FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

176. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, November 14, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. At 4:35 p.m., Ball telephoned McGeorge Bundy to say that "Bobby [Kennedy] has an answer [from Khrushchev], which is not too encouraging. It keeps it wrapped up." Bundy told Ball that the President wanted the Under Secretary and Thompson to come to the White House to look over Khrushchev's message with the President and Rusk. (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Bundy; November 14; Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba)

I have read with great satisfaction the reply of the President of the United States/1/ and I agree with the considerations expressed by the President. It is of particular pleasure to me that we seem to have the same desire to liquidate as soon as possible the state of tension and normalize the situation so that to untie our hands for normal work and for solving those questions that are awaiting their solution. And this depends in the main on agreement between us--the two greatest powers in the world with whom special responsibility for ensuring peace lies to a greater degree than with other countries.

/1/Apparent reference to Document 155.

The question of the withdrawal of the IL-28's within mentioned 30 days does not constitute any complicated question. Yet this period will probably not be sufficient. As I already said in my oral message/2/ I can assure the President that those planes will be removed from Cuba with all the equipment and flying personnel. It can be done in 2-3 months. But for me, for our country, it would be a great relief if the state of tension that evolved in the Caribbean were liquidated as soon as possible. I have in mind what I have already said, namely: to lift immediately the quarantine, that is, blockade; to stop the flights of the US planes over Cuba; to write down the mutual commitments ensuing from the messages of the President and mine of October 27 and 28/3/ to which end your representatives and ours have to prepare with the participation of the UN acting Secretary General U Thant an appropriate document. This is the main thing now.

/2/Document 171.

/3/See Documents 95 and 102.

You understand that when we say that it is necessary to announce now the withdrawal of the IL-28's at the time when your planes are flying over Cuba it creates for us no small difficulties. I have no doubt that you will understand--and the Cuban Government understands this--that such actions constitute violation of sovereignty of the Cuban state. Therefore it would be a reasonable step to create in this respect also conditions for the normalization of the situation and this in a great degree would make it easier to meet your wish of expediting the withdrawal of the IL-28 planes from Cuba.

If we attained all that now and if this were announced, then more favourable conditions would be created for our country to solve the question of time table for the withdrawal of IL-28 planes.

Now our main difficulties lie precisely in the fact that, as it is well known to everybody and it is being rightfully pointed out to us, we have removed from Cuba missiles and warheads, that is, we have fulfilled our commitments while the US is not carrying out its commitments--the quarantine continues, the US planes continue to fly over Cuba and there is no agreement that would register the pledges of the US. And all this finds ears that are listening and listening attentively. It is difficult for us to give explanations to such unjustifiable state of affairs. Therefore to carry out the final procedure after the missiles and warheads have been removed, already now the quarantine must be lifted, the flights of the American planes over Cuba must be stopped and mutual commitments of the sides must be written down in an appropriate document with the participation of the UN.

It is hard to say for me what specific agreement is possible on the question of UN observation posts. But we as well as the Government of Cuba have already expressed a desire to come to terms on this question. If the question of the observation posts is of interest to the US--and I think it must be of interest--then I consider it wise to come to an agreement on this. I think that the Government of Cuba will not object to the UN posts, of course on the condition of respect for the sovereignty of Cuba, on the condition of treating her as equal which must mean that on the territory of other countries of the Caribbean and in a corresponding region of the US there will be also set up similar UN posts, that is on the condition that reciprocity will be observed in this question.

You understand, Mr. President, that no country can assume unilateral commitments, and it would be wise to make them mutual.

I have already said that perhaps it will be necessary for us in the negotiations on disarmament between our countries at the first stage to return to our proposals providing for the establishment of posts at airfields, in major sea-ports, at railway junctions, on highways in order to give guarantees to all the countries of the world that no country will be able to secretly concentrate troops and get prepared for an attack against or invasion of another country. It is wise, it appeals to us.

If you would give your representatives--McCloy, Stevenson and others--appropriate instructions on the question of UN posts in the Caribbean region and adjoining regions of the US--and our representatives have such instructions--and if they would come to an agreement then all this could be made public. Then there would be removed the difficulties connected with making a public announcement on the withdrawal of IL-28 planes and we would name then specific dates. These dates will be probably much closer than those which I name and maybe even closer than those which were named by you.

That is why we should make a final step in this direction. Then we would really cut the knot which was tied tightly enough and having cut it we would create normal relations between our countries to which our people aspire and which your people, we are sure of that, also want.

