALD. Did you learn of it subsequently? Mr. MALLEY. I don't remember it. If I did know it, I don't remember it now. Mr. McDONALD. One of the other items that has come up over the years regarding the Warren Commission and Mr. Hoover was that it has been reported that Mr. Hoover had dossiers or files, on members of the Warren Commission and staffs. Were you aware of this, and I am not referring to security-check files, but just things that we would call a dossier. Are you familiar with that? Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I was ever told. It seems to me it would be a normal procedure if you were dealing with a large number of staff members and committee members, that it would be well to know exactly what was transpiring on each one, from your standpoint of your dealings with him. If one of them said this on a certain date, contradicted himself on another date, certainly, it would be well to have had a record of what was going on. So, when you refer to a file, a dossier on each one, I can well understand why they might have had such a thing. Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, I just have one further question. And that is with the benefit of hindsight of 15 years and looking back on what went on, in your opinion, was the overall investigation of both the assassination of the President and the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald handled properly? Mr. MALLEY. Well, I might turn that around just a little bit and say you have had the benefit of the Church Committee investigations, you have had the benefit of the Warren Commission and you had the benefit of all our files. Maybe you could tell me what you feel we did wrong and I will be glad to answer what you think we did wrong. 487 Mr. MCDONALD. Well, we appreciate you trying to turn the table on us--but, we are here to ask you questions. Mr. MALLEY. No, I am not trying to turn the tables. I am just asking you what you feel we did wrong and if I am not entitled to that, well, that's that. Mr. MCDONALD. I am not here to answer questions. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Counsel. The procedure at this point will be that the Chair will yield himself such time as he may consume, after which we will then operate under the 5-minute rule. Mr. Malley, one thing I would appreciate you clearing up for me that you just stated to Counsel for the committee, do I understand you to say that the Commission did their work and we did ours; is that your statement? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Chairman STOKES. And by that, what do you mean? Mr. MALLEY. I meant, Mr. Stokes, exactly what I said, in that we were not asked to be leg-runners or do every little thing that they might think of. If they did have something to come up, we did it. We were operating independently on our own investigation, but definitely under instructions from Mr. Hoover that if they needed any clarification or had any requests to make of us, that we carry them out fully. Chairman STOKES. Then, for further clarification, anyone having the understanding that in terms of the Commission's investigation that was being directed by them and the FBI was pursuing leads under their direction, that would not be true; is that right? Mr. MALLEY. It would be true if they asked us. But the numbers of requests they made was minimum. They were reviewing reports, anything else that we sent to them and proceeding on their own to evaluate it and whenever they made a request, we did do it. You can say that we are an investigative arm when they needed us. But beyond that, we were not under their direction. Chairman STOKES. So, the basic investigation was being completed under the total direction, then, of the FBI itself?. Mr. MALLEY. That's right. Chairman STOKES. In terms of your responsibilities, what was your relationship with Assistant Director William Sullivan? Mr. MALLEY. As I mentioned awhile ago, and I don't know whether you understood me, I said I do not recall very many conversations that I had with Sullivan in connection with the assassination and the Oswald case. I did have direct communication with other people in his division. Chairman STOKES. You know, of course, that Assistant Director Sullivan is now deceased? Mr. MALLEY. Yes. Chairman STOKES. Let me read to you some excerpts from an interview with former Assistant Director Sullivan that was conducted by another House committee in 1975 after which I will ask for your comment. In the interview, Mr. Sullivan was asked to recall Director Hoover's relationship to the Warren Commission. In the interview, Mr. Sullivan stated that Mr. Hoover, and I now quote Mr. Sullivan, 488 "did not like to see the Warren Commission come into existence, that he did show marked interest in limiting the scope of it or circumventing the scope of it by taking any action that might result in neutralizing it." In this same interview, Mr. Sullivan went on further and said this, and I again quote "From what I saw and what I heard, what I understood, he, Mr. Hoover, was not pleased about the creation of the Warren Commission, No. 1. No. 2, he was not interested in seeing the Warren Commission conduct an exhaustive investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy because he thought that the FBI investigation was adequate." Having heard this statement by Mr. Sullivan, would you concur in his observations on this point? Mr. MALLEY. I would not, because I have no knowledge of what Mr. Sullivan was talking about when he says the Director was opposed to the creation and so on. The only comment I have heard along that line is the one that Mr. McDonald read awhile ago based on the telephone conversation with the White House. And I never personally heard him object to the Warren Commission in any way, shape, or form. Chairman STOKES. In this same interview, Mr. Malley, Mr. Sullivan was asked whether he had seen anything in the files to indicate that Oswald had any relationship to the CIA. In response to this question, Mr. Sullivan answered in a rather ambiguous manner, and I quote his testimony at that point: "No I think that has been discussed. I think there may be something on that, but you asked me if I had seen anything. I don't recall having seen anything like that, but I think there is some thing on that point. Whether it is valid or not I don't know It rings a bell in my mind." Now, it would seem that Director Sullivan was not giving a clearly negative response to that type of a question. And I wonder, from your investigation of this matter, whether you would make some comment with reference to that point. Mr. MALLEY. I am not trying to avoid your question. I have difficulty answering it because when I was before the Church Committee, I was asked about some CIA material that had allegedly been delivered to the Bureau and that it had not been furnished by the Bureau to the Warren Commission. The material they referred to me, I had no recollection of it at the time. Subsequently, I was shown a letter which was sent on November 23d to the President--it may have gone to the Attorney General--where it referred to a source in Mexico giving some information which related to the fact that Oswald had been in Mexico and had been in communication with the Soviet Embassy. I do not know for sure. I can only assume where it came from. But I had no knowledge of it at the time I was before the Church Committee, that I can recall. Whether Mr. Sullivan had knowledge, he is the only one who could answer the question, or maybe somebody in his division who worked with him. I don't know what Mr. Sullivan did as far as any materials such as this. Chairman STOKES. On that specific point, that is as much light you can shed on that point? Mr. MALLEY. That is all I know about it. 489 Chairman STOKES. Let me now make reference to another segment of the same interview with Assistant Director Sullivan in 1975. This segment relates to what Mr. Sullivan perceived as gaps in the Bureau's investigation into the possibility of whether Lee Oswald was involved with others in the assassination. Keeping in mind that Mr. Sullivan was the man in charge of directing the Bureau's investigation of any conspiracy aspects of the case, let me refer to these further comments by him. "To my recollection, we never developed any conclusive evidence that would tie or bind Mr. Oswald to any foreign nation or to the instructions of any foreign nation directly or indirectly in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Now, there are gaps here that I would like to make very clear. These gaps certainly bothered the men in my division and they bothered me. And I am sure they bothered some of the men in the Dallas field office. "For example, there is a gap as to what transpired when Mr. Oswald was in Russia. We really do not have any firm information on this at all." From your own investigation, did you find the same or similar gaps? Mr. MALLEY. If my memory is correct, another Government agency, who had access to information about Oswald's activities in Russia, furnished to the Warren Commission--my memory is not good enough to tell you that I had access to every word of it--but I would presume if they furnished it to the Warren Commission, it was given to us. That would have been given to the Domestic Intelligence Division inasmuch as it related to their activities, rather than the actual assassination. Chairman STOKES. What about Mr. Sullivan's comment that there were other men in the division who found such gaps disturbing. Mr. MALLEY. The only thing I can tell you, and I repeat what I have said before, there was very, very close coordination between the men, and I say that regardless of what Mr. Sullivan may have said because I know it of my knowledge. And if there were any such gaps in anyone's mind, they certainly had an obligation to discuss it with the men in both divisions to see to it that they were cleared up, if possible. Chairman STOKES. You are saying, then that no one discussed those gaps with you? Mr. MALLEY. No. Chairman STOKES. Mr. Malley, let me again quote Mr. Sullivan during the course of interview. He says, "It is my understanding from conversations on this subject, that he, Hoover, did not want the Warren Commission to conduct an exhaustive investigation for fear that it would discover important and relevant facts that we in the FBI had not discovered in our investigation. Therefore, it would be greatly embarrassing to him and damaging to his career and to the FBI as a whole." And then when asked if he believed that the Dallas FBI's secret destruction of a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald could have been one of the things that Mr. Hoover was afraid the Warren Commission might uncover, Mr. Sullivan further stated as follows, and I quote him again: "Well, that could be, but it didn't happen to come 490 to my mind when you raised the question. I do think, though, and this is only an opinion, I do think that what he had in mind went beyond that. If he did have that in mind, it went to something more basic, that we might have failed to discover a relationship between Oswald and the Cubans, and if we had failed to discover a relationship between the two and the Warren Commission did, then we would, indeed, as a Bureau be in serious trouble." Can we ask for your reaction to this point brought up by Mr. Sullivan? Mr. MALLEY. With regard to the first part, where he is saying the Director was opposed to this, that and the other thing, I don't know if it was the first day I was back in Washington or the second, Mr. Hoover called for Belmont, his associate director, and myself, to come to his office. We were told in very firm conversation by the Director that we were to exhaustively pursue every aspect of any lead that developed, no matter how small it appeared to be, and to leave nothing to doubt. If that sounds like the Director, who was trying to short-circuit the investigation, I can't understand plain English. I think that is a very, very important thing for you gentlemen to understand, that where I was concerned, Mr. Hoover never said anything except go forward to the nth degree on anything that comes to your attention. Where Mr. Sullivan gets his information, I cannot tell you. He is dead and I am not going to make any statements that I can't back up personally. Chairman STOKES. Mr. Malley, we have learned in the years since the assassination that Director Hoover secretly disciplined 17 Bureau officials for what he regarded as mistakes and deficiencies in their pre-assassination investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald. The fact that these Bureau officials were punished for these deficiencies in the Oswald investigation was never revealed to the Warren Commission. It was never, in fact, publicly known until 1976. Let me now read to you a statement by former Assistant Director William Sullivan regarding this area and then I would like to ask for your further comments on this. And I quote him: "I suggested that the disciplinary action was arbitrary but calculated rather than capricious. It was calculated, it was thought out as a means of Mr. Hoover protecting himself against any indictment that he was at fault in the assassination of President Kennedy. That the FBI, under his direction, had made mistakes and, therefore, he was culpable and apparently his reasoning, as we interpreted it at the time, was that if he ordered disciplinary transfers and letters of censure to a large number of men and then if he was charged with culpability in the assassination of President Kennedy, he could say these men are the ones responsible, and I have already taken disciplinary action against them." Do you believe that this was true? Mr. MALLEY. Again, I don't know where Mr. Sullivan got his information. I know that I was not made aware nor did I ever see the memorandum which you are referring to concerning the disciplinary action. I did hear that some had been recommended, but I 491 was never made aware of what went on. I think you would have to talk to somebody else who had more knowledge about it that I do. Chairman STOKES. Were you personally familiar with any disciplinary action relative to Mr. Hosty, James Hosty? Mr. MALLEY. Yes, in that there were certain things that occurred in Dallas that Hosty was involved in where I was told he would probably be recommended for some action based on some loose, unnecessary statements that he made the day of the assassination. Other than that, I have no recollection of anything else. One other thing. You mentioned this note. The first time I ever heard about the note was after it appeared in the newspapers. I believe it was a year ago this summer. I was questioned at that time by the Bureau when they were conducting their own investigation to find out who might have known about it at the time, and didn't reveal it. Chairman STOKES. The first time you heard about the note was a year ago? Mr. MALLEY. That's correct, when it came out in the newspapers. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. I have no further questions. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Malley, for being here this morning. I would like to go back to the very first question that Chairman Stokes raised to you. I didn't write down your exact quote when you responded, but it struck me. You talked about the relationship between the Bureau and the Warren Commission. You described it as a business relationship. They asked for things and you would respond and it was a very, well, I guess, business relationship is maybe the best way to describe it. And I was a little struck by that. It occurred to me that we had a commission that was set up by the President of the United States, that was chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of this country, investigating the death of an American President. I sensed, in your response, and this is my opinion, but I sensed in your response that the creation of the Warren Commission was a source of embarrassment to the Bureau because it, in effect, was saying that we can't rely on the Bureau to do a thorough and complete investigation of this matter, and we have to set up a separate commission. Would I be incorrect in assuming that that was not an uncommon feeling among upper echelon people within the Bureau that, in fact, the creation of the Warren Commission was, in effect; a black eye; that the very fact it was created was a black eye for the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. The only answer I can give you on that is no official--- Mr. DODD. Is no what? Mr. MALLEY. No official higher than I has discussed their feelings with me about the creation of the Warren Commission. I personally did not consider it any black eye to the Bureau. I felt that on such a matter as important as that, that if they wanted to create a commission to double-check what the Bureau was doing, they had a perfect right to do it, and I went along with the 492 Director's feeling that we should cooperate fully and do anything we could to help, which we did. Mr. DODD. Your answer now has a bit of a different twist to it than it did when you originally answered it. Mr. MALLEY. No, you are indicating that I felt there was something wrong, that I was not in agreement that the Commission should be created. If I gave that impression, I am sorry because it was none of my business whether they did or did not have a commission. Mr. DODD. Let me ask you this: You talked about it as a business relationship, and I presume by that you mean that since you, the agency, the Bureau, was the body responsible for the collection of data, evidence and so forth, in effect, the Bureau was the investigating arm of the Commission. The Commission did not have a separate group of investigators. It relied upon the Bureau for the collection of information; isn't that correct? Mr. MALLEY. That's correct. Mr. DODD. Am I to assume further from your response to Mr. Stokes' question that unless the Commission asked for something specifically, unless they asked for certain data and evidence, that the Bureau was not forthcoming on its own with information--- Mr. MALLEY. No, that's a completely erroneous impression. We were constantly turning over reports, every time that one was received from the field, to the Warren Commission and gave it to them just as fast as we possibly could. So, when you say that we were not doing anything unless they asked us, that is completely wrong. Mr. DODD. The Bureau volunteered information? Mr. MALLEY. We kept doing it up until the day they disbanded the Commission. Mr. DODD. Why didn't you give them the Hosty letter? Mr. MALLEY. Because I didn't know about it. If I had I certainly would have. Mr. DODD. I am not suggesting you yourself, I am talking about the Bureau. If the Bureau was cooperating in giving information to the Warren Commission, you were aware of the Hosty letter, that is the Bureau was, why didn't the Bureau in the sense of cooperation you are describing, turn over the Hosty letter to the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. I can't answer the question because not knowing about it, I don't know what the thinking was of the people who had it or knew about it. Mr. DODD. So, using that example, there was not a full sense of cooperation in terms of making the information available? Mr. MALLEY. Well I would have to say, is there a man in this room who never made a mistake in judgment? Mr. DODD. I am not suggesting that there is a mistake in judgment. You are talking about a letter written in the hand of the man who has been accused of assassinating the President to an FBI agent in Dallas. That is not a mistake in judgment, that is a decision on the part of someone not to turn over a very valid and important piece of evidence. Mr. MALLEY. I can't answer your question any more than saying what I have already. 493 Mr. DODD. Did you have any, or to your knowledge, did anyone in the Bureau have any kind of a special relationship with anyone who was a member of the Warren Commission? By that, I am asking you this: Did anyone who served on the Warren Commission, was any member of that Commission requested to provide information to the Bureau, from executive sessions, that would not otherwise have been available to the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. Not that I am aware of. There is a possibility that somebody may have been very friendly and talked to them, but I don't know of any special request that was ever made to anyone to keep them advised. Mr. DODD. You never made any requests? Mr. MALLEY. I did not. Mr. DODD. To your knowledge, no one else made any requests of any member of that Commission to report on what the activities of the executive sessions of that Commission were? Mr. MALLEY. Not that I can recall. Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I think my 5 minutes may be up. I will come back. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley, during the original investigation in Dallas, and when you were first brought in, was there a tremendous amount of pressure from the Bureau to get it done? Mr. MALLEY. It would depend on how you interpret the comment that you have just made. There was all kinds of pressure to get everything under control as fast as you could. Everybody was reading things from the news media, radio, television and so one, questions were being asked, what about this, what about that, and no matter how much pressure you were getting, a group of men can only do so much in a given time in handling investigative work; whereas as far as I am concerned, I repeat again, I was never given any time limit that we had to have anything finished. Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, at that stage in your investigation you did not feel that there was pressure being brought to bear that resulted in the investigation being anything but complete? Mr. MALLEY. Not where I am concerned. Mr. MCKINNEY. Did you hear through general gossip columns of the FBI or your fellow colleagues, of any inordinate pressure being brought upon the FBI by the Attorney General or by anyone else in the administration, including the Director, to speed it up at any cost? Mr. MALLEY. No. Mr. McKINNEY. After the Warren Commission was established and you became liaison, the Committee is aware of several statements on the part of different people within the administration suggesting that they wanted the Warren Commission wrapped up as quickly as possible. Did you at that point as liaison to the Warren Commission, feel that this type of pressure was in any way hurting your efforts to fully supply the Warren Commission or fully answer any of the questions they had? Mr. MALLEY. Truthfully, I cannot remember that such comments were made. It wouldn't have had any effect whatsoever on what 494 the Bureau did at that time regardless of whether they wanted to wind it up or whether they didn't. We were working on something and we would have continued it until we thought we had fully exhausted it. Mr. McKINNEY. You made a statement earlier that you were sending reports to the Warren Commission right up to their dissolution, so to speak. Did you feel, as an individual and as a long-term agent, and I gather a specialist in your field which was Communism in the United States, that the Warren Commission was brought to a close too soon, before it had all of the information the FBI had? Or, did you feel that it should have been continued longer? Mr. MALLEY. The best answer I can give you on that is that the majority of reports that were being sent to the Warren Commission, after probably the middle of the summer, 1964, were rather innocuous reports of miscellaneous allegations and so on that were continuing to come in. I am not in a position to give you examples, but just things that would have to be checked out to see if there was anything to them. I do think that the Warren Commission in their hearings, exhausted all of the fundamental aspects of the inquiry as I knew it at that time. Mr. McKINNEY. The Warren Commission had rather a cavalier attitude toward the role of Jack Ruby, in fact almost to the point of suggesting that they could find no real ties between Jack Ruby and organized crime. How did you feel about their handling of the Ruby matter. Mr. MALLEY. Well, when you say his ties with organized crime, the only comment I could make is from what I remember reading in reports. I do remember reading that there were several individuals, possibly high school associates of Ruby, that did eventually become pretty well known in organized crime. To the best of my--- Mr. McKINNEY. Wasn't it pretty well known to the FBI that Jack Ruby, No. 1, was a member of organized crime, No. 2, he ran a strip joint and has been somewhat commonly referred to as a supplier of both women and booze to political and police figures in the city of Dallas. Didn't you find it a little difficult to accept the Warren Commission's final output on Ruby with the knowledge that the FBI had put into the Commission? Mr. MALLEY. You are saying the final findings. All I know is that every effort was made to check out his activities completely and anything that we checked was given to them. Now, I am not in a position to criticize what the Warren Commission findings were and I can't say that I agree or disagree with what they found, it is too many years ago. Mr. McKINNEY. Do you think that the push for speed and a resolution to the Warren Commission's deliberations might have been one of the reasons why they were deficient in such areas as following through on Ruby? Mr. MALLEY. Well, based on my conversations with Mr. Rankin I think if he felt we were shortchanging him on time that he would have made a statement for the record at that time to say so. 495 Mr. MCKINNEY. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley, yesterday, Mr. Kelly, with the Secret Service, testified that on December 9, 1963, they were instructed to turn over the assassination to the FBI. To what extent was this investigation continued by the FBI? Mr. MALLEY. Are you referring to what Secret Service was doing or what? Mr. FORD. No; when they turned the investigation over to the FBI on December 9, after receiving orders from the White House, to what extent was this investigation continued from that point on? Mr. MALLEY. Well, I don't know whether I interpret your question correctly because we were already doing everything we possibly could. We continued to do so. Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelly said yesterday that the Secret Service considered the case practically closed when Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested. I think you said earlier that the FBI did not feel that way, and so I am asking at this point what steps or how did you continue the investigation? Mr. MALLEY. We never changed our position one way or the other. Just because Secret Service was dropping out of it we went right ahead with everything that we could possibly do to definitely establish not only the information we thought was correct, namely, Oswald was probably involved, but to firmly show it and see if there was anyone else involved, which we had in mind constantly. Mr. FORD. Memos were coming from Director Hoover instructing that the case be wrapped up as soon as possible, is that correct, Mr. MALLEY. That is what you are telling me. I wasn't in Wash- ington at that time so I don't recall reading them when I got back. Mr. FORD. One final question. Could Director Hoover's attitude toward the Kennedys have had any effect or influence on the investigation of the assassination? Mr. MALLEY. Well, I think I am going to say this for about the third or fourth time. He told me not to stop at anything, to go all out and do everything to thoroughly exhaust every possibility. That certainly wouldn't indicate that any relationship he had would have had any effect on our investigation. Mr. FORD. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to review again exactly the structure of authority in Dallas after you arrived there. Is it your testimony that you were put in charge and that Shanklin and Hosty reported to you during their days out there? Mr. MALLEY. Hosty did not report to me directly at any time. As far as Mr. Shanklin's position, he was the agent in charge of the office, I was sent down there to help coordinate the activities, to help him out in any way I could. There were a number of days where I think that both of us were on the phone close to 16 to 18 hours a day, and beyond that, I don't know whether I know exactly what your question is. 496 Mr. FITHIAN. Well, who made decisions? Mr. MALLEY. If there were any decisions to be made, if Shanklin was the one who received the information, he discussed it with me. If we agreed, fine. If we didn't agree, it was up to me to say yes or no. Mr. FITHIAN. So, in other words, you were the authority in Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. As far as from the sLandpoint of making any decisions on that level. Mr. FITHIAN. OK. At the time you were conducting your investigation, did you know, were you aware that when Oswald killed Officer Tippit, presumably, that he was in about the most direct walking route that one could lay out between his apartment and Jack Ruby's Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I knew it immediately. It did come out because of checks that were made to try and tie in whether or not Ruby and Oswald had ever had any relationship of any kind, friendship, working relationship, or anything else, the Bureau's investigation did not ever reveal the slightest indication of a tieup between Ruby or they were ever--- Mr. FITHIAN. I understand that. I am just asking whether or not you were aware at the time the investigation was----- Mr. MALLEY. Sometime during the investigation I definitely was. Mr. FITHIAN. And were you aware of a memorandum from Evans to Belmont, or the substance of that memorandum, dated November 26, 1963, which I believe is JFK F-457, in which it is clearly acknowledged, that at least there are rumors, this is not evidence, there are rumors, people want to know and it says "There have also been allegations that Oswald and Ruby were known to each other and were part of a conspiracy. It has been further alleged Oswald was killed to silence him." Just to clarify for you in the record, I am not now espousing the theory that necessarily Ruby killed Oswald to silence him. What I am doing is this. This data was in the possession of the Bureau, that is, it was no news to you or anybody else that there were rumors that these two men were associated and, therefore, it seems to me rather pertinent that the chief investigative officer there on behalf of the Bureau would have known that, to the layman at least, it appears that Oswald might be walking from his apartment to Jack Ruby's at the time that he inadvertently came upon police officer Tippit. My question is whether or not you at the time you were conducting the investigation were aware of that? Mr. MALLEY. There is no way that I can go back 15 years and tell you when I became aware of it. While I was in Dallas I certainly went out and retraced the steps from here to here to here, to the rooming house he stayed in, and so on and so forth. Mr. FITHIAN. So you were aware of it sometime before December 10th? Mr. MALLEY. I think I left on the 12th. Mr. FITHIAN. On the 12th, when you returned, you were aware of it some time? Mr. MALLEY. I am reasonably sure I would have had to be. Mr. FITHIAN. Let me move to another question. 497 I think you testified that you were not aware of a threatening note from Oswald to the Bureau in Dallas, to Hosty, in particular. At the time that the decision was made by someone of that important piece of evidence pertaining to Oswald's relationship with the Bureau and his feelings toward a Bureau agent, isn't that the kind of information that would be discussed between Mr. Shanklin and yourself prior to its destruction? Mr. MALLEY. Had I known about it I would certainly have done something about it. I am sorry, he didn't tell me. Mr. FITHIAN. Did you recommend to the Bureau any kind of censure or punishment or reprimand for either Hosty or Shanklin as a result of subsequently finding out that this had been destroyed and that, you while in charge, were not informed? Mr. MALLEY. First of all, I didn't find out about it until a year ago, when I had been out of the Bureau for some 6 years. So I would not be making any recommendations as to what should be done about it. Mr. FITHIAN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FORD [now presiding]. The gentleman is recognized for 2 additional minutes. Mr. FITHIAN. Were you made aware at any time during your stay in Dallas, or during the existence of the Warren Commission--were you made aware of the extent of Oswald's contacts with the FBI, that there was an actual security file on him? Did you know that when you arrived in Dallas? Mr. MALLEY. I knew that on Friday, November 22. I had not had a chance to see the file before I left to go to Dallas because of the fact that there were a lot of people who were interested in seeing the file. They were working in the Domestic Intelligence Division. Subsequently numerous copies were made up and were available to anyone that needed one. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. I would like now to ask a question of a much more general nature and perhaps would call upon sort of your general philosophy and review of your thoughts while you were in the Bureau. Yesterday we had some interesting testimony here from the Secret Service. One of the important aspects of that testimony was a rather clear indication on the part of the witness that he believed Oswald to be some kind of a nut, and it seemed to have emanated from this witness' view that anybody who attempted the assassination of the President of the United States would have to be psychopathic or he would have to be mentally out of order. Would you concur with that general line of interpretation? Mr. MALLEY. I am not in a position to give you a very direct answer. All I can tell you is that there are many people around the country that you would never know what their thoughts were or what they were capable of doing, and that because one does something on a spur of a moment or with a few days of deliberation, I don't know how you can describe the individual. We do know that Oswald, 6 months before he killed Kennedy, took a shot at Oswald, I mean at General Walker. So the man's mentality must have been one of wanting to either do something where he would feel proud of himself, or something of that nature, 498 but that is not a very direct answer to what you have asked me. I just don't know how to answer you. Mr. FITHIAN. I was just wondering if ever in any of the times when you were talking over coffee and---- Mr. MALLEY. The only thought that I have ever had on the matter is that from the very early stages of Oswald's life he seemed to be a complete loner, completely independent, and resented taking instructions from anyone. Mr. FITHIAN. What I was trying to get at is whether or not you and the other high officials in the Bureau, when discussing this, either after the Kennedy case, after the Kennedy assassination, or before, generally tend to believe that the only person capable of actually trying to undertake the assassination of a President or a high official in the United States would have to be mentally unbalanced or off or different? Mr. MALLEY. I wouldn't say that that is a complete necessarily correct situation. You do know that where Oswald is concerned he did some planning on his own. You can say that he was mentally unbalanced. He was certainly smart enough to do a little figuring on that particular situation. He did manage to get away from the building, not for long, but he did manage to get away. Who is to say whether the man is unbalanced or whether he has just got a temporary point that he wants to make for himself and make some history, whether he is going to be prosecuted, killed or what himself, I don't know. Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, the reason I raise this question, is that I guess that I was increasingly disturbed by yesterday's testimony and I really kind of wanted to go back to that witness or to those witnesses, both of these agencies, and ask whether or not either agency would in retrospect have been able to detect or identify a politically motivated, apart from a pathologically motivated, psychopathically motivated, type of an assassination. I guess I am not sure that we are fully aware that there are terrorists who for political reasons these days do things which cannot be normally attributed to somebody who is just mentally off. Maybe we would have thought that 15 years ago, that anybody who hijacked a French airliner or who did many of the kinds of sensational terrorist things that have happened in the last 5 years, or so, maybe we would have thought that only someone who was mentally warped could have done that, but my question, which is very ill phrased, and ineptly phrased, is whether or not, either then or now, the Bureau and the Secret Service and other agencies are really thinking in the dimension of today's world in terms of real terrorists, who act for political, not personally unbalanced reasons, and it disturbs me that that kind of thinking might have prevailed then and therefore, the whole investigation by the FBI was put in that direction rather than to immediately question and thoroughly investigate the potential of either a politically inspired collaborative thing or one in which organized crime was involved? There are two or three other kinds of lines of investigation that seem to me to be rather inadequate by the Bureau and the Secret Service and the Warren Commission, as for as that is concerned, and that is why I was wondering what your philosophy was, where you were coming from? 499 Mr. MALLEY. Well, the only thing that I can say to you is that at that time and today you have literally hundreds of people walking around the streets that may be capable of violence or terrorist activities at any time. I don't know how the Government could afford to spend the money that would be necessary to keep a surveillance on everyone that they thought had the potential to do something out of the question. Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to this question but I am going to have to run and vote or miss that vote. Thank you very much. Mr. EDGAR [now presiding]. I yield back to the Chairman and then I will ask some questions. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Malley, who is in charge of the Monday after Oswald's assassination by Jack Ruby, of the FBI's investigation into the death of President Kennedy? Mr. MALLEY. Who was actually in charge of it? In Washington or in Dallas or where? Mr. EDGAR. OK, let's start with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. MALLEY. Well, I think you would say Mr. Alan Belmont, Associate Director under Mr. Hoover, was actually overseeing the entire investigation. Mr. EDGAR. Again, would you sit closer to the mike? Mr. Alan Belmont? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. EDGAR. In your opinion, Mr. Alan Belmont was in charge of the investigation? Mr. MALLEY. Overall. Mr. EDGAR. For the Federal Bureau of Investigation. What was your relationship with him? Mr. MALLEY. I described my prior position. I was, therefore, working under Belmont and then under Rosen, so there were two people, one person in between myself and Belmont. Mr. EDGAR. At any time in the days following the assassination of President Kennedy, did you suggest or did you participate in a meeting to develop an investigative plan of where the Federal Bureau of Investigation was going to go in analyzing this particular case? Mr. MALLEY. To say that that particular question, the purpose of a meeting, I cannot do it. I do know that I had many, many conferences with Mr. Belmont by myself, many with the supervisory staff that was working in the Division that I was from, as well as supervisors from the Domestic Intelligence Division. Mr. EDGAR. Did the FBI have a plan? Mr. MALLEY. Well, there was a definite plan, namely, the purpose of the investigation, as we have said five times already, was to find out whether there was any conspiracy involved and to make sure whether or not Oswald did actually kill the President. Mr. EDGAR. Was that plan written down anywhere? Mr. MALLEY. If it was, I am not aware of it. Mr. EDGAR. Now, you have just indicated that the FBI had a plan and that that plan was not written down anywhere but---- 500 Mr. MALLEY. I didn't say it wasn't. I said I am not aware of it. Mr. EDGAR. You did suggest, though, that the verbal plan was to check out conspiracy? Mr. MALLEY. Certainly. Mr. EDGAR. What part did the FBI play in trying to coordinate the information of the CIA and Secret Service? Mr. MALLEY. If we received any information from the Secret Service or the CIA we would have taken it into consideration in our own investigation. Following the creation of the Warren Commission, I presume they gave their information to the Warren Commission. Whether they gave it to us, you would have to come up with a specific document and check. Mr. EDGAR. Why wouldn't you have suggested that the FBI sit down with the CIA and the Secret Service to find out what information they had and to share with them what information you had about Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, or anything relating to the assassination? Mr. MALLEY. With respect to the Secret Service, while I was in Dallas no one was in more constant communication with Inspector Tom Kelly than I was. We talked very frequently on the phone. Following the assassination and back in Washington, I frequently had lunch with Tom Kelly and talked to him on the phone frequently. So I don't think you can say that we weren't aware of one another's problems and that we didn't try to help one another out a bit. As to CIA relationships, that would have been handled by Mr. Sullivan's division and I can't offhand say what they did with CIA. Mr. EDGAR. Did you talk to Mr. Kelly about the scope of the FBI's investigative plan? Mr. MALLEY. I do not remember that I did. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDGAR. Mr. chairman, I ask unanimous consent to continue for 3 additional minutes. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized. Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Kelly testified yesterday that his agency checked out Lee Harvey Oswald's rifle in Chicago, and the purchase of that rifle, and discovered that the FBI had already been there and that some information was shared with the proprietor of the shop indicating that the FBI had said don't talk to anyone else about this. Do you know if that is accurate? Mr. MALLEY. I don't have the slightest idea. I am not ignoring your question, I just don't know. Mr. EDGAR. Just a few moments ago you said that the purpose of the Warren Commission--and I hope I am correctly quoting your words--was in essence to quote "double check the FBI's investigation. Was that your testimony? Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I said the purpose. I may have been asked a question where I said I would presume that they were asked to make certain what the FBI did and whether it was complete and thorough and so on. 501 Mr. EDGAR. Was that the attitude of the FBI at the time of the Warren Commission's formation? Mr. MALLEY. We just went through this a little while ago, and I can't tell you of anybody that had any attitudes as such. They may have talked among themselves, I don't know what they did. All I know is that nobody tried to convince me that we were to do anything other than a very thorough job and cooperate fully with the Warren Commission. Mr. EDGAR. But if the prevailing attitude were that of the same phraseology that you have just shared, it would indicate to me that the FBI was a bit paranoid about the Warren Commission in that it was in a sense looking over its shoulder and doublechecking it and looking at its investigation, and that is backed up by some comments that I just read in a report that we have in our folder here, the final report, book V of the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy reference of the intelligence agencies. It goes through a whole litany of concerns that the FBI had about the overseeing of its investigation and the things that the Warren Commission might find out. Did it ever occur to you that the Warren Commission may have been formed to provide a coordinated function of putting together a puzzle and that rather than being a doublecheck of the FBI it was m essence using the FBI as its investigative arm, and it was looking at the Secret Service and the CIA and Oswald and Ruby and just trying to figure out what in fact took place in Dallas, and what it could tell the American people about that particular event, with no malice or intention of doing anything to the FBI. Is that a possibility? Mr. MALLEY. Well, unless I saw the instructions that were given to Mr. Rankin and the entire Warren Commission, I would certainly have no idea of the exact purpose for which they were established. I do know what I thought they were trying to do, and they were certainly trying to find out all the facts relating to the assassination, and I don't think they cared whether it was good or bad from the standpoint of whether we made mistakes or did something perfect, they wanted to know the correct situation and would bring out what happened. I don't think they were showing any partiality nor do I think they were showing malice. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has again expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in order that the record may be complete--and I welcome Mr. Malley here today--Mr. Malley, you and I have been acquainted for something in excess of 35 years, isn't that right? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. And you and I were both assigned to the New York office at the same time? Mr. MALLEY. That is right. Mr. DEVINE. I believe you were in a supervisory capacity and I was just an ordinary special agent; is that right? Mr. MALLEY. I wouldn't say an ordinary, Mr. Devine, I would say you were assigned there and were doing your job. Mr. DEVINE. I believe that Assistant Director Belmont was also assigned to the New York office at that time? 502 Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. And he has since deceased? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. How long ago did he pass away? Mr. MALLEY. I believe it was a year ago this spring, but I may be wrong. Time goes by fast. Mr. DEVINE. Yes. Mr. Malley, I am sorry that these rollcalls require us to be absent from time to time, and I understand that our chairman and perhaps our counsel questioned you about the statements attributed to Mr. Sullivan. Are you in a position--you may have answered this--are you in a position to state whether or not Mr. Sullivan was looked upon with disfavor by the majority of your personnel? I don't mean to put you on the spot. Mr. MALLEY. I said before--Mr. Sullivan is dead, he can't speak for himself--I will repeat what I have told the two men from your committee, that I said to them, Mr. Sullivan was not an easy man to get along with and on a personal situation. I think I am correct in saying that three out of five telephone calls I ever had with him I ended up hanging up after a discussion where there was no possibility of discussing anything sensibly. It all comes down to the fact that Mr. Sullivan had a very strong attitude, that if I say something, I am correct, and if you don't agree with me, you are wrong. Mr. DEVINE. Are you in a position to say the circumstances under which he left the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. I had left the Bureau prior to that time so I am really not capable of saying. It would be strictly hearsay on my part. I do know from rumors that there were some difficulties encountered. Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Malley, I think I know what your answer will be to this but I think it should be made clear for the record. Did the Bureau have any preconceived notion on who was responsible for the Kennedy assassination and then conducted an investigation to confirm that preconceived idea? Mr. MALLEY. Other members of your committee have indicated they might feel that we did that. That is not correct. As far as people who were working on the assassination, they had an open mind and still had an open mind up to the time that I left the Bureau in 1971 that there could be somebody else involved. Mr. DEVINE. So that in this investigation the Bureau followed its time-tested policy of being purely a factfinding organization, seeking facts and not making recommendations, letting the chips fall where they may; is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. Finally, Mr. Malley, I would like to refer to the narration our chief counsel, Mr. Blakey, when he was giving pretty much the history of the Bureau. In one place he indicated that J. Edgar Hoover's three distinct priorities were the fight against communism, statistics that reflected FBI progress, and the positive image of the Bureau. 