[capitalized sentences are not author's emphasis.]

The New York Times, October 3, 1963
In the Nation [column]
"The Intra-Administration War in Vietnam"
by Arthur Krock 

  WASHINGTON, Oct 2 The Central Intelligence Agency is getting a very bad
press in dispatches from Vietnam to American newspapers and in articles
originating in Washington. Like the Supreme Court when under fire, the C. I.
A. cannot defend itself in public retorts to criticisms of its activities as
they occur. But, unlike the Supreme Court, the C. I. A. has no open record of
its activities on which the public can base a judgment of the validity of the
criticisms. Also, the agency is precluded from using the indirect defensive
tactic which is constantly employed by all other Government units under
critical fire.
  This tactic is to give information to the press, under a seal of
confidence, that challenges or rebuts the critics. But the C. I. A. cannot
father such inspired articles, because to do so would require some disclosure
of its activities. And not only does the effectiveness of the agency depend
on the secrecy of its operations. Every President since the C. I. A. was
created has protected this secrecy from claimants Congress or the public
through the press, for examples of the right to share any part of it.

With High Frequency

  This Presidential policy has not, however, always restrained other
executive units from going confidentially to the press with attacks on C. I.
A. operations in their common field of responsibility. And usually it has
been possible to deduce these operational details from the nature of the
attacks. But the peak of the practice has recently been reached in Vietnam
and in Washington. This is revealed almost every day now in dispatches from
reporters in close touch with intra-Administration critics of the C. I. A.
ñ with excellent reputations for reliability.
  One reporter in this category is Richard Starnes of the Scripps-Howard
newspapers. Today, under a Saigon dateline, he related that, "ACCORDING TO A
HIGH UNITED STATES SOURCE HERE, TWICE THE C. I. A. FLATLY REFUSED TO CARRY
OUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE [AND] IN ONE INSTANCE
FRUSTRATED A PLAN OF ACTION MR. LODGE BROUGHT FROM WASHINGTON BECAUSE THE
AGENCY DISAGREED WITH IT." [My emphasis]. Among the views attributed to
United States officials on the scene, including one described as a "very high
American official who has spent much of his life in the service of
democracy" are the following:
  THE C. I. A.'S GROWTH WAS "LIKENED TO A MALIGNANCY" WHICH THE "VERY HIGH
OFFICIAL WAS NOT SURE EVEN THE WHITE HOUSE COULD CONTROLÖANY LONGER." "IF THE
UNITED STATES EVER EXPERIENCES [AN ATTEMPT AT A COUP TO OVERTHROW THE
GOVERNMENT] IT WILL COME FROM THE C. I. A. AND NOT THE PENTAGON." THE AGENCY
"REPRESENTS A TREMENDOUS POWER AND TOTAL UNACCOUNTABILITY TO ANYONE." [Again,
my emphasis].

Disorderly Government

  WHATEVER ELSE THESE PASSAGES DISCLOSE, THEY MOST CERTAINLY ESTABLISH THAT
REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCHES HAVE EXPANDED THEIR WAR AGAINST
THE C. I. A. FROM THE INNER GOVERNMENT COUNCILS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE VIA
THE PRESS. [My emphasis]. And published simultaneously are details of the
agencyís operations in Vietnam that can come only from the same critical
official sources. This is disorderly government. And the longer the President
tolerates it the period already is considerable the greater will grow its
potential of hampering the real war against the Vietcong and the impression
of a very indecisive Administration in Washington.
  The C. I. A. may be guilty as charged. Since it cannot, or at any rate will
not, openly defend its record in Vietnam, or defend it by the same
confidential press "briefings" employed by its critics, the public is not in
a position to judge. Nor is this department, which sought and failed to get
even the outlines of the agencyís case in rebuttal. But Mr. Kennedy will have
to make judgment if the spectacle of war within the Executive branch is to be
ended and the effective functioning of the C. I. A. preserved. And when he
makes this judgment, hopefully he also will make it public, as the appraisal
of fault on which it is based.
  Doubtless recommendations as to what his judgment should be were made to
him today by Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor on their return
from their fact-finding expedition into the embattled official jungle in
Saigon.
[end]

  This is the article that Mark Lane contends documents the war between
Kennedy and the CIA quite well and predicts a possible coup from them.

  The agency was receiving frequent and methodical attacks from within the
executive branch. I cannot imagine them taking that peacefully.

  Mr. Krock was a close friend to Mr. Kennedy and his father and Lane often
states that he believes that the high government official quoted was the
President, himself.

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