I will allow myself to express some other considerations and I believe you will not take offense and will not consider that I intrude too much into the sphere of our internal affairs. Voting in the elections to the Senate, the House of Representatives and in gubernatorial elections which just took place has resulted in the defeat of your former rival who was clearly preparing again for the next presidential elections. It is significant that as a result of the elections precisely those candidates were defeated who, if I may use such an expression, were making most frenzied bellicose speeches.

This indicates that the American people already begin to feel that if the arms race continues further, if a reasonable solution is not found and an understanding is not achieved between our countries then our peoples will feel still more strongly the threat of the dreadful catastrophe of a thermo-nuclear war.

Let us then not keep people of peace all over the world in suspense, let us give them joyous satisfaction. Having cut the knot in the Caribbean we would thereby immediately create better conditions and would reinforce people's hope for coping with other questions which are now awaiting their solution. Peoples expect wisdom from us, first of all from our two states. Of course our two states can not do everything, but all that depends on us in the sense of reaching an understanding will be of decisive importance. Needless to prove that other states would be also satisfied. And he who was especially displeased will have to agree after this understanding is reached that there is no other way of meeting the aspirations of all states, all peoples.

Sincerely,/4/

/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

177. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)

November 14, 1962, 10:10 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

McCloy--You have seen this report./1/ This is my reading on it. In the first place on the overflights, I haven't been quite able to make up my mind whether it was just a formal protest or whether it is something we have to look rather seriously at. But it might be no more than the former, although it is not too clear.

/1/Regarding the report of Stevenson and McCloy's meeting with Kuznetsov and Zorin, see footnote 1, Document 175.

Ball--It is possible that it is something they had to do to help Mikoyan out.

McCloy--Well I wouldn't be surprised. But they are going to put that in as a condition of their taking out the IL-28's.

Ball--That is your impression?

McCloy--That is my impression. I think we should resist that.

Ball--Yes.

McCloy--But this is what is coming and it perfectly clear to me, after reading that full message from K the other day,/2/ together with this thing here, that they are going to take the IL-28's out but they want to take them out now at the end of the road rather than immediately. My instinct on this would be to tell Kuznetsov and not tell him at one of these formal meetings, to say "Now look here, we have done our damnedest here to relieve your situation, you are talking a lot about the quarantine, you have balled up the business on the Red Cross because you kind of insist on your definition of offensive weapons, we have done something now that is really beyond what we agreed to do." Respond to that, don't talk to us any more about your having done everything and we have done nothing. "And that you get those things out of there and we will do as we say, we will raise the quarantine the minute that you give the order."

/2/Document 171.

Ball--Right.

McCloy--But I would do that on a sort of another walk basis rather than on one of these damn meetings at which Zorin is present and the whole damn works are present.

Ball--Yes. I think that is right.

McCloy--You all get tensed up and the hell with this feeling of dignity. This is just an oil--it is just a different approach that may very well bring the thing about. Now that is what I would do, if I had a free hand on this thing.

Ball--Let me talk to Dean and the President about it. I am going to be seeing them both in a few minutes.

McCloy--Yes. I would just go in and say "Look Mr. K come on down and I will give you lunch and I will show you downtown New York" and incidentally put that in his ear.

Ball--Yes.

McCloy--Now that would be my way of coping with this. And then the second thing I have got in mind is I am damn sure that we are going to be faced with the necessity of drafting something on the guaranty or the assurances. To put something down on paper.

Ball--Yes.

McCloy--Because we are trying to get it very shortly from the Soviets and it is going to be a pretty elaborate document.

Ball--Right.

McCloy--I always believe in getting out first draft. I think we shouldn't postpone that any longer.

Ball--Well we have got a draft of some stuff.

McCloy--Get it crystallized if you can, as soon as you can because I think that is going to be the first order of business.

Ball--Right. Don't you think we can avoid any kind of protocol?

McCloy--Yes. I would--Zorin is the devil in the play on that. I would just say no, and fortunately we have got the UN with us on it and we will hold out on that. In the last analysis I would suppose--I don't know what you mean by protocol--the form of the thing doesn't make a great deal of difference, but I think we are going to get away with a declaration.

Ball--Yes. The only difference is if you get into a highly formal argument then the amount of comments is going to be terrific.

McCloy--Yes, and moreover I got a letter from Herman Phleger/3/ that caused me a little concern. He said you know if you make a pledge of non-invasion that that has to take the form of a treaty because it is the impairment of the Congress' authority to declare war and that this has to be approved by the Senate. That is something that I think Chayes ought to be looking at.

/3/Not found.

Ball--All right.