503 He also had, according to some, two glaring blindspots in the areas of civil rights and organized crimes, which put him at odds with the Kennedy administration. Are you in a position to make any comment upon the activities of the Bureau in the area of civil rights up to and including this time? Mr. MALLEY. Yes, I think I am. Mr. DEVINE. Would you state that, please? Mr. MALLEY. Personally, while I was in the field, before I was called into the seat of government, I had several occasions where I was asked, not asked, told, to conduct civil rights investigations, which I did. Back in the late middle-forties, while I was assigned as an assistant agent in charge in Houston, Tex., I attended a number of schools for police and sheriffs, where one of the topics to be discussed was the civil rights statutes, and explained to the police officers who were present the full details of why the investigations were being made on civil rights matters and the necessity of changing their ways, if they were engaging in any activities whereby they would be in violation of the civil rights statutes. On returning to or coming back to Washington in 1952, there was a civil rights desk set up at the seat of government where they were supervising civil rights cases, and I do know that it was a pretty active desk. So when the comment is made that Mr. Hoover had no interest in civil rights, what his personal feelings were I cannot say, officially he was carrying out all obligations under the civil rights statute. I also know that some claims were made concerning our attitude and when you say that we didn't take over and do things until the Kennedys came in, I remember one instance, which I would like for your record to show, namely, that certain people in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice felt that they had a perfect right to have agents assigned to them to go out in the field and they would direct all of the agent's activities and not be in a position to do what they felt needed to be done except on the departmental attorney's instructions. The Director flatly refused to assign personnel under those circumstances but did say, "you tell us the cases you want investigated, we will do them, turn the results over to you, and if your have any problems with our investigation we will do as much more or anything else that you want to ask us to do, but we will conduct our original investigation." Beyond that, I think I have covered it. Mr. DEVINE. The second part of the question, Mr. Malley, had to do with organized crime and some conflict with the Kennedy administration. Are you in a position to comment on that? I know you were not assigned to the criminal division at that time. Mr. MALLEY. I am not really in a position to comment about any conflict. I do know that following the Kennedy assassination, I am sorry, the Kennedy administration taking power, more emphasis was placed on organized crime. Beyond that I am not in a position to comment. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. 504 Mr. Malley, with reference to some of the answer's you have just given Mr. Devine with reference to the attitude of the department with reference to civil rights, were you still with the department when the COINTEL program was initiated? Mr. MALLEY. That was in another division. I did hear references to it. I was not thoroughly familiar with it. Chairman STOKES. Well, since you have left the department are you now familiar with the COINTEL program? Mr. MALLEY. Only what I have read in the newspapers. No other way could I be familiar with it since I left the Bureau. Chairman STOKES. Are you aware of the fact that as a result of a Senate committee uncovering the COINTEL program, it has been described as being one of the most disgraceful activities to ever be conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation against people like Dr. Martin Luther King, and other civil rights persons? Mr. MALLEY. I saw it in the paper that there was a lot of criticism. Chairman STOKES. And having seen that in the paper, does that in any way impact upon your statements here this morning with reference to the great civil rights attitude of the department? Mr. MALLEY I didn't hear your last part Chairman STOKES. From what you have read, then, about the impact upon the statements that you have made here about the fine attitude of the department toward civil rights? Mr. MALLEY. When you say department, are you referring to the Justice Department or do you mean a department in the FBI? Chairman STOKES. I am talking about the FBI. Mr. MALLEY. The only thing that I can tell you is what I did say, that we were interested in conducting civil rights investigations. What was handled under the COINTEL program I cannot comment on because I don't know exactly what was going on. Chairman STOKES. Another point with reference to Mr. Sullivan. It seems to me that the underlying question here is not whether he was a difficult man to get along with. The question, it seems to me, is as you knew him, was he a truthful man? Mr. MALLEY. I can't cite instances. I would say there are a number of recollections where I felt to myself that that is not the way I understood the situation to be when I read certain things that he had prepared. Chairman STOKES. That is not my question, sir. My question is, as you knew him, was he a truthful man? Mr. MALLEY. I wasn't acquainted with him on a social basis. As far as official dealings with him, I did not always believe every- thing that he tried to convince me of. That still is not a direct answer. That is the only way I can answer it. Chairman STOKES. Well, let's put it another way. From all that you knew about him, would you disbelieve him under oath? Mr. MALLEY. I think that if it looked to Mr. Sullivan like it was to his advantage to say what he was thinking he might say it and I don't know whether he would even be aware whether he' was fabricating or not. 505 Chairman STOKES. Mr. Malley, I think the question I am putting to you is a fairly simple question and really requires a fairly simple answer. From all you know about him. Mr. MALLEY. I would not trust him. Chairman STOKES. Beg pardon? Mr. MALLEY. I would not trust him, if that is a better answer for you. Chairman STOKES. There is a difference between trust and credibility. Mr. MALLEY. Let me say then that I don't think his credibility was as high as most people that I was acquainted with in the Bureau. Chairman STOKES. You don't care to answer my question, is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. I can't say that he lied deliberately at any time. All I know is that I had many dealings--- Chairman STOKES. I just asked you sir, from all you knew about him, would you believe him under oath? Mr. MALLEY. Not necessarily. Chairman STOKES. Now, Mr. Hoover was a powerful man, wasn't he. Isn't that a fair statement? Mr. MALLEY. I would regard it as true. Chairman STOKES. And throughout the Bureau, by the men in the Bureau, he was regarded as being a powerful man, was he not? Mr. MALLEY. Yes. Chairman STOKES. And it will be a fair statement to say that in his imposing position he intimidated men who worked in that Bureau, isn't that true? Mr. MALLEY. I won't agree with that statement. Some fellows may have felt that way. I felt that if I didn't like what Mr. Hoover was doing I had a right to walk out any time I wanted to. He didn't ask me to come to work, I asked him to work there. Chairman STOKES. Well, with reference to other men in the Bureau, wasn't it commonly known that he intimidated men? Mr. MALLEY. All I can answer there is to say that if something went wrong your agents knew they would probably be receiving disciplinary action. If you call that intimidation, maybe it is. Chairman STOKES. And with reference to that disciplinary action, because of the fear of incurring his wrath, wasn't it commonly known in the Bureau that field supervisors would often cover up the mistakes of their men so as not to incur his wrath? Mr. MALLEY. I don't have knowledge of that. I was a field supervisor for 4 1/2 years and I don't remember that I ever covered up for anybody. Chairman STOKES. Well, I am not asking you what you did, I am asking, wasn't it common knowledge? Mr. MALLEY. I can't answer what other people did. When you say common knowledge, I don't know that to be common knowledge. Chairman STOKES. I have no further questions. The gentlemen from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. I yield to Mr. Sawyer. Chairman STOKES. I am sorry. I didn't realize the gentleman had gotten back. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 506 As I understand your job of liaison entailed reading carefully anything that went from the Bureau to the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. SAWYER. At least that was part of the job? Mr. MALLEY. Yes. Mr. SAWYER. What was the purpose of your reading carefully everything that went to the Warren Commission before it went there? Mr. MALLEY. To make certain that everything was properly, thoroughly, and exhaustively run out. Mr. Belmont and I had the same assignment, and in reading reports, et cetera, I know that I did it, and I am sure that Belmont made notes reading reports to double check back and see what the preliminary investigation was on certain matters, whether it had been completely followed through. If there wasn't a definite answer, to see to it that further investigation was made, check with the supervisors to find out whether more investigation was being conducted. Mr. SAWYER. Did you have authority to decide, after reading something, that it wasn't going to go to the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. I did not. There was nothing that came through, as far as the Bureau was concerned, that did not eventually go to the Warren Commission. Mr. SAWYER. When you say eventually, what do you mean eventually? Mr. MALLEY. What I am saying is that if a report came through and it was obviously incomplete and had not been thoroughly looked into, we sent it back to the field to get a more complete investigation and then sent over a completed product. Mr. SAWYER. Did you do that, did you exercise any discretion with respect to things that, in your judgment, might be embarrassing to the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. I did not. Mr. SAWYER. Was that part of your job? Mr. MALLEY. As I said before, we were told to hold nothing back from the Warren Commission. Mr. SAWYER. But you were told to read carefully anything before it went? Mr. MALLEY. And to make sure it was accurate and fully investigated. Mr. SAWYER. You operated somewhat as a censor, then, between the Bureau and the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. No, sir. When you say a censor, you are inferring I would have the right to take this out and take that out, and I am saying that my only purpose in reading material was to make certain that the investigation was complete. Mr. SAWYER. So you only had authority to add in and not take out, is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. And the additions would only be to get further data to explain what the thing was all about. Mr. SAWYER. And you never in the course of this saw this Hosty letter either? Mr. MALLEY. I have said four times I never saw the letter until-am sorry, you were out, maybe you didn't hear me--I never knew 507 anything about the Hosty letter until 1 year ago when it came out in the newspapers. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, let me just make sure I am correct. You were the first person assigned, you were initially assigned as the liaison to the Warren Commission, is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. That is correct. Mr. FITHIAN. And did anyone else serve as the liaison throughout its existence? Mr. MALLEY. Not to my knowledge, unless there was some situation where I was ill or might have taken a day off, and I don't recall that occurring. Mr. FITHIAN. And you told us that you reviewed documents and all matters that went to the Warren Commission, you read them personally? Mr. MALLEY. That is right. Mr. FITHIAN. I would now like to direct your attention to the Oswald address book and ask you whether or not you saw that document prior to its going to the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. To be specific, I can't recall that I saw the address book as such. I saw the results of everything that was in his address book in a report form and I believe that I was shown the actual address book. Mr. FITHIAN. And did you satisfy yourself that it was authentic and complete; that is, did you look at the report that was going from the Bureau to the Warren Commission, compare that with the address book itself?. Mr. MALLEY. I had to use a little reliance on people who were working with me. To take the time to go through everything that was in Oswald's notebook and compare item by item, I could not take the time to do it. Mr. FITHIAN. So that we can be completely accurate, then, it would be inaccurate to say that you read everything that was forwarded from the Bureau to the Warren Commission? Mr. MALLEY. I did make the comment that I read any letters and all reports that went from the Bureau. Mr. FITHIAN. Are you aware that a particular page from the Oswald notebook was not forwarded and that that page included agent Hosty's name and address and license number? Mr. MALLEY. I had no recollection of it. I was told by one of your staff members that that occurred. Mr. FITHIAN. Do you have any comment for the committee as to how that could have occurred? Mr. MALLEY. No, I am not in a position to answer you because I knew nothing about it. Mr. FITHIAN. Is it your professional judgment that the book once acquired by the FBI always remained in the possession of the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. It would be most unusual if it did not. 508 Mr. FITHIAN. And, therefore, would it be fair for the committee to conclude--- Mr. MALLEY. May I interrupt you there? Mr. FITHIAN. Yes. Mr. MALLEY. I do not know if this is one of the items of evidence that was picked up by the Dallas Police Department prior to the time that it was turned over to the FBI. Mr. FITHIAN. Who would have given you the book? Mr. MALLEY. One of the supervisors in Washington or one of the agents in the field office before it was sent into Washington; I cannot recall. Mr. FITHIAN. Does the Bureau retain some kind of chain of custody within the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. Generally speaking, when a piece of evidence is picked up in the field, it is handled by the agent who picked it up until he dictates his material. It is then put in an evidence envelope. If it is coming to Washington, it is marked "evidence" so anyone knows that it is evidence. Mr. FITHIAN. So it would be reasonable, would it not, to believe that the only possible alteration of the contents of the book would have to have been done by somebody in the Bureau? Mr. MALLEY. All I can tell you is that we did receive a lot of material from the Dallas Police Department. When that book may have been turned over, if it was turned over by them, I don't know. Mr. FITHIAN. I should correct this by saying it is the transcription that has the page removed. Mr. MALLEY. Not from the actual report, and not from the actual notebook. Mr. FITHIAN. No, I believe it is; I have to check with counsel on this, but I believe it is the transcription of the address book, that which was prepared by the Bureau, the transcription prepared to go through you to the Warren Commission, is that not correct, and so it would be a page of that transcription that is missing. Mr. MALLEY. I would have no way of knowing. Mr. FITHIAN. Who would have prepared the transcription and signed off on it? Mr. MALLEY. It would depend on the agent's name that was on the report or whether it was an insert prepared by an agent. Mr. FITHIAN. But when it got to you, you would verify that someone had, even if you didn't check it yourself, line by line, you would verify that somebody, some responsible authority in the Bureau, had signed off on the document, wouldn't you, isn't that the way you keep your custody straight? Mr. MALLEY. Are you referring now to keeping the evidence straight or are you referring to this transcription? Mr. FITHIAN. You see, I am not a lawyer, but it just seems to me that when the President of the United States is killed and documents are transmitted from one person to another or one agency to another, certainly documents as important as those belonging to the alleged assassin--- Mr. MALLEY. Certainly. Mr. FITHIAN [continuing]. That there would have to be some kind of clear chain of travel for the document. I don't think it just appears in your hand, and so my question is: Was there not some 509 system in the Bureau whereby each person who had that and prepared the transcript and brought it to you as the supervisor, as the liaison to the Warren Commission, would have signed off on it? And your responsibility to the supervisor would have been to ascertain that, in fact, someone had attested to you in one form or another that that was a bona fide document, a complete document before it went to the Warren Commission. Now, is that too much to expect that that is the process? Mr. MALLEY. You are dealing with an entirely different situation in this instance. It was usually handled in the field; namely, most pieces of evidence went direct from a field office to the U.S. attorney's office. In this instance, anything coming in from the Dallas office in the way of evidence would have had to come in, it would be seen by the supervisor and he, in turn, if it was being handled by an individual letter, would have kept it in a folder marked "evidence" and sent it to myself and then on up to Mr. Belmont. As far as signing a document of some kind, to say this one handled it or that one handled it, I don't know of any time the Bureau followed that much of a clerical procedure. Mr. FITHIAN. I ask for unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recog* nized. Mr. FITHIAN. Let me review this, then. Since it has now been demonstrated that a page, in fact, of the transcription was missing and since reasonable evidence is that it came to the Bureau complete, the alteration, the omission would have to come either at the Dallas office level, at the Washington supervisor level, or by you or by the Warren Commission prior to publication. That's the only four stops that it made; isn't that correct? Mr. MALLEY. Correct. Mr. FITHIAN. And your testimony is that you did not know of the omission. Is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. That's what I said. Mr. FITHIAN. Now, there is additional evidence that the page, in fact, was not only missing, but that it was retyped so as to appear to be a complete record. What kind of penalty, what kind of reprimand might be reasonably expected to come down from the top, from you or someone, for the person who had made such an alteration? Wouldn't there be some kind of discipline? Mr. MALLEY. If it had been known, there would have been a thorough check made and recommendations made. Mr. FITHIAN. The way it appears to the casual and perhaps to even the careful observer is that the Hosty note was destroyed because it reflected badly on the Bureau, that the Oswald transcription was altered because it reflected badly on the Bureau and a number of other things were done so as to put the Bureau in the best possible light. Can you give us any hard evidence as to why we should not believe that that is the case; that is, that various things were altered, omitted, or drafted in such a way as to put the Bureau in the very best possible light rather than to give the complete information to the Warren Commission? 510 Mr. MALLEY. Concerning your second comment, that Hosty's name was left out of this transcription, I know of no good reason that it would have been left out. Hosty, at one time, was handling the investigation of Oswald. The fact he had gone out and talked to his wife would be no reason to try to eliminate Hosty's name that I know of. So, I am not in a position to say why anyone would eliminate it. I have to let you draw any conclusions you want to as to why these things were done because I do not know about them. Mr. FITHIAN. And you are not prepared to offer any hard information as to why that kind of conclusion might be drawn by someone reviewing the documents? Mr. MALLEY. No, I am not; I am not. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has again expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Going back to the questioning of our chairman, Mr. Stokes, and the questioning of Mr. Devine about both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover, could you describe Mr. Hoover's personality to the committee as you understood it? Mr. MALLEY. With regard to what? Mr. EDGAR. What was he like to work for as an individual? Mr. MALLEY. He was a very domineering individual who wanted the job done by everybody that was involved. As far as I am concerned, demanded as much excellence that was possible to obtain. Mr. EDGAR. In the course of your many years in the FBI, did you see any changes in Mr. Hoover's personality? Mr. MALLEY. I don't think so. Mr. EDGAR. So, he was the same in 1955 as he was in 1963 and the same as he was in 1968? Mr. MALLEY. As far as I am concerned. Mr. EDGAR. It has been pointed out through a number of documents that we have had access to that Mr. Hoover became concerned at some point that the FBI would not be looked upon favorably by the Warren Commission. Is that your impression of Mr. Hoover's concern during the end of 1963 and early 1964? Mr. MALLEY. I have previously stated that I saw nothing to indicate that Mr. Hoover was worried about what the Warren Commission came up with. He wanted us to thoroughly cooperate with them, thoroughly go ahead with our investigation. You say you have these indications; I know nothing about them. Mr. EDGAR. Well, on an April 3, 1964, memorandum to William Sullivan, he handwrote the note, "Their so-called compliments of the Bureau's work are empty and have no sincerity." It goes on to point out several other memorandums and notes where Mr. Hoover was concerned about how the Bureau would be seen. I do note that there was by one agent--well, here's another quote of Mr. Hoover, "In any event, such gross incompetency cannot be overlooked for administrative action postponed,' and this was a handwritten note on the 17 agents that were going to be disciplined secretly. Did you know of that disciplinary action? Mr. MALLEY. I knew that Mr. Gale had been requested to conduct an investigation. I didn't know when he completed it, nor did I 511 know all details about it. I don't recall that I ever saw the memorandum that recommended it. Mr. EDGAR. Did you ever bring to the attention of the Warren Commission that there were agents who were reprimanded? Mr. MALLEY. I just got through telling you that I never saw the note, memorandum. I wasn't aware of all the details and I, therefore, would not have had anything to do with bringing it to their attention. Mr. EDGAR. It seems to me that what you are saying by that answer is, even though you were the liaison person for the FBI, there was information available to the FBI not available to you that was not transmitted to the Warren Commission. Mr. MALLEY. As I said, I was not shown the memorandum. I couldn't have made any recommendations about it going any place, not knowing whether it had ever been completed. Mr. EDGAR. I can respect that. From the indications that 1 am receiving from reading these documents, Mr. Hoover was angry that those agents did not put Mr. Oswald on the security index and yet Mr. Hoover, at least, did not direct you to transmit that information, and the reasons for that feeling on his part to the Warren Commission; is that correct? Mr. MALLEY. I can't answer what Mr. Hoover thought. Mr. EDGAR. Did you ever transmit to the Warren Commission the feeling of the Director that Lee Harvey Oswald should have been on the security index? Mr. MALLEY. No; not to my recollection. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. You knew Agent Hosty was suspended or otherwise disciplined for his conduct in connection with the Oswald affair; did you not? Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall the exact date. I do know that eventually for some time he was suspended, but I don't remember when it was. Mr. SAWYER. Do you know why? Mr. MALLEY. Are you referring to the original investigation? Are you referring to the Hosty note or what are you referring to? Mr. SAWYER. Do you know why he was suspended--Agent Hosty? Mr. MALLEY. If I knew, I would be glad to tell you. I do not know. Mr. SAWYER. And it was then, in your view, just happenstance that Hosty was eliminated from this transcription of the notebook? Mr. MALLEY. I didn't say that. I said I do not know why it would have been because I see no reason for it to have been. Mr. SAWYER. You don't think that reason could have been connected with the same reason that Hosty was suspended for his activities? Mr. MALLEY. I really can't say that I would take that attitude because it was very obvious from the reports that were available that Mr. Hosty had been involved in the investigation of Oswald. I don't know why they would want to try to eliminate his name just from a notebook. Mr. SAWYER. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. 512 Mr. Malley, as a witness before our committee, at the conclusion of your testimony, you are entitled to 5 minutes at which time you may, in any way, explain any portion of your testimony, you may comment upon it, you may expand upon it in any way. On behalf of the committee, I, at this time, extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose. Mr. MALLEY. I have no further comments I desire to make. Chairman STOKES. There being nothing further, on behalf of the committee, we thank you for having appeared here and giving us your testimony today. Thank you very much. You are excused. [Witness excused.] Chairman STOKES. The Chair now recognizes Professor Blakey. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The FBI security case on Lee Harvey Oswald was opened on October 31, 1959, after it was learned that he had defected to the Soviet Union and had informed officials at the American Embassy in Moscow that he intended to provide radar secrets to the Russians. The case was intermittently closed and reopened during the following 4 years as Oswald returned from the Soviet Union and moved from Fort Worth to Dallas to New Orleans and back again to Dallas. It is the handling of the Oswald case that resulted in a decision by Director J. Edgar Hoover, not made public at the time, to discipline a number of Bureau employees, including an assistant director. The next witness, Mr. Chairman, is a retired official of the FBI, James H. Gale. Immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy, Director Hoover assigned Mr. Gale to conduct an inspection of the Bureau's performance in the Oswald security case prior to the assassination. Mr. Gale's reports resulted in the censuring of a number of FBI employees. Mr. Gale was hired as an FBI clerk on November 29, 1939, and became an agent on June 21, 1943. He has served as the assistant special agent in charge and special agent in charge in Anchorage, Alaska, and a special agent in charge in Richmond, Cincinnati, and the Washington field offices, as well as Chicago. In 1962, Mr. Gale became Assistant Director for the Inspection Division. In 1964, Mr. Gale became Assistant Director of the Special Investigative Division. He retired from the Bureau on October 1, 1971. Mr. Chairman, before calling Mr. Gale, it may be appropriate to note for the record that the select committee has deposed Special Agent James B. Hosty. His testimony was also taken earlier by other House and Senate committees and the select committee has, through the courtesy of those committees, full access to Mr. Hosty's testimony. The select committee has also been in recent contact with Special Agent Hosty. Mr. Hosty has now new information to offer this committee. Newspaper stories that have recently indicated otherwise are not rounded in fact. Mr. Hosty's role in the Oswald secu- 513 rity case and subsequently will, of course, be treated in the final committee report in December. He will not be called to testify here today. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, at this time to call Mr. Gale. Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Mr. Gale. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. GALE. Yes, I do. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, you may be seated. TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. GALE Mr. GALE. May I approach him, please, the Counsel? Chairman STOKES. Mr. Genzman you want to see. The Chair recognizes Counsel for the committee, Robert Genzman. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gale, would you state your full name for the record? Mr. GALE. James H. Gale. Mr. GENZMAN. What was your occupation in 1963? Mr. GALE. In 1963, I was the Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division. Mr. GENZMAN. Briefly, what were your duties? Mr. GALE. As Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division, I had charge over approximately 7 inspectors and about 25 permanent inspector's aides, and it was my responsibility to make inspections of every seat of government division as well as each of the 56 field offices on at least a one-time-per-year basis. During that time, we would go into the files, investigative files, administrative procedures, make investigative suggestions, insure that personnel was being utilized at a maximum advantage, make sure that we were not indulging in too much redtape, and check into any investigative deficiencies and make pertinent recommendations for administrative action for any administrative or investigative deficiencies. Mr. GENZMAN. How long did you perform inspection duties for the Bureau? Mr. GALE. I was an inspector from 1956 to 1959. And then I was in charge of the Washington field office, thereafter going to Chicago, and then coming back as Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division from 1962 until 1964. Mr. GENZMAN. And when did you retire from the Bureau? Mr. GALE. I retired from the Bureau on October 1, 1971. Mr. GENZMAN. In connection with your FBI duties, did you ever investigate the FBI's internal security case on Lee Harvey Oswald? Mr. GALE. Yes, I did. Mr. GENZMAN. Have you previously testified about your investi- gation of the Oswald security case? Mr. GALE. No, I have not. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would ask that the exhibit marked as JFK F-460 be entered into the record. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record. [The above-referred-to exhibit, JFK F-460, follows:] 514 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 515 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 516 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 517 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 518 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 519 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 520 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 521 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 522 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 523 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 524 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 525 JFK EXHIBIT F-460 cont. 526 Chairman STOKES. Do you also want it displayed? Mr. GENZMAN. No. Mr. Gale, can you identify JFK exhibit F-4607 Mr. GALE. Yes, JFK exhibit F-460 is a memorandum which I prepared on December 10, 1963, to Mr. Tolson, who is the associate director. Mr. GENZMAN. What was the subject of this memorandum? Mr. GALE. The subject matter was Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security-R. Mr. GENZMAN. What does the "R" denote? Mr. GALE. Russian. Mr. GENZMAN. Can you identify the distinctive handwriting which appears throughout JFK exhibit F-460; on page 3, for instance? Mr. GALE. On page 3, there are several handwriting statements which were made in the handwriting of J. Edgar Hoover. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gale, why did you write this report? Mr. GALE. The day after the President was assassinated, Mr. Hoover called me into his office and told me that undoubtedly a commission would be appointed to check into all facets of the assassination of the President and he indicated that he wanted us, wanted me, to make a thorough scrutiny of all the material which we had on Lee Harvey Oswald to determine whether we had properly fulfilled all of our investigative responsibilities and to make any necessary changes in our procedures regarding the handling of cases of this type. Mr. GENZMAN. Would you read aloud the first paragraph of this report? MR. GALE. Director instructed that complete analysis be made of any investigative deficiencies in the Oswald case, an analysis made concerning any necessary changes in our procedures; re, handling cases of this type. An analysis, re, procedure changes and dissemination policies handled separately. Mr. GENZMAN. Does this paragraph adequately reflect the purpose of this report? Mr. GALE. I think it does. Mr. GENZMAN. How did you investigate the handling of the Oswald security case? Mr. GALE. The first thing I did was pull all the files that we had down at the seat of Government. I made a thorough review of all the material which we had on Lee Harvey Oswald, all the cases, investigative cases that we had opened on him. I thereafter interviewed certain personnel in the Internal Security Division, and I also sent out teletypes and made telephone calls to various field offices which were involved to obtain explanation from pertinent personnel as to what were considered as possible deficiencies in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. GENZMAN. Did you travel to any FBI field offices? Mr. GALE. No, I did not. Mr. GENZMAN. Were the steps which you undertook adequate for this type of investigation? 527 Mr. GALE. The steps which I took, in my judgment, were definitely adequate, and fulfilled the purpose of this investigation. Mr. GENZMAN. What conclusions did you reach as a result of your investigation? Mr. GALE. I reached conclusions that there were certain investigative and reporting delinquencies in the investigation for which administrative action should be taken against the responsible personnel. Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 6, would you read the second sentence? Mr. GALE. "As indicated above, there were a number"--- Mr. GENZMAN. The second sentence, Mr. Gale. Mr. GALE [continuing]. "Oswald should have been on the security index. His wife should have been interviewed before the assassination and investigation intensified, not held in abeyance, after Oswald contacted Soviet Embassy in Mexico." Mr. GENZMAN. Does this sentence adequately summarize your conclusions? Mr. GALE. Yes, it does. Mr. GENZMAN. Did J. Edgar Hoover agree with your conclusions? Mr. GALE. Yes, he did. Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 3, can you find any indications there that Mr. Hoover agreed with you? Mr. GALE. He made several observations concerning excuses made by Dallas personnel that they had not interviewed Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald. "Oswald had been drinking to excess and beat up his wife on several occasions. The agent indicated there should be a 60-day cooling-off period and Mr. Hoover said that was certainly an asinine excuse." Mr. GEMZMAN. Are you reading his handwriting? Mr. GALE. Yes, I am. Mr. GENZMAN. Continue, please. Mr. GALE. "And also after Oswald returned from Dallas, no interview was conducted of Mr. Oswald because they said that they were trying to avoid giving the impression that she was being harassed or hounded because of her immigrant status." In order that the interview when conducted might be as productive as possible, Mr. Hoover said I just don't understand such solicitude. Then I indicated I felt this entire facet of the investiga tion was mishandled. I felt that Mrs. Oswald definitely should have been interviewed, and I felt the best time to get information from her was after she had been beaten up by her husband. It was felt she was far more likely to cooperate when she was angry at Oswald than otherwise, and Mr. Hoover indicated this certainly made sense. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, earlier you testified that Lee Harvey Oswald should have been on the security index. What is the security index? Mr. GALE. The security index was a list of names of individuals who are participants in activities of subversive organizations, had anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, and were likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety, as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 528 3 years established through reliable sources, informants or individuals. Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to the last paragraph on page 1, would you read that paragraph? Mr. GALE. Field and seat of government employees who handle instant case maintain subject did not come within the security index criteria. Inspector does not agree claiming that Oswald came within the following category. Investigation has developed information that individual, though not a member of or participant in the activities of subversive organizations, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants or individuals. Mr. GENZMAN. Why did you think Oswald came within this category? Mr. GALE. I felt that Oswald came within this category because of his contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. He passed out pamphlets; had a placard around his neck reading "Hands off, viva Fidel." He had also engaged in certain other activities which I felt came within the purview of the security index. He defected to Russia. He stated he would never return to the United States for any reason. He stated that he was a Marxist and had advised the Department of State that he would furnish the Soviets any information he had acquired as a Marine aviation electronics expert. He also affirmed in writing allegiance to the Soviet Union and said the service in the Marine Corps gave him a chance to observe American imperialism. According to the State Department, he displayed the air of a new "sophomore" party liner at the time. Upon returning to the United States, he displayed a cold, arrogant, and generally uncooperative attitude and refused to take the Bureau polygraph test to determine if he had cooperated with the Soviets or had a current intelligence assignment. And he also subscribed to the Worker, east coast Communist newspaper, and he had also written a letter to the Worker asking for literature saying that he was forming a Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans and he sent honorary membership to those fighters for peace, Mr. Gus Hall and Mr. Ben Davis and he was arrested August 9, 1963, for passing out Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets on the street, and shortly thereafter, he was interviewed on radio and said Russia had gone soft on Communism and that Cuba was the only revolutionary country in the world today. So, for those reasons, I felt he should be on the security index. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you. Did J. Edgar Hoover agree with you that Oswald met the criteria of the security index? Mr. GALE. Yes, he did. Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to the routing slip following page 11, can you find any indication there of Mr. Hoover's position? It is the last page. Mr. GALE. Frankly, the copy I have here, I could read Mr. Hoover's handwriting very well on an original copy, but the handwriting here is such that I am having a difficult time reading it. Mr. GENZMAN. Let me read it, correct me if I am wrong. 529 "If the English language means anything, it certainly included a character like Oswald," at the bottom of the page. Mr. GALE. Yes, I think that's correct. Mr. GENZMAN. Did the FBI supervisors and field agents who were actually involved in the Oswald security case think that Oswald met the security index criteria? Mr. GALE. No, they did not. Mr. GENZMAN. None of them did? Mr. GALE. None admitted to me that he did. Of course, if he did, then it would not be a very wise thing for them to do probably because it would be self-serving; it was self-serving for them to maintain that he should not be on the security index because if he should be on the security index and was not, then, of course, they were culpable of not having put him on the security index. Mr. GENZMAN. What would have been the result if Oswald had been on the security index? Mr. GALE. I don't think it would have had any result insofar as the assassination was concerned. I don't think it would have prevented the assassination. I don't think it would have had any material effect insofar as the assassination was concerned at all. It was an internal error. They did not have him on there, and I felt he definitely met that criteria and that he should have been on there. Mr. GENZMAN. Based on your findings, what recommendations did you make? Mr. GALE. I made recommendations for certain administrative action against the agents involved for the different investigative and reporting delays. Mr. GENZMAN. How many employees at the FBI were disciplined? Mr. GALE. There were 17 employees disciplined as a result of my inquiry. Mr. GENZMAN. Did these 17 employees include supervisors as well as field agents? Mr. GALE. Yes, they did. Mr. GENZMAN. Can you explain how they were disciplined in general terms? Mr. GALE. Some were censured and some were censured and put on probation. Mr. GENZMAN. Were any employees suspended or transferred at this time. Mr. GALE. Not to ray recollection. Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 6, would you read the middle paragraph, beginning with the word "concerning"? Mr. GALE. Concerning the administrative action recommended hereinafter, there is a possibility the Presidential Commission investigating instant matter will subpena the investigating agents. If this occurs, the possibility then exists the agents may be questioned concerning whether administrative action had been taken against them. However, it is felt these potentialities are sufficiently remote, that the recommended action should go forward at this time. It appears unlikely at this time that the commission subpena would go down to an agent level. 530 Mr. GENZMAN. Would you explain what you meant in this paragraph? Mr. GALE. What I meant was that it was unlikely that any of the agents would be subpenaed by the Commission-- Mr. GENZMAN. By the Warren Commission? Mr. GALE [continuing]. By the Warren Commission and there was considerable feeling among some people in the Bureau that the administrative action should not be taken at this time for fear of the fact that it might come out publicly, and I was opposed to that. I felt the administrative action should be taken and Mr. Hoover agreed that this matter should not be overlooked nor administrative action postponed. Mr. GENZMAN. Are you reading from his handwriting below the paragraph? Mr. GALE. I am interpolating that. Mr. GENzMAN. Thank you. Mr. GALE. I can't read the copy I have. Mr. GENZMAN. Would you explain again why you were concerned about this information getting to the Warren Commission? Mr. GALE. I said here that there is a possibility the Presidential Commission investigating instant matter will subpena the investigating agent. If this happens, the possibility then exists that the agents may be questioned concerning whether administrative action had been taken against them. However, whether the Commission would subpena him and they would testify to that or not, I still felt they should be disciplined. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would ask that the exhibit marked as JFK F-461 be entered into the record. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record. [The above-referred-to exhibit, JFK F-461, follows:] 531 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 532 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 533 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 534 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 535 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 536 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 537 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 538 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 539 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 540 JFK EXHIBIT F-461 cont. 541 Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, can you identify, JFK exhibit F-461, Mr. GALE. Yes; JFK F-461 is a memorandum from me to Mr. Tolson dated September 30, 1964. Mr. GENZMAN. What is the subject of that memorandum? Mr. GALE. It is captioned "Shortcomings in Handling Lee Harvey Oswald Matter by FBI Personnel." Mr. GENZMAN. Why did you write this report? Mr. GALE. I wrote this report because Mr. Hoover had noted that he wanted this matter carefully reviewed insofar as it pertains to FBI shortcomings by Gale. He said that the Warren Commission report tears us to pieces. He also wanted a memorandum as to what had been done to plug our gaps, and he also wanted to make certain that we check and make certain that proper disciplinary action had been taken against those responsibile for derelictions charged to us. Mr. GENZMAN. Were you just now reading from the first paragraph of this report? Mr. GALE. Yes, sir. Mr. GENZMAN. I direct your attention to the bottom paragraph at page 5. Would you read the first two sentences? Mr. GALE [reading]: We previously took administrative action against those responsible for the investigative shortcomings in this case, some of which were brought out by the Commission. It is felt that it is appropriate at this time to consider further administrative actions against those primarily culpable for the derelictions in this case, which have now had the effect of publicly embarrassing the Bureau. Mr. GENZMAN. What conclusion did you reach concerning the testimony of FBI witnesses before the Warren Commission? Mr. GALE. The conclusion reached by me was that some of this testimony was not adequately handled. We felt that they were testifying in too flamboyant a fashion and were not confining themselves to the facts and testifying the way they were supposed to as FBI personnel. Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 5, would you read in the middle of the page the three sentences beginning with "The Bureau"? Mr. GALE [reading]: The Bureau by letter to the Commission, indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on the passport as our investigation disclosed no evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions of or on behalf of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels that it was proper at that time to take this public position. However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not definitely know whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time. Mr. GENZMAN. Why was this public position taken? Mr. GALE. I don't know. I didn't write that particular letter to the Commission. However, I might say that in analyzing this, this was not something that was black and white. Whether or not we should have had the passport or the stop on his passport was subject to interpretation. In other words, there were shades of gray involved here and apparently those that wrote the letter to the Commission took a different view than I took, and I felt that there should have been a stop placed on that, but apparently the people who wrote the letter to the Commission did not feel that there was a--did not warrant placing a stop on his passport when they sent 542 that to the Commission, the same as they felt that, I guess, that it was not proper to have him on the security index, and I differed and I felt that he should be on the security index. Mr. GENZMAN. Would you reread the last sentence of that paragraph? Mr. GALE [reading]: However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, according to some individuals, this sentence implies that the FBI did at some point determine that Oswald had connections with some U.S. intelligence agency. Mr. GALE. That is not what I meant. What I meant in writing that sentence was that we did not know definitely whether he had any intelligence assignments at that time, but I felt in my mind that he possibly could have had intelligence assignments based on his Russian background, his defection to Russia, and the fact that he would not take the polygraph examination, and also because of his activities with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. However, I had no concrete information to establish any of those possibilities. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you. As a result of your memorandum were additional disciplinary actions taken against various agents? Mr. GALE. Yes, they were. I want to say at this time that disciplinary action was not unusual in the Bureau. As I said before, I had the responsibility, and inspectors before me had the responsibility, of making inspections of the field as well as the seat of government, and where investigative shortcomings were found, in almost every inspection that was made, there would be administrative action taken against agents in the field or at the seat of government, and very seldom did any inspection go by whereby some administrative action was not taken. Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, was there every any internal inspection of the Bureau's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy? Mr. GALE. No; I was never called upon to make any investigation of the Bureau's investigation of President Kennedy. All of my investigation here was confined to the presecurity investigation of Mr. Oswald and I conducted no investigation of anything that was done insofar as the investigation of the assassination. Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gale. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. At this point, the Chair will yield himself such time as he may consume, after which we will operate under the 5-minute rule. Mr. Gale, I understand you to say that disciplinary action within the Bureau was not unusual? Mr. GALE. No; it was not. Chairman STOKES. And would disciplinary action always be taken for, what you have described here today, as deficiencies? Mr. GALE. Sometimes. We had a rule in the FBI, Mr. Chairman, and some of the orders of censure that were sent out in this case, we had a rule that all leads had to be covered in 30 days and a report had to be submitted in 45 days. 543 Now, this particular investigation, a number of instances, as I recall, were not handled properly. It was not obeyed. Chairman STOKES. How much time did you devote to the investigation that you made that resulted in your report finding these deficiencies? Mr. GALE. I can't recall exactly, but it must have been approximately 1 1/2 or 2 weeks. Chairman STOKES. I see. You have made some mention of agents being flamboyant and not--let's see what language you used--not acting as FBI agents should, or testifying as they should. Tell us what you mean by that? Mr. GALE. The memorandum reflects that one of the agents testified that conditions in the Dallas police station at the time of detention and interrogation of Oswald were not too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, maybe like Yankee Stadium during the World Series games, and I said it was questionable whether the agent would have described in such an editorialized and flamboyant manner, but rather should have indicated conditions were crowded and if called upon to give an estimate of how many people were located therein to give such an estimate. Chairman STOKES. Now, can you tell us, Mr. Gale, having conducted this investigation, and having made the kind of findings that you made here, and the conclusions which appear in your report, tell us why these type of deficiencies occurred, how did this type of thing come about? Mr. GALE. Well, of course, they gave explanations. The agents in their expansions said it was due to the pressure of other work, and so forth. I might say that, in the light of Presidential assassination, if you were to take any investigation, and a lot of investigations and scrutinize them, you would find errors in them that you wouldn't ordinarily find unless you scrutinized them so carefully. Chairman STOKES. Did any of the deficiencies come about as a result of a man just disregarding rules and regulations of the Department? Mr. GALE. Of course, these rules, the 45th day reporting deadline, for example, the 30-day investigative coverage deadline, were disregarded. Also we felt that good judgment was not used in a number of instances in the failure to take prompt investigative action after they had received information. Of course, I cited that in this memorandum that I wrote. Chairman STOKES. When disciplinary action of this type is taken, does news of that spread throughout the Department pretty rapidly? Mr. GALE. Sometimes it did and sometimes it didn't. It all depends on what it was. The Bureau, as I indicated before, Mr. Chairman, took disciplinary action with considerable regularity over violations of rules and regulations, over investigative delinquencies, and scarcely any inspection went by without our taking some sort of administrative action against somebody for not doing what we felt should have been done. We felt, Mr. Hoover felt, and no one likes to be inspected, I might add. I was a clerk, I was an agent, I was assistant agent in charge and a special agent in charge. At no time did I ever relish 544 being inspected. However, the inspection system, I feel, and even though I disliked being inspected, and when I no longer was an inspector I was in charge of a division, I didn't like being inspected then either. Nevertheless, it was a catalyst that made the FBI at that time a highly efficient organization because it made you go to that extra step. Rather than go home maybe at 6 o'clock at night, you would stay until 8 o'clock at night to do what you should have done in order to achieve a high degree of efficiency. Chairman STOKES. Well, would it also be fair to say that no one likes being disciplined? Mr. GALE. That is exactly right. Chairman STOKES. And had it not been for your inspection, many of the things which you brought out, perhaps would have never been brought out, relative to deficiencies, isn't that true? Mr. GALE. They might have been brought out on another inspection. In other words, a routine inspection. If someone picked up this file, if I pick up the file on a routine inspection I am sure I would have picked up some of the same deficiencies. But, of course, you couldn't review ever single file in the FBI. It was a random thing. Chairman STOKES. Couldn't some of these deficiencies have been detected or picked up by those in a supervisory position over those men? Mr. GALE. Absolutely. That is why they were disciplined, for not picking them up. Chairman STOKES. And wouldn't you say that Mr. Hoover was feared by the men in the Department? Mr. GALE. No; I would say he was respected by the men. Chairman STOKES. Well, in the field? Mr. GALE. In the field, I would say that they had a degree of reverence for him when I was there. Chairman STOKES. But didn't he also have a reputation for being able to bring down his wrath upon anyone whom he felt did not perform in a certain way? Mr. GALE. Mr. Hoover was a perfectionist. He demanded a very high degree of performance and it was always my contention that if you demand an average performance you will probably get a degree of mediocrity. Mr. Hoover demanded perfection. He never got perfection but he got excellence, and if he had only expected something to be average, he would have gotten mediocrity. Chairman STOKES. And where he did not get the standard of perfection that he demanded, he dealt with that in a very wrathful manner? Mr. GALE. He dealt with it in a firm but fair manner. You knew what you were going to get if you didn't do your work right. You knew precisely. The word was around. The agents knew very well from training school on that if they did not handle their investigations in an efficient manner that their promotions would be denied and that they would not receive salary increases, and so forth, which I think is entirely proper. I don't think that those individuals who were not doing their work properly should be given promotions and get salary increases and so forth. 545 Chairman STOKES. Now, your finding that Oswald had not been placed on the security index was an important finding, was it not? Mr. GALE. It was. I felt all the findings were important, but that was one of the important findings. Chairman STOKES. One Of the more important ones, I would say. How would that have changed Dallas, had he been placed on the security index? Mr. GALE. In my opinion, it would not have changed Dallas at all. Chairman STOKES. What is the relative importance of it? Mr. GALE. Because we had a criteria that individuals of this type should have been placed on the security index and, therefore, the agents and employees handling that should have complied with that. Chairman STOKES. Then had he been on the security index, in your opinion, the Secret Service or no other agency would have looked at him differently in Dallas at that time? Mr. GALE. I don't think so. We had an awful lot of people on the security index. I don't believe that would have looked at him any differently. Chairman STOKES. Do we still utilize the security index today? Mr. GALE. I understand that we do. I don't know. I have been retired for a period of 7 years. Chairman STOKES. During the course of your investigation of the assassination, did you find any evidence that Oswald had been an FBI informant? Mr. GALE. Absolutely not. I had all the files pulled on Mr. Oswald when I made my inquiry and I received no files indicating that he had been an informant. If, of course, I had, I would have taken an entirely different attack on this thing. Chairman STOKES. I see. So the bottom line is that you have no information? Mr. GALE. Absolutely none of it. Chairman STOKES. All right. Now, did you come to find out about the threatening note that Oswald had left at the Dallas FBI office? Mr. GALE. Only after I had left the FBI and I was interrogated about that by an assistant director in my law office. Chairman STOKES. Now, was James Hosty one of the men that you recommended disciplinary action on? Mr. GALE. Yes; he was. Chairman STOKES. Tell us why. Mr. GALE. I don't recall offhand. I would have to look at this report. For certain investigative and reporting delinquencies, I believe, the late reporting, failure to put subject on the security index. The report states: For holding, for failure, including the earlier interview of Oswald's wife, for holding investigation in abeyance after being in receipt of information that subject had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Chairman STOKES. Now, I Suppose these findings came about as a direct result of direct contact you had with Hosty himself?. Mr. GALE. No, that wasn't how it was done in the Bureau. Almost on a daily basis, every couple of days anyhow, almost all field offices would receive communications from the headquarters asking for explanations. They would come by teletype or else by 546 airtel, and they would ask for explanations from the agent as to his investigative shortcomings. They would send back an explanation to the headquarters. It would go to the individual investigative division. Many times the divisions themselves would raise the question. Other times Mr. Hoover would raise the question on an investigation. Why wasn't this done, why wasn't that done, why didn't we do it this way, why did we do it that way. A teletype would go out to the field or a telephone call would go out to the field, explanations would be required. And in this instance, if I recall correctly, to the best of my recollection, I either telephoned the agent in charge in Dallas or else I sent a teletype out, I am not sure which, or airtel, probably a telephone call or teletype, asking for certain explanations as to how this case was handled. Thereafter memoranda came in to me and the memoranda reflected what the agent said in his defense. I asked him for explanation as to why he wouldn't do this and why he did that and why he did the other thing. That was the usual inspection procedure, and all matters of that type we would write up the matter itself, set forth what we felt were delinquencies, and ask for a written explanation. Very seldom was the agent ever interviewed in a situation like this personally. Chairman STOKES. Well, now, you seem to have found Hosty deficient in several areas, then, as a result of the reports that came in to you? Mr. GALE. Yes sir. Chairman STOKES. And when did you learn of the note that had been left for Hosty in the Dallas field office. Mr. GALE. I only learned of that after I had been retired about 4 years. Chairman STOKES. Had you learned about such a note, what would have been your reaction to that during the course of your investigation? Mr. GALE. If I had learned that a note had been left and that nothing had been done with it, or what is the question? Chairman STOKES. That it had been destroyed. Mr. GALE. If I had learned that a note had been left and it had been destroyed I would have certainly made an inquiry as to the whys and wherefores and who had been responsible for destruction of it. Chairman STOKES. Would you have probably at that point also talked directly with that agent? Mr. GALE. No; I probably would not. Very seldom did an official from the headquarters talk to an agent in the field. We dealt with them through their supervisors or through the agent in charge. We very seldom dealt directly with the agent. Chairman STOKES. I see. Thank you. I have no further questions. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gale, I want to clarify one thing before I go to the questions I have, and that pertains to JFK exhibit F-460 and not the report that you sent, but a memorandum from you to Mr. Tolson, I believe. 547 I understand the heading is correct. In any case, it is dated December 10, 1963, and the memorandum also carries in the blank following it between the dates, D.C. DeLoach. Do you have that with you? Mr. GALE. Yes sir. Mr. FITHIAN. It is page 11 of your document. Now, I draw your attention to the last paragraph. Can you tell me something about that, the one that starts: "It is significant to note"? Mr. GALE. I am not sure I read the same thing that you are, Congressman. Mr. FITHIAN. Would counsel assist us a little bit? Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale.---- Mr. GALE. My copy here is very bad. That is why I am having a problem with reading it. Mr. GENZMAN. On page 11 of your December 10, 1963 report there is an addendum with the initials A.H.B. signifying Alan Belmont? Mr. GALE. Yes. Mr. GENZMAN. Do you see that paragraph? Mr. GALE. Yes, I see it here, right. Mr. FITHIAN. Just read over that last paragraph. Mr. GALE [reading]: It is significant to note that all of the supervisors and officials who came into contact with this case at the seat of government, as well as agents in the field, are unanimous in the opinion that Oswald did not meet the criteria for the security index. If this is so, it would appear that the criteria are not sufficiently specific to include a case such as Oswald, and rather than take the position that all these employees were mistaken in their judgment the criteria should be changed. This has now been recommended by Assistant Director Gale. Mr. FITHIAN. What does that mean? Mr. GALE. Well, that meant that the other people did not agree with the fact that the security index did not--that Oswald met the security index, and Mr. Belmont took the position that rather than saying all of these employees were mistaken in their judgment, the criteria should be changed. Mr. Hoover took the position that they were more than mistaken. Mr. FITHIAN. So, if I interpret this correctly, it is the people who are being disciplined, it is their collective judgment that Oswald did not qualify? Mr. GALE. That was not unusual. Most people being disciplined took the collective judgment that the inspector was wrong. Mr. FITHIAN. I suspected as much. Do they usually go so far as putting that in writing? Mr. GALE. Mr. Belmont was a high official and, therefore, he had that prerogative. Mr. FITHIAN. So his putting this in writing in a memo is not unusual? Mr. GALE. No. I reported directly to Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover, and so did he. Mr. FITHIAN. I direct your attention to the last sentence, "This has now been recommended by Assistant Director Gale." Mr. GALE. Right. 548 Mr. FITHIAN. Does that mean that you recommended that the security index criteria be expanded, or that you recommended and concurred with that whole paragraph? Mr. GALE. That does not mean that I recommended and concurred with the whole paragraph. I recommended that if they want to change, let them go ahead and change it, if they felt it should be changed. Mr. FITHIAN. You held to your feeling that the discipline should go forth? Mr. GALE. Yes, sir. Mr. FITHIAN. Is that correct? Mr. GALE. Yes. Mr. FITHIAN. Now, you are something of an expert on discipline, obviously, in inspections and infractions of the rules in the FBI. What did you hope to achieve by this sort of collective disciplining of everybody who might have made another judgment in the preassassination handling of Oswald? Mr. GALE. Let me point this out. That I wasn't necessarily an expert on discipline or an ogre in the Bureau. I was merely fulfilling the responsibilities- Mr. FITHIAN. I understand that. Mr. GALE [continuing]. That I had and that many others who held the same job before and since did in the same fashion what the Inspection Division hoped to achieve and, of course, as I said before, no one liked to mete out discipline. I do not get any pleasure out of meting out discipline, and I am sure Mr. Hoover did not either. I would much rather give an agent commendations. On the other side of the coin, inspectors on occasion would pick up an investigation and find that it was particularly well done and commend the agents or recommend the agents or recommend them for an incentive award. So this was a double-edged sword. We weren't just meting out discipline, we were also recognizing superior performance. Mr. FITHIAN. I understand that and I apologize for the lack of clarity of my question. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. And the Inspection Division is not necessarily a new division, it wasn't organized following the Kennedy assassination, was it? Mr. GALE. No, it was not; it has been in existence since Mr. Hoover took over the FBI and, of course, the reason, one of the reasons that he put the Inspection Division in the FBI was because when he took it over it was in such a terrible state of disarray with crooks and so forth permeating its ranks. Mr. DEVINE. That dates back to 1924? Mr. GALE. That is right. Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Gale, I think you earlier stated that the Director sough perfection and demanded excellence among the agents, and those that failed to measure up to those standards or for one reason or another didn't reach that pinnacle faced disciplinary action; is that correct? Mr. GALE. If their performance was bad enough, yes. 549 Mr. DEVINE. Back in my day and I think it continued through your day and probably still yet, you were either censured or re- duced in salary and transferred to a much less desirable office. Mr. GALE. That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. I know in my time if a fellow was in Miami, he would probably be transferred to Butte, or if he was in Los Angeles, he would go to Sioux Falls. Mr. GALE. That is right. Mr. DEVINE. This was part of the overall disciplinary action that was followed back in those days and continued through the Kennedy assassination disciplinary action into today. Mr. GALE. That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. So the thing I am trying to bring out is the fact that disciplinary action was taken in this major case, it was not unusual as it relates to any major case, if there were what you as an inspector considered a dereliction of duty? Mr. GALE. That is exactly right. That is what I was trying to point out insofar as the field inspections we made in the field offices. There was scarcely a field office inspection that went by without somebody not being disciplined as a result of some error in judgment or some violation of the investigative rules or reporting rules. It was not at all unusual. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. What happens when somebody is put on the security index; what does that do? Mr. GALE. It doesn't do much of anything until Congress and the President, in a national emergency would declare a national emergency, and in World War II I can tell what it did. The President and Congress decreed that the individuals on the security index should be detained, and they were detained, picked up for custodial detention at that time, and there were hearings held. Mr. SAWYER. If a President, let's say, is going to visit an area, such as Dallas in this case, would anybody check the security list for people who were on it in that area? Mr. GALE. I don't know what was done in that regard. That was not in my particular sphere of expertise, so I don't know. Mr. SAWYER. You actually don't even know that, whether they do or not? Mr. GALE. I don't know whether they do it now, I don't know whether they did it then. Mr. SAWYER. So then whether somebody goes on the security index is just kind of put in the bank against a national emergency or something, and nothing happens, the person isn't--- Mr. GALE. Right. In case we have a national emergency tomorrow, if they weren't on the security index, certain investigative actions would not be taken against them, and it is possible that they could do great damage because they would not be receiving investigative scrutiny in a national emergency and, of course, nobody knows when a national emergency is going to occur. Mr. SAWYER. But no reference was ever made to the security index absent a national emergency, it was just filed away, nothing was done with---- 550 Mr. GALE. There were certain investigative, as I recall, there were certain investigative requirements if you were on the security index, where they took investigative steps periodically to see where you were and what you were doing. You weren't left in a dormant status. They would keep better track of your activities if you were on the security index than if you were not. Mr. SAWYER. If I understand you to say before nothing happened, when you went on the security index, I misunderstood, there is a surveillance followup? Mr. GALE. I told you before, I was not assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division, my primary background in the FBI was in the criminal field, and I frankly am not the person to be talking insofar as the security index is concerned. I don't have any great expertise in that. Mr. SAWYER. I am not asking you for great expertise. You spent 32 years in the Bureau. Certainly you can't sit there and tell me you don't know what happens when somebody is on the security index. Are you telling me that? Mr. GALE. I just told you what happened when they were on the security index. I told you that in the event of a national emergency some action would be taken against them. I also told you that periodically their cases would be reviewed if they were on the security index. So I did not tell you I did not know anything about it. I told you that when it came down to the fine technicalities of the security index there were others who were more qualified than I to testify about that. Mr. SAWYER. How often would they be checked if they were-- Mr. GALE. I don't know. Mr. SAWYER. You don't know? Mr. GALE. No. Mr. SAWYER. Would it be as often as once a year? Mr. GALE. Possibly. I don't know. I think maybe it might have been. I have forgotten since I have been out 15 years, and frankly, I don't remember how often we checked them at that time. Mr. SAWYER. You said something about checking where they are located. Were they kept track of as to location? Mr. GALE. I don't recall the details at this time as to how we did that. Mr. SAWYER. But do you know whether you did that or not? Mr. GALE. I think we did. To the best of my recollection, I think that was done. Mr. SAWYER. And you wouldn't have any knowledge as to whether people like the Secret Service would check on people in the localities who were on the security index? Mr. GALE. I don't know what procedure they were following after the assassination. I can't recall at this time the recommendations that I made. I don't have any memoranda in front of me concerning that. I know I made another inquiry concerning the security index and those procedures, but I have forgotten that now in the 15 years that have elapsed. Mr. SAWYER. Would they have or would the Secret Service have access to the security index? Mr. GALE. I don't know whether they would or not. 551 Mr. SAWYER. Was it disseminated outside of the FBI, or was that something strictly internal in the FBI, the security index? Mr. GALE. 1 think it would be disseminated to the Department of Justice, too, I don't recall. Mr. SAWYER. You don't know whether the Secret Service would have access? Mr. GALE. I don't recall. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What did you hope to achieve by recommending the disciplining of these 17 people? Mr. GALE. As 1 indicated before, disciplinary action was recommended against Bureau personnel from time to time in order to achieve a higher standard of performance in the organization. Mr. FITHIAN. It had nothing to do-- Mr. GALE. I know from my own experience the fact that disciplinary action was taken for mistakes and for shortcomings made you work harder and made you do the job better because you did not want to be the subject of discipline. Mr. FITHIAN. Well, I have conducted a few Navy inspections myself, so I understand that part of the philosophy. My basic question drives to the question as to whether or not you thought that by recommending these disciplinary actions the Bureau would in some way look in a better light with regard to its conduct of the post-assassination handling of Oswald? Mr. GALE. I don't feel that this had anything to do with the post- investigative handling of Oswald. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. Do you have any idea how many people would have been on the security index in Dallas? Mr. GALE. No, I have no idea. Mr. FITHIAN. 1 asked Mr. Malley earlier this morning about some other kinds of iniractions which seemed more serious than the ones you recommended discipline for. What would you have recommended, had you conducted an investigation and found that a subordinate had concealed from his superior certain pertinent evidence? Mr. GALE. I have no idea what I would have recommended at this stage of the game. That is a highly speculative question, I think. Mr. FITHIAN. In all of your inspections--- Mr. GALE. I am sitting here in 1978 and you are asking me what I would have recommended in 1963. Mr. FITHIAN. I understand that. You had some standards for inspection, didn't you? Mr. GALE. Of course we had standards, yes sir. Mr. FITHIAN. In your inspections, in any inspection you ever covered, did you ever uncover a situation in which a subordinate had intentionally concealed from his superior any pertinent evidence? Mr. GALE. I don't recall anything like that. 552 Mr. FITHIAN. And did you ever uncover in any inspection you conducted a situation where anyone had destroyed evidence? Mr. GALE. No, I don't recall ever discovering in any inspection that I conducted anything where anybody destroyed any evidence. Mr. FITHIAN. And did you ever discover a case where an FBI employee's personnel had altered evidence? Mr. GALE. I have no recollection of ever discovering anything like that in any of my inspections. Mr. FITHIAN. So that if you never discovered that in all of your inspections, may we now, 15 years later, say that any one of those actions would be considered very serious? Mr. GALE. I would say yes. Mr. FITHIAN. And would we conclude properly that some kind of significant discipline might be in order? Mr. GALE. Yes, I would say so. Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Gale, you are generally familiar with the policies followed by the FBI, aren't you, with regard to the dissemination of information contained in the FBI security index? Mr. GALE. No, I am not too familiar with that at this time. I do not recall that at this time, I said before. Mr. FITHIAN. Do you know whether it was the policy of the FBI to share the information contained on the security index with any other Federal agency? Mr. GALE. I don't recall that offhand, no. Mr. FITHIAN. You don't know whether it would have been policy to share that with the Secret Service? Mr. GALE. I don't have any present recollection of that. Mr. FITHIAN. Is it your judgment that the FBI should have shared that information with the Secret Service when the Presi* dent was going to Dallas, or at any other time? Mr. GALE. I think that there should be a free exchange of information between the FBI and the Secret Service concerning any individuals who have a subversive background. I believe that is being done now. Mr. FITHIAN. So it would not surprise you then that the Secret Service felt that it should have indeed had that information from the FBI? Mr. GALE. I wouldn't know what the Secret Service would be surprised at or what they wouldn't be surprised at. Mr. FITHIAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Mr. Gale, is it not conceivable that when we take the deficiencies that you found relating to Oswald, and in particular the deficiencies surrounding the deficient manner in which James Hosty treated the Oswald case, is it not conceivable that had he been handled in accordance with the rules and regulations that Oswald would have been then known he was under close surveillance by the FBI and, therefore, that might have been a deterrant to his actions in Dallas on November 22, 1963? Is that not conceivable? Mr. GALE. Well, of course, anything is conceivable, Mr. Chairman, and I think that is strictly speculative as to whether or not that would have taken place. I don't know whether the investigative deficiencies here would have caused him to reach that conclusion or not, because undoubtedly one of the things that you are 553 doing in making an investigation is trying to handle it in such a way that the person does not know that he is under such intensive scrutiny, and most of the investigations of subversives are done in a manner whereby you do not place them under close surveillance or don't let them know that they are under investigation. You are not advertising to people you have under investigation that they are under investigation. Chairman STOKES. Yes, but according to Hosty, he said he was waiting until a certain time had elapsed after the beating or whipping, or something. Mr. GALE. Of his wife. Chairman STOKES. His wife, before he would contact him further. It is just conceivable to me and since you felt that was improper action, did you not? Mr. GALE. Yes. Chairman STOKES. You felt the proper time to have talked with Marina was when she was angry. Mr. GALE. Yes. Chairman STOKES. With Oswald, and she might have told them something of value; isn't that true? Mr. GALE. If they knew anything about it. Whatever she knew, she might have told them, yes. Chairman STOKES. Whatever she knew, she would have told them, and that is what you felt should have been done? Mr. GALE. Right. Chairman STOKES. Is it not also conceivable that had Hosty done his job properly, he would have been able to advise the Secret Service that Oswald was working at the Texas Book Depository which was on the direct parade route. Mr. GALE. I don't know whether he would have done that. Just the fact that he would have discovered that, I don't know whether he would have advised them of that or not. I don't know what he would have done. In other words, I am not the proper person, I don't think, to ask what Hosty would have done. Chairman STOKES. You see, I don't think we are dealing entirely in speculative matters because, as a result of J. Edgar Hoover feeling that the FBI had not performed their responsibilities properly, he sent you in and gave you the direct responsibility of ascertaining whether or not they had done their job properly. Mr. GALE. Correct. Chairman STOKES. Pursuant to his direction, you investigated, found deficiencies, reported them back to the Director and then your recommendations relative to censure were carried out; isn't that correct? Mr. GALE. That's right. Chairman STOKES. So, then the purpose, it would seem to me, of his having taken that action and your having taken your action, was for the purpose of saying what had been done improperly and if it had not been done in this way, things might have been different. Mr. GALE. No, I don't think that is what we were saying because I reached a conclusion that even if the investigative shortcomings and reporting shortcomings, which I had found, had been carried 554 out that it would not have made any difference in Dallas. That was my conclusion. That is still my conclusion. What we were trying to do here was to insure that agents throughout the Bureau and these agents did not make similar mistakes in the future. Chairman STOKES. Well, then, how do you come to the conclusion that if the Bureau had performed on par with the excellence demanded by the Director that this still would have occurred? I don't understand how you arrive at that conclusion. Mr. GALE. Of course, if Hosty knew that Oswald was going to go to the book building with a gun, naturally, he would have advised Secret Service. But he didn't know that. We are sitting back here after the fact and it is much easier to see what you would have done after the fact than it is before the fact. I frankly do not feel that these investigative shortcomings play any part in the Dallas assassination. They were investigative errors--if we felt they had played a part in that, believe me, the disciplinary action would have been much stronger. Chairman STOKES. Isn't it conceivable that if they had talked with Marina, when they should have talked with Marina, they might have found out that he had shot at General Walker. Mr. GALE. I don't know what she would have told him. Chairman STOKES. But it is conceivable, isn't it? Mr. GALE. Anything is conceivable. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to one part of your testimony earlier today where you stated there was no stop put on Oswald's passport; isn't that what you said? Mr. GALE. Yes. Mr. FITHIAN. If there had been any suspicion of Oswald somehow being associated with foreign intelligence ties, would that have altered the recommendation on putting a stop on the passport? Mr. GALE. Yes. Of course, I thought there should have been a stop placed on the passport anyhow. Mr. FITHIAN. I am sorry. Mr. GALE. I felt there should have been a stop placed on the passport anyhow. Mr. FITHIAN. It certainly would have increased the probability they would have put a stop on his passport if they had any thoughts he was somehow associated with either Russia or Cuba, right? Mr. GALE. Yes, I would think so. Mr. FITHIAN. What effect would any information that he had ties, let's say, to our own domestic intelligence system, what effect would that have had on your recommendation? Mr. GALE. Well, that never crossed my mind in any way, shape, manner or form. Mr. FITHIAN. But it would be kind of inverse of the other? Mr. GALE. The fact that he would have any ties to any of our domestic intelligence or--of course, I would have known if he had been a Bureau informant because I had that information from the files. But if I had any idea that he had been with any other 555 agency--I had no idea, it never crossed my mind he possibly would be involved in that and I still don't think he was. Mr. FITHIAN. One last question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gale, are you satisfied with the post-assassination handling of the investigation by the FBI? Basically, we have concentrated on sort of pre-handling of Oswald. Mr. GALE. I had nothing to do with the post-investigative assassination, whatsoever. I was still assigned to that when Mr. Malley completed that investigation. I was still assigned to the Inspection Division and at no time did Mr. Hoover ever ask me to make any inquiry concerning the post-assassination of Oswald and so, therefore, I was occupied doing other things with regard to my responsibilities as assistant director in charge of the Inspection Division and did not again come in contact with the investigation of the Oswald matter after I had completed this. Mr. FITHIAN. And have not given any more thought to it? Mr. GALE. Not particularly. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. GALE. I have not read the reports. I have not read the reports that Mr. Malley wrote. I did not read any memorandum. I read certain newspaper accounts, of course. I followed the Oswald and Ruby matter, but from the standpoint of official memorandum, I was not reading that at the time. I had no official interest in that. Mr. FITHIAN. And before we close, would you repeat for me why you were dissatisfied with Hosty's performance in Dallas? I know what it says in the report. We have gone over that. Mr. GALE. That's why. Mr. FITHIAN. Is that it, the whole 9 yards? Mr. GALE. That is as much as I can recall now. I only can recall why I was dissatisfied with anybody's performance at this point from reviewing the record. I certainly have no personal recollection of anything like this as to an individual agent as to why a certain course of action was taken against him 15 years later. Mr. FITHIAN. What I am saying is, does your written recommendation reflect your total thinking on Hosty's performance at that time? Mr. GALE. There possibly--at the time? To the best of my recollection, yes. Mr. FITHIAN. And you started to say something else. Mr. GALE. It is possible there is some memoranda, other memoranda in the file concerning this, I don't know. There must be some explanations from him, and I don't know if there is something else written by me or not. All I know right now is what I have here in front of me. That is all I recall about the matter. If there is anything else in the file, it could possibly refresh my recollection, but I don't have any recollection of this other than what I have here. Mr. FITHIAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. I am a little puzzled, as I understand your testimony, that these deficiencies in the pre-assassination investigation had really nothing to do with the ensuing result in Dallas. Mr. GALE. I didn't think so; no, sir. 556 Mr. SAWYER. And yet, your report devotes itself to some speculation whether the administrative punishment ought to be withheld because it might get to the Warren Commission or whether you should go ahead because the subpenas probably wouldn't reach down to the agent level and, therefore, they wouldn't find out about it. If it had nothing to do with the result in Dallas, why were you so concerned about the Warren Commission finding out about it since that was all they were concerned with? Mr. GALE. I wasn't particularly concerned about it. There were other officials who were concerned about the administrative action being made public, I think, and embarrassing the Bureau. Mr. SAWYER. You make mention in your recommending or suggesting you go ahead with it, you say the subpenaes of the Warren Commission probably would not reach down to the agent level. So, apparently, you were concerned, or-- Mr. GALE. I didn't feel it would and I didn't particularly care if it did. I felt the administrative action should go forward and so did Mr. Hoover. No matter who found out about it, I thought the chips should fall where they may, no matter who found out about it. Mr. SAWYER. Yes, but you were saying they probably wouldn't find out about it which was an argument in favor of going ahead. Mr. GALE. That is exactly right, because there were others who were opposed to it. Mr. SAWYER. So, why would it be an argument of going ahead or not going ahead if it had nothing to do with the result in Dallas. Mr. GALE. Because there were others in the Bureau who were opposed to that. Mr. SAWYER. Well, then, they apparently felt differently than you did about whether it would have affected the results in Dallas; is that correct? Mr. GALE. I don't think so. They may have felt the Warren Commission should not have had it because they didn't want it to become public at that time. They were concerned about adverse publicity insofar as our mishandling the case. It was not the practice and policy of the FBI to be airing its dirty linen in public. Mr. SAWYER. The Warren Commission weren't interested in the procedural operations of the FBI in particular if they were connected with their charge; namely, to investigate the assassination in Dallas; isn't that correct? Mr. GALE. You might be interested in knowing, Mr. Sawyer, that the Warren Commission found the same deficiencies that I found on the same things and right down the line. As a matter of fact, Mr. Tolson called me on two of the agents in New York that they found had, they felt, were derelict in the way they had reported the matter, and he asked me if we had found those and I told him, the Director wants to know if you found those and I told this, the Director wants to know if you found those and I told him, that, yes, we had found those. And so, the Warren Commission apparently didn't feel that these errors made any difference in Dallas, and I don't feel they did, either. They had the same errors in front of them. They found the same exact errors that I found. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 557 Chairman STOKES. I have just one final question, Mr. Gale. A part of the mandate given this committee by the House of Representatives is that we assess and evaluate the performance of the agencies as they related to the assassination of the President. And based upon your testimony here today with reference to the preassassination performance of the agency, your findings, your recommendation, if you were asked to rate the performance of the FBI on a scale of zero to ten, with ten representing the highest performance of the agency, what rating would you give the FBI? Mr. GALE. Of course, insofar as the post-assassination investigation is concerned, as I indicated, I have not read that investigation. Chairman STOKES. My question to you, I am sorry to interrupt you, my question is with reference to your inspection, your findings relative to the pre-assassination performance of the FBI. Mr. GALE. Insofar as the investigation of Oswald, insofar as the pre-assassination investigation of Oswald, obviously would not give the agents who conducted the investigation a rating of ten. I possibly would give them a rating of maybe six or seven, insofar as the investigation of Oswald was concerned, the preassassination of Oswald. Further than that, I cannot comment because I was not involved in any other aspect of the situation. Chairman. STOKES. Thank you. Does anyone have anything further? Mr. Gale, as a witness before our committee, you are entitled at the conclusion of your testimony to have 5 minutes in which you may explain or comment in any way upon your testimony before our committee. I extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose. Mr. GALE. I have no further observations or comments to make, and I thank the committee for their courtesy. Chairman STOKES. We thank you very much for having appeared here and been a witness before our committee. Thank you very much. You are excused. [Witness excused.] Chairman STOKES. There being no further business to come before the committee at this time, the committee will adjourn until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. [Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Thursday, September 21, 1978.] 558 (blank page) 559 INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1978 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 8:04 a.m. pursuant to recess, in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Dodd, McKinney, Sawyer, Thone, Fithian, and Edgar. Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary T. Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel. Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present the committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I understand that one of our distinguished witnesses this morning is on somewhat of a tight time schedule. In the interest of time, therefore, I would summarize my normal narration, but I would ask that it be included in the record as if read in full. Chairman STOKES. So ordered. NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL Mr. BLAKEY. President John F. Kennedy was the fourth American President to be assassinated, but his death was the first that led to the formation of a special commission for the purpose of making a full investigation into its circumstances. In the earlier assassinations, the investigations were left to existing judicial bodies: In the case of Abraham Lincoln in 1865, a military commission determined that John Wilkes Booth was part of a conspiracy, and the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army saw to the prosecution of six defendants, four of whom were hanged. The assassins of James A. Garfield in 1881 and William McKinley in 1901 were promptly tried in courts of law and executed. In the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, it was decided by President Lyndon B. Johnson that a panel of distinguished citizens should be given the responsibility for finding the full facts of the case and reporting them, along with appropriate recommendations, to the American people. (559) 560 The Commission was authorized by Executive Order 11130 to set its own procedures and to employ whatever assistance it deemed necessary from Federal agencies, all of which were ordered to cooperate to the maximum with the Commission, which had, under an act of Congress, subpena power and the authority to grant immunity to witnesses who invoked the fifth amendment. The Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren was selected by President Johnson to head the Commission. Two senior members of the Senate, Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, and John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, were chosen to serve on the Commission, as were two distinguished members from the House of Representatives, Hale Boggs, Democrat of Louisiana, and Gerald Ford, Republican of Michigan. Two attorneys who had long been in active Government service, Allen W. Dulles, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and John J. McCloy, former president of the World Bank, were also named to the Commission. J. Lee Rankin, former Solicitor General of the United States, was sworn in as general counsel on December 16, 1963, and 14 attorneys were appointed within a few weeks to serve as assist- ant counsels. The Commission did not employ its own investigative staff. Instead, it relied on agencies in place--the FBI and Secret Service for domestic aspects, the CIA when activities involving foreign countries required probing. In September 1964, following a 9-month effort, the Warren Commission published a report that not only included its findings and conclusions, but also a detailed analysis of the case as the Commission perceived it. In addition, in its report the Commission wrote its own description of the challenge it undertook to meet: "... to uncover all the facts concerning the assassination of President Kennedy and to determine if it was in any way directed or encouraged by unknown persons at home or abroad." In the years since the Warren Commission completed its work, there has been both praise and criticism of the product. The praise came first, and it was based on the obvious enormity of the effort. After all, the Commission had combed through so much evidence that only a part of it could be contained in 26 supplemental volumes, with the rest of it stored at the National Archives. And it had taken testimony, either in person or through deposition, from a total of 552 witnesses. A Pulitizer Prize-winning journalist, in an introduction to one edition of the Warren Report, wrote: The Warren Commission spent the better part of a year in an exhaustive investigation of every particle of evidence it could discover .... No material question now remains unresolved so far as the death of President Kennedy is concerned. Evidence of Oswald's singlehanded guilt is overwhelming. It was the determination of Oswald acting alone that opened the Commission to attack from critics. For the most part, they were authors and independent investigators who rounded up numerous clues, some sounder than others, of a conspiracy. Some suggested that the Federal Government, the Warren Commission itself included, was covering up the conspiracy by suppressing evidence. A result of the criticism was a growing doubt among the American people that the Warren Commission was right, that Oswald 561 had indeed been the lone assassin. Then, in 1976, it was revealed in hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee that certain Federal agencies had not been as candid with the Commission as had been thought. The Warren Commission was not accused of being a party to the failure to find the truth, but its victim. The culpable agencies? The FBI and the CIA, both of which, the Senate committee concluded, had withheld significant information from the Commission. The mandate of the Select Committee on Assassinations calls for an investigation of the performance of Federal agencies assigned to any aspect of the Kennedy case. With the Warren Commission itself, the issue to be considered is whether its procedures, techniques and organization were sufficient to carry out its mandate. In other words, the committee must consider the quality of the conduct of the Commission to judge the reliability of its conclusions. Mr. Chairman, the three members of the Warren Commission still living have agreed to appear today and testify. They are: Gerald R. Ford, John Sherman Cooper and John J. McCloy. President Ford received an A.B. from the University of Michigan in 1935 and an LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1941. President Ford practiced law in Grand Rapids from the time of his admission to the Michigan State bar in 1941 until he was elected to Congress as a Republican of Michigan in 1949. President Ford was a Member of the 81st to the 93rd Congresses; he was elected minority leader in 1965 and he became Vice President of the United States in 1973. He served as President of the United States from 1974 to 1977. It would be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to call President Ford. Chairman STOKES. The committee calls President Ford. All persons in the room are requested to remain seated when the former President comes into the room. This is for security reasons. Good morning, Mr. President. TESTIMONY OF FORMER PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD President FORD. Good morning. Chairman STOKES. May I ask you to please stand and take the oath. Just raise your right hand. You solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God. President FORD. I do. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated. Welcome back to Capitol Hill, Mr. President. President FORD. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Nice to see you here. For security purposes we asked that all persons remain in their seats when you came into the room. At this time the Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Gary Cornwell. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. President. President FORD. Good morning. 562 Mr. Chairman, if I might, I have a very short opening statement which I would appreciate the opportunity to read, then I will be glad to respond to whatever the questions may be of Mr. Cornwell. Chairman STOKES. Mr. President, we would be glad to receive your statement at this time. President FORD. Chairman Stokes, members of the committee, it is nice to be home and it is a great honor and great privilege to testify before this committee, and I thank you for the opportunity to appear along with my distinguished former colleagues on the Warren Commission, Senator John Sherman Cooper and the Honorable John McCloy. Each of us who were appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Warren Commission and who signed the final report of that Commission are prepared to respond to questions as submitted by you or the members of the committee or the staff. I trust the committee understands my particular situation. I am most willing to respond to any and all questions relating to my service on the Warren Commission and related matters, but I must respectfully refuse to answer questions under the principle of Executive privilege that relate to the period from August 9, 1974, to January 20, 1977, the time that I served as President of the United States. The Warren Commission was given by President Lyndon B. Johnson the tragic responsibility to investigate the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. No member of the Commission sought the assignment, but each member believed it was a public duty to respond to the request of the President. It was not an easy or pleasant duty because each of us had known President John F. Kennedy. The Commission, under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice, Earl Warren, conducted, in my opinion, a thorough, objective analysis and investigation, with the assistance of an outstanding staff and the help of many, many others within and without the Federal establishment. The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission were unanimous. We believe the Commission report, despite questions that have been raised over the past 14 years, was an authoritative document covering one of the most tragic episodes in the history of the United States. In my own case, the staff of the committee has submitted a set of questions and requested responses in specific areas of inquiry. I will be glad to respond to the questions as propounded by Mr. Cornwell or members of the committee and I thank you for the opportunity to make my opening statement. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. President, and we appreciate your appearance here this morning, and at this time the Chair will recognize Mr. Gary Cornwell for preliminary questions. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, I would like to initially direct your attention to the fact that in response to the assassination there were a number of basic decisions made, first, of course, to create the Warren Commission, as opposed to relying, hypothetically, for instance, upon such other bodies as the Department of Justice, for the purpose of supervising the investigation. Second, I would like to focus your attention upon the decision to rely upon the investigative agencies as opposed to perhaps attempt- 563 ing to create an investigative staff of the Warren Commission; the question of time constraints that may have been imposed upon the members and their staff because, of course, they were influential and busy men and they did have outside interests which coincided with the operation of the Commission; and such things as the relationship between the Commission and the investigative agencies. I would like to ask you to comment upon that, namely, the effectiveness of the organization and the procedures which were adopted in response to the assassination. President FORD. In my judgment, Mr. Cornwell, the Warren Commission made a basic decision, which was a proper one. We decided that it was inadvisable for the Commission to recruit a totally new investigating staff, and we felt that it was far better to pursue the procedure which we did, which was to employ a limited group of very outstanding and prestigious lawyers, as I recall 14 in number, who came onto the staff and headed the staff organization. Then that staff under the close supervision and control of the Commission worked with the various investigative agencies of the Federal Government such as the FBI, the CIA, Secret Service, and others. I must emphasize one point. Although the staff and the Commission utilized the investigative personnel and capabilities of organizations within the Federal establishment, we as a Commission and the staff were never satisfied with what information we got from these Federal organizations. What we did was to use them as a base, and then the staff and the Commission took off from there and handled individually the inquiries, the questions, and any leads that came to the Commission or to the staff. Mr. CORNWELL. The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations looked into some of these same areas and in book V of their final report they commented upon them. It is my understanding that your opinion was not consulted, in fact I don't believe the opinions of the other Warren Commission members were consulted, prior to the publication of that report, so I would like to direct your attention to a limited portion of it and ask you to comment upon its accuracy from your point of view. At page 6 of the report, the Senate committee concluded that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI or CIA, as well as other agencies of the Government who were charged with investigating the assassination. The FBI was ordered by Director Hoover and pressured by higher Government officials to conclude its investigation quickly. The FBI conducted its investigation in an atmosphere of concern among senior Bureau officials that it would be criticized and its reputation tarnished. On page 46 the report goes on to note that with only minor isolated exceptions, the entire body of factual material from which the Commission derived its findings was supplied by the intelligence community, primarily the FBI, and on page 47 the report concludes that although the Commission had to rely on the FBI to conduct the primary investigation of the President's death, their relationship was at times almost adversarial, such relationship was not conducive to the cooperation necessary for a thorough and exhaustive investigation. 564 Would you agree with that, and to what extent, if any, would you think that such factors might have substantially affected the effectiveness of the investigation? President FORD. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Cornwell, the committee did send to me this question, among others, and the material from the Church committee report. Because I want to be very accurate, since it involves a committee of the U.S. Senate, I would like, if I might, Mr. Chairman, to read a response to the question that Mr. Cornwell has asked, and with your approval I will do so. Chairman STOKES. You certainly may do so. President FORD. I concur with the conclusions of the Church committee's final report, book V, page 6, which states, and I quote: "The Committee emphasizes that it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy." I categorically deny that the investigation of the assassination was deficient. The Church committee concedes directly or by implication that the Commission's conclusions based on available evidence were correct. To date, I have seen no new evidence that would change my views as a former member of the Commission. The Church committee states that the FBI was pressured by Director Hoover and higher Government officials to conclude its investigation quickly. The committee does not differentiate between the Commission's investigation and the investigations by the FBI and other Federal agencies. The FBI may have hurried its internal investigation, but the Warren Commission sets its own schedule for completion of its work, based on its best estimate of the time required to carry out the mandate of President Johnson. When the Commission found that July 1964 was insufficient, the time was extended so we could properly conclude. The Church committee erroneously assumed that the main investigation was done by the FBI, when in fact it was undertaken by the Commission and the 14 independent lawyers assembled by the Commission and the rest of the Commission staff. I do find in reading pages 6 and 7 of the Church committee's report, that questions of policy procedures, decisions and so forth are raised but then in many instances the committee report did not come to firm conclusions or make categorical recommendations based on their sources of information. My response to pages 46 and 47 of the Church committee report are as follows: 1. The Warren Commission did use the intelligence agencies of the Federal Government for the initial factual information and their preliminary analysis. However, the Commission and the staff never accepted this material at face value. From the information supplied from all sources, an independent followup investigation was conducted by the Commission staff, including interviews, interrogations and cross checking. Conclusions by the Commission were based on this independent process and not on Federal agency determinations. The Commission had an obligation to follow a dual policy, on the one hand, to get maximum voluntary cooperation from all Federal agencies including the FBI, and on the other hand, to be insistent that the agencies respond in cooperation in however the Commis- 565 sion demanded. The latter requirement may have led some agencies to believe that there was an adversarial relationship. For the Commission to have adopted any other posture would have led the Commission critics to charge that the Commission was not carrying out its Presidential mandate. Mr. CORNWELL. I would next, Mr. President, ask you if you would direct your attention to the possibility of some outside pressure or concern upon the Commission, and for that purpose I would like to show you two exhibits marked for identification, JFK F-457 and JFK F-443. The first exhibit, Mr. Chairman, is a memorandum prepared by Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins, dated November 24, 1963, and containing a resume of comments by FBI Director Hoover made on that date, and the second one is a memorandum reflecting-well, a memorandum from Mr. Evans and the FBI to Mr. Belmont and attaching a memorandum of Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach dated November 25. May we have those admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point. [The above-referred-to exhibits, JFK F-457 and JFK F-443, follow:] [JFK exhibit F-457 was entered previously.] 566 JFK EXHIBIT F-443 567 JFK EXHIBIT F-443 cont. 568 JFK EXHIBIT F-443 cont. 569 What I would like to ask you is, were you aware of any such pressures at the time, and if so, to what extent, if any, do you think they might have distorted the investigative process? President FORD. To the best of my recollection, and I remind the committee that the commission did its job 14 years ago, there was no pressure as a consequence of a memo or a statement by Walter Jenkins. There was no pressure from any actions taken by Mr. Katzenbach. I fully would understand, however, the concern of the White House staff at that time for some early resolution of whatever the Warren Commission would decide. I can understand why the Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies, may have wanted some statement from the Commission at the earliest possible date. But to my best recollection, there was nothing that came from President Johnson or any of his associates in the White House, there was nothing that came to the Commission from the Department of Justice or other Federal agencies to hurry, in an incomplete way, a decision by the Warren Commission. Now, again, to be very precise, I would like to read from a prepared response I have in reference to the Mexican question that has been raised. I was not informed at the time of the Helms cable to the CIA Mexican station chief, but to my best recollection, the members of the Commission were familiar with the strong personal feelings of the then-U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. The Ambassador did believe that Castro was somehow involved in a plot to assassinate President Kennedy, and he was forceful in setting forth those views. This view of the Ambassador obligated the Commission to make a thorough investigation of the Ambassador's charges and the attitude of the CIA, FBI, and State. Although the Helms cable, to my best recollection, was not seen by me, I was familiar with the general views of the three departments as reflected in the Helms cable. I believe the Commission was carried out to investigate any divergent views between the Ambassador, on the one hand, and the three departments on the other. Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. President, the committee has received evidence about such things as the destruction of a note within the FBI that caused internal dissension at the time, a note which may have been from Oswald and was delivered to Special Agent Hosty. We have received evidence of such things as the existence of CIA assassination plots, an association between CIA officers and some members of the underworld. Was the Warren Commission familiar with those type of things and, if not, using the benefit of hindsight, could their existence have distorted the investigation? President FORD. It is my best recollection that we were not familiar with the alleged destruction of the Oswald note to Hosty. From what I have read of the content, or the alleged content of that note, I don't think the course of the investigation would have been changed by either the note itself or the destruction of that note. The other question that was raised, the allegation that the CIA considered the possibility of using Oswald as a source of informa- 570 tion, I am not able to recollect whether we were familiar with that possibility, but, in my opinion, if we had known about it, I do not believe it would have significantly changed the course of or the conclusions of the Warren Commission. There was a question raised about Mr. Hoover's theory of 1959 that Oswald may have been an imposter. I personally was not familiar with that attitude of Mr. Hoover, in all honesty, I don't think that attitude on his part would have significantly changed the course of our investigation or the conclusions of the Commission. You also raised the question as to the connection or possible involvement of the underworld in any assassination plot. I would like to state this for the record: I do not believe that if there was any association between some CIA officers and members of the underworld that that would have changed the conclusion of the Warren Commission. However, had the Warren Commission known of any assassination plots directed against Castro, this might have affected the extent of the Commission inquiry. In other words, if we had known of these assassination plans or attempts by an agency of the Federal Government, it certainly would have required that the Commission extend its inquiry into those kinds of operations by an agency of the Federal Government. But from what I have known of those plots, what I have read or heard, I don't think they, in and of themselves, would have changed the conclusions of the Commission. Mr. CORNWELL. Finally, I would like to show you two exhibits marked for identification as JFK F-464 and JFK F-467, each of which respectively relate to the fact the CIA may have considered, at one point, the possibility of using Oswald as a source of information, and the second one relating to a theory or speculation that Mr. Hoover had at one point, that there may have been an Oswald imposter. May we have those admitted into the record, Mr. Chairman? Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record. [The above referred to exhibits, JFK F-464 and JFK F-467, follow:] 571 JFK EXHIBIT F-464 572 JFK EXHIBIT F-464 cont. 573 JFK EXHIBIT F-467 574 JFK EXHIBIT F-467 cont. 575 JFK EXHIBIT F-467 cont. Mr. CORNWELL. Was the Warren Commission told about either such matter, to your knowledge, Mr. President? President FORD. Not to my best recollection. Mr. CORNWELL. Finally, the committee has received some evi- dence there may have been an employee in the Cuaban consulate in Mexico City which may have had foreknowledge of the assassina- tion, and the employee may have been a member of Cuban intelligence. Did you ever receive ay such information, to your memory, during there course of the Warren Commission's deliberations? President FORD. It is my best recollection we were not so in- formed. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Counsel. At this point, the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, we welcome you here this morning and we appre- ciate it must be a bit difficult after 14-plus years to recall every- thing that occurred on this Commission, particularly due to the vast responsibilities that were put upon you, as both Vice President and President of the United States, during the intervening time. With all due deference to the other members of the Warren Commission that are present, you did attain, probably, the reputa- tion of being the most conscientious member of the Commission, 576 having attended more meetings and interviewed more witnesses than anyone else on the Commission at that time. In that conclusion, Mr. Chairman, would Ms. Berning make available to the President JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442. Mr. President, I think you have had an opportunity to, on a previous occasion, review these two memorandums, one of which is dated December 12, 1963; the other December 17, 1963, both memorandums being authored by the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Cartha DeLoach. And I would like to ask you if these memorandums, you had a chance to review them, are accurate with respect to the conversations with you and what, if any, relationship you had with the FBI during the operation of the Warren Commission. President FORD. Congressman Devine, I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the two memorandums from Mr. DeLoach, one of December 12, 1963, and one of December 17, 1963. And if the committee will permit, I will read a prepared statement because I wish to be very accurate in this regard. During my service in the Congress from January 3, 1949, until appointed to the Warren Commission, I had had an excellent relationship with the FBI. It was not on a frequent basis. I barely knew J. Edgar Hoover, but like most Americans, had great respect for him and the Bureau. Over that period, I became reasonably well acquainted with Lou Nichols, who was Mr. DeLoach's predecessor. Mr. Nichols had a longstanding relationship with eight or nine editors of Booth newspapers in Michigan, including the Grand Rapids Press, which was the Booth paper in my hometown. I met with Mr. DeLoach through Mr. Nichols, and when Mr. Nichols retired and whenever I had a congressional matter involving the FBI, I would contact Mr. DeLoach. These were contacts well before my appointment to the Warren Commission. After my appointment to the Commission, and following several of the Commission's organizational meetings, I was disturbed that the Chairman, in selecting a general counsel for the staff, appeared to be moving in the direction of a one-man Commission. My views were shared by several other members of the Commission. The problem was resolved by an agreement that all top staff appointments would be approved by the Commission as a whole. In my December 12, 1963 discussion with Mr. DeLoach in my office, I told him of this temporary internal conflict with the Commission-within the Commission, I should say. In that same meeting with Mr. DeLoach, we discussed several other matters, including involving possible decisions of the Commission, and I related the visit to my office by Mr. John McCone, who was then director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. DeLoach gave me additional information on the matter discussed by Mr. McCone. On December 17, 1963, I again met with Mr. DeLoach in my office and the subjects discussed are set forth in the copy of the memo from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Moore. In reference to these meetings with Mr. DeLoach, and my questions relating to my relationship as a Commission member with the FBI, I will state the following: 577 One, I do not have any memoranda which shows that after December 19, 1963, I had any contact with Mr. DeLoach, and I know of no other memoranda from any source. Two, the two contacts with Mr. DeLoach, which were prior to December 20, were made during the organizational period of the Commission and before any investigations or hearings were undertaken by the Commission. Three, to my best recollection, the DeLoach memos appear to be accurate, but the relationship mentioned by Mr. DeLoach did not continue during the investigation period of the Commission. Mr. DEVINE. On Sunday, June 7, 1964, Mr. President, you and I, I think, Chief Justice Warren went to Dallas and had an interview with Jack Ruby. Do you recall that situation? President FORD. I recall it vividly, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. You may further recall that during this conversation, Mr. Ruby said as follows, and this appears on page 194 of the transcript: Gentlemen, if you want to hear any further testimony, you will have to get me to Washington soon, because it has something to do with you, Chief Warren. Do I sound sober enough to tell you this? Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; go right ahead. Mr. RUBY. I want to tell the truth, and I can't tell it here. I can't tell it here. Does that make sense to you? I would ask you, Mr. President, why was Ruby not taken to Washington for further questioning as he requested? President FORD. First, the Chief Justice, the Chairman of our Commission, and myself, along with several staff members, thoroughly interrogated Jack Ruby in Dallas on that Sunday afternoon; the interrogation went 3 or 4 hours. We believe that we had fully probed from him all of the information that he had available, and the Chief Justice, the Chairman and I reported back to the other members of the Commission the interrogation that we had of Jack Ruby. The other members of the Commission had full access, of course, to the transcript. It is my best recollection that the other members of the Commission agreed with the Chief Justice and myself that it was not necessary to bring Jack Ruby from Dallas to Washington and to go through another interrogation of him in the Nation's capital. Second, as the transcript indicates, Jack Ruby did request a polygraph examination. At his request, that was given, and the Commission and the staff of the Commission had the benefit of that polygraph and that interrogation. So, when you brought it all together, the interrogation by the chairman and myself and the staff, plus the polygraph, it did not seem necessary to bring Jack Ruby down to Washington for further investigation or interrogation. Mr. DEVINE. In other words, it was the feeling of the Commission, or at least a majority of them, that no meaningful purpose would be served by transporting him from Dallas to Washington, is that right? President FORD. That is correct, sir. Mr. DEVINE. In another vein, Mr. President, if you know, why did Earl Warren agree to accept the position as head of the Warren Commission? 578 President FORD. I assume that the responsibilities of the Chief Justice--- Mr. DEVINE. Would you hold a minute, I think we have lost our sound. Thank you Mr. President. Let me repeat the question, if you know, why did Chief Justice Warren accept the assignment as head of the Warren Commission? President FORD. I believe that Chief Justice Warren accepted the assignment from President Johnson for precisely the same reason that the other six of us did. We were asked by the President to undertake this responsibility, as a public duty and service, and despite the reluctance of all of us to add to our then burden or operations, we accepted. I am sure that was the personal reaction and feeling of the Chief Justice. Mr. DEVINE. I know that you were personally reluctant to accept it because you did not seek the assignment and I doubt if any of the other members did. What was Allen Dulles' role on the Commission? President FORD. Allen Dulles had an identical relationship and role on the Commission with the rest of us. He was unique, however, in that he had served for a considerable period of time as the Director of the CIA, so that as a member of the Commission he could draw on that experience and expertise in any matters that involved the foreign intelligence problems. It is my best judgment, Mr. Congressman, that we were fortunate to have had a person like Allen Dulles on the Commission because of his background. Mr. DEVINE. Would you know, Mr. President, what his informal relations were with the CIA, since he was the retired Director? Did he have an opportunity to obtain more information for the Commission because of that unique position? President FORD. To my best knowledge, he had no unusual relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency other than the fact that he had been a former Director. As I said a moment ago, I believe that background and experience was beneficial to the Commission and not harmful or detrimental to our investigation and our recommendations and conclusions. Mr. DEVINE. To put it another way, Mr. President, you then don't feel that his former relationship with the CIA in any way hindered the operations of the Warren Commission? President FORD. Not at all, sir. Mr. DEVINE. If you know, why has the public acceptance of the findings of the Warren Commission diminished to reasonably low proportions over the years? This is speculation, but we would like to have the benefit of your thinking. President FORD. Because I would like to be very precise I have a written statement which I would like to read in this regard. Public acceptance of the Warren Commission findings has diminished for several reasons. No. one, the critics who have obtained the widest publicity have either deliberately or negligently mislead the American people by misstating facts and by omitting crucial facts in their discussions. Second, there is general public cynicism about any report of an assassination of a President. The record shows questions after 579 many years are still being raised as to the assassination of other Presidents. Third, the overwhelming majority of the American people have not read the entire Warren Commission report. Now, under point one, let me make this specific matter a matter of the record. The coverup of the underlying facts, in my opinion, of the Tippit murder has been a hallmark of critics of the Warren Commission. For instance, in the introduction to one of the best selling books professing Oswald's innocence, one reads, and I quote: The plain fact is there is no evidence at all to explain how or why the Dallas police instantly pounced on Oswald and until some adequate explanation is given no one can be blamed for entertaining the most likely hypothesis, viz, that the Dallas police had undisclosed reasons for arresting Oswald even before they had valuable evidence pointing towards him. Once that hypothesis is admitted almost all of the evidence accepted by the Commission can be reinterpreted in a different way. In my opinion, no investigation of the tragic assassination of the President can be complete without including an investigation of the murder of Dallas police officer J.D. Tippit. Almost all who have claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald was innocent of the murder of President Kennedy have also claimed that Oswald was innocent of the murder of Tippit. This is despite the fact that at least six eye witnesses, who either saw the murder or saw the Tippit gunman leaving the murder scene with a gun in hand, identified that gunman as Lee Harvey Oswald. Moreover, Oswald was arrested with the Tippit murder weapon in his possession. The arrest of Oswald was an outgrowth of the acts of an alert citizen in Dallas, J. Calvin Brewer, who managed a shoe store in the neighborhood of the Tippit shooting. Shortly after Brewer learned from radio newscasts about the shooting of Tippit in his neighborhood, he became suspicious of the way a man first ducked into the entryway of his shoestore, where police sirens were heard coming down the street, and then left the front of the store soon after the police sirens subsided. Brewer followed the man down the street into the Texas Theater and then had the cashier call the police. When the police arrived at the theater, Brewer pointed out the man who was Lee Harvey Oswald. As the policeman approached Oswald pulled out a revolver. Carrying a concealed gun is a crime. The fact that Oswald had such a weapon in his possession, and drew it, is highly suspicious. Subsequent evidence provided that this very revolver had been purchased through the mail by Oswald under the same alias he used to acquire the rifle used in the assassination of President Kennedy. Both Oswald's revolver and Oswald's rifle were mailed to the same post office box in Dallas. Witnesses at the Tippit murder scene saw the gunman throw cartridge cases into the bushes as he reloaded his revolver; an irrefutable ballistic evidence proved that those cartridge cases came from Oswald's revolver, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world. This exactly corresponds with the ballistic evidence that proved that the bullet found off Governor Connally's stretcher in Parkland Hospital in Dallas, and the two large bullet fragments in the President's limousine which came 580 from the bullet which struck President Kennedy's head, came from Oswald's rifle, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world. Now, the point I wish to make is that in too many cases some of the critics of the Warren Commission have either misstated or omitted facts that were developed by the Commission and in the process of either an omission or misstatement have led the public to have less than full support for the commission's recommendations and conclusions. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you. I have one question in a completely different vein. As you know, one of the mandates that the Congress has placed on this select committee is to ultimately make recommendations. You as President were the subject of a number of attacks, and fortunately escaped with your hide. President FORD. I am pretty healthy now. Mr. DEVINE. You certainly look so. President FORD. I am glad she missed. Mr. DEVINE. Not wanting to be distasteful, and God forbid that another situation would occur like occurred during the Kennedy years, I hope we never have another assassination or assassination attempt, but it is my understanding that if such a thing would occur they would go through the same autopsy procedures as they did back in 1963; whoever is President would be taken to Bethesda Hospital, and he would be looked at probably by clinical pathologists rather than forensic pathologists. It is my understanding also, Mr. President, that the Metropolitan Police Department here has anticipated that type of need for any so-called VIP and that they have put together what they call an executive autopsy procedure where they have everything available, they have videotapes available, they have forensic pathologists available. That leads up to this question, Mr. President, do you in your capacity as former Presi dent, as a former Member of the Congress that has been deeply involved in the Warren Commission and the assassination problems, do you have any recommendations that you would like to make to this committee either legislatively or procedurally as it may relate to an assassination like this occurring in the future? President FORD. Well, No. 1, I am glad that some plans have been laid to maybe make the procedure in the case of another tragedy in better, more professional hands. I am talking about the autopsy. From what I read, this committee has determined that the autopsy procedure in Bethesda was not conducted by the experts or professionals in that area. That was of course unfortunate, and I trust that what is now laid out would eliminate whatever the difficulties were at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. If such an assassination were to take place again, I am certain that there would be a public demand for some organization to undertake and investigate the full facts. I don't think the public would be satisfied with anyone or all of the Federal agencies themselves investigating and coming to conclusions. So you come down at the bottom line, I would recommend that in such a tragedy that what President Johnson did would be repeated. I see no better alternative. I just hope it doesn't happen again, but if it did I think that is the best option. 581 Mr. DEVINE. Do you feel there is any need for further legislation in this area? As you know at the time of the occurrence of the Kennedy assassination, it was not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate nor have jurisdiction in matters of this nature. That has been changed during the interim period. President FORD. As I recall, that was a recommendation of the Commission and Congress responded to it, so at least legislatively we probably have a better circumstance today than we did in 1963. And other things have improved after as you have indicated. I would like to make a comment so the record is clear. Even though there may have been some inadequacies, at the time the autopsy was undertaken in Bethesda, as I understand it, the individuals who investigated and actually reviewed the material on the autopsy, a very prestigious group from what 1 read, they have come to the conclusion which is the same as those who did it before, Kennedy was shot from behind. Mr. DEVINE. Fine. Thank you, Mr. President. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentlemen has expired. Committee will now operate under the 5-minute rule. Mr. President, in the commission arriving at the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin, to what degree did the Commission struggle with the question of motive and what was the final conclusion relative to his motive? President FORD. My best recollection, and I repeat it is 14 years later, is that we were not able to precisely pin down a motive for the assassination by Lee Harvey Oswald of President Kennedy. There was no way of really being definitive as to that motive and so we could only speculate. Chairman STOKES. Did it come to the attention of the Commission that the CIA had in their possession a Soviet defector by the name of Yuri Nosenko, who claimed to have information about Lee Harvey Oswald while he was living in Soviet Russia. President FORD. It is my best recollection the commission was cognizant of the existence of Mr. Nosenko. It is also my best recollection that there was no certainty within the intelligence community of the Federal Government as to whether he was a plant, on the one hand, or a bona fide, on the other. There was that difference of opinion. And so the commission had to make its own decision as to the validity of whatever information he had. Chairman STOKES. I would take it from that then that in terms of the Agency, that is the CIA, they were unable to give you some definitive information relative to his bona fides, so you might then come to a conclusion relative to any information regarding Oswald in the Soviet Union. President FORD. I think that is generally correct, Mr. Chairman. Yes, sir. Chairman STOKES. NOW, yesterday we had a former agent from the FBI who testified before our committee, and the way he explained the investigative procedure was that the Commission conducted its own investigation, that the FBI conducted their own investigation, and I think the term he used "they did their own thing, we did our own thing; if they requested anything from us we gave them whatever they asked for." 582 Would it be your recollection that that was the way that the Commission operated investigatively and FBI operated? President FORD. Let me put it my way. Chairman STOKES. Sure. President FORD. The FBI, and I use that as an example, undertook a very extensive investigation. I don't recall how many agents, but they had a massive operation to investigate everything. The Commission with this group of 14 lawyers and some additional staff people then drew upon all of this information which was available, and we, if my memory serves me accurately, insisted that the FBI give us everything they had. Now that is a comprehensive order from the Commission to the Director of the FBI. I assume, and I think the Commission assumed, that that order was so broad that if they had anything it was their obligation to submit it. Now if they didn't, that is a failure on the part of the agencies, not on the part of the Commission. Chairman STOKES. Mr. President, was the Commission made aware of the fact that as a result of an investigation or inspection which was directed by J. Edgar Hoover, that 17 agents were found to be deficient in the preassassination investigation relative to Oswald? President FORD. To my best recollection, at least I was not familiar with any reprimand or corrective action taken by the Director. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. President. My time has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to have you here, Mr. President, and Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy, as the three members of the Warren Commission that can testify today. I think one of the problems the Warren Commission has had is that you went out of existence immediately upon the filing of the report, and you haven't had the opportunity to answer your critics. There has been no official Warren Commission. And so I think it is very appropriate that you have this chance to answer for the historical record today. Following up on the question Mr. Devine asked, one of the mandates of this committee is how should we deal with the eventuality of a high-level assassination in the future. The Warren Commission was the first citizens' commission, as I understand it, which investigated an assassination. In the past we have left it up to the normal course of the judicial system. You have had experience with citizens' commissions. You appointed the Rockefeller Commission I believe. And you served on this commission. In view of your experience, do you feel that a high-level political assassination should be dealt with by a citizens' committee, or should we leave it up to the normal workings of the judicial system? President FORD. I would strongly advocate a high-level citizens' commission as was done by President Johnson. To leave it up to the agencies of the Federal Government, in my opinion, would multiply cynicism and skepticism as to the conclusions. We certainly have had our problems with all the critiques that have been floating around in recent years but I think if the in-house agencies of the Federal Government had done the job and come to the same 583 conclusion we did, the critiques would have been far, far greater. So I recommend what President Johnson did as a possibility for the future. Mr. PREYER. One further question on that score. The Warren Commission did not employ its own investigative staff and used agencies in place to develop the basic information--FBI, CIA, Secret Service. You have indicated that Warren Commission decisionmaking was independent of any conclusions of those agencies and that you crosschecked their information. But in the future, if a citizens' commission is set up, would it be your judgment that they should employ its own investigative staff as well as forming its independent conclusions with a limited staff, or do you feel that using agencies in place and forming your judgment on that as the Warren Commission did is the best way to go. President FORD. It is my best judgment that the procedure and the policy the Warren Commission followed was the correct one, and I would advocate any subsequent commission to follow the same. For the Warren Commission to have gathered together an experienced staff, to get them qualified to handle classified information, to establish the organization that would be necessary for a sizable number of investigators, would have been time consuming and in my opinion would not have answered what we were mandated to do in a timely and responsive manner. It is my, it is my strong feelings that what we did was the right way. We were not captives of but we utilized the information from the in-house agencies of the Federal Government. After getting the benefit of their experience and reports, we undertook by a wide variety of procedures to verify or to undercut what they had given us. Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. President. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. President, it is a pleasure to have you here. Basically, to follow up on Judge Preyer's line of questioning, the then Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Katzenbach, in a deposition to this committee, and I quote from page 19, stated: Perhaps naively but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the Commission would ensure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that information available to the other Commissioners. He might have been skeptical about how far it was to go to the staff or how it might be further investigated because there was somewhat more of an aura of secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is in 1978. We have found out that there were CIA files and information, of course, that were not given to the Warren Commission. So following through on the judge's questions, did you at the time feel information was being withheld, and how would you handle this if another commission were to be formed to make sure the Commission knew it was getting all information? President FORD. I had the feeling then, as a member of the Commission, that we were getting all of the information from any one or all of the Federal agencies, including the Central Intelli- 584 gence Agency. Obviously, there was some information as to assassination plots that, to my best recollection, was not given to us. I can't give you a 100-percent guarantee how you can get that information. It depends on individuals, it depends on the system. Why we weren't given it, quite frankly, I don't understand. Mr. McKINNEY. Continuing on in that same deposition, on page 20, Mr. Katzenbach says: It never would have occurred to me that the FBI would cover up anything. If you ask me the question if the FBI failed to do something it should have done, would they have covered that up? My answer to you is, even then, would have been yes, they probably would not cover up information that somebody else was guilty of something of the kind, but if the Bureau had made any mistake or anything for which the public might criticize the Bureau, the Bureau would do its best to conceal that information from anybody, including the Commission. Of course, we find out now that this was true in the case of the action brought against the agents for a supposed failure before the assassination in handling the case of Lee Harvey Oswald. Again, it seems to be a fact that the Bureau was withholding information from the commission, despite a Presidential mandate. Is there any way that you could suggest that we, as a committee, could--again, I keep hoping this will never have to happen--give a legislative or governmental standing to this type of commission, should it ever have to be formed again, which would override this type of bureaucratic decision within agencies such as the CIA or the FBI? President FORD. I don't believe it is necessary to have a legislative charter for a commission of this kind. If my recollection is correct, we did get, as a commission, legislative authority to put witnesses under oath and to interrogate them under those circumstances. As I recall, we had to get special legislation for that purpose, which we did. I think that's enough, or I think that's sufficient to insure that we have the power to pursue any and all angles. Mr. McKINNEY. I want to thank you very much for taking time out of your schedule, and it is a pleasure to have you here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, to reiterate the remarks of my colleagues, it is a pleasure to have you here with us on Capitol Hill, particularly in the Cannon Building. You were telling us earlier it was your place of residence as a Member of Congress for some years. President FORD. I had an office down on the third floor down the hall for 16 years. Mr. DODD. Welcome back. I would like to, if I could, Mr. President, direct your attention to the two memos I think you have in front of you, exhibits 441 and 442. Those are the DeLoach memos. And I would like to, if I could, ask you to respond to some questions with regard to the December 12, 1963, memo first, particularly two paragraphs, the very first paragraph of the memorandum and the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum. The first paragraph, for purposes of the record, reads, and I am quoting from it: 585 I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. "Jerry" Ford R. Michigan in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving, he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to. Referring to the next to the last paragraph of the same memo, again I am quoting Mr. DeLoach here: Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential. Mr. President, I would like to ask you some questions about this, if I could. First of all, the December 5 and December 16 meetings of the commission, is it my understanding those meetings were closed to the public and press; these were executive sessions? President FORD. I don't recall those precise meetings, Mr. Congressman, but it is my best recollection that all meetings of the Commission were in executive session; not only those, but all that followed. Mr. DODD. And as I understand it, Mr. DeLoach would not necessarily have had access directly to the meetings. There was liaison with the FBI, but he was not the liaison. President FORD. He was not the liaison person, but there was an FBI liaison officer there, as I recall, at all hearings. Mr. DODD. If I understood your testimony accurately this morning, you stated that you felt that the information that was contained in these two memorandums, two documents, was basically accurate, and yet you said that you had terminated your relationship with Mr. DeLoach in terms of these kinds of meetings after this December 17 meeting you had with him. Can I, therefore, conclude that Mr. DeLoach's statements with regard to the next to the last paragraph on the second page of the December 12 memorandum is wrong? President FORD. As 1 said in a prepared statement which I read in reference to both memorandums, it is my best recollection that we no longer had contacts, as indicated in these two memos, and to my best information, there are no other memorandums that would indicate a continuing relationship. There are these two, all of which meetings took place in the organizational phase of the commission's operations. To my best knowledge, and I asked the staff of the committee to check most carefully, there are no other memorandums indicating contacts with Mr. DeLoach. Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in that second sentence of that next to the last paragraph, quoting it again, he stated, referring to you, I believe, "This would have to be on a confidential basis. However, he thought it should be done.' Do you recall what your motivation was, if that is a correct statement, that the time you thought it should have been done and then having changed the relationship, at that particular time, why you felt that it might be important to have this kind of a confidential relationship with Mr. DeLoach? President FORD. First, as I said in the prepared response earlier, I, like most Americans, at that time had great respect for the Director, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, and for the achievements and the 586 accomplishments of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I had developed a personal relationship, on a very off-and-on basis, with Mr. DeLoach. If I had a question as a Member of Congress that involved the FBI, such as you would have today, there is somebody over at the FBI you can call, and he will come and see you. That's the kind of relationship I had with Mr. DeLoach. If I had a problem that involved the FBI, my contact at that time was Mr. DeLoach. I don't know who your contact would be at the present time, but there is a person at the FBI who will respond to your inquiries, and that was my relationship with Mr. DeLoach. At the outset, during the organizational phase of the commission, we had some problems. We were concerned about what appeared to be the attitude of the chairman. Second, several others on the commission thought he wanted a one-man commission. Most of the members of the commission didn't agree with that. There were other organizational matters that I thought I could get a better feel for if I talked to Mr. DeLoach and had the benefit of his or the FBI investigations. That's why I had those two meetings, and, to my best recollection, that relationship terminated at the conclusion of the December 17 meeting. Mr. DODD. Mr. President, you anticipated my next question. I wanted to know, if I could, from you, why you felt it was important that you share this information specifically with the FBI, particularly when it seems to have been, at least, on a couple of internal matters--who should be chief counsel, for instance, whether or not there should be a press release issued on the FBI report. Granted, it was on the FBI report, but that again, sounds more like an internal matter to the commission--what they should be doing, when the Chief justice wanted to finalize the report. I am curious about why the FBI, why not someone else? President FORD. Well, in the course of a conversation, maybe 15 minutes, you cover a lot of subjects. Some of it may be related to or pertinent to the organizational--organization of the commission, some of it may have been just general information. I can't help but indicate here that in one of these memos, it does state that John McCone, then head of the CIA, came to see me, and it is also indicated in here that Mr. McCone went to see other members of the commission. Was that improper? Mr. McCone was the head of an organization which was in the process of being investigated by the Commission. I don't think you turn a person away, a person of that responsibility, and I didn't, and I think it was perfectly proper. I don't know what other members of the commission did, but you have to remember, we were a unique group that was trying to get all the information we could. It was our obligation. It was mandated by President Johnson. In the organizational phase, we had a lot of questions, and, frankly, I think it was very proper to do what I did. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. DODD. Could I ask unanimous consent to proceed for a couple of additional minutes, Mr. Chairman? Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recognize Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned in the memo, as well that you thought these meetings ought to be confi- 587 dential. Was it your understanding, given the personal relationship of Mr. DeLoach, that there would only be information you should share with him as an individual, or did you fully expect him to report to supervisors or superiors of his within the Bureau as to any common suggestions and statements that you might have made to him in those meetings? President FORD. I didn't pursue what the process would be after he left my office. Frankly, it didn't occur to me I should check it out. I only know what our two relationships were on those two occasions, December 12 and December 17, 1963. Mr. DODD. Did you, Mr. President, by any chance, you mentioned that Mr. McCone sought out various other commission members. In fact, he sought out you to talk to you about something. Did you seek out anyone else in any other agency to talk to at that time, other than Mr. DeLoach? President FORD. Not to my best recollection. Mr. DODD. I gather from what you had mentioned just a minute ago that there were other personnel from various investigatory agencies that did contact other members of the commission from time to time. Is that an accurate statement of your testimony? President FORD. I can't verify it one way or another. I have no way of knowing who might have contacted other members of the commission, and certainly my memory at this point would not be sufficiently accurate to make such a charge. Mr. DODD. Am I to understand that because of the confidentiality or the nature of these two meetings with Mr. DeLoach, that the other members of the Warren Commission, at the time, were not aware of the fact you had met with Mr. DeLoach? President FORD. To my best recollection, I didn't indicate to him that I had those meetings; no. Mr. DODD. Did Mr. DeLoach--granted this is going back a long time--but do you recall whether or not he shared any information with you as to their feelings that you brought back to the commission? Was it comments, statements, suggestions, or anything that he might have said to you that you then brought to the commission as a member of that commission? President FORD. I don't recall that any advice or suggestions he made were conveyed by me back to the commission; no. At least that's my best recollection. Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I have no further ques- tions. Again, Mr. President, I appreciate your being here today. President FORD. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, I would like to first join with my colleague in thanking you for appearing here this morning. I only have one question for you, Mr. President. Do you feel that the Warren Commission received full and honest information from the FBI and the CIA in regards to Oswald's alleged connection with foreign governments? President FORD. To the best of my recollection, I think we got from any and all of the Federal agencies all of the information they had as to Oswald's connection with any foreign government. 588 Mr. FORD. One additional question. What about the Secret Service, did the Warren Commission ever have dialog or communication with the Secret Service? President FORD. Oh, yes, we had testimony, as I recollect, from the Director, who was Mr. Rowley at the time. We interrogated, as a commission staff, made a thorough investigation of the advanced procedures of the Secret Service, the actual operations of the Secret Service while President Kennedy was in Dallas. The commission and the staff, in my opinion, made a very thorough investigation of all the responsibilities and activities of the Secret Service; yes, sir. Mr. FORD. Thank you very much, Mr. PreSident, and, again, I thank you for coming. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. Mr. President, I join with the others in saying what a pleasure it is to have you here. You have been really my only claim to distinction as a freshman Congressman here. You would be amazed how many times when I am introduced, to somebody, they say, this is the fellow who occupies Gerald Ford s seat and the seat you held with such distinction for 25 years. President FORD. Thank you. Mr. SAWYER. Going back to this Tippit situation, one thing that has bothered me consistently, and I have to confess up until now I haven't had any substantial enlightenment on it, I just wonder if you have formed an opinion, not with respect to whether Oswald shot Tippit, I am totally satisfied on that and I think the evidence is overwhelming on that, but why Tippit stopped Oswald is a perplexing question in that at that point in time, as you may recall. Oswald had gone to an entirely different area of the city, far removed, he was only walking up the street. The description that had been issued was a general description that would be just kind of an average guy in size and general appearance. Did you form any opinion on that? President FORD. Unfortunately, because of his murder, we never got any testimony from Officer Tippit, but I assume that he was a good officer and he had been alerted that there had been an assassination. I suspect that any well-qualified, alert officer was anxious to pursue anything that was suspicious. I think we ought to compliment and congratulate Tippit for undertaking this effort that he did. Unfortunately, it resulted in his death. But why he did, other than carrying out his responsibilities, I wouldn't know. Mr. SAWYER. DO you think that there would be any advantage in a criminal law applying to such a commission, let's say, as the Warren Commission, making it a Federal crime for any Agency personnel to withhold or not provide all pertinent information that they are requested to provide? President FORD. I haven't studied this but are there not present laws on the statute books that would permit such a charge? Mr. SAWYER. I Can't answer you. President FORD. If not, I think that ought to be investigated. Mr. SAWYER. Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. President. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 589 Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to join with the others in expressing my appreciation for your coming this morning. I have just two areas I would like to explore briefly with you. I would like to return for just a minute to your earlier statement concerning bullet fragments found in the Presidential limousine. In reviewing the Warren Commission, I find that the FBI tests of the fragments, both through spectography and neutron activation analysis, could not in fact determine the origin of the fragments. I just want to read briefly from the Commission report: Each of the two bullet fragments had sufficient unmutilated area to provide the basis for an identification. However, it was not possible to determine whether the two bullet fragments were from the same bullet or from two different bullets. With regard to the other bullet fragments discovered in the limousine and in the course of treating President Kennedy and Governor Connally, however, expert examination could demonstrate only that the fragments were "similar in metallic composition" to each other, to the two larger fragments and to the nearly whole bullet. Is it your recollection that other evidence or other tests were run on the bullet fragment other than what I have had access to? President FORD. I am not able to recollect that detail as to what other tests, if any, were conducted at that time. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. I would like to ask you about something that has been troubling me throughout our investigation and some reports that there was unusual pressure to either arrive at an early conclusion that it was Oswald alone, or to arrive at unanimity that Oswald was the lone assassin, et cetera. There was a report in 1975 pertaining to a June 4 meeting of the commission, and the report in the Washington Star indicated that Ford provoked "a near uproar in the panel when on June 4, 1964 he charged that outside forces were trying to pressure the commission to decide in advance that Oswald was a solitary assassin." I wonder if you would help the committee out by commenting on that report? President FORD. I have no recollection of that particular June 4 meeting or any pressure that the commission received for any definitive conclusion. As other members of the commission, I think, will testify, we had a unanimous vote as to the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald committed the assassination and all other decisions of the commission were also unanimous. There was no pressure. We operated as a unit of seven members who fortunately all agreed. Mr. FITHIAN. I want to return briefly to the unanimous question in just a moment. But is it then your testimony that in your judgment the FBI had not decided prematurely, that there was no evidence that you had that the FBI withheld information from the commission or gave information to the commission that would make the Bureau look better instead of "everything that you asked for"? President FORD. I suspect that the FBI, after its investigation, came to the conclusion that Oswald was the assassin. I suspect there is evidence, reports, around the Bureau, or maybe over in our 590 files, that that was their conclusion, but I emphasize their conclusion did not determine the conclusion of the commission. What they came to as a conclusion was helpful to the commission, but it didn't decide for the commission what our conclusion was. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. FITHIAN. I ask unanimous consent to ask one additional question. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized. Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. President, it has been reported many places that there was some difficulty in arriving at unanimity of the conclusiveness of the evidence for the final report and that in order to get the unanimity, which is the historical record now, certain very carefully drafted language, such as no evidence to the contrary, or according to the evidence presented to us, and then the conclusion. Would you care to comment on the effort at drafting the report in such a way, did you have any problem arriving at the unanimity short of drafting some very careful, artful language? President FORD. There was a recommendation, as I recall, from the staff that could be summarized this way. No. 1, Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. Two, there was no conspiracy, foreign or domestic. The commission, after looking at this suggested language from the staff, decided unanimously that the wording should be much like this, and I am not quoting precisely from the Commission staff, but I am quoting the substance. No. 1, that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. No. 2, the Commission has found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic. The second point is quite different from the language which was recommended by the staff. I think the Commission was right to make that revision and I stand by it today. Mr. FITHIAN. Well, thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Thone. Mr. THONE. Welcome back, Mr. President. The hour is late. Just one question. There was no question but that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a lot of background material on Lee Harvey Oswald that should have alerted them, I am sure did alert them, to the fact that he could very well have been a security problem. They also knew, as I understand it, as least one agent knew, that he was working in the Texas Book Depository. It is my understanding that that information was not then transmitted to the Secret Service. Do you have any thoughts or suggestions regarding this obvious breakdown in communication? President FORD. At one time I knew that whole story, but I must say I can't recall all of the details. I think the conclusion of the Commission was that there had to be a better liaison between the FBI and the Secret Service and/or any other agencies involved in intelligence, et cetera, and I trust and hope that that interrelationship has been improved. It wasn't the best at that time, as my memory serves me. 591 Mr. THONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to welcome you to the committee today and thank you for your answers to our questions. Mr. President, was there a sitdown meeting of the Warren Commission with the FBI, the CIA, and the Secret Service at the very beginning of the Warren Commission's investigation to outline an investigative plan for the commission? President FORD. I do not recall any meeting of the lull commission with the Director of the FBI, the Director of CIA, and the Director of the Secret Service. I am not sure such a meeting was necessary or essential. Our first responsibility was to appoint a staff, which we did, and to layout a procedure by which we would investigate, et cetera. Mr. Rankin and the Chief Justice, if my memory is accurate, had the basic man to man relationship with the head of the FBI, the Secret Service and the CIA, and it is my feeling that that interrelationship was sufficient from the point of view of myself as a member of the commission. Mr. EDGAR. Did the commission itself have an investigative plan? President FORD. Well, we have a plan that was under the direction of the commission and implemented by the staff, and that was a very specific investigation method, procedure, and I think it worked. Mr. EDGAR. The reason for my question is that we have uncovered some information that the Secret Service and the FBI and the CIA didn't talk together very well and did not share information with each other prior to the assassination, and that there is some evidence that even after the assassination each of them worked separately and apart from each other. Wouldn't it have been a proper role of the Warren Commission to act as a coordinating function between these agencies to get them to share information about Lee Harvey Oswald or about the investigation? President FORD. If you will return or look at, Congressman Edgar, the report of the commission, page 24, under subparagraph small (c), the report says, and I will read it for you: The Commission has concluded that there was insufficient liaison and coordination of information between the Secret Service and other Federal agencies necessarily concerned with Presidential protection. It goes on, but that is a summary of the rest of the paragraph. Yes, I think we found there was insufficient liaison, coordination, before the assassination. I don't think it was necessarily required that they have liaison afterwards in the course of the investigation. To do their respective responsibilities effectively, cooperation was essential before the assassination. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you. Moving to another area. In reference to the disciplinary action of the 17 agents of the FBI, to the best of your recollection, when did you first come to know about the disciplinary action? 592 President FORD. To be honest with you, I did not know of that disciplinary action at any time while I was a member of the commission. Mr. EDGAR. Do you think that knowledge of that information would have been helpful to the commission in light of the fact that Edgar Hoover indicated that part of the reason for the disciplinary action was that the agents should have been aware of Lee Harvey Oswald's background and placed him on the security index? President FORD. It might have been helpful to the commission but I don't think it would have altered in any way the final recommendations or conclusions. [ think we might have been helped by that information, but I don't think it would have varied other commission conclusions. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized. Mr. EDGAR. Mr. President, you mentioned the importance of Officer Tippit. I wonder if you could speculate for us where Lee Harvey Oswald was going at the time of the shooting of Officer Tippit? President FORD. I have no immediate recollection of where he was going at that time. I would have to refresh my memory before I could give you any firm answer. Mr. EDGAR. Did you have an opportunity as part of the commission to retrace Lee Harvey Oswald's steps from his rooming house to the shooting of Mr. Tippit and then to the--- President FORD. Yes; I went to Dallas with the Chief Justice and we spent a full day not only interrogating Jack Ruby but going over precisely Oswald's movements as we understood them, during that whole period. We went, again I can't recall the number, by the house where the woman was on the porch, et cetera. Mr. EDGAR. In that journey, did you also travel to Jack Ruby's apartment? President FORD. I don't recall that. Mr. EDGAR. Let me just ask one final question, then. Mr. President, what would you do to improve the protection of the President of the United States? President FORD. Well, having experienced 30 months of their protection and their continuing protection at the present time, I think they do a very professional job. They are an outstanding group of people. They are well organized and have fine leadership. I only know firsthand that in two instances they did a very, very superb job in responding to an assassination attempt. In the case of Fromm in Sacramento, an agent, Larry Boondorf, really moved in effectively and quickly. In San Francisco, again, what was done I thought was very professional. I am very grateful as to how they handled themselves, what they have done, and the way they are organized. I know of no way you can improve it from my personal experience. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. President. No further questions. 593 Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, is seeking additional recognition. Mr. DODD. Just one question, if I may, and this will be the last one. I know you are running behind. Today you stated that there were a number of alleged incidents or facts that were relevant to one degree or another to the assassination which you and the other members of the commission, or many of them, were not aware of at the time you served on the commission. You refer specifically to the existence of the Hosty letter and its contents, or its alleged contents; the allegations that Lee Harvey Oswald might have been an FBI informer; J. Edgar Hoover's so called second Oswald theory in 1959 when he was overseas; assassination plots against Fidel Castro; and just recently here, in questioning from Congressman Edgar, the disciplinary action that was taken against the agents in the FBI; things that you were not privy to at the time you were serving on the commission. I raise those points to ask you this question. Without--and I understand your answer with regard to the conclusions in light of these additional revelations--but putting that aspect of it aside, the conclusions, in terms of an investigation, would you agree that the investigation of the Warren Commission, I mean that, for example, the witnesses interrogated, in light of these four or five facts or allegations that I have just mentioned, in light of that, do you feel that the investigation of the Warren Commission would have called upon additional witnesses, that the investigatory process would have changed as a result of those additional facts and information? President FORD. To a degree, but I do not believe that there would have been any significant change in the process or the methods. Obviously we wanted to have all information, including the information that you have related. Unfortunately, for various reasons, it was not made available to the commission. But I refer again to what I said earlier. I do not think our lack of information in those instances had any adverse impact on our conclusions or would have changed the conclusions. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine, is seeking additional recognition. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. President, again for your total cooperation and appearance here. I ask unanimous consent that JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442 be admitted in evidence at this point in the record. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be admitted to the record at this point. [The above referred to JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442 were admitted into evidence and follow:] 594 JFK EXHIBIT F-441 595 JFK EXHIBIT F-441 cont. 596 JFK EXHIBIT F-442 597 JFK EXHIBIT F-442 cont. 598 JFK EXHIBIT F-442 cont. Chairman STOKES. Mr. President, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, he is entitled under our rules to 5 minutes. He may take that 5 minutes for the purpose of comment- ing upon his testimony or explaining it or expanding upon it in any way, and I would extend to your at this time 5 minutes for that purpose. President FORD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not take that time. I do wish to express my appreciation to you, the committee members, and the staff for their consideration. It has been a pleasure to be here. I will give my time to my former associates on the commission, John Sherman Cooper and John McCloy, who I am sure will be very helpful in expanding or im- proving on my observations here this morning. I thank you very, very much. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. President, for not only the time you have expended with our staff and Mr. Cornwell prior to your appearance here today, but taking time out of what we know is a very busy schedule to appear here and to offer the testimony we have received this morning. As one of your former colleagues herein the House, it has been an honor to have had you here. President FORD. Give my best to everybody. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, we certainly will. All persons are requested to remain in their seats for security reasons until President Ford has left the room. Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Our next two witnesses this morning, Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy, will be called as a panel. Mr. Cooper received an A.B. degree from Yale University in 1923, and LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1925. He served the State of Kentucky as U.S. Senator from 1947 through 1949, 1953 through 1955, and 1957 through 1973. Currently he is in private practice in Washington, D.C. as counsel of Covington & Burling. 599 Mr. McCloy received an A.B. degree from Amherst College in 1916 and an LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1921. He is admitted to practice in New York and the District of Columbia. Currently he is in private practice in New York with the firm of Bilbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. Mr. Chairman, at this time it would be appropriate to call both Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy. Chairman STOKES. The committee calls both witnesses. TESTIMONY OF JOHN SHERMAN COOPER AND JOHN J. McCLOY Chairman STOKES. Gentlemen, would you raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. McCLOY. I do. Mr. COOPER. I do. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, you may be seated. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Gary Cornwell. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Would you have identified for the record, counsel, the gentleman who has so ably assisted President Ford and who will be assisting these gentlemen? Mr. CORNWELL. It is Mr. Dave Belin. He was a member of the Warren Commission staff and he has been here as counsel for the President. Mr. McCLOY. He is not acting as counsel for me. I know him and have great respect for him but he is not here as my counsel. Mr. CORNWELL. Senator Cooper, I am sure that the committee will wish to explore with you whatever areas you may wish to elaborate on or that you may have any disagreement with in respect to the President's testimony. I just have one question I would like to ask you. You are quoted as stating in a televised broadcast recently that there were disagreements among the commission members, that, and I quote: I think the most serious one of the ones that come to me most vividly, of course, it the question of whether or not the first shot went through President Kennedy and then through Governor Connally. Would you mind explaining to us the nature of that disagreement and how it was resolved? Senator COOPER. If you don't mind, may I make just a short preliminary statement? First, I do want to thank the chairman and members of the committee for inviting the remaining members of the Warren Commission to be here. I think it has importance that we can give you our view of our work, our responsibilities, at a time 14 years before this date. Also, I appreciate the fact that recent studies and events in the intelligence community have raised new questions which have caused you to conduct this investigation. I would like to say that I agree wholeheartedly with the statement made by President Ford. We conducted our investigation, in the way he explained. I don't know whether you will go into that 600 question with me, but we were not pressured in any way by any person or by any organization. We made our own decisions, as the President had asked us to do, and as we determined to do on the basis of what we thought was right and objective. We knew each other. I had known every member of the commission before in some way. I cannot say we were intimate friends but we did know each other. We did have disagreements at times in the commission and, as I have noted, I think the chief debate grew out of the question as to whether there were two shots or three shots and whether the same shot that entered President Kennedy's neck penetrated the body of Governor Connally. The original judgment of the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA was that there were three shots. I don't think that convinced us except as a statement by people, many of them who were familiar with ballistics. This question troubled me greatly. If not the first witness, one of the first witnesses, was Governor Connally of Texas. I remember very clearly this testimony. He said, "I heard a shot, I turned immediately to the right, and looked over my shoulder in the direction of the Texas School Book Depository." Later, he said, "I am familiar with firearms and I knew the shot came from that direction. I then turned back, I wanted to look at the President, over my left shoulder. In turning back, I knew I was struck by a bullet." He then fell or was pulled into the lap of his wife who was sitting to his left in the jumpseat, and he said, while lying there, he heard a shot and there fell over on him, into, I believe his hands, brain tissue, which, of course, he believed came from the President. We heard later the testimony of ballistics experts. Some contended that because of the time element and relying to some degree upon the Zapruder films and other films, that is was not possible to turn off three shots in such a limited specified time. Others testified that certainly there was the time, that the rifle was a perfect rifle for that kind of firing, that the alinement was correct, there was a slight deviation at the end, but it was perfectly possible within the area and time space, which was I think between 5 seconds and 8 seconds. I must say, to be very honest about it, that I held in my mind during the life of the Commission, as I have since, that there had been three shots and that a separate shot struck Governor Connally. It was determined, as shown in the report of the Commission, which I can read to you, but I know you are familiar with the report. It states there was disagreement on this issue, particularly as the subject was debated, that there were different opinions about it. The majority believed that the same shot struck both President Kennedy and Governor Connally, but the report ended by saying, in effect, whatever was the fact, whether there was one, whether two or three shots, that it did not alter the conclusion of the Commission that Oswald was the sole assassin and there was no conspiracy. Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. McCloy, again I am sure the committee may wish to explore with you whatever comments you may have in light of the President's testimony and which you may agree or 601 disagree with, but I would like to ask you about one subject matter. In an interview with our staff previously, and I hope I am quoting you substantially accurately, you expressed the view that the Commission did have enough time to reach its conclusions, but that you were greatly disturbed by the rushed composition and writing of the report. I wonder if you would explain that to us and comment upon it, if you would. Mr. McCLOY. I will be very glad to. I would like to read a very brief statement from some notes about my general attitude toward this examination and the conclusions which we arrived at 14 years ago. With respect to this particular question that you put to me, there was a book called I think, "Rush to Judgment," or some such title, and I had that in mind when I received this inquiry. There was no "rush to judgment." We came to a judgment in due course. There were some questions of style in regard to the preparation of the report where I would like to have had sort of a lawyer-like chance to make it a little more clear, from my point of view, as to what our conclusions were, but I had no question whatever about the substance of the report. As I say, it had only been a matter of style and I had a feeling at the end we were rushing a little bit the last few days to get to print rather than to arrive at any conclusions. We had already arrived at our conclusions. It was just a matter of putting them into good form. I may anticipate some of your questions in this very brief statement I will read from my notes here, but I would like to put one or two points before you, if I may. You, of course, know I was appointed by President Johnson to this Commission. He called me up personally and asked me to serve, and he referred to some of my prior experience in government. I had known President Johnson before and he was aware of some earlier work I had done in the investigative field. I gathered that this was one of the reasons why he desired to have me serve. He personally enlisted, I think, all our services, and we all had a deep sense of responsibility to present to the President and to the people the facts, all the facts, relating to the assassination. I believe that the Commission did aquit itself of that responsibility. I had a strong impression after our first meeting with the Commission, which we had early on, that each of the men--let's put it this way, not one of the members of the Commission had any prior conceptions as to facts surrounding the assassination. As Chief Justice Warren very bluntly put it, "truth is our only goal." There are one or two things that I would like to say in addition to the reaffirmation of my belief that the report of the Commission does contain all the essential facts surrounding the assassination. I think it has stood well the test of time, and in short, I think it is a straightforward, objective, and reliable report of the essential circumstances of that great crime. I don't want to reexamine all of the evidence or defend the conclusions here. Probably, if I tried to defend them, it would take up too much time in the first place, and in the second place, it 602 probably wouldn't be looked upon as an objective analysis when I got through with it. But I do wish to point out one or two things that I think have not been sufficiently stressed, as far as I can tell, in the course of this investigation. We are, in New York, handicapped by the fact we don't have any newspapers and we can't follow from day to day what has transpired down here. But I would like to attempt to put in perhaps better perspective before this committee the contributions which were made to the essential integrity and accuracy of the report by the trained and conscientious investigators who took part in making it. And I would refer, first, to the much-maligned Dallas police force. I also refer, of course, to the FBI investigators and those of the CIA who were called on to assist, and the Secret Service and a number of other agencies. And, lastly, I would like to do justice to the Commission itself and its staff in arriving at these conclusions. These factors have not been sufficiently stressed either here, so far as I know, and indeed, in any of the commentaries I have seen over the years. By and large, I would say that we had the benefit of very skilled and valuable investigative services in the course of reaching our conclusions. In the course of our work, I had ample opportunity to come in contact with the people that were doing this work and I have, generally, a very favorable impression of the quality of that work. And coming back for a moment to the Dallas police force, I think it was rather remarkable the way that police force, bedeviled as they were by newspaper reporters and the press at that point and by the other pressures they were under, performed and that they should be given credit for the prompt and, in many cases, excellent police work which resulted in the very early apprehension of the assassin. The Dallas police were responsible for the early collection of evidence which came to be of vital significance and they were also beset by all of these other agencies that were pounding around them at the time, including those of the Commission. I was rather impressed with the way they handled themselves in spite of the fact that there was a great dereliction of duty in connection with the provisions they made for the security of Oswald, resulting in his death. But my point is, in spite of that ou can't and shouldn't deny the Dallas police credit for an assiduous and, I think, prompt and efficient bit of police work. The FBI made some mistakes and some misinterpretations, and we criticized them for the lack of full surveillance of Oswald that they probably should have undertaken before the assassination. But their work generally, I think, was of rather high order, and I don't see that, as President Ford said, the mistakes, such as I can recall them now, had any relevancy or any reflection upon the conclusions which the Commission reached. I would refer to the staff of the Commission itself, which has already been referred to by President Ford. It is not true we didn't have our own investigative facilities. There was a very distinguished group of litigating lawyers that constituted the staff. I remember I was called upon to make suggestions as to who we 603 might get from my knowledge of the bar. We had a very impressive list and they did excellent work. It is not true, as has been alleged, that we relied entirely on the agencies of the Government. Mr. Ford has brought that all out. I subscribe to what he said. But I would also like to refer to the Commission itself. The Commission itself had considerable ability, in terms of experience in investigative procedures. Here is Judge Cooper; he was also a judge as well as a Senator. He was a county judge in Kentucky, and I am sure in connection with that position he had a great deal of experience in investigative work and in balancing judgments on evidence. Hale Boggs, who is deceased, had a lot of investigative work in the House, certainly. I don't know that he ever held an office as a prosecuting attorney, but Senator Russell, who is also now dead, had been, as I recall, a county attorney or prosecuting attorney. Justice Warren, himself, had been not only the former Governor of the State of California, but he had been attorney general and I think he had been a State prosecuting officer before that. You know the experience of Allen Dulles. As for myself, I don't want to overemphasize it, but I spent 10 years of my life on a case which people have now forgotten about, but it was a rather famous case at one time. It was called the Black Tom case. It involved litigation--you probably heard of it--it had international and national prominence, at one time. It is hard to conceive of any experience that required any more exacting or more sustained investigative work than that litigation did. The outcome of it finally didn't take place until just before the beginning of World War II. It related to crimes that had been committed by the German Government in this country while we were neutral in World War I-murder, arson, explosions, and sabotage were involved. I won't go into all the details of it, but it took years of my time and experi- ence, and I had rather extensive investigative training as a result of it. I am simply saying that this Commission was far from a naive group. When the President asked me to take this position, he referred to my Black Tom experience. He said, you have a reputa tion for having some investigative experience. But he said, what I have in mind is something in the nature of the royal Commission which the British made such good use of and still do. It was something after that pattern that he was thinking in terms of the Presidential Commission that he set up. I don't know if that throws a great deal of light on what his motivations were, but certainly he put a great deal of pressure on us m terms of the responsibility that he was putting on our shoulders. He was clearly very sensitive of how important an investigation this was. So, I think the combination of the investigative experience, of not only the staff but of the Commission itself, was rather impressive. They weren't, as I say, naive. They had the know-how and the experience of weighing facts and evidence. It may be some of them didn't attend all the formal meetings, but the record doesn't show what work they did do outside of meetings. For example, I personally traced every step that I think that Oswald took after he committed the crime. 604 I sat there in the little cubbyhole he had from which he shot at the school depository; I worked and reworked the bolt of the rifle. I have had a good bit of experience with firearms and I knew a good. bit about ballistics. I spent a lot of time in match shooting, using bolt-action rifles. And I tested for myself what I thought a man could do in terms of firing that particular rifle. And the contacts that we had with the various witnesses and the staff, none of which are a part of the record, are perhaps not understood. I think if you had a realization of all this work, you would find that the Commission as a whole was really most assiduous in terms of its application to its task. It didn't simply sit back and accept something that was handed to it. Perhaps I would suggest that the sum total of the experience, of the investigative experience of the Commission far exceeded that of all the commentators that came along after the event and broke into print purporting to be experts in the matter. We, of course, had some questions and differences of view; we talked to each other--Senator Cooper, I recall, had considerable doubt about this question of the path of the bullet which hit Connally. If I may just draw for a minute on my personal experience-perhaps I shouldn't do this--but it influenced my judgment. It was an important element in arriving at my own judgment in regard to that bullet, the so-called single bullet theory. Twice in my life, and I am sure a number of people in this room may have had a somewhat similar experience, I stood right alongside of a man as he was shot. The first man--it was in World War I in France--was killed. The second man recovered from his wound. The circumstances of the second experience were really quite amazing. I am convinced, after my experience, that on occasion, when you are shot, you don't know the minute you are hit. There is a sort of a perceptible period following the impact before you get the full realization that you have been hit. In the first case, it was a fellow officer in World War I. We were not far apart and he quietly said, "Jack, I think I am hit." He shortly collapsed subsequently and died of his wound. The other experience, which is almost unbelievable, was in Berlin when we were rehearsing for the reception of President Truman, who was going to visit us at the American headquarters in Berlin after the war. I had been, as you know, an official of the Government, Military Governor, and later High Commissioner for Germany, and Gen. Lucius Clay, my predecessor as Military Governor was with me, and we began to rehearse the ceremony because President Truman was coming along that afternoon to visit the headquarters. We were rehearsing, for example, who would step up and first shake hands with the President, when the bugles should sound off, et cetera--"You are going to do this and you that." There was a friend of mine who was on Clay's staff and who later became a very distinguished jurist in Massachusetts. He became Chief Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court. His name was Cutter, and we designated him to pose as the President. We said, "you are going to be President Truman, you are going to be the President and are to stand here." We started through the rehearsal. This was in front of the headquarters in Berlin and, by 605 George, Cutter turned to me at a certain point, sort of hesitated and said, "Jack, I think I'm shot," and in a little while, he collapsed. You can imagine what a tizzy that created. There were Secret Service people all around. Here was the man we were setting out to impersonate the President of the United States who was shot. And here again there was a very definite perceptible period following the shooting before he fully realized he was hit. I know Governor Connally very well; I have shot quail with him and I know he's a good shot and I know he is familiar with firearms. Frankly, I don't think he knew exactly when he was hit. I saw his recent testimony--at least somebody reported to me, perhaps indirectly, that he wasn't as certain now as when he first appeared before us--before our Commission when he said he was sure it wasn't the same shot which hit President Kennedy which hit him. I don't know where that bullet could have gone if it didn't go through Governor Connally. Moreover, Governor Connally didn't know until the next day, I think it was, that he had been shot in the hand, as well as in the body. I am suggesting that the certainty which he felt earlier isn't entirely reliable. The Germans have a word for it. They call it the "nachschlag." I believe those who had been close to places where people have been shot are frequently aware of a perceptible delay on the part of the victim in registering an awareness of the shot. Insofar as the conspiracy issue is concerned, there has been so much talk about it that I don't think I need to dwell on it any further. I no longer feel we simply had no credible evidence or reliable evidence in proof of a conspiracy, but I rather think the weight of evidence is affirmatively against the existence of a conspiracy, though it falls short of proof. I know how difficult, and you all know how difficult it is, to prove a negative. Somebody may pop up at some point and come forth with some affirmative testimony that would be credible when you have not been able to find it. But we weren't able to find it in spite of all our rather extensive efforts. And I think we inquired of every agency that purported to have any information about it and all of the reports which came back to us were negative. I wouldn't know what kind of an agency could have told Oswald to stand ready in Dallas to shoot the President of the United States or at some other point when the opportunity arose. It was hard for me to concoct a conspiracy, whether with the assistance of Oswald or not, when there were so many fortuitous circumstances. Oswald clearly, in my judgment and everybody else's judgment, I think, who purports to be objective about it, was the undisputed assassin of the President of the United States, and that in a very brutal manner he indisputably killed Tippit closely following the assassination. He also had tried to kill General Walker. If Walker hadn't pulled his head back the minute of the shot, he would have been a goner, too. Oswald, the evidence shows, was a killer and he was a loner. Having said that, my chief objective is now to try to give this committee the conviction that the Warren Commission was a rather well-equipped organization, because of its experience and because of the standing of the members, to perform its duties. This 606 is relative to the question as to what should be done if this situation arose again. This is something that has been puzzling me as to what one should do, because I know the disrepute in which the findings of the Commission, our Commission, have been held. The Gallup Polls, I have been told, have shown that some 80 percent didn't believe our report to have been thorough and reliable. I didn't talk this over with President Ford, but I was interested when he was asked the question. He said he thought he would do pretty much the same thing as President Johnson did. I had rather come to that conclusion myself because I have the feeling--this may be too subjective--that the Commission was a very thorough bipartisan unit, got together and hammered out an objective, reliable report. It did act in somewhat the same manner as the royal Commissions of Great Britain have done in the past. They have proven to be a rather effective form of investigating body. I would hesitate to put legislation on the books now that would tend to set a rigid form for future investigations. I think you have to deal with the situations as they develop. I do believe that things have improved and some defects disclosed. I believe better communication between investigating agencies is apt to take place in the future, partially due to the criticism we made in our report of the prior work of the FBI in terms of surveillance, as well as in the findings of this committee. I don't know, however, that you can today sit down and work out a piece of legislation that ought to cover all future assassination. Let's hope that we never have a recurrence. Suppose I just stop here and let you carry on with any other questions you may have, and I will try to answer them to the best of my ability. Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. That answered my question and I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. Do any other members of the committee have questions? Mr. Sawyer, the gentleman from Michigan. Mr. SAWYER. Just more of an observation than a question. I think that the most puzzling and unsatisfactory part of the conclusions of the Warren Commission, to me, had always been the single-bullet theory. I had trouble with that. I think that the evidence that has been produced before this committee, and what I think was a superior scientific analysis by some NASA people who worked with that question, I think, at least in this committee member's opinion, has made me a total convert to the single-bullet theory, and I think we have, to any reasonable mind, now proved that beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't think there was any deficiency in the Warren Commission members. I just think that there was a superior scientific analysis of it, particularly one that made use of a still picture from the opposite side of the street of Magruder which, by placement of things in a car, was able to position Mr. Connally in the car at a position laterally, considerably to the left of the President, which I had never really appreciated before.. So that it was their conclusion that the bullet that went through the President's neck could not have missed Governor Connally. 607 Mr. McCLOY. I don't think it could have missed Connally. I think we were a little lax in the Commission in connection with the use of those X-rays. I was rather critical of Justice Warren at that time. I thought he was a little too sensitive of the sensibilities of the family. He didn't want to have put into the record some of the photographs and some of the X-rays taken at the time. We took the testimony of course, of the doctors and probably with the X-rays--we wouldn't have been able to read the X-rays if we hadn't had the doctors' testimony. I believe later on a more thorough examination of those pictures and the X-rays and photographs with the respective positions of the President and Connally did produce a more convincing proof of where that bullet went. As I say, I don't know where else it could have gone. I have talked with Governor Connally about it on a number of occasions, and I was very much interested to see he was a little shaken the last time he testified here. He had a conviction earlier that it was a second bullet that hit him. Mr. SAWYER. I think we have had some evidence that would tend to bear out Governor Connally's recollection. I think there has been considerable evidence now that the first bullet missed everything, and it was the second bullet that hit the President and Governor Connally which then coincides with his testimony because he probably would not have heard the shot that hit him. But in any event, I also wanted to commend you on your conclusionary statement in the Warren Commission that there was no evidence of a conspiracy because you, as a lawyer, I am sure, appreciate about as far as you can go in proving a negative is to say that there was no evidence of the affirmative. Mr. McCLOY. That's right. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McCloy and Senator Cooper, it is wonderful to see you again, particularly you, Senator Cooper. I remember meeting you on a number of occasions when you served in the Senate. It is a pleasure to see you here this morning. Senator COOPER. Thank you. Pardon me, could you speak just a little bit louder? Mr. DODD. I will try and speak a little more clearly. It is nice to see you here this morning. I would like to just ask you, if I could, one question. You heard this morning the testimony of President Ford. Senator COOPER. Yes. Mr. DODD. And I specifically asked him some questions with regard to a memo that was drafted by Mr. DeLoach from the FBI pursuant to a conversation. Senator COOPER. Yes. Mr. DODD. That then Congressman Ford had with Mr. DeLoach. Senator COOPER. Yes. Mr. DODD. At the outset of the Warren Commission hearings. President Ford, in his response to my question this morning, indicated that it was not an uncommon thing for a Member of Congress to have a relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 608 tion, have someone there you might know, talk over things with and so forth. That was the gist, as I understood it, in part anyway, of his answer to my question. My question to you, Senator Cooper, is this: As a member of the Warren Commission and also as a Member of Congress, at the time that the Warren Commission began its work, did you have any such meetings or interviews with anyone from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency which you initiated on your own to report in a confidential way the happenings of executive sessions of the Warren Commission? Senator COOPER. First, I never initiated nor did the FBI ever initiate any conversation or correspondence with me. I met Mr. Hoover socially. I never talked to him about anything connected with his work. We just met him. I knew Mr. McCone chiefly because my wife was from California and had known him. It happened his wife was from my State, Kentucky. We saw each other socially, but never during this time or after did we ever discuss the work of the Warren Commission or the work of the CIA as it applied to the Warren Commission. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Senator. Senator COOPER. I never discussed with the Secret Service during this time any of their duties or their responsibilities outside the hearings. After it was over, 2 or 3 years later, I was accompanying President Johnson to Kentucky on a trip. Mr. Youngblood of the Secret Service was in the car with us. President Johnson got out and spoke to everybody on a country road for 50 miles. Mr. Youngblood turned around and said--I was in the same car--he said, "you remember what I told you?" As he had told the Commission, it is almost impossible to protect the President who wants to see the people. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Senator. Senator COOPER. I was asked this one question, and I am not going to take up your time, but in order that my first answer may not be misconstrued, would it be permissible for me to make two or three comments? Mr. DODD. Certainly. Senator COOPER. First, I would like you to consider the difference in the time from 1963 to date. The FBI, at that time, was headed by Mr. Hoover who had been appointed Director continuously. He had, I would say, a good reputation. I don't think anybody ever thought about the CIA meddling in internal affairs. The shock of the President's death called for an immediate investigation. It actually lay in the jurisdiction of Texas. There was no law that would permit the Congress to investigate. We were given that right by statute, also the right to subpena witnesses and also to give immunity. We never gave immunity to anyone. We provided complete protection to witnesses--right of attorney, right of record, right to cross-examine, and open hearing if they desired. Only Mr. Lane asked for an open hearing. We also had advisers sitting in with us from Texas: Mr. Jaworski, well-known today, the president of the American Bar Association; also Mr. Louis Powell, now Justice Powell of the Supreme Court, sat in at times. They took turns. And Mr. Eberstadt of New Orleans, former president of the American 609 Bar Association. Now, I just want to say this. As far as the killing of the late President Kennedy, we will always remember it with sadness. There is no evidence of any kind except that is directed toward Oswald: his rifle was purchased under an assumed name, but directed to his post office box; the cartridge shells which were down on the floor; the tests which showed that this was the only rifle which had the markings which were shown on the bullets; the fact that a man was seen by several witnesses, not identified, but seen in the window with the general description of what he looked like; his flight immediately; the fact that within a few minutes it was radioed that the killer perhaps came from the Texas Book Depository and radio cars were circling the city. That is the reason Tippit was circling the city; the fact Tippit was killed and his killing witnessed by several witnesses brought Oswald to the Texas police offices. The police had already found the cartridges and the rifles and the bag in the Texas School Depository and within a half an hour, those facts were known. Now, people have said that somebody told them that they saw somebody on the railroad bank or saw somebody going over the bank, but no one has ever been able to show any cartridges, any rifle, any pistol, no one has ever found anything other than the evidence about Oswald. I would like that to be known; these facts are in the summary which I think is a very good one. The intelligence investigation under the leadership of Senator Church, which I know has helped cause this investigation by you, points out that the agencies did not disclose certain facts to us and that certain plots were going on. At the time we were in session, they should have been disclosed to us. They were not disclosed to us. We knew nothing about them. There was no testimony of conspiracy--Oswald's efforts to get in touch with the Soviets and with the Cuban Fair Play groups in New York were rebuffed, rebuffed at every step--I think he felt he was a failure and for the United States and for President Kennedy and all of us. He knew he was a failure at everything he tried, frustrated, with a very sad life, but he was a Marxist. Very curious, at the age of about 13 years, he began to study Marxism and he kept on in his writing, affirming that he was a Marxist. Probably he did want to show himself as a great, supreme Marxist. Rather, like the anarchists of the last century, he didn't care if he was killed or not. They just wanted to be known. We found no trace of any conspiracy. Our staff not only received the reports from these agencies, they examined them. They questioned them. They went to the files of the FBI and CIA to see if there were any informants, if Oswald was an informant. They did a thorough job and I join with President Ford and Mr. McCloy in praising them. But they did not disclose to us all the facts. I wanted to make this statement to make it clear that I concur wholly in what President Ford and Mr. McCloy have said, that we did our best. We found what we could at that time--the truth. If somebody else can find something else which we didn't find, that, of course, is a duty on their part, as is the truth. It will be the truth. I do make this final statement. I don't think many people have ever read the report. Who has read 26 volumes of this case? How 610 many read the summary? If you read the summary, it takes a long time. Everything is in there and one of the reasons I know few people have read the summary is, there are some very interesting little side stories in it, that newspapermen and others would have published. For example--and I will quit--the press dodger that was put out on the streets in Dallas. In this summary, it shows that that author just before he was discharged from the Army in Munich, he and a comrade demanded to go back to Dallas; they were trying to figure out ways they could make the quickest, and they said, we will go back to Dallas and we will infiltrate the John Birch and YAF and that's what they did. I just have talked too long, but I congratulate you on the efforts you are making. I am very proud to come back, to speak on the disinterested effort we have made and I believe that, with all due respect, that the decisions we made, when we turned our final report over to President Johnson, will stand in history. Mr. DODD. Thank you very much, Senator, for your statement. Mr. McCloy, if I can I would like to just address the very same question I did to Senator Cooper, the first initial question I had for him, the same one I had in the light of the questioning, that I followed this morning with President Ford, and that is whether or not you, as a member of the Commission, at any time, whether during the organizational meetings of the Warren Commission or any time after that, initiated any contact on your own in a confidential manner to report or confide in those agencies with regard to the happenings of the Warren Commission? Mr. McCLOY. No, I had no such contact. I saw their agents and talked to them but I initiated no contact with them whatever. Mr. DODD. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time has expired. Any more members seeking recognition? Mr. McCLOY. May I make one addition to the record. I don't like to let that Berlin situation stand without pointing out the reason that Mr. Cutter was shot was because a major was cleaning his pistol three or four blocks from where this took place and the bullet came in and hit this man that was posing as President of the United States, and everything quieted down after that. But it was an extraordinary circumstance. Chairman STOKES. Gentlemen, Mr. McCloy and Senator Cooper, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank both of you for having appeared here today and taken the time to give us the benefit of your observations with reference to the service you rendered while members of this very distinguished panel of Americans, and you certainly have been very helpful to this committee, and we also appreciate the time you have expended with our staff, and at this time, does counsel have something further? Mr. CORNWELL. Before we adjourn, it might be a good idea to make a matter of record JFK exhibits F-476 and F-477, a chart of the Warren Commission and a photographic blowup of the Warren Commission members that have been displayed during the testimony of the last three witnesses, and perhaps we could enter them into the record at this time? 611 Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this time. [The above referred to JFK exhibits F-476 and F-477 follow: JFK EXHIBIT F-476 JFK EXHIBIT F-477 So again we thank you very much for having appeared, and you are now excused. Mr. McCLOY. Thank you very much. 612 Senator COOPER. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. At this time the committee will stand in recess until 1 p.m., in the afternoon. [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 1 p.m. of the same day.] AFTERNOON SESSION Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The next witness to be called this afternoon is J. Lee Rankin. Mr. Rankin served as General Counsel to the Warren Commission. He received an A.B. degree in 1928, and LL.B. degree in 1930, from the University of Nebraska. He is admitted to practice in New York, Nebraska, and the District of Columbia. Mr. Rankin served from 1953 to 1956 as an Assistant Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice, in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, and from 1956 to 1961 as the Solicitor General of the United States. After serving as General Counsel to the Warren Commission, he became the corporation counsel for the city of New York from 1966 to 1972. Currently he is in private practice in New York with the firm of Rankin and Rankin. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Rankin. Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Mr. Rankin. Please raise your right hand to be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Thank you, you may be seated. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Klein. Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sir, could you please state your full name for the record? TESTIMONY OF J. LEE RANKIN, FORMER GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE WARREN COMMISSION Mr. RANKIN. My full name is James Lee Rankin. Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Rankin, what was your position with the Warren Commission? Mr. RANKIN. I was General Counsel. Mr. KLEIN. And could you give us an idea of what your duties were as General Counsel? Mr. RANKIN. I had the executive responsibilities for the staff working under the Commission. Mr. KLEIN. Were you in charge of the day-to-day operations of the Warren Commission staff? Mr. RANKIN. Yes, I was. Mr. KLEIN. How did it come about that you became General Counsel for the Commission? Mr. RANKIN. I was called by Chief Justice Warren and asked whether I would be willing to serve as General Counsel for the Commission and I told him I would have to call him back, and I finally said I would but probably the rest of the Commissioners 613 would not want me and he had better find out whether they wish me to be General Counsel. He said he had already found out before he asked me and they were unanimous about my being the General Counsel. I then came down and was sworn in as Counsel. Mr. KLEIN. Was there any discussion at that time about the goals of the Commission? Mr. RANKIN. The only discussion was that we were to try to find out who the assassin was and whether there was anyone else involved in it beyond the person whom we found to be the one who committed the act. Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that the chart already up, marked JFK F-476 be received as a committee exhibit. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be received. [The above referred to JFK exhibit F-476 was entered previous- ly.] Mr. KLEIN. Looking at the chart which is on the extreme left, Mr. Rankin, it is entitled "The Warren Commission", is that an accurate representation of the personnel who worked for the Warren Commission? Mr. RANKIN. Yes, it is. It does not include all of the personnel, of course, but does set forth the upper layers of it, and the Commis- sioners. Mr. KLEIN. Could you tell us how the investigation itself was organized? Mr. RANKIN. I proposed an investigation that would consist of five parts and went to the Chairman, the Chief Justice, and the Commissioners, with that proposal, and it was accepted and that is the way we proceeded. They are all described on the chart there. Mr. KLEIN. How did you determine what the five parts it would be organized into would be? Mr. RANKIN. Well, it seemed to be a logical division of the responsibilities of trying to discharge our requirements under the executive order of the President. Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall at this time what the five areas were? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I wouldn't wish to miss any of them. If you have them, if you will just recite them, I can tell you whether they are correct or not. Mr. KLEIN. The facts of the assassination, the identity of the assassin, the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, conspiracy, inves- tigation and death of Lee Harvey Oswald. Are those the five areas? Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. Mr. KLEIN. How many lawyers were assigned to each of these areas? Mr. RANKIN. There were two on each of the areas. Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say the the the Federal Bureau of Investigation did most of the investigation for the Warren Commis- sion? Mr. RANKIN. Well, that would be accurate as to the proportions, if you mean by most, percentage-wise, but we used all of the intelligence agencies of the Government before we got through and sometimes we used one intelligence agency on matters that we were not satisfied concerning and which were worked upon by 614 another intelligence agency. Oftentimes we wanted a doublecheck or felt that there were some inaccuracies or we were not completely satisfied, and asked some other agency that had no apparent relationship to check on the matter for us. Mr. KLEIN. Whose decision was it to use Federal agencies as opposed to hiring investigators? Mr. RANKIN. That was a decision of the Commission, although I recommended that kind of a procedure because I described various possibilities of getting outside investigators and that it might take a long period of time to accumulate them, find out what their expertise was, and whether they could qualify to handle sensitive information in the Government, and it might be a very long time before we could even get a staff going that could work on the matter, let alone have any progress on it. Mr. KLEIN. In 1964, at the conclusion of the investigation, what was your opinion of the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation? Mr. RANKIN. Well, as to their cooperation with us, I thought it was good. We were critical about some of the things that happened about alerting the Secret Service, about information that they knew about and we learned they had not informed the Secret Service about. That was all in the report. But as far as not being frank and open with us and revealing what information they had, we assumed that they did that. I did, at least, and I think the Commission did. Mr. KLEIN. You have partially anticipated my next question, which is, today, 1978, with what you learned over the course of the years, what is your opinion with respect to the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I have been very much disappointed with some of the things that have been revealed and I have, of course, no personal knowledge about those matters. I have just read them in the press from the reports of investigations by the Senate committee and others, but I had a close relationship with J. Edgar Hoover while I was in the Department of Justice and it was always friendly, but also professional, and I thought good. I never believed that he would withhold information or have it withheld from anybody like the Commission or that the FBI would do that. It seemed to me from my experiences that they were more professional than to do anything of that character. When I learned that they were supposed to have known about plans for an assassination that were underway in the CIA, according to the investigation of the Senate committee , and did not report it to us and that we didn't receive any such information from the CIA, it was quite disheartening to me to know that that kind of conduct was a part of the action of our intelligence agencies at that high level. Mr. KLEIN. I only asked the question as applying to the FBI, but your answer applies to the CIA and the FBI; is that correct? Mr. RANKIN. I think it was our experience as it is revealed by investigation on the Senate committee. With the CIA it is worse than with the FBI because the FBI apparently did not originate the assassination plans and apparently the CIA did. So the FBI only happened on to them or were informed about such plans and then did not convey them to us. 615 But the CIA, they were apparently involved in them and did not alert us to the situation at all, give us any opportunity to take the action that we should have had the chance to, of investigating that type of information. Mr. KLEIN. As General Counsel of the Warren Commission, you had no knowledge whatsoever of the assassination plots against Fidel Castro? Mr. RANKIN. That is true, I did not. Mr. KLEIN. What were some of the pressures, the political pressures, time pressures, that were exerted upon the Warren Commission staff?. Mr. RANKIN. We had pressures from the beginning on the time element because the country was anxious to know what had happened and whether there was any conspiracy involved. I was assured by the Chief Justice that it would only take me 2 or 3 months at the outside in this job and that is all the time I would be away from my law practice, and, of course, I wished to get the job done correctly and properly, but also to get back to my other work. On the other hand, the first meeting we had with the staff, I told them that our only client was the truth and that was what we must search for and try to reveal. I think we adhered to that, that we never departed from that standard, any of the Commission or myself or the staff. We tried as conscientiously as possible to convey the information explicitly that we discovered. Mr. KLEIN. The report, the final report was completed in September of 1964. Was there any pressure to get that report out before the election in November? Mr. RANKIN. I didn't think there was any pressure. There was an expression by some members of the Commission that it would be better if the problem of the assassination and whether any conspiracy was involved and what had happened, who the assassin was, as the Commission found, if all of those questions were not injected into the various political conventions, but there was no indication at any time that we should try to get the report out for any such purpose and not adequately make a report or investigate whatever sources we were able to find. Mr. KLEIN. Were there any pressures exerted not to find a foreign conspiracy because of the dire consequences that such a conspiracy might have for war or peace? Mr. RANKIN. None at all. There was a conscientious effort throughout to try to discover anything that would reveal that there was a conspiratorial action about the assassination of the President. Mr. KLEIN. On that question of a possible conspiracy, the Commission has been criticized over the years for not devoting enough time, effort, and resources to investigating the question of whether there was a conspiracy to assassinate the President. Would you tell us first, do you believe that the Commission did devote adequate time and resources to that question, and second, would you give us an idea of how the Commission went about investigating whether there was a conspiracy? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I think that they did an adequate job in that regard. The problem of what could be discovered concerning whatever happened in the Soviet Union and whether there was any 616 involvement there was necessarily a very difficult matter because of the closed nature of their society. Our opportunity, even with the best penetration that we were able to learn of by our own intelligence people, to reach within that society and discover material that could be relied on, was quite sparse to say the least. We, within the domestic community, made great efforts, and we followed out as far as we thought there was any reason to believe that there was a possibility of any Cuban involvement. If we had had the information from the CIA, we certainly would have run out those leads and tried to find out whatever we could in that area, but we were not given the advantage of that. Mr. KLEIN. The Commission has received a good deal of criticism to the effect that in some areas in the final report the evidence was not strong enough to support the conclusions reached in that report; and that some staff members immediately prior to the issuance of the report stated that in certain areas they felt the evidence was not strong enough to support the conclusions. What would be your position in reply to this criticism? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think it is a valid criticism. I examined, I think, every word of the report before it was printed and I constantly tried to understate rather than overstate the findings, the position of the Commission on all of the various matters that it acted upon and reported upon. These positions were carefully reviewed by the Commissioners, in fact by each one of them, and they argued them, and the staff presented such materials they had and the Commissioners examined it. They participated in hearings and it was their disposition, so expressed, that the report not overstate what the Commission found and the evidence that would support it. Mr. KLEIN. In connection with this issue of whether the report overstated the evidence, I would like to read you a portion from a deposition of Mr. David Slawson, one of your staff counsel he made the statement in 1978, when he was deposed by this committee. I stand corrected, it was at an executive hearing before this committee, that he made this statement. He said, "I think because Earl Warren was adamant almost that the Commission would make up its mind on what it thought was the truth, and then they would state it as much without qualification as they could, he wanted to lay at rest doubts. "He made no secret of this on the staff. It was consistent with his philosophy as a judge." Do you agree with this statement by Mr. Slawson? Mr. RANKIN. No, I don't. That was not in character with the Chief Justice in my experience with him. He was explicit that he thought we should not spare any effort in trying to find out the answer to the question whether or not there was any other involvement than Oswald in the assassination. But with regard to what we should say about it, or report about it, he was always very vehement and expressive that we should tell it exactly as it was. Mr. KLEIN. As you sit here today, do still believe the conclusions of the Warren Commission to be correct? Mr. RANKIN. I do. Mr. KLEIN. In retrospect, what, if anything, would have been done differently in the Warren Commission's investigation? 617 Mr. RANKIN. As I have said, if we had the information from the CIA and FBI, that they failed to give us, certainly those leads should have been followed out to discover whether or not there was anything of a conspiratorial nature involved. I assume that this committee has been doing that and that if you had anything of that kind we would know it by now, one way or the other. But otherwise it has been suggested we could have taken a longer time. Of course, you could go on and on for years on anything of that kind. But I think there are reasonable limits and the Congress, I am sure, recognize that. I think the American people do. They realize that you can't spend forever on matters of that kind and there is a limit to the amount of money that the people would want to spend, all within reasonable limits, I think. We never had any difficulty on problems about money. We were assured that by the President. Our expenses were paid out of the Presidential funds. We received any money we needed, and we were never at any time told that we were to limit ourselves in that regard. Nevertheless, we would certainly not have wanted a staff just staying on and on nitpicking at a lot of little things that didn't have apparently any prospect of success. Mr. KLEIN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You say you have no further questions? Mr. KLEIN. No. Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. The procedure at this point will be the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer, for such time as he may consume, after which we will go to the 5-minute rule. Mr. SAWYER. Counsel, Mr. Rankin, has the fact that the Warren Commission report, according to all polls, received so much poor acceptance by the American people, given you any pause to reflect on whether you went about it correctly or not? Mr. RANKIN. Not really. You know, as a part of my job as General Counsel, I researched all of the assassinations and a number in regard to other countries, and went into the materials that were available about the assassination of President Lincoln. I discovered that there was a large body of opinion that didn't believe any of the findings about Lincoln's assassination, and about other people that had been assassinated. Apparently that is the lot of anybody that works in this kind of a field. Mr. SAWYER. Did you make any effort either as a staff or, to your knowledge, as a Commission, to determine just where Oswald was going at the time he was intercepted by Officer Tippit? Mr. RANKIN. We speculated on it but speculations aren't worth much. Mr. SAWYER. Did you come to any reasonable hypothesis as to where he was going? Mr. RANKIN. We all agreed that he was on his way to try to escape but where we didn't know, and everything from that point on was just one person's guess against another's. Mr. SAWYER. Of course, I presume you were aware that the direction in which he was heading at the time that he was con- 618 fronted by Tippit kind of led to nowhere with respect to either escape routes or anything, just out in the neighborhood? Mr. RANKIN. We didn't think that was really the complete answer because at that point he was very hardpressed and we thought he was more in the posture of just running. Mr. SAWYER. Well, did you find out that Jack Ruby's apartment was about two or three blocks up the street, also on the direct route he was going? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. SAWYER. Did you also find out that in the Dallas newspaper announcement of the President's visit, that on the same page was the identity of an informant who had substantially destroyed the Communist Party in Texas by informing to the FBI and he was identified as living just about two blocks up the street, also on the direct route he was going? Mr. RANKIN. I don't recall that I was aware of that. Mr. SAWYER. But other than just the fact that on this some 14 1/2 or 15 minute walk he had taken through a neighborhood after leaving his roominghouse, other than just running or escaping, you had formed no hypothesis on where he may have been going or what his intent may have been? Mr. RANKIN. That is true, we did not. Mr. SAWYER. With respect to--As you are undoubtedly aware, much of the criticism of the Warren Commission report and much the basis of the various critics who have written extensively on the subject has been centered about one thing, principally the single bullet theory and the fact that available time did not permit one assassin. You made a decision or you and the Commission not to allow access to the autopsy information. Are you still satisfied with that decision as being a sound one? Mr. RANKIN. Yes, I am. I think it has been revealed, that the basis of the decision was that the Kennedy family did not wish to have the pictures of the President, as shown by the X-rays and the other pictures after the assassination attempt, be the way that the American people and the world would remember the dead President. We thought we had good evidence from the doctors who were involved at the hospital in Dallas and also at the autopsy, and we did not want the President's memory to be presented in that manner, and we had already promised the American people that the investigation that everything that we obtained, except for such matters as involved national security, would be made available to them, so we would have had to publish it, if we used it ourselves. In light of that, I think the choice that was made was correct and I don't think it has done any harm. I still would hate to have published throughout the world those pictures as a rememberance of our President. Mr. SAWYER. On the other hand, Mr. Rankin, this committee staff and the committee made all of that original material available to a panel of pathologists, but we did not feel any necessity to make the pictures themselves public. To the extent they were relevant we had drawings made from the original and produced them and were able, I feel, to have totally laid at rest the one bullet theory, because of the ability to determine the points of entry of wounds and exits to be able to project back from those 619 wounds to locations from which firings occurred, and I don't think we were in any way compelled to or did do anything either distasteful or shocking at all as far as our public exhibitions of the situation were concerned. Mr. RANKIN. As far as I know, you haven't promised the American people that you would give them everything that you have received. Maybe you have, I am not aware of it, but we had, the Commission had. The Commission would not have been willing to cover up anything or withhold anything after such a promise. Mr. SAWYER. Well, do you feel then that you may have made an error in promising to make all original material available, or do you feel you may have made an error in not making the material available to pathologists? Mr. RANKIN. No, I don't think either one was an error. I think if we hadn't promised the people and done what we did about giving them everything that we, the Commission examined, that was not involved in national security, the Commission's work would have had little credence with the people. I also think that once having done that the Commission couldn't say, well, we did everything but this and this and this and that we aren't going to give you--- Mr. SAWYER In other words, then, if I understand you, because you made this commitment and didn't feel like this was material you wanted to make public for taste reasons or feeling reasons, you just didn't even look at it then, you let this promise govern your investigation? Mr. RANKIN. There was another factor that it was merely additional evidence, that is cumulative. The evidence of the doctors was equally good as far as the law goes and was of first quality, so that it wasn't as though we were without evidence. Mr. SAWYER. Based on the testimony of those doctors and the evidence developed, they were, for example, like 4 inches off on the point of entry of the head wound, which, of course, projected, would be a horrendous error. Mr. RANKIN. I don't know that. I have heard that your staff discovered that and that Dr. Humes has admitted that he was that much off. At the time it was, and since, until I heard that, it was difficult to imagine that a man conducting an autopsy could make that kind of a mistake when he was observing the body that he was examining, and so forth. Mr. SAWYER. Well, now that you have heard that, are you still satisfied with the decision not to even allow access to the X-rays and autopsy original data? Mr. RANKIN. I think I would not allow access if you combined with that the obligation to publish the X-rays as they are, because I think that, with the importance of President Kennedy to the people of this country, and to the world, and as an American public leader, I think that is very valuable even today. Mr. SAWYER. Would you have taken that position vis-a-vis any relevant information that if you decided that either because of embarrassment or damage it might do to the FBI or the CIA or international relations, or whatever, that because of this self-imposed obligation to publish in general, you just then followed the proposition of not even looking at it? Mr. RANKIN. No, and I think our work shows that we did not. 620 Mr. SAWYER. Are you still happy with your decision to use the FBI as your sole investigative source? Mr. RANKIN. Well, that does not meet my, does not conform to my testimony, in my opinion. I thought I--I tried to make it plain that we used all of the intelligence agencies of the Government and we used Secret Service and others, including Military Intelligence, to check back on the FBI from time to time. We also had a couple of investigators who were not important in the whole scheme of things. They could not do enough. But we had many files of investigations that the FBI made and if we had had a force to equal the number of man hours that we used the FBI, Secret Service, Military Intelligence, the cryptology people and all the others that we used in the Government, there would have been many thousands, and I think it would have been impossible and we would not have gotten out a report for years. Mr. SAWYER. But as you probably know now, information was withheld by the FBI with respect to the so-called Hosty note from Oswald threatening to burn down a police station, or allegedly so. Mr. RANKIN. Yes, but Congressman, if you look back at that period we, all of us, did not believe the FBI was capable of that kind of conduct, at least I did not, and none of the commissioners did. And I think all of our ideas about what people in government are capable of and do has changed, but back then we did not think they would do such things. Mr. SAWYER. Did you ever receive any advice from the FBI about the 17 agents that were subjected to administrative discipline because of their mishandling of the pre-assassination information about Ruby--not Ruby, Oswald? Mr. RANKIN. I think that is very shocking too. I think we were entitled to that information and a frank disclosure by Mr. Hoover that he felt they should be disciplined and why, and that we should have been able to go into that and try to discover whether it had any effect on our work. Mr. SAWYER. I assume you feel the same way about the CIA's nondisclosure of alleged assassination plots that they may have participated in, via-a-via Castro. Mr. RANKIN. I do. Mr. SAWYER. I am interested in the fact that you had received advice that Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who had defected, was available and willing to testify, had you not, before the Warren Commission. Mr. RANKIN. Yes, I had. Mr. SAWYER. And that he professed to have first-hand knowledge of Oswald's activity in Russia during the period that Oswald was in Russia. Mr. RANKIN. Congressman, you did not include in your statement, as I understood it, that the CIA had told us that he was a fake and not a real KGB officer and that he was probably just planted on us. That was the information we got from the CIA about him, and it was in light of that that we did not call him because we thought, the Commission thought, they would just be the dupes of such a plan, if that was true. Now, we certainly did not have the expertise, even with Allen Dulles on the Commission, to be able to judge whether a man was 621 truly a KGB agent or a plant. They, as the people in government skilled in that work ought to know such things. They spent a lifetime at that work, told us so that we felt, the Commission felt that there was no purpose to examine him after such advice and they did not want to be used to assist in the distribution of any information that the KGB; or anybody else; would be interested in having distributed to the American people through the Commission by somebody that was making a dupe of them. Mr. SAWYER. Well, did you opt to have the man at least interviewed by one of the staff to form a judgment yourselves? Mr. RANKIN. No. I had nobody on the staff and I had no Commissioner with such expertise. I do not think Allen Dulles could have done it; or could have had the skill, the expertise to make that kind of a judgment? Our information was that the CIA put a group to work on Nosenko to try to examine all of his background and find out whether he had enough knowledge of various events and matters within the Soviet picture to be a true KGB agent. We were led to believe, at least I was--it was my belief that these people had sufficient knowledge and the skill that was required so as to determine anything of that kind. Mr. SAWYER. So that, then, because of the doubt cast on his veracity by the CIA, you opted not to even have the staff talk to him or even check what he had to say, is that right? Mr. RANKIN. No; they were not telling us his veracity--whether he was truthful or not, except insofar as he was representing that he was a KGB agent. They were telling us that he was not a real agent and that seemed to me very important with regard to what he might have to say about the matter. Mr. SAWYER. You are aware that the CIA has now reversed themselves totally on that position, I assume. Mr. RANKIN. Yes; but I am shocked by the way they arrive at that conclusion and the procedures they apparently went through as I observed from some of your TV programs. Mr. SAWYER. Are you satisfied with the decision of the Commission to hold all executive session hearings rather than public hearings? Do you think that may have contributed to the lack of acceptance of the report? Mr. RANKIN. We had one open hearing. Mr. SAWYER. That was because Mark Lane demanded-- Mr. RANKIN. That was Mark Lane, and I think you had similar experiences-- Mr. SAWYER. Who would naturally demand a public hearing, right? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think it helped with your hearing, although I think you handled it well in regards to some of the problems developed. Mr. SAWYER. As some people who watched it said that Mr. Lane had done for the legal profession what the Boston Strangler did for the door-to-door salesman. Mr. RANKIN. We had no indication by the public that they were unhappy with our failure to have more open hearings. I cannot answer the question about whether it would have helped. But I have been impressed with this committee's open hearings. They seem to have gone well and the reaction I have heard from various 622 people to some of the evidence has been impressive; they have been convinced by some of it. Of course, they were not convinced by all of it; but you cannot expect that. Mr. SAWYER. Another thing that I was interested in was that in the conference or interview or interrogation, whichever, that President Ford and the Chief Justice and some staff members had with Mr. Ruby while he was incarcerated in Dallas, he said, according to the transcript, substantially that he would like to tell the whole truth but he cannot tell them the whole truth while he is in Dallas, and if they would transport him to Washington, he would tell the whole truth. Was any follow-up ever done on that at all by the staff or otherwise? Mr. RANKIN. No, there was not. We were all convinced that Ruby was interested in a trip to Washington rather than how much he could enlighten the Commission. It seemed quite apparent when you observed him and his approach to the whole suggestion. Mr. SAWYER. Were you there at the time? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. SAWYER. Is that the impression you got individually? Mr. RANKIN. Yes, I thought that he was quite enamored with the idea of coming to Washington and he even wanted to see the President. It was easy to imagine what that would all develop into if you got started on it. Mr. SAWYER. There were no followup attempts, though, to try to elucidate that situation? Mr. RANKIN. No, there were not. Mr. SAWYER. Was any check ever made or any check requested by the Commission to have the possible organized crime participation of this situation investigated? Mr. RANKIN. Well, we did the checking that is revealed by our report and appendices in that regard. We did not find enough possible connections to go beyond what we did. When I heard about some of the information that the Senate committee had developed about plans for the use of personalities from organized crime in connection with the proposed Castro assassination, or efforts or plans, or whatever you want to call that activity, it did disturb me some as to that aspect. I said to some of your staff, "I assume they were following up on that, and are running that out," to be sure they investigated out to the end of it. Mr. SAWYER. The FBI liaison officer who appeared before this committee and who was acting as the sort of sole or principal liaison between the FBI and the Commission said that they had never involved or were never asked to or ever did involve their organized crime section of the FBI in the matter. Is that consistent with your recollection of it? Mr. RANKIN. That is, yes. Mr. SAWYER. So, you did not have access what electronic surveillance may have been available in that section that may have related to their interest in doing away with President Kennedy; am I correct on that? Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. 623 Mr. SAWYER. Thank you very much. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Rankin, it appears to me that there are two things that the Commission was looking for and could find neither. One was a motive for Lee Harvey Oswald to commit the crime and the second was the question of whether there was or was not a conspiracy. Would that be true, the Commission was trying to ascertain the facts of those two things? Mr. RANKIN. It is true, they were. I felt they did find an answer to the first one you described. They felt there was no motive beyond Oswald's own ambition for notoriety and position and so forth that was gone into at some length in the report. Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you this: Whatever his activities were in Soviet Russia, do you think that it is possible that that could have provided some insight into motivation by way of background? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think so beyond what we presented. Now, I am quite aware, as I think the report shows, that we only said that we were unable to discover any such information about conspiracy or conspiratorial activity. What else he might have done that we never could get any information about in our efforts through the State Department or CIA or anyone else, is just a matter of speculation. Chairman STOKES. It would seem that in that area, that is where Yuri Nosenko would have been very important to the Commission in terms of what he was able to tell the CIA about Oswald while he was in Soviet Russia, would it not? Mr. RANKIN. Well, if they got anything from him. When they reported to us, they did not report that they got any word about his associations with Oswald or knowledge about Oswald or anything like that. Chairman STOKES. Do I understand from what you are saying that--I think we are talking about the CIA, are we not? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Chairman STOKES. Tell us what they did tell you that Nosenko told them about Oswald in Russia. Mr. RANKIN. They were satisfied he was not a KGB officer. They felt that he was a plant, that he was sent in for some purpose, but they did not know what it was, to try to participate. They said they felt he was not believable about anything that he would claim about Oswald or knowledge about him. Chairman STOKES. And that he was not himself a bona fide defector then, I suppose. Mr. RANKIN. That is what they said. Chairman STOKES. Did they tell you though what he had told them that he knew about Oswald? Mr. RANKIN. They did not go into any detail about what he said. They said that he just wasn't believable. Chairman STOKES. When you say they, can you tell us specifically whom you are talking about at CIA? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I cannot remember the names now. It seemed to me, though, looking back on it, that it was their specialist in 624 Soviet matters and i think they had, my recollection is, they had a number of them and it wasn't just one man; it was teamwork of some kind. Chairman STOKES. Did you ever have any conversation with Richard Helms about Nosenko? Mr. RANKIN. My recollection is he supported that position, that there was no purpose in trying to have Nosenko before the Commission or to inquire what he knew because he was not believable. Chairman STOKES. Did anyone ever tell you Nosenko had said that while he was in Soviet Russia that two suitcases full of documents on Oswald were flown up from Minsk to the Russian capital immediately after the assassination? Did they ever tell you that? Mr. RANKIN. I do not remember anything like that. Chairman STOKES. Probabilities are that if you were told something about that you would recall. Mr. RANKIN. Yes; because it is quite impressive. You would want to see what was in those suitcases if you had heard, I am sure. Chairman STOKES. That is correct. That is part of the information Nosenko has given this committee. I have no further questions. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. Mr. PREYER. I have just a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman, relating to the problems that might have been created by using the FBI as your major investigative arm. Early on in the work of the Commission, I believe it did come to your attention, allegations came to our attention that Lee Harvey Oswald might have been an FBI agent; is that right? Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. Mr. PREYER. How were you able to investigate the truth or falsity of that charge? What did you do to investigate it? Mr. RANKIN. When that information came to my attention and then to the Commission's, we were very much shocked about it and the Commission had deliberations in which they tried to determine what was the best approach to try to find out the fact. They decided that we should make direct inquiries to J. Edgar Hoover. The problem was not, as I recall it, whether Oswald was ever listed as an agent in their records because, as I recall, we checked that out and he was not. My recollection is that the question involved whether he might have been a numbered personality that the FBI had where the name of the individual is not revealed and thus has a cover, and it could be concealed. We examined the possibility that we could try to go into their records and examine every person, identify every person who had a number and we were assured that involved a large number of personalities. The FBI was greatly disturbed about the idea of taking the cover off of all those agents that they had established over a long term of years and revealing their names to all of the staff as well as the Commissioners. I couldn't assure that their identity would not become known in that kind of a process. So, the Commission finally determined that they would accept J. Edgar Hoover's personal assurance by affidavit that Oswald had never been an informer or agent of the FBI, and that was given. Mr. PREYER. But you were somewhat in the position of asking the FBI to investigate itself or going to the innkeeper to ask whether the wine was good or not. 625 Mr. RANKIN. Well, back at that time, Congressman, that did not seem so impossible as it might today. Mr. PREYER. Yes; I think your answer to an earlier question has demonstrated a certain fall from innocence that we have all had since that time. Things are now believable which we would not have thought believable at that time. Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. Mr. PREYER. The threshold of this belief has gone up quite a bit. Let me ask you one other thing. The FBI reached a conclusion in their report that was made 17 days after the assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin. Don't you think that would have had some chilling effect, would have dampened the incentive of FBI agents in following out the question of a conspiracy where his organization had already declared itself to the effect that there was no conspiracy? Mr. RANKIN. I think that is true but we always assumed that. We started out knowing the FBI had already decided who the assassin was and that no one else was involved, and we knew that was the agency position. It was very evident. But we did not rely on anything like that. We sought detailed evidence and if we didn't get the evidence we asked for, we sent back time after time to get it. We treated their report in which they promptly found Oswald as the assassin and that was no conspiracy as though that was just an interesting document, but we are not there to ratify that; we were to find out if it was true and I think we were probably quite offensive, especially some of the younger members of our staff who looked forward to the opportunity of finding that the FBI was wrong, at least on as much as they could find. So that often times they were challenging the agents, I had difficulty with some of our relationships because of that. I do not think it affected our people at all, but, of course, I recognize that it would have been less majesty for anybody to tell Mr. Hoover, that the report was wrong. Mr. PREYER. Just one final question along the problems that could arise where you use the FBI as your major investigative arm. You told Mr. Sawyer, I believe, that you did not know about the destruction of the Hosty note. Do you think if you had had independent investigators rather than relying on the FBI that you would have learned about the destruction of that note? Mr. RANKIN. There is always the possibility that we might. It seems to me there is a possibility it might have leaked out some way from the FBI, but it did not. I think that it would have been helpful to know that, although I do not suppose we would have changed about using the FBI and the other government intelligence forces, if we had discovered the note. Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Rankin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rankin, you were in Dallas with Chief Justice Warren and President Ford on the occasion of the interview with Jack Ruby. Mr. RANKIN. Yes. 626 Mr. DEVINE. Did you participate in the questioning of him, or were you merely present, if you recall? Mr. RANKIN. It is hard to recall because I know I questioned him some, but whether I did the general examination, I cannot now recall. Mr. DEVINE. He indicated at that time, if you were in the room this morning when President Ford testified, that Ruby requested that he be brought to Washington in order that he might tell the full and the true story. The President said that after discussing it with the Commission and the Commission staff they felt no meaningful purpose would be served by doing that. Did you agree with that decision? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. DEVINE. Do you agree at this time that that was a proper decision? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. As I said earlier, when Congressman Sawyer asked me, I felt that he really wanted a trip to Washington rather than to help us in our problems. Mr. DEVINE. In your interrogation or in the files of the Commission in having interrogated Jack Ruby, did the Commission ever come to a conclusion as to his motive in shooting Lee Harvey Oswald? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think they were ever satisfied as to what his motive was. Mr. DEVINE. Did not the Commission receive testimony that Ruby was known in Dallas as a "police buff," that he had a habit of hanging around police headquarters and that his presence there was not unusual? Mr. RANKIN. That is correct. Mr. DEVINE. And was there not also testimony before the Commission or at least reported to the Commission, that Ruby's motive probably was that as an obscure nightclub operator of some questionable reputation that he thought he would become a national hero if he killed the person that assassinated the President? Mr. RANKIN. I think that is true. I am not sure the Commission was satisfied that that was the answer. Mr. DEVINE. Does that seem to make some degree of logic to you as chief counsel of the Commission? Mr. RANKIN. Well, it always seemed to me that it was quite a step for a man to take, with all the risks that were involved, just for that kind of a purpose. Mr. DEVINE. I do not believe the Commission in its very thorough investigation ever tied Oswald and Ruby together in any association, did they? Mr. RANKIN. They did not. Mr. DEVINE. In another area, Mr. Rankin, there was some testimony this morning about 17 or so FBI agents being subjected to disciplinary administrative procedures within the Bureau for lack of discretion or failure to meet the necessary standards on the preassassination investigation of Oswald and the fact he was never placed on the security index. Were you aware of this administrative action within the Bureau? Mr. RANKIN. No, I was not. My relations with Mr. Hoover deteriorated a great deal after the report came out, and I was quite 627 surprised to learn that he took this position with the agents in light of his severe criticism of me and the report, but it appeared to me that this action was quite confirmatory of some of the criticism that the Commission had made in the report about some of the failures of the FBI in its liaison with the Secret Service. Mr. DEVINE. Had you known of this action prior to the conclusion of the final report of the Commission, do you think it would have affected the investigation in any way or led it in any way to different results or conclusions? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think it would have changed the results or conclusions. I think that if we had been aware of it, we would have wanted to inquire about each one of the situations and see if there was anything there that could help. us in our investigation. Mr. DEVINE. It was not surprising to you, was it, Mr. Rankin, with your vast experience in and out of Government, to recognize that administrative steps were taken within many Government agencies, disciplinary steps were taken without airing the laundry publicly? Mr. RANKIN. No; but I was naive enough with regard to this particular task, as general counsel, to think that when the President of the United States told everybody to cooperate with us that they would understand that was an order and mandate and part of the law that governed public servants and that they would do it. It seemed to me that the question of what they failed to do in each of these instances was a matter that would be of interest to the Commission and each of the Commissioners and that Mr. Hoover had an obligation on his own to inform us and let us take whatever proper action the Commission thought should be taken to find out what acts were being criticized and whether there was something that would affect the Commission's work. Mr. DEVINE. Finally, Mr. Rankin, recognizing that nearly 15 years have intervened since the event and 14 years since the filing of the Warren Commission report, learning the things that you have learned during the intervening period, the new technical exotic crime detection techniques that have developed, additional witnesses that were not available to you, the meeting of the Rockefeller committee, the Church committee, the Assassinations Committee and all, as you sit here today, do you feel that the Warren Commission, had they had the benefit of all this additional information, would have reached a conclusion different than that which you actually did? Mr. RANKIN. No; I think the Commission would not have arrived at any different conclusions. Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, in light of the fact I arrived a little bit after Mr. Rankin completed his statement, I will pass for the moment, if I can. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rankin, we want to thank you for coming and for cooperating with our committee. I have several questions that I would like to pursue, if time permits, and I might have to beg of the chairman some additional time. 628 First, I would like to ask whether or not the Commission and yourself, in particular, reviewed and approved the firearms tests that were administered by the FBI on the Mannlicher-Carcano that was alleged to be the Oswald weapon. Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. FITHIAN. And was a part of that test to determine how fast it could be fired? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Mr. FITHIAN. And the FBI performed those tests. Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. FITHIAN. Do you remember what the results were? Mr. RANKIN. I remember that the results were positive that the three bullets could have been fired within the time limits that I think were computed on the film. Mr. FITHIAN. The 2.3, or as one witness I believe had it, 2.25 seconds between firings as the minimum time, it is your impression the three shots would fit in? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Mr. FITHIAN. And is it also your understanding that the firearms experts who performed these tests made use of the telescopic sight? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Mr. FITHIAN. Did the Commission order firing the tests of the weapons without the scope? Mr. RANKIN. I do not recall that they did. Mr. FITHIAN. Did it ever occur to anybody on the Commission that it might have been fired without the scope? Mr. RANKIN. I do not think any of the Commissioners in discussing it thought that anybody could have shot with that accuracy without a scope. Mr. FITHIAN. After you heard Governor Connally, did this give you any problems then? Mr. RANKIN. No. Mr. FITHIAN. In trying to square his testimony with the FBI tests? Mr. RANKIN. I heard him before when he testified before the Commission. Mr. FITHIAN. I meant, at that time, at the Commission's testimony? Mr. RANKIN. I think he is just mistaken and I think that the more evidence that is adduced will establish that where he was he had to be shot by that same bullet. Mr. FITHIAN. But did the Commission's understanding of the firing time of the Oswald weapon cause any problems in interpreting other evidence, including the Zapruder film, or eye witness accounts? Mr. RANKIN. I don't recall any. If you could refresh my memory. Mr. FITHIAN. You will recall that Governor Connally said he heard a shot and he turned. Mr. RANKIN. Yes sir. Mr. FITHIAN. And the Zapruder film shows that turning, which tends to corroborate what the Governor said, I mean just to the layman. I am wondering if you had any problem with that? 629 Mr. RANKIN. Well, the fact that he turned I think is well established by the film. Whether he heard the shot after he had been shot isn't established by the Zapruder film. Mr. FITHIAN. Well, now, if it can, and as it has in a tentative way by this committee, been established that the weapon can be fired with pretty good accuracy, and a lot faster than the FBI said, if you had had that information, what would this have done to your sort of adjustment of your interpretation of the evidence? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I don't think it would have changed unless you are thinking of something that I am not. We took into account, the Commission did, that there were three casings there and that there was testimony about three shots and other factors along with the time element. Mr. FITHIAN. But there was also conflicting testimony, though I believe not given as much credibility by you and your staff and the Commission, that indicated that eye witness accounts heard other shots from other areas, particularly the grassy knoll area. Wouldn't your firing time limitation of necessity almost have to come to bear on that kind of testimony beyond the three cartridges that you found? Mr. RANKIN. We never thought that the testimony of shots from other points was impressive in the light of the wounds. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. FITHIAN. I would ask either unanimous consent, to let me finish up this line of questioning, but I do have another area I would like to question after everybody else has completed, if I may. Chairman STOKES. Without objection. Mr. FITHIAN. But it just seems to me that someone, somewhere, who had a modicum of experience with firearms, would have discovered right off, even if you go down to the Archives today and look at the rifle, it is not a particularly difficult problem to pick it up and look at it and see it can be fired without the telescopic sight, and anybody who has fired with a scope would know you can fire a lot faster if you are looking for a moving target, you don't have to find it in the scope, if it can in fact be fired faster. For 15 years we have been told it couldn't be fired faster. We now know that it is not true. It seems to me someone on the Commission having some evidence which appears to me not to be able to fit into the 2.25, which is the minimum time of the FBI, might have requested another kind of test firing, and I am curious that it did not occur to a single person on the Commission or on your staff or in the FBI, or anywhere else, along the line. I guess my final question is, Was there no consideration given by the Commission, as far as you know by the FBI, to another kind of test firing of that weapon? Mr. RANKIN. Not that I know of. Of course, there were also problems of the leaves on the trees and how you fit them in, and the point where the Zapruder film showed the impact had to be, that is, that it had to be within certain spaces. All of that had to be fitted in too. So you are not just free to say, well, I can shoot this weapon so many times within so many minutes. There are other problems that you have to deal with and fit within. Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. 630 I would just like to make sure that we have in the record at this point that our own final test firings will become a part of this record as they are completed. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not being here during the earlier questioning of you, Mr. Rankin, but I do have some questions that grow out of earlier discussions about the way in which the Warren Commission began its investigation. You have indicated, I think, that within a relatively short period of time, after the assassination, the Warren Commission was formed and the Warren Commission did put a document out, did they not, indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald was essentially the lone assassin, shortly after the beginning of the Commission? Mr. RANKIN. Not that I recall. Mr. EDGAR. Well, not necessarily a lone assassin but that he was the assassin, is that correct? Mr. RANKIN. I don't remember that either. Mr. EDGAR. When was the first time that the Warren Commis- sion went public with any of their preliminary findings? Mr. RANKIN. I just don't recall. Mr. EDGAR. Let me ask it in a different way. Did the Warren Commission have an investigative plan? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. EDGAR. How was that plan developed? Mr. RANKIN. It was developed by my making a draft of a plan and submitting it to the Commission for its acceptance or modification or rejection. Mr. EDGAR. The members of the Commission had an opportunity to review the plan and decided where the investigation and study would go? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Mr. EDGAR. In making that plan, did you bring in the FBI or CIA to help assist you in areas of investigation, such as conspiracy? Mr. RANKIN. No. Mr. EDGAR. At any time, in the beginning phases of the Warren Commission study, did you bring in the FBI and the CIA and the Secret Service to try to coordinate what information they had available to them and have a discussion among them about what information would be available to them? Mr. RANKIN. No; I didn't. At that period of time, the relations between the Secret Service and FBI were terribly strained in connection with what happened and the fact that the President had been assassinated and there was some feeling that neither one had done themselves proud in connection with the whole event. Mr. EDGAR. Would it have been a relevant possibility to bring them together to put aside those bickerings and differences and to say now that the assassination has taken place, and the Warren Commission has been formed, we now have to provide to the American public the most accurate information of what was available to us at the time of the death and what transpired following the assassination? Mr. RANKIN. I don't think so, because I think it would have appeared that the Commissioners were putting themselves under 631 the domination of the FBI. The FBI had already come forward with their report in which they said that Oswald was the assassin and there was no conspiracy involved. That had leaked out. To have brought the different groups together would seem to me, in the first place the Secret Service is much smaller, less powerful and---- Mr. EDGAR. Wouldn't that have given the Secret Service and CIA an opportunity to pose an alternative possibility to the already established rumor of the FBI? Mr. RANKIN. No; because I gave each of them in separate discussions with the Directors ample opportunity to suggest anything they wanted to and asked for their help in every way possible. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. EDGAR. Just one additional question, if I may. May I ask unanimous consent to proceed? Chairman STOKES. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. EDGAR. In December and January of 1963 and 1964, when the FBI was disciplining 17 individuals for their role in the preassassination information of Lee Harvey Oswald, was that information made known to you in December and January of 1963 and 1964? Mr. RANKIN. No, it was not. Mr. EDGAR. Was it made known to you at any time during the Warren Commission? Mr. RANKIN. No; it was not. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney. Mr. McKINNEY. You were basically in charge, Mr. Rankin, were you not, of assignments of the staff? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. McKINNEY. Was it true that the counsels Hubert and Griffin were essentially assigned to the investigation of Jack Ruby? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. McKINNEY. Why under those conditions and whose decision was it, that they then did not go to Dallas to interview Jack Ruby when the Chief Justice and Congressman Ford went? Mr. RANKIN. I think it was in a discussion by myself with the Chief Justice and former President Ford and they said this matter is of sufficient importance we want you to supervise the examination. Mr. MCKINNEY. But in essence you were required to have a generalized knowledge of everything that was happening, rather, than the specifics of Jack Ruby? Mr. RANKIN. Well, I was watching it in detail in every area, too. I had to. Mr. McKINNEY. One of the criticisms of the Commission report has been the depth of the Ruby investigation, and there have been many critics who questioned why the two counsels who were charged with investigating Jack Ruby were not present at the time he was questioned extensively in Dallas. Mr. RANKIN. Well, I don't think the criticism relates itself to the examination of Ruby. The criticism is whether or not the various 632 leads were followed to the extent that they should have been. That was a function that they both had. Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, you depended on their following through on Jack Ruby as to, for instance, the question of his ties to organized crime rather than on the FBI doing that, or did you depend on both? Mr. RANKIN. Both. Mr. McKINNEY. When did you become aware of the animosity of the FBI, or at least of J. Edgar Hoover toward the Warren Commission. It is expressed quite frankly in what we have listed as Kennedy exhibit F-471, which is the Belmont to Tolson letter. In that letter it is pretty well stated that the FBI itself is not going to send a liaison to the Warren Commission's meeting called by the Chief Justice, that the request of Attorney General Katzenbach that he be briefed so at least he could answer questions. I believe Mr. Belmont states: That would be very undesirable because there was really only one answer, that is, the question raised as to what the FBI is doing. There is a very simple answer, namely, we are pressing the investigation in the writing of the report. This is our major goal. Until that is completed there is nothing we can contribute. In other words, the Chief Justice of the United States of America, the head of a Presidential Commission investigating the assassination of a President of the United States, was in essence told to forget it when he asked the FBI to have a liaison person there. How did you react to that? Mr. RANKIN. I tried to avoid an open fight. It was obvious to me that I certainly had a reluctant relationship with the FBI in many respects and I was also making unreasonable demands everyday upon them and--- Mr. McKINNEY. Excuse me. Is that your wording, unreasonable demands, or would that be the Bureau's wording? Mr. RANKIN. That is my wording, too. It was unreasonable but I couldn't do anything else. I needed that help. The staff needed it and the Commission needed it and we didn't have enough other intelligence agencies to just forget about the FBI, and they had people stationed in various parts of the country, who it was logical to use. The Secret Service had people occasionally in various places but they didn't have them stationed there all the time, and the FBI had a great group of personnel that could be used if they would be cooperative and help. So I was constantly asking for hundreds of investigations in places all over the country, and as soon as I got the reports on that and the responses, I would ask for some more, and I would ask for more complete reports on the ones that I thought were unsatisfactory. That in itself made a very difficult relationship and I don't blame them for feeling that they were being ridden pretty hard, which was true, but we never got to the place where they either apparently dared or would say they wouldn't do it. And as long as they didn't, I kept on. Then I had to be careful to watch everything they did to see that I was getting something worthwhile and that it was well done, and I knew pretty well what an FBI agent was capable of doing, from my experience in the Department, and I knew when it wasn't up to standard. 633 So when it wasn't up to standard we came back to them and said this has got to be done, get another agent on it if you can't get it done right. Mr. McKINNEY. This was an actual memorandum dated December 3, 1963, right at the very beginning, and there is a clear implication that the FBI just was not going to cooperate with any preliminary facts nor were they going to send anyone to answer any questions. Wasn't any attempt made at that point, with this sort of dramatic refusal, to have anyone in a higher position in the Government such as the Attorney General or the President of the United States, turn around to Mr. Hoover and say cooperate? In the terms of at least sending a liaison person? That is the one question here. Mr. RANKIN. I don't know in my experience with Government that anybody ever did that with Mr. Hoover during his lifetime. Mr. McKINNEY. I would think almost nobody would have done it because I am sure Mr. Hoover had something on all of us, but, I also recognize the Chief Justice of United States, Earl Warren, as a rather controversial and opinionated gentleman who didn't like to take orders from anybody. I just find it amazing, since you were chief counsel between these two, that in essence the Chief Justice would sit back and take this sort of cavalier treatment from a subagency of the United States? Mr. RANKIN. I think the Chief Justice was shrewd enough to realize that the way to handle that was to put them to the test and see whether they would refuse, and when it came down to actually doing the work, they never did refuse. Mr. McKINNEY. So even though the attitude was wrong, the answers were all right, so it was shunted aside? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Now, except for these things they didn't tell us. It is apparent now that there were certain things they withheld, and that is something different. Mr. MCKINNEY. The whole catalog of horrors which some of my colleagues have addressed for the record. I thank you. Chairman STOKES. Your comment, Mr. Hoover had something on all of us, someone said speak for yourself. [Laughter.] Chairman STOKES. I ask that the clerk mark the exhibit I have handed her JFK F-447. I request she show it to the witness, please. [Document handed to the witness for his inspection.] Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Chairman STOKES. All right, the Chair requests unanimous consent that this document be made a part of the record at this point. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The exhibit follows:] 634 JFK EXHIBIT F-447 635 JFK EXHIBIT F-447 cont. 636 JFK EXHIBIT F-447 cont. 637 JFK EXHIBIT F-447 cont. 638 JFK EXHIBIT F-447 cont. 639 Mr. Rankin, have you had a chance to review this document? Mr. RANKIN. I have. Chairman STOKES. And can you tell us what it is? Mr. RANKIN. It is a communication from William T. Coleman, Jr., and David Slawson to the Commission regarding Mr. Nosenko. Chairman STOKES. And was a copy of this document provided to you and does it indicate thereon? Mr. RANKIN. It does, yes. Chairman STOKES. All right. Now, this document or this memorandum was prepared from information furnished on whom? Mr. RANKIN. It was furnished regarding Oswald. Is that what you mean? Chairman STOKES. Well, the subject matter. Mr. RANKIN. It was concerning what the FBI had learned from Nosenko about what he claimed he knew about Oswald. Chairman STOKES. And this is a five page document prepared by members of your Commission staff?. Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Chairman STOKES. And my understanding is that Nosenko was in the possession of the CIA? Mr. RANKIN. That is right. Chairman STOKES. And that this memorandum was prepared as a result of an interview of Nosenko by the FBI? Mr. RANKIN. Yes sir. Chairman STOKES. Is that correct? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Apparently, I don't know how they ever got to him, because they were not supposed to have jurisdiction in that area but--- Chairman STOKES. Our understanding is that the FBI would have to submit to the CIA the questions they wanted to ask Nosenko, the CIA would then ask Nosenko those questions and submit his answers back to the FBI. Is that your recollection of the procedure? Mr. RANKIN. No; I don't know what the procedures were. Chairman STOKES. But, at any rate, with reference to this memorandum, can you give us some idea of how heavily the Commission relied upon this memorandum in its determinations? Mr. RANKIN. It is my impression now that the Commission did not rely on it at all, that the fact that the CIA was telling them that Nosenko was not a KGB officer and could not be relied upon, dissipated anything that the memo says about him and what he claimed to know about Oswald and caused the Commission to think that he was unbelievable about any of that. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fithian will be back with some additional specific questions. Let me just ask you some general questions to help me focus on your role with the Warren Commission and its relationship with the FBI. Did you personally meet with J. Edgar Hoover? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. Mr. EDGAR. What was his attitude toward you personally? Mr. RANKIN. It had changed. Mr. EDGAR. Changed from when to when? 640 Mr. RANKIN. From the way our relationship was when I was with the Department of Justice. He was quite cold and uncommunicative. Mr. EDGAR. During your period of time with the Warren Commission? Mr. RANKIN. No. You asked me about when I saw him and I thought that was what you were dealing with. I went over to see him--- Mr. EDGAR. Just clarify for me what you are talking about. His mood about you changed and you said he was cold. Was that on your personal visits to him, while you were with the Warren Commission? Mr. RANKIN. Yes. I don't think I had more than two, if I had that many. I was dealing constantly with people below him. Mr. EDGAR. And could you further describe what you mean by the coldness, what were some of the conversations that he would share that would indicate this coldness? Mr. RANKIN. Well, by the nature of our work, when I was an Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, I had conferences with the President involving legal problems and some of them necessarily involved the FBI, and so we had consultations about such matters. The same is true when I was Solicitor General. At all times our relations were warm and cordial and we seemed to have an understanding between each other and cooperation; in trying to get the work accomplished that we had before us. When I saw him during my work with the Warren Commission, in his office, he acted as though he felt that the Commission was hostile to him and to the FBI, and he commented upon all the man-hours we were demanding of him and how it was a burden to the FBI in its carrying on its other work. Without actually abusing me he made it plain that he was not pleased with our relationships. Mr. EDGAR. Did he resent the fact that you were doublechecking the FBI's investigation? Mr. RANKIN. Every agent that I had anything to do with when I did that resented it. But I just had to do it anyway and I kept on doing it. Of course, that didn't help with any of them. They soon could find that out. Mr. EDGAR. What is your feeling now in retrospect looking back in terms of your relationship and coldness and the resentment that the FBI felt about their alleged withholding from you of information? Mr. RANKIN. Well, you know, I assumed at that time, apparently mistakenly, that they were professionals and even though the didn't like whatever I would demand as a lawyer, or if I was too insistent about the investigation or wanted a better investigation or something more complete, or more information or more disclosure, that they would recognize that I was acting as a lawyer in trying to carry out my work, and if they didn't like it they still would appreciate that it was necessary to my work. Therefore, the thought never crossed my mind that they would deliberately withhold something as important as information about what had happened in connection with this assassination, which I thought was of major importance to the country. I didn't think the FBI's interests 641 in its own Bureau, as important as I appreciated it could be to an agent or Mr. Hoover, still was more important than that of the interests of the country as a whole, so I never thought that they would deliberately conceal or withhold anything. I thought there might be some times when I would have to pull it out of them, and I might have to keep after something a good many times that I should have been able to get the first time, but the other never crossed my mind, as I say, and I never believed that Mr. Hoover would deliberately lie to the Commission. Mr. EDGAR. One final question, just in terms of your own intuitive speculation relating to a question I asked former President Ford earlier this morning. Where do you think Oswald was going when he left the rooming house and walked behind the back alley there and up the street and shot Officer Tippit and went to the theater? Where was he heading? Was he just walking aimlessly or did he have a direction he was going? Mr. RANKIN. I have nothing except speculation and I have always thought he was just trying to get away and that is a curious thing about life, that Officer Tippit would show up in that situation. Mr. EDGAR. Did you have occasion to visit Jack Ruby's apartment? Mr. RANKIN. No. Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no further question. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. We have a time problem, I am informed, with reference to the next witness to follow Mr. Rankin. Mr. Rankin, I wondered this. Several of the members have indicated they have some additional questions they would like to ask you. I wonder if you would agree that if we submitted those to you that you would be able to answer them for the record for us. Would that pose any problem for you? Mr. RANKIN. No; I would be glad to do that. Chairman STOKES. Fine. All right. Then at this time let me extend to you on behalf of the committee 5 minutes, which you are entitled to as a witness before this committee, at which time you may make any comments you would like to make with reference to your testimony, and you may add to it or subtract from it, or whatever you like. I extend to you at this time that 5 minutes for that purpose. Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take up 5 minutes of this committee's time but I do wish to express myself that I am maybe not happy to be here but I am quite willing to be here to assist in your deliberations in any way and I hope that any enlightenment that you can contribute with your work and your staffs efforts toward these problems will soon be available to the American people and will be helpful to their understanding of what happened. Thank you. Chairman. STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Rankin. We appreciate your cooperation and your presence and your testimony here, and again we thank you. You are excused. 642 Prior to the recognizing of counsel, I would like the record to reflect the fact I am informed by counsel for the committee that prior to April 4, 1964, that is, February 1964, to April 4, 1964, that the FBI did have access to Nosenko, although Nosenko was under the control at that time of the CIA. After April 4, 1964, they did not again have access to him until 1969. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey. Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is time now to consider the role of the Department of Justice in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. Senior officials at Justice were, of course, active in supervising the investigation, though the responsibility for carrying it out was in the hands of the FBI. In the de facto absence of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in the days following his brother's murder, the job of coordinating the Department's activities was up to Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. Soon after the assassination, Katzenbach became a proponent of an independent Presidential commission to investigate the assassination. The proposal he and others suggested to President Johnson called for the creation of a blue ribbon body that was to become the Warren Commission. It would, he recommended, be composed of present and former Government officials of eminent stature, such as the former Commission members who have testified here today. When the Commission was created on November 29, 1963, the Department of Justice no longer was involved in the investigation in any way, although it continued to perform liaison functions for the Commission. Here today, Mr. Chairman, is the Honorable Nicholas Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United States. Mr. Katzenbach became Attorney General in 1964, when Robert Kennedy ran successfully for the Senate from New York. Mr. Katzenbach was later named by President Johnson to serve as Undersecretary of State. Presently, he is general counsel and vice president of the IBM Corp. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Katzenbach. Mr. PREYER [presiding]. The committee calls Mr. Katzenbach. TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES Mr. PREYER. Mr. Katzenbach, it is good to have you with us today. I ask that you stand and be sworn in at this time. Do you solemnly swear the evidence you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. KATZENBACH. I do. Mr. PREYER. We have a rather slim attendance at this moment because of a vote that is on on the House floor. I think Members will be returning momentarily. Mr. KATZENBACH. Not a new experience for me. 643 Mr. PREYER. I suggest that we take a several minute recess in place, if you do not mind. We would like to have--here is Mr. McKinney here right now. I think we are ready to proceed. The committee will recognize Gary Cornwell, counsel for the committee, to begin the questioning of the witness. Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared at this time to question the witness. However, I had the opportunity to take a lengthy deposition from Mr. Katzenbach previously. That deposition has been provided to the committee and I have been informed that the committee has had an opportunity to study it carefully. In light of that, I might suggest, in view of the late hour, perhaps the committee might simply like to begin first and ask the questions of Mr. Katzenbach in those areas that we are most concerned with. Mr. PREYER. Is the deposition a part of the record or do you wish it introduced into evidence at this point in the record? Mr. CORNWELL. It is in the files. Mr. Katzenbach has not yet had an opportunity to read it carefully himself and to sign it. As soon as he does so, it will be made a permanent part of the record, Mr. Chairman. Mr. PREYER. Fine. The Chair recognizes Mr. McKinney to begin the questioning of the witness. Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Attorney General, it is a pleasure to see you again. We really appreciate your coming to help us in these deliberations. I would like to start out by asking the question as to your exerting tremendous pressure right after the assassination to get the FBI report out and to get a report in front of the American people. This is somewhat evidenced by your memorandum to Mr. Moyers of November 25. What was your basic motivation in looking for such speed? Mr. KATZENBACH. I think my basic motivation was the amount of speculation both here and abroad as to what was going on, whether there was a conspiracy of the right or a conspiracy of the left or a lone assassin or even in its wildest stages, a conspiracy by the then Vice President to achieve the Presidency, the sort of thing you have speculation about in some countries abroad where that kind of condition is normal. It seemed to me that the quicker some information could be made available that went beyond what the press was able to uncover and what the press was able to speculate about was desirable in that state of affairs. Mr. McKINNEY. In your deposition to the committee on page 8, you suggested that one of your interests was that the facts, all of them, had to be made public and it had to be done in a way that would give the public, both in this country and abroad, the confidence that no facts were being withheld at all. Do you think that pushing for this type of speed might have hurt the accuracy of the report or brought about the fact that some people would question the speed of its issuance its thoroughness its completeness? Mr. KATZENBACH. I do not think the two notions are connected, Congressman. I think the motivations for getting some kind of report out, some facts out early were the ones that I have stated. 644 The memorandum of Mr. Moyers and a number of other conversations and things that I have said really related to the desirability of a totally thorough, complete investigation by a commission, such as the Warren Commission, which should point out all of the facts available and all of the reasons for their conclusions. I never intended at any point that the investigation done by the FBI would be a substitute for the kind of investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. Mr. McKINNEY. Perhaps for the general public and for the committee, you could discuss for us your recollection of when and how the idea of a Presidential Commission came forth. I know you mention it in your memorandum to Mr. Moyers again. How did you feel about it, at first? Were you opposed to it or not, and when it was finally firmed up, how was it finally decided? Mr. KATZENBACH. I think an idea like that perhaps has several apparents. It was something that very soon after the assassination I thought was a good idea, that such a Commission should be formed of people of impeccable integrity, people who would search for the truth and who would make that truth public because I did not believe that if it remained entirely within the executive branch that that effect could ever be achieved as far as the general public here or abroad was concerned. So, I thought very early that such a Commission was essential to, really to the political process, to getting all of the facts out on such an occasion as the assassination of a popular and respected President. So, I pressed for that very early. I was never opposed to it. I was, however, in a somewhat awkward position because of my responsibilities in the Department of Justice as Deputy Attorney General at that time and, in effect, very nearly acting Attorney General at that time because of Robert Kennedy's tragic loss and reaction that he had to the assassination of his brother. My awkwardness was because it was perfectly obvious to anybody who knew anything about the Federal Bureau of Investigation that they were certain to resent the appointment of any such commission. 80, on the one hand, and if I were thought to be the source of that or to recommend that, then it would very seriously affect my relations with Mr. Hoover and the Bureau. Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, it is safe to say that with the mere mention of another investigation or another investigation or an investigative commission, Mr. Hoover would have considered it a somewhat of an insult to the FBI in its activities in this area. Mr. KATZENBACH. Absolutely. Mr. McKINNEY. You brought up the subject of the Attorney General, so I will move to that for just a moment. I think it also might be of benefit to the committee and the public if you were to describe to us as best you could the Attorney General's role and his feelings at that time. It has been difficult, I think, even though everyone is aware of the tremendous loss, for many people to understand why the Attorney General., who had had task forces all over the United States looking into organized crime, who had been an active prosecutor of organized crime, who had been an extremely activist Attorney General, why he never took more of a role in ordering the FBI to do things and in ordering his in-the-field people 645 who had connections with the Mafia to move into any areas such as the Cuban area. Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, when the assassination occurred, Robert Kennedy's world just came apart, in that not only his affection for his brother, but everything that they had been trying to do, everything they had worked for a long time just went with that shot. He was very devastated both I think by the personal loss and by the sudden crashing halt of all of the things that he had worked for with his brother for a long period of time. His attitude was not difficult, I think, for those who knew him well to understand. He said nothing that was done was going to bring his brother back to life and it was, I think, almost as simple as that, as far as he was concerned. Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, not only was his devastation personal but it was political in that it was just over, the whole dream. Mr. KATZENBACH, I think it was both. Both the two were so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish them, I think. I think I would put them both under the feeling of personal. Everything that you were doing in life, a brother who was beloved just suddenly turned to dust. Mr. McKINNEY. Throughout your deposition, you bring up a point that I do not think as a committee member I was aware of. Even in discussing the formation of a commission on page 13 of your deposition, you said, "I thought Chief Justice Warren probably had more credibility abroad than any other American." And you go on throughout your deposition in describing a tremendous amount of pressure from the State Department. I wonder if you would like to go into that in any more depth for the committee as to exactly why that pressure and in what forms it took. We have several exhibits suggesting the international repercussions, which I will put in the record later, which are essentially memos from Belmont, Jenkins, and Donahou and others. I thought perhaps you might like to go into the background of that. Mr. KATZENBACH. I was certainly communicated with several times by the State Department and I suppose in a sense that is pressure, although I do not know that I really felt it as pressure. I felt they had their problems and they wanted some help in trying to resolve them. We have 120, or whatever it is, Embassies around the world and every Ambassador there was being asked about this, being asked by that government what was happening, what was the story on it, as well as what effect it would have on our foreign policy, and 1 think they were very--being no information really available to them, they were simply feeling the lack of it and feeling that affected their credibility in foreign governments. Mr. McKINNEY. Were they suggesting or did you have any con- versations with the White House that suggested that perhaps President Johnson's viability as a world leader was in question or weakened until the whole issue of who shot President Kennedy was resolved to the world's satisfaction? Mr. KATZENBACH. I do not now recall any conversations as specif- ic as that. It seems to me that had to be an underlying factor and, 646 in addition, perhaps it is important to remember that President Kennedy had worked a long time and had achieved a considerable amount of stature after some fairly difficult beginnings. That here was not a totally unknown President, not totally unknown, relatively certainly unknown person in the Presidency. Mr. MCKINNEY. As essentially, although certainly not officially, acting Attorney General during this period would you describe to the committee what your relationship was with Mr. Hoover at that time? Mr. KATZENBACH. I had never had a great deal of relationship with Mr. Hoover in terms of personal relationship with him. I suppose I had seen him a half dozen times maybe while I was in the Department of Justice. He had a considerable animosity, I think, toward Robert Kennedy. I think he had never been in a position of having an Attorney General who was closer to the President than he was and that was a new situation for him, and one I do not think he liked. His relationship with Mr. Kennedy was very, I think, cold formal and I suppose as Robert Kennedy's deputy, some of that shed off on me. Mr. McKINNEY. Wasn't it true or isn't it inferable that Bobby Kennedy's very drive against organized crime was, in effect, a slap in the face to Mr. Hoover in that it implied that the FBI had not been the gangbusters that we were all brought up to think they were? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I think that is true and, of course, the drive in civil rights was one that kept exposing the Bureau to criticism, right or wrong, and that was resented by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Hoover resented criticism to a degree greater than any other person that I have ever known. Mr. McKINNEY. I do not know whether you were in the room earlier, but I mentioned and brought up to Mr. Rankin a letter to Mr. Tolson in which the FBI, in essence, refused to go to the Warren Commission meeting as liaison and in essence refused to brief you as to what they were doing, stating that they would have nothing further to say to either the Commission or anyone else until their investigation was finished. This was somewhat a slap to you as well as to the Warren Commission. How did you react to this? Mr. KATZENBACH. I think, Congressman, the first thing to remember is that was a letter from Allen Belmont to Tolson, not a piece of paper that I saw at the time or the Chief Justice saw at the time or that anybody other than those within the Bureau. I think it is also important to remember that no memorandum, no letter written in the Bureau was really written for anyone other than Mr. Hoover. That is, it would reflect whatever the author thought Mr. Hoover's views were. I do not believe that Al Belmont put to me or had me put to the Chief Justice any flat refusal of that kind to go as a liaison. My recollection is that the Bureau's attitude at that time was that it would be better if we did not go to this organizational meeting of the Commission because we will be asked a lot of questions about a report that is not complete, which we do not wish to answer until the report is complete; not an unreasonable posi- 647 tion to take and not one which reflects the attitudes reflected in the memorandum which you are reading. And I believe that 1 probably, although I have no specific recollection of it, conveyed to the Chief Justice that view and those reasons and that he accepted them. Mr. McKINNEY. How did you feel as the Warren Commission moved on in its work? How did you feel about the FBI's thoroughness and the FBI's cooperation with the Commission? Mr. KATZENBACH. It was always my view, the whole time that I was in the Department of Justice, that the Bureau would do what you asked the Bureau to do and that they would do it well and professionally. They did not like what they were doing. They might want something more specific in the way of instructions than if they liked what they were doing. For example, if you were to look at the files now on civil rights matters and compared them with ordinary crimes that the Bureau was investigating, you would find very detailed memorandum to the FBI from John Door in the Civil Rights Division, Burke Marshall saying please do this and then answers to that or this, do something else, three and four page instructions. Whereas if it was a kidnapping, you did not really have to give them any instructions. They were there and doing things as they ought to be done. I regarded then and I regard now, despite all that has come out, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is probably the most highly trained, the most effective investigative agency in the world. Mr. MCKINNEY. How do you tie that though to the fact that we now know they actually withheld from the Warren Commission any information they had regarding the CIA's overtures to the Mafia and the assassination attempts against Castro? Mr. KATZENBACH. I am very surprised that they did that and I really have no explanation as to why they did that. It may have been because Mr. Dulles was a member of the Commission and they thought that was his job to do it, but I am quite surprised, given relationships between the FBI and the CIA, I am surprised that the FBI did not seize the opportunity to embarrass the CIA. Mr. MCKINNEY. I am glad you used that word "embarrass" the CIA because I was going to ask you if you would describe your understanding at this period. My understanding is that the Director of the FBI had removed liaison from the CIA and the CIA retaliated. We had a situation where neither agency was talking to the other, basically on the basis of personal animosity rather than anything factual. Is this your understanding of their relationship at this time? Mr. KATZENBACH. There may be some overstatement in that. Essentially that was strained for that reason. On the other hand, whenever that occurred and it occurred on other occasions, liaison was maintained simply because it had to be maintained at a lower level. Mr. McKINNEY. You state in your deposition--we will move on to the CIA, on page 19. You say and I quote: Perhaps naively, but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the Commission would insure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that 648 information available to the other Commissioners. He might have been skeptical about how far it was to go to the staff or how it might be further investigated because there was somewhat more of an aura of secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is in 1978. And then you went on to say that you are referring to generally anything that the CIA had in its files. Are you somewhat appalled at this point when you find out that not only were the files not thoroughly given to the Warren Commission but that such impor- tant things as Nosenko were not really given very happily? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I am. Mr. McKINNEY. Do you think that there is anything that this committee could possibly propose, should this terrible type of horror happen again, that would give a Commission such as the Warren Commission any type of authority which would override the bureaucratic malaise that we seemed to have had back during the Warren Commission days? Mr. KATZENBACH. I really cannot think of anything offhand. In the final analysis in government, you have to rely on the integrity and the competence of people in high position. They may not always have the integrity they should have and they may not always have that competence, but if you do not have that, it is pretty hard to scotch tape a solution around. Mr. MCKINNEY. There are two letters, as you probably know, which are Kennedy exhibits F-466 and F-473 from Mr. DeLoach, one of them on 11-25 and one on 12-20 concerning the leaks of the FBI information and a report, in essence, in one accusing you of leaking information. In your deposition you indicated it would be difficult for you to do so because you did not know the information. And I just wondered what you could give this committee that would enlighten us at to why the FBI instead of simply putting out their report with the facts as they saw them started this process of slowly leaking to their favorite reporters? Mr. KATZENBACH. I think it was largely because of the appoint- ment of the Warren Commission. Mr. McKINNEY. I am sorry. Mr. KATZENBACH. It was largely because of the appointment of the Warren Commission and their resentment about that. They very much wanted the report to be made public. They very much wanted to get all the credit for it. They very much wanted the center stage. When that was frustrated, I think they took steps of leaking the information. They have done that in much lesser contexts many, many times when I was in the Department. Mr. McKINNEY. Isn't it also possible that there is a definitive feeling on their part that a leak would not show a deficiency in an investigation as much as a report would be criticized for deficiencies? Mr. KATZENBACH. I doubt that. It is a speculation one can make. I doubt it for only one reason. I doubt very much that the Federal Bureau of Investigation thought there were any deficiencies whatsoever in their report. Mr. McKINNEY. Or as least they thought there would be no deficiencies. Mr. KATZENBACH. They thought there were none; yes. 649 Mr. McKINNEY. Well, I am fascinated that the Senate came to the conclusion that, quoting from book V on page 6: The committee had developed evidence which impeaches the process by which intelligence agencies arrive at their own conclusions about the assassination and by which they provided information the the Warren Commission. They go on to state that "Facts that might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission." Then you state on page 30 of your deposition that "Mr. Hoover resented greatly when Mr. Kennedy or I talked directly to any agent in the field." On page 47 of your deposition you said: You see, nobody really could do it other than the Bureau, with the Bureau's acquiescence. Nobody else knew. I did not know what was going on. Nobody in the government knew what was going on other than very short conclusionary statements which you got from liaison people, from the Director himself. In other words, isn't this really sort of a stone wall attitude toward the Commission, toward the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General and almost everybody else involved? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, it can be viewed that way. The Bureau, during the time that I was in the Department of Justice, had a very strong view that they were to do investigations. That was their responsibility and their responsibility ran essentially to Mr. Hoover on that, and they wanted suggestions. They would follow suggestions, orders with respect to an investigation from prosecutors, from the attorneys in the Department who had responsibility for the development of a case. But essentially how they went about it and how they did it, who was assigned to it, what they said was received up through their bureaucracy. What they resented was our talking with an agent in the field about an investigation he was doing, or about something he was familiar with rather than get that report coming back through the FBI bureaucracy and coming out with Mr. Hoover's signature and a memorandum to the Attorney General from one of the Assistant Directors, as a memorandum for an Assistant Attorney General or whatever. That is not all bad. They simply did not want to be pinned with the views expressed by some agent in the field. If they did not acquiesce in those views or if they had other information available to them which cast some doubt upon those views, and I can understand that, as frustrating as it often was. I can understand that. I mean, when I was in government or even today--I have lot of lawyers working for me. Not every one of those people is expressing my views. Mr. McKINNEY. I guess one of the bottom lines, then, of all of this, is to ask the question: If the FBI and if the CIA had been wholly cooperative and wholly open to the Warren Commission, do you, No. 1, feel that there would have been any different result in what the Warren Commission came up with or how long it took to come up with that answer? Or do you feel that perhaps the Warren Commission's final conclusions would not have been open to such tremendous criticism and skepticism? Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, I think obviously things would have been investigated that were not investigated or investigated in more 650 depth than they were investigated. I have no way at all of knowing whether what light that would have cast. I have been personally persuaded that the result was right and I do not think it would have changed any of the evidence that they had that led to that result. But I suppose one has to say, an investigation that did not take place, it is impossible to know what would have come out of it. And I think on the third part of your question, it is clear to me that had that been done, had that been investigated, had those facts been made public, perhaps what is going on here today would not have taken place, would not have been necessary. Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, the opening would not have been there. It is luck perhaps that the Warren Commission may have hit the right result but there were so many avenues in which individual bureaucratic decisions were made not to open and were not discovered that it is relatively lucky they did not lead anywhere. Mr. KATZENBACH. I think lucky is too strong a word. They did an awful lot of work and had an awful lot of facts and an awful lot of good investigation was done in the areas where it was done. Mr. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions--one more question I guess I would ask. In general, we discuss the pressure from the State Department in the beginning and the reasons for that pressure and your memorandums. Do you feel that the pressure from, say, the State Department, the pressure from the White House, general pressures of the time really made the Warren Commission do its work too quickly and the FBI do its work too quickly so that also subjected them to criticism? Mr. KATZENBACH. I think more true of perhaps the initial FBI report, but I don't think it is possible in that period of time to do the kind of investigation that had to be done, nor do I think in essence that was what they were doing. I think they were trying to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of a very intensive, massive, but hasty investigation so as to get the most salient facts out. The Warren Commission, my recollection is, too, about a year, and it would seem to me that is not--I don't think there was any great pressure to get it out within a year. If they felt it was 18 months, I think it would have taken 18 months. Mr. MCKINNEY. It is known the Chief Justice definitely wanted to get it out before the heat of a political campaign rose to the front? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, and I am sure he wanted to get back on the bench. Mr. McKINNEY. It is safe to say you found yourself in the uncomfortable position of being pressured to get information out but at the same time realized that speed was certainly not going to make the FBI investigation as accurate as you would like to see it? Mr. KATZENBACH. The conclusions might be accurate but the investigation couldn't conceivably be as thorough in that period of time as the assassination of a President ought to require. Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you very much. I really appreciate your answer. I am finished. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer. 651 Mr. PREYER. Just one question, Mr. Chairman. You have served as Attorney General, and a very good one, and you were also instrumental in setting up the citizens committee. In the awful chance that we might ever have had to go through this kind of thing again, would you recommend the setting up of a citizens committee once again, or would you prefer to rely on the judicial system solely to investigate such an assassination? Mr. KATZENBACH. The question is difficult, Congressman, because had Ruby not shot Oswald, then I think you would have had a very different state of facts. I assume in those circumstances that it would have been investigation by the agencies of the Government developing the evidence they had, for prosecution--at the time by State authorities--of Oswald for the murder of the President. Whether subsequent to that, depending on what then happened, you would have had a commission, a citizens group, such as the Warren Commission, I suppose, would have depended on what all the surrounding facts were at that time. Given the identical situation; yes, if that occurred I would take the same course again, and I think I would do it the same way. I think I would rely in the same way and hope that the reliance was not misplaced. Mr. PREYER. So the fact that there was no public trial possible in the Kennedy assassination is one good reason for having a citizens committee? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes sir. You might need one in any event, because a trial--- Mr. PREYER. Pardon me? Mr. KATZENBACH. You might need one in any event, because the nature of a trial might leave out, leave a lot, might e. stablish the guilt of murder of the defendant without bringing in all of the collateral things which--- Mr. PREYER. That was going to be my next question, such as the guilty plea in the James Earl Ray case? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. Mr. PREYER. Of Martin Luther King? Mr. KATZENBACH. Sure, exactly. Even without the guilty plea the limits of relevant evidence, there may be a lot of unanswered questions after the judicial process has been completed. Mr. PREYER. You mentioned the FBI, you felt, was the most effective investigative agency in the world, but you have also noted a number of the difficulties of the citizens committee working with the FBI, certain institutional jealousies there. Do you think if you had to do it again that you would advise the Warren Commission to go the route of employing independent investigators, or would you rely on the FBI as the major investigative arm? Mr. KATZENBACH. I think the question is somewhat hypothetical because, you see, I don't think there are other investigators who have nearly the competence. I don't think they are available in the numbers that you would need them. So it seemed to me that even today, as then, not to use the investigative agencies of the Government, and particularly the FBI, is probably to waste one of the most valuable assets that you have. Mr. PREYER. Thank you very much. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. 652 The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Katzenbach, nice to have you here with us today. I suppose that an awful lot of the speculation that grew out of the Warren Commission, after the completion of its work, over the past 15 years, a lot of it stemmed, and I will ask if you agree or disagree with this--stemmed from the memorandum, the so-called memorandum from Mr. Moyers, the November 25 memorandum that you drafted and sent to Bill Moyers. As I recall, over the past 15 years, on any number of occasions I have either read or heard people refer to that first paragraph in that memorandum, three points, and I will quote it for you, then-I don't know if you have a copy or not, I will see that you get one in front of you. I am quoting here: 1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial. This was November 25, 1963, 3 days after the assassination. Now, unfortunately they don't always quote the other paragraphs in that memorandum, which I think to an extent mellow that single paragraph, but still that paragraph has been quoted extensively as an indication that the Warren Commission was really a self-fulfilling prophecy, that it was not designed to investigate the assassination of the President from a de novo position, but rather to confirm what the FBI had already concluded, what the Dallas police had concluded, and that, therefore, the Warren Commission didn't really fulfill its obligation, the obligation that Chief Justice Warren outlined when he said our responsibility is to get at the truth. I am creating that scenario for you because that is how I think it has been portrayed over the years. I have listened today to you talk about the various motivations, and it is hard, one can only sympathize, not empathize, with your position in those days, what it must have been like to be in the position you were in and have the responsibilities you had. Can you tell this committee, or help us try and straighten out what your motivation was at that moment that you wrote those words--and this is 3 days after the assassination--"the public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin." Why was it so important that the public be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin? Mr. KATZENBACH. Because, very simply, if that was the conclusion that the FBI was going to come to, then the public had to be satisfied that that was the correct conclusion My whole attitude in that memorandum, and I think it is contained or reflected in other paragraphs that you mentioned, I think it was reflected in other conversations, other memorandums that you have, one overwhelming feeling that I had, and that was in the assassination of the President of the United States, all of the facts, all of the evidence, everything that was relevant to that had to be made public. Mr. DODD. You say then, I should quote--in fact, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that this memorandum, if it is not already admitted into evidence, be admitted now. 653 Chairman STOKES. I believe it is already in part of the evidence. Mr. DODD. I think all of it should be there. You say in the first paragraph: It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy's Assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad all that the facts have been told and a statement to this effect be made now. I think that is fine, but still I am perplexed, absolutely perplexed, on why it was in the public interest to prove that Oswald was the one, and that as reflected in the next sentence, did not have confederates who were still at large. Why was it so important to prove that 3 days after the assassination? Mr. KATZENBACH. Because for the very simple reason, if that was not a fact, and all the facts were not on the table, then it seemed to me that nobody was going to be satisfied, and I thought that the public was entitled--if there was a conspiracy, then we ought to say there was a conspiracy. If there were confederates at large, it ought to be said there were confederates at large. I knew then already that Oswald had been in Russia, Oswald had been in Mexico. Now, if you are going to conclude, as the Bureau was concluding that this was not part of a conspiracy, that there were no confederates, then you had to make that case, with all of the facts, absolutely persuasive. If you didn't reveal these facts, somebody else was going to reveal them. Now, if there was a conspiracy, there was a conspiracy, and you put those facts out. But if you were persuaded Oswald was a lone killer, you had better put all of the facts out and you better not cover up anything, and you better say now all of the facts are going to be made public. That was the advice I was giving Moyers and that was the advice I was giving the President and that was the motivation for the Warren Commission. I don't think this is artistically phrased. Perhaps you have never written anything that you would like to write better afterwards, Congressman, but I have. Mr. DODD. You won't get me to say that. Mr. KATZENBACH. But I think if you take that, take the other paragraphs of it, take other things I was quoted as saying, other things I said, that there is a consistent view on my part. Mr. DODD. I didn't want to pull this out of context. I want to make sure it is all in there. In fairness to you, it should all be in there. Mr. KATZENBACH. I was very conscious of those facts which were going to be seized upon. Is this a Russian conspiracy? And I was very conscious, perhaps as a little bit of a history buff, that nobody ever put to bed satisfactorily the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Mr. DODD. You seemed in the next paragraph--I quote you again here--you say: Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seem about too pat--too obvious (Marxist, Cuba, Russian wife, et cetera). The Dallas police have put out statements on the Communist conspiracy theory and it was they who were in charge when he was shot and thus silenced. Am I off base there in detecting a feeling that you had on November 25, 1963, that there was something more to this, that 654 you felt, in fact, whether intuitively or based on other information, that this guy had been set up, Oswald was not alone? I sense that in that paragraph, reading it word for word, and carefully, that you had some thoughts running through your mind, and you were expressing them to Bill Moyers in those words. Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't think I had a view one way or the other, other than what I was being told the FBI investigation had, but I was saying you have got a lot of facts here, if you say Oswald was the lone killer, he wasn't in conspiracy with anyone, had nothing to do with any foreign government, you have got a lot of awkward facts that you are going to have to explain, and you had better explain them satisfactorily You had better put it all out on the table. Chairman STOKES. Time has expired Mr. DODD. May I have 1 more minute and I will terminate? Chairman STOKES. Without objection. Mr. DODD. On page 22, when asked by Mr. Cornwell--I won't read the question to you, but basically he is talking to you about the assassination plots, asking, during the deposition, about the assassination plots, and your response is this: No. In fact, I never believed there were such plots. I testified to this before but I remember at one time they were in the White House at the time of the Dominican upheaval and I remember Lyndon Johnson asking a direct question to Dick Helms about assassination and got a flat denial from Mr. Helms that the CIA had anybody involved. It was a short conversation and you can qualify it any way you want to, but I went home pretty confident. Did you prepare any memorandum at that time, after that conversation, or do you remember that conversation so clearly that you have no doubt in your own mind that Mr. Helms told the President of the United States in 1965 there were no assassination plots? Mr. KATZENBACH. I remember the conversation. It is hard to remember verbatim word for word. The question may well have been "Have we ever been involved in any assassination of anybody," and the answer to that may have been the flat "no." I don't know, I don't remember exactly how the question was phrased, but it obviously had to do at that time with Vietnam, and I was satisfied from that that we didn't engage in that kind of activity in this country, and I suppose I was satisfied in part, Congressman, because it was so incredible to me that we should have. Mr. DODD. You didn't take any notes? Mr. KATZENBACH. I almost never did. I never had time. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Katzenbach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer. Mr. SAWYER. I just have a single question. Mr. Hart, who was a spokesman for CIA here in connection with their having taken into custody for some 3 years Yuri Nosenko, the Russian defector, said that their authority for putting this man in a specially built isolation cell for 3 years, was you, that Helms had gone to you and gotten an OK for this. Is that true? 655 Mr. KATZENBACH. I have no recollection of any conversation involving Mr. Nosenko with Mr. Helms. There may have been such a conversation. I don't think that I authorized putting anybody in jail for 3 years. I simply have no recollection of any such conversation occurring, but there may have been a conversation about a defector. I don't know. Mr. SAWYER. But you don't believe that you would have authorized that kind of thing, if you had been asked? Mr. KATZENBACH. No, I think I would have--l think if somebody said we have a defector, we don't know whether he is a true defector or not, we have got him under some questioning, I wouldn't have--I don't suppose that would have bothered me that much. But when you talk about incarceration for 3 years, and so forth, that seems to me a different proposition. One would expect a defector to be questioned by CIA. Mr. SAWYER. But not put in solitary for 3 years in a specially constructed vault, in effect? Mr. KATZENBACH. No. But I would not have been surprised if he had been questioned intensively for a week or two. Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford. Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I don't have questions at this time. I yield my time to the Chair. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian. Mr. FITHIAN. I didn't expect Mr. Ford to pass. I don't have my document out here I wanted to talk to you about. It has to do with your views as to how, in keeping with your deposition, you said that we should leave no stone unturned and pursue every possibility, and so on, and particularly with regard to conspiracy. There have been some questions here of the Cuban situation. What I would like to do is ask if you could shed any light as to how you would have advised the FBI to proceed with the alleged connections between Jack Ruby and organized crime? Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, I think it should have been explored in normal investigative ways, that is, they have some sources they were using and still use, to some extent, electronic devices, in appropriate circumstances, and I would have thought they would have made any effort, every effort that was possible, to see what those connections were, if any. There is certainly a massive amount of data in the FBI with respect to organized crime. There even was at that time. I suspect there is a lot more today. Mr. FITHIAN. I wonder if we might provide the witness with the February 24 memorandum from Hubert and Griffin to Howard Willens. JFK F-448, I think, is the number. If we could provide that to the witness, I would ask that it be introduced into the record at this time. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it might be entered into the record at this time. [The exhibit follows:] 656 JFK EXHIBIT F-448 657 JFK EXHIBIT F-448 cont. 658 JFK EXHIBIT F-448 cont. 659 JFK EXHIBIT F-448 cont. 660 JFK EXHIBIT F-448 cont. 661 Mr. FITHIAN. It is in today's briefing book under exhibit 5. At least that is its number. Mr. KATZENBACH. Did you want me to read it? Mr. FITHIAN. If you would just glance over it quickly. As I understand your experience in the Department during Attorney General Kennedy's tenure, you became fairly familiar with the whole effort on organized crime; is that not correct? Mr. KATZENBACH. Not really terribly familiar, Congressman. That was one of the areas that Robert Kennedy was most interested in himself and, therefore, one of the areas where he had far more extensive knowledge than I. What I usually picked up from him as deputy was the areas where he had less interest, so I was not an expert on organized crime. Mr. FITHIAN. If you would like, just as we chat back and forth here, to glance over that four or five pages, I think you will find that there are recommendations here from these two junior attorneys on the Warren Commission that at least lead me to believe that they were recommending a much more ambitious program than obviously was pursued and, in fact, if you go to the page 5 with me, paragraph 9, their recommendation is really precise, and it said that Mr. Rankin should address the letter to the chief executive of each of the telephone companies mentioned in paragraph 8, requesting such companies not destroy until June 1, 1964, any records that they may have with respect to telephone services of all subscribers, and so on. If you look above that it is a number of towns. If you look on the back in the document there are a number of names that they suggest that they might pursue, and if you look earlier on in the document you find a suggestion that they survey any telephone within the reach of Jack Ruby. Now, I am not really vitally concerned about this document with this particular witness, Mr. Chairman, but I am interested in what recommendations you would have made to the Bureau to pursue, or either you or the Department would have made to the Bureau, to pursue the possible organized crime complicity in the assassination, and that is the first part of the question. The second part is, isn't it reasonable to expect, given the expertise of Justice in this particular field, that this might be one of the areas that we as a committee could expect the greatest amount of interaction between Justice and the Bureau, given your widespread experience down at Justice in this and the necessity of the two groups really to cooperate? Am I way off on that, Mr. Katzenbach? Mr. KATZENBACH. No. I don't know how you are using the term Justice on that. I think with respect to the Commission that we felt, in fact, the Commission should have, whatever investigation the Commission wanted should be done and should be performed in accordance with what they wished. I don't recall making any suggestion to the Commission as to what I thought they should go into. Mr. Willins was liaison from the Department, using Department in the narrow sense of the lawyers in the Department. He had considerable experience with organized crime and I would have expected, because of the strange shooting of Oswald by Ruby, and 662 because of allegations of organized crime connections--I would have expected the Commission to go into those to whatever depth they thought appropriate in terms of coming to whatever conclusions they came to. My point is I wouldn't have either interfered or wanted them to interfere or told them what to do. Mr. FITHIAN. Wouldn't that expectation have been heightened by what Mr. Rankin told us today that is section No. 4 of their investigative plan had to do with the whole conspiracy, did anybody at least assist? Question. I guess what I really want to get to, Mr. Katzenbach, is in light of the FBI's role as really the investigative arm, granted the Commission had some lawyers, but the real investigation was done by the Bureau? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir. Mr. FITHIAN. And the Bureau under the Justice Department. Are you satisfied--- Mr. KATZENBACH. The Bureau under the Warren Commission, really. Mr. FITHIAN. All right. Are you satisfied, as you review the case, that the FBI, in assisting the Warren Commission, did an adequate job with regard to the approach to investigating the question of any possible complicity of organized crime via the Jack Ruby link? Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't really feel in a position to answer that question. You gentlemen could answer that question far better than I because you have gone over all of this to a much greater degree than I have. Mr. FITHIAN. At any time during the whole Warren Commission existence, did anyone from either the FBI, to your knowledge, or the Warren Commission, come over and sit down with the Organized Crime Section of the Justice Department, or the Attorney General himself, or anybody, you or anyone else, and sort of review the bidding as to the approach that they might use in trying to ferret out any possible association? Mr. KATZENBACH. I know of no such thing, no such occasion. They certainly did not with me, but Mr. Willins, who was the liaison there, he was a very good lawyer, had a lot of experience in organized crime, and would have been quite competent to have helped to assist them as they wanted in this respect, and I simply have no knowledge as to what conversations he had with the Warren Commission or the staff on that subject, but he was certainly competent to do so. Mr. FITHIAN. He never made any-- Chairman STOKES. Time has expired. Mr. FITHIAN. He never made any reports to you? Mr. KATZENBACH. No. He occasionally told me orally, but it was my view that the Warren Commission was doing this and our job was to do what they wanted done, to give them what support they wanted in the job that they were doing, and not to interfere in any way. Mr. FITHIAN. And the last question, you never felt that Justice or the FBI ought to go to the Commission and say, "Look, if you are really going to look into the organized crime section, this is the way you want to do it." 663 Mr. KATZENBACH. No, I don't think any occasion came up where I felt that was appropriate or necessary. Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine. Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Sawyer asked you about the decision to sign off for Mr. Nosenko. Can you tell us whom it was that came to you and asked for your permission to begin the interrogation of Nosenko? Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't recall anybody doing so, Mr. Chairman. I understand that Mr. Helms has said that he had a conversation with me, or recalls that he had a conversation with me on it. I have no recollection of that conversation. But perhaps his recollection is better than mine. I don't know. I don't recall any such conversation. Chairman STOKES. Was this your testimony, that you don't recall anyone talking to you about it? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, that is my testimony. Chairman STOKES. At any time? Mr. KATZENBACH. At any time. Chairman STOKES. How did you learn of it? Mr. KATZENBACH. I learned of it when the gentleman writing a book called me up about 3 or 4 months ago or 6 months ago, and asked me about it. And I said, "Who is Nosenko"? Chairman STOKES. That would be Mr. Epstein? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, Edward J. Epstein, right. And that was the first that I heard of it, to my recollection. Chairman STOKES. So then, so that the record is patently clear on this point, during your tenure you knew absolutely nothing at all of this situation? Mr. KATZENBACH. Nothing that I can recall at this time. It was quite a while ago, but I have absolutely no recollection of Mr. Nosenko or anything to do with him during that period of time. Chairman STOKES. And while you held the office that you held, were you at any time requested to give your approval to treating any defector in this manner? Mr. KATZENBACH. No, sir, the only connections that I can recall with the CIA at all fell into two categories: One was when they wished to wiretap or some electronic device to be put within this country they came to me; and the only other thing is whenever they wanted a book suppressed they came to me and I told them not to do it. Chairman STOKES. Told them what? Mr. KATZENBACH. Told them not to do it, that there wasn't any way you were going to do it. And those are the only, at least offhand the only--l had very little connection with the CIA when I--none that I recall as deputy, a little bit, I guess at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and perhaps some at the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange. But I had very little connection with the CIA. And I don't recall, except for those occasions, their ever asking me any legal advice whatsoever, perhaps for good reason. 664 Chairman STOKES. And you are absolutely certain that you cannot recall any conversation with Mr. Helms about Nosenko? Mr. KATZENBACH. I am certain that I don't recall it; yes, sir. I can't flatly deny that such a conversation occurred, but I have no recollection of it. It is quite a while ago, and I believe--I believe if it was as dramatic as it was put by Congressman Sawyer, I would remember it. If I was simply informed that somebody was being questioned, there was a potential defector, I might not recall it. Chairman STOKES. Thank you. Any other questions? Mr. SAWYER. Yes. Mr. Katzenbach, I don't know whether you are informed on the details of the situation, but we had testimony by a spokesman for the CIA, so that it is not just a statement of some employee or something, he was designated by the present Director to come here and present the story because he was supposedly the most familiar with it, since he had reviewed it for the CIA. And he stated in substance that Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection, or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material, the guards were instructed neither to talk to him nor smile at him, he was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in, and then kept him there under equivalent conditions for some 3 years, with that kind of thing, 1,277 days, to be specific. At which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go. And then they gave, as I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that, did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr. Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK that this would be legal. And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why--and I also don't imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you wouldn't rather clearly remember the incident, if it had occurred. Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts as you have just set them forth to me, Congressman, had ever been made known to me, (A), I would recollect it, I am certain; and I hope to goodness I wouldn't have given the legal advice that it is claimed. Mr. SAWYER. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does counsel, Mr. Cornwell, desire to be recognized? Mr. CORNWELL. I only note, Mr. Chairman, that during the questioning by the committee members there have been various exhibits which have been referred to directly or indirectly. They include exhibits which have been marked for identification as JKF F-462, F-463, F-465, F-466, F-458, F-471, F-472, F-473, and F-448, and I might ask they be placed in the record at this time. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this time. [The above mentioned JFK exhibits F-462, F-463, F-465, F-466, F-471, F-472, and F-473, follow:] [JFK exhibits F-448 and F-458 were entered previously.] 665 JFK EXHIBIT F-462 666 JFK EXHIBIT F-463 667 JFK EXHIBIT F-463 cont. 668 JFK EXHIBIT F-465 669 JFK EXHIBIT F-465 cont. 670 JFK EXHIBIT F-466 671 JFK EXHIBIT F-466 cont. 672 JFK EXHIBIT F-471 673 JFK EXHIBIT F-471 cont. 674 JFK EXHIBIT F-472 675 JFK EXHIBIT F-472 cont. 676 JFK EXHIBIT F-472 cont. 677 JFK EXHIBIT F-473 678 JFK EXHIBIT F-473 cont. 679 Mr. CORNWELL. I have nothing further, thank you. Chairman STOKES. Mr. Katzenbach, as a witness before our committee, you are entitled at the conclusion of your testimony to have 5 minutes in which to make any comment that you so desire relating to testimony before this committee, and I extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so desire. Mr. KATZENBACH. I will be very, very brief, Mr. Chairman. I regret that the Warren Commission report was inadequate, if it was inadequate in any respects, and that as a consequence this committee has felt, the Congress has felt through this committee, the necessity to reexamine the assassination. I am sure that you, sir, and all the members regret that equally. I have confidence that what this committee is doing and will do in its report, will reflect the wisdom and integrity of its members. Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, and on behalf of the committee, we certainly thank you for your appearance here and for the cooperation you have given this committee and the time you have expended in giving us the benefit of your testimony. Thank you very much. Mr. KATZENBACH. Thank you. Chairman STOKES. You are excused. There being nothing further to come before the committee, the committee adjourns until 9 a.m., tomorrow morning. [Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene Friday, September 22, 1978, at 9 a.m.] [The deposition of Mr. Katzenbach referred to previously follows:] 680 Stenographic Transcript Of HEARINGS Before the President John F. Kennedy SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH Washington, D.C. August 4, 1978 Alderson Reporting Company, Inc. Official Reporters 300 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C. 681 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 682 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 683 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 684 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 685 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 686 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 687 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 688 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 689 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 690 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 691 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 692 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 693 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 694 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 695 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 696 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 697 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 698 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 699 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 700 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 701 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 702 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 703 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 704 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 705 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 706 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 707 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 708 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 709 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 710 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 711 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 712 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 713 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 714 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 715 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 716 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 717 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 718 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 719 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 720 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 721 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 722 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 723 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 724 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 725 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 726 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 727 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 728 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 729 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 730 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 731 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 732 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 733 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 734 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 735 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 736 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 737 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 738 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 739 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 740 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 741 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 742 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 743 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 744 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 745 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 746 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 747 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 748 DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont. 749 On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the following letter supplementing his testimony: Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504 September 25, 1978 The Honorable Louis Stokes Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives 331 House Office Building, Annex 2 Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 21, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964. On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the calendar. Although it is clear form this page that there was such a meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and therefore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the calendar itself. It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some recollection of the meeting. I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investigation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While 750 this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not change my testimony, it did seem to me that in fairness ot both the Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you. Respectfully yours, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach cc: Mr. Gary Cornwell Hon. Richard C. Helms Edward Bennett Williams, Esqu. 751 Thursday, April 2, 1964 Harold Reis ) 9:35 a.m. SAW Sol Lindenbaum ) Civil 9:35 a.m. SAW Joseph Dolan ) Rights 9:35 a.m. SAW David Filvaroff ) briefing 9:35 a.m. SAW John Douglas ) 9:35 a.m. SAW Jack Rosenthal ) 9:35 a.m. SAW Burke Marshall ) 9:35 a.m. SAW David Filvaroff 11:55 a.m. SAW William Foley 12:27 a.m. SAW William Orrick 1:50 p.m. SAW Marshal McShane 2:37 p.m. SAW David Filvaroff 3:10 p.m. SAW William Geoghegan 3:25 p.m. SAW Edgar Chan, O.L.C. 3:30 p.m. SAW Burke Marshall 3:32 p.m. SAW Burke Marshall 4:07 p.m. SAW [Lawrence Houston, CIA 4:08 p.m. SAW [Richard Helms, CIA 4:08 p.m. SAW [David Murphy, CIA 4:08 p.m. SAW [J. Walter Yeagley 4:08 p.m. SAW [William Foley, Crim. Div. 4:08 p.m. SAW [Defector Case] 4:08 p.m. SAW Addressed Brandeis Univ. 4:40 p.m. SAW Students (40) in AG's office Sol Lindenbaum 6:45 p.m. SAW John Douglas 6:56 p.m. SAW William Orrick 7:06 p.m. SAW David Filvaroff 7:12 p.m. SAW Joseph Dolan 7:15 p.m. SAW Friday, April 3, 1964 John Duffner (White Motor) 9:15 a.m. SAW Sol Lindenbaum ) 9:30 a.m. SAW Harold Reis ) Civil 9:30 a.m. SAW David Filvaroff ) Rights 9:30 a.m. SAW Burke Marshall ) briefing 9:30 a.m. SAW Jack Rosenthal ) 9:30 a.m. SAW Joseph Dolan ) 9:30 a.m. SAW NdeBK to Puerto Rico 10:15 a.m.