Subject: US Super CPUs For Nuclear Weapons Research Date: Tue, 31 Mar 1998 02:11:35 GMT From: softwar@us.net (softwar@us.net) Organization: softwar@us.net Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.politics.clinton,alt.politics.org.nsa,alt.politics.org.fbi,alt.politics.org.cia,alt.fan.rush-limbaugh,talk.politics.misc,alt.current-events.clinton.whitewater Four Documents below: 1- NSA Director Adm. McConnell to Ron Brown 11/15/93 2 - GAO Report on Chinese military - snip from nukes section 3 - FOIA response of the Dept. of Energy to Softwar request for all info on super exports for nuke weapons research. 4 - GAO report on sale of super cpus to Russia for nuclear weapons research ps - FYI I included this to a crypto newsgroup because the cyber war of cracking codes takes place inside super computers - eg... not all of these units sold are being used for honest purposes. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FORT GEORGE C. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000 15 November 1993 Honorable Ronald H. Brown Herbert C. Hoover Building 14th Street and Constitution Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20230 Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing to express my appreciation for your decision, reflected in the new draft Export Administration Act, to preserve export controls on cryptography. NSA remains ready to work with industry and the Department of Commerce and State to achieve the least regulatory burden on industry consistent with national security interests. Our recent agreement to a relaxation of export controls on telecommunications and supercomputers should enable U.S. industry to expand markets for these goods and retain its competitive edge in these critical technologies for the future. Industry's positive reaction of the recommendations of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, announced on 30 September, indicates that industry agrees these changes will significantly assist its export efforts. Our meeting on 30 July was a valuable opportunity to enhance mutual understanding of our respective concerns. I look forward to working with you and the Department of Commerce to address the many issues we confront. Please call if we can be of assistance. J. M. McCONNELL Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy Director, NSA ~~~~~~~~~~~` National Security: Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region, GAO/NSIAD-95-84 June 6, 1995 United States General Accounting Office NUCLEAR WEAPONS -------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1 China, a nuclear power with air-, land-, and sea-based warheads, has maintained the same official nuclear policy since it first detonated a nuclear device in 1964. Under this policy, China pledges not to use nuclear weapons first and not to use them against nonnuclear nations and nuclear-free zones. Under its nuclear strategy, China seeks to deter other nuclear powers by maintaining strategic nuclear forces of adequate size and range to reach a few cities in any potential adversary's homeland. Thus, in a crisis, an adversary cannot use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against China without facing the possibility of nuclear retaliation. According to Arms Control Today, the air-based leg of China's nuclear triad consists of approximately 120 long-range (3,100 kilometers) B-6 bombers, 30 medium-range (1,200 kilometers) B-5 bombers, and 30 short-range (400 kilometers) A-5 attack aircraft that are nuclear capable. These aircraft are based on 1950's and 1960's technology and would have limited operational capability against modern air defense systems. China is working to develop a new supersonic bomber, the B-7, which first flew in 1988 but has yet to be operationally deployed. The land-based leg of China's nuclear triad consists of several different types of intermediate- and long-range land-based ballistic missiles, most of which are liquid-fueled. These missiles can carry warheads with yields up to 3 megatons from about 1,800 kilometers to over 13,000 kilometers. However, China possesses only a handful of missiles with sufficient range to strike targets anywhere in the United States, according to Arms Control Today. China's sea-based leg of its nuclear triad consists of one Xia-class ballistic missile submarine. It can carry up to 12 ballistic missiles. China is developing new, solid-fuel land- and sea-based ballistic missiles with improved accuracy, according to numerous reports. Additionally, China appears to have developed technology for a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle that would allow it to strike several targets with one missile. Whether China maintains tactical land-based nuclear weapons such as artillery shells or warheads for its short-range M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles is uncertain, although reportedly both missiles can carry nuclear weapons. China's policy on the use of tactical nuclear weapons is unclear. China appears determined to upgrade its strategic nuclear capabilities, despite the end of the Cold War. It has been the only country to continue nuclear testing during the past 2 years, while an unofficial worldwide moratorium has been in place. China justifies this testing by pointing out that it has conducted far fewer nuclear tests than either the United States or Russia (including those conducted by the former Soviet Union). However, after it completes a series of nuclear tests by 1996, China reportedly desires to see a comprehensive test ban treaty implemented. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON, DC 20585 SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 Mr. Charles R. Smith SOFTWAR RE: FOIA #9705290005 Dear Mr. Smith: This is in final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated May 21, 1997, for access to information on "LEGISLATION, PLANS, DOCUMENTS, NOTES OR MEETINGS ON EXPORT CONTROL ON SALES OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS FOR USE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES" submitted to the Department of Energy. A search was conducted of the files in the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation and responsive documents originated with the Department of Commerce (DOC) were located. As agreed in your telephone conversation this morning with Douglas Downen on my office, your request will be forwarded to DOC for review and direct response. Please address any inquires to Brenda Dolan, FOIA Officer, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230. Please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Downen on 202-586-2123 if you have any questions regarding the disposition of your FOIA request by the Department of Energy. Thank you for the opportunity to assist you. Sincerely, Michael V. McClary Executive Officer Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation cc: Brenda Nolan, DOC (with FOIA request) Gayla Sessions, DOE, HR-73 Chris Balsbaugh, DOE, NN-40 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Export Controls: Sales of High Performance Computers to Russia's Nuclear Weapons Laboratories (Testimony, 04/15/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-128). In December 1996, the State Department informed MINATOM that the United States did not approve the export license applications under review because the applications were inconsistent with the U.S. government's export control policy. This policy seeks to prevent the export of high powered computers for end uses or end users that directly or indirectly support nuclear weapons activities. POSSIBLE IMPROPER SALE OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS TO RUSSIA ---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6 Subsequent to the executive branch's decision to return the license applications without action, press reports began to circulate here and in Russia that Russia had obtained several high performance computers from U.S. companies, apparently without an export license.\5 Press reports indicated that MINATOM told one of the companies that sold them a computer without a license that the computer would be used for modeling of earth water pollution caused by radioactive substances. However, MINATOM officials have stated that the computers will be used to maintain the Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles and the Minister of Atomic Energy indicated that the computer would be used to confirm the reliability of Russia's nuclear arsenal and ensure its proper working order under the terms of the CTBT. Because the computers Russia obtained use a technology known as parallel processing, a number of processors can be added to increase their performance. If the high performance computers allegedly acquired by Chelyabinsk-70 were to be aggregated into a single cluster, the laboratory would have a central computer with a CTP capability of about 9,000 MTOPS. Through other acquisitions that the Russian Minister indicated had been made, this capacity could be increased to about 14,000 MTOPS. -------------------- \5 U.S. press reports indicate that Silicon Graphics, Inc., sold four computers to Chelyabinsk-70 in the fall of 1996 for $650,000 and a distributor in Europe sold an IBM computer for $7 million to MINATOM. The New York Times has reported that Russian nuclear officials said the computer will be used to simulate nuclear weapons tests. 1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775 Charles R. Smith SOFTWAR http://www.us.net/softwar softwar@us.net Pcyphered SIGNATURE: AB8A6B6844B3137E02786F8DCB56C86B6BDE8D89EB9F639EB689C95BBE714C83 4F3BCD77E5A1378EEC9582742A5851EC9A693650FCF96054206F03679C614D02 C8D3E7CCB3E90E41