McCloy--You know Phleger is a pretty good lawyer and he was very serious about this because he didn't see how we could get around it, in view of Congress' authority to declare war.

Ball--Well, I will get the boys working on it.

McCloy--Yes, get them working on that. There is one thought that they all take comfort in, they say well all we are doing is what we have already done under the Rio Pact and the UN Charter. But that may not be so because we are in an awkward position there because under the UN Charter and the Rio Pact we still supported an invasion from the Bay of Pigs and we defended it. Now is this something more or how do you avoid going to Congress. I think the lawyers ought to be looking at it.

Ball--OK, fine.

178. Memorandum of Conversation Between Attorney General Kennedy and Director of Central Intelligence McCone

Washington, November 14, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Copy sent to Carter.

NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney General at 10:30 a.m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI's request.

McCone explained that he had dinner the evening before with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).

Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with members of the Industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban developments of the last three weeks.

After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.

In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA had 20 million dollars on covert deposit [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and that two letters of credit had been issued [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] one in the amount of 10 million dollars to Pfizer, and one for seven million dollars to Merck. As long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of 17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs. I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.

Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction, the American public and a great many others would be confused and disenchanted.

For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange for the bank to withdraw the letters of credit, and for the withdrawal of a substantial part of the money [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Also advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of action.

We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the negotiation aside pending further developments on other important problems involving our Cuban relationship.

McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone at 1:45 p.m.

John A. McCone/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

179. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)

Washington, November 15, 1962, 9:25 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 62 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba.

McCloy told Ball he thought he would call the fellow/1/ for lunch if it is the desirable thing to do. He asked if Ball had anything new over night that might have some effect on it. There are rumors that Mikoyan is coming back tomorrow. If McCloy did this it would be mainly on a contact basis, but he is not so sure he would offer what Ball had suggested yesterday. He would simply tell him he was disturbed by his continuous talk that they have done everything and we have done nothing. Ball agreed this would be the thing to do and might be helpful at this time.

/1/Kuznetsov.

McCloy asked about the Fowler Hamilton business and Ball told him some time when he sees him he will give him a sketch of what he has in mind there.

180. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)

Washington, November 15, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 62 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba.

McCloy said he had invited the fellow/1/ to lunch but he told McCloy he had a date he could not cancel. He invited McCloy to come out to his place on Long Island some time during the weekend, and it was left that way. Ball asked if this would imply that Mikoyan might be there and McCloy said he didn't know; that he could not get anything out of him about Mikoyan. McCloy said he thought this would be cleared up in the next 24 hours. We can bear this in mind should the opportunity come up.

Ball told McCloy he would tell the President.

/1/Kuznetsov.

181. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, November 15, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C. 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. This message was considered an "oral" exchange, but a written copy was given to Dobrynin. Copies of this message were sent to Thompson, McNamara, and McCone. A note on the first page of the source text reads: "(This copy is as it actually went.)."

I am glad to learn of your assurance of agreement that the IL-28s should be withdrawn./1/ All that remains is to reach understanding on the timing.

/1/See Document 176.

Let me review the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh and your letter of October twenty-eighth./2/ You agreed to remove the weapons systems we described as offensive and with suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba. On our side, we undertook to agree to remove the quarantine measures in effect and to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. There were two conditions attached to our undertaking. The first was that the weapons systems would be removed "under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision," and, second, that there would be established "adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments."

/2/See Documents 95 and 102.

I cannot agree with your statement that you have fulfilled your commitments and that we have not fulfilled ours. Let us recall what, in fact, has occurred. You have removed a certain number of missiles from Cuba--not under United Nations supervision--but you did cooperate in arrangements which enabled us to be reasonably sure that forty-two missiles were in fact taken out of Cuba. There has been no United Nations verification that other missiles were not left behind and, in fact, there have been many reports of their being concealed in caves and elsewhere, and we have no way of satisfying those who are concerned about these reports. The IL-28's are still in Cuba and are of deep concern to the people of our entire Hemisphere. Thus, three major parts of the undertakings on your side--the removal of the IL-28's, the arrangements for verification, and safeguards against introduction--have not yet been carried out.

We suppose that part of the trouble here may be in Cuba. The Secretary General of the United Nations was not allowed to make arrangements for the experts he took with him to Cuba to verify removal of the offensive weapons; the Cuban Government did not agree to international Red Cross inspection at ports; they have refused the Secretary General's suggestion that the Latin American Ambassadors in Havana undertake this verification; they have rejected a further suggestion of the Secretary General concerning the use of various non-aligned Chiefs of Mission in Havana for this purpose. It is difficult for me to understand why the Cubans are so resistant to the series of reasonable proposals that have been made to them by U Thant unless, for reasons of their own, they are determined to see the crisis prolonged and worsened. We both have means of influencing the Cuban Government and I do not believe that we can allow that Government to frustrate the clear understandings our two governments have reached in the interests of peace.

In these circumstances we have so far been patient and careful, as we have been, indeed, at every stage. As you know from your own reports, we have always applied the quarantine with care and with regard for the position of others, and in recent days we have relied on the oral assurances of the masters of your ships and other ships. Moreover I myself held back orders for more forceful action right to the limit of possibility during the week of October 27th and 28th. But we cannot make progress from here--or avoid a return of danger to this situation--if your side now should fall into the mistake of claiming that it has met all its commitments, and refusing to help with the real business of carrying out our purpose of untying the Cuban knot.

What, in those circumstances, should be done? We are entitled to insist on removal of the IL-28's and on safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons before we lift the quarantine or give assurances of any sort. But we are interested in making rapid progress, step-by-step, and that is why we have proposed an arrangement more favorable from your standpoint: that as soon as you give the order for the removal of the IL-28's and their men and equipment, to be completed within thirty days, (and I am glad you say the length of time is not the real problem) we will announce the lifting of the quarantine. That is more than we agreed to on October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth, but we wish to end this crisis promptly.

Beyond that, we are quite willing to instruct our negotiators in New York to work closely with yours in order to reach agreement on other matters affecting this problem. We believe, again, that these matters should follow the removal of offensive weapons systems, but just as we have been able to discuss other matters while a number of missiles were leaving, we believe the urgently needed talks can and should go forward while the bombers are leaving. We do not insist that everything wait its exact turn--but only that the essential first steps be clearly going forward.

But what is most urgent, after we can agree that offensive weapons are leaving, and after the quarantine is lifted, is to make some real progress on continuing observations and verification. It will be essential to have such arrangements--and this again is clear in the letters of October 27 and 28--before our assurances can be more formally stated. Our undertaking on this point remains firm and clear, and we want nothing better than to be able to give our assurances, just as we said we would, when the necessary conditions exist.

In the absence of any arrangements under the United Nations or otherwise for international verification or safeguards, we have of course been obliged to rely upon our own resources for surveillance of the situation in Cuba, although this course is unsatisfactory. Just today we learned of new threats by Castro against this necessary surveillance. I should make it very clear that if there is any interference with this surveillance, we shall have to take the necessary action in reply, and it is for just this reason that it is so urgent to obtain better safeguards.

We note with interest that in your last message the arrangement of observation and verification is enlarged from Cuba to include certain other areas. This is a substantial change from the terms of our exchange of messages, and as we see it any such wider arrangements would necessarily require careful discussion. For example, if we move outside Cuba to observe what is happening in other countries which have been involved in the recent tensions, there might have to be observation posts at the appropriate ports in the Soviet Union from which weapons could be shipped to Cuba, as well as in appropriate places in the United States. This is a matter which deserves close study and it may offer a chance of real progress in the long run, but for the immediate future it seems to us better to work within the framework of our understanding of October 27 and 28.

We also think that the Brazilian proposal for a verified Denuclearized Zone in Latin America/3/ could, with the cooperation of Cuba and if acceptable to the other Latin American countries, in the long run offer an acceptable means for a broader approach. However, the immediate problem is, I repeat, the carrying out of our understanding with regard to verification that offensive weapons have in fact been removed from Cuba and the establishing of safeguards against their reintroduction pending the coming into effect of longer-term arrangements. Even apart from our understanding, given the history of this matter, I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that you can understand that this is a real necessity if we are to move to the settlement of other matters.

/3/Draft U.N. Resolution A/C.1/L.312. A revised version of it, U.N. Document A/C.1/L.312/Rev. 2, was submitted to the First Committee of the United Nations by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador, November 15. (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1056-1057)

But the first step is to get the bombers started out, and the quarantine lifted--for both are sources of tension. Meanwhile discussion can continue on other aspects of the problem.

182. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 15, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Macmillan Telephone Conversations, 10/62-11/62. Top Secret.

Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan 15 November 1962, 6 pm

President: Did you get my two messages?/1/

/1/The messages have not been found. On November 14 Kennedy called Macmillan to discuss the issue. Macmillan quotes from the November 14 telephone call in At the End of the Day, 1961-1963, p. 215.

Prime Minister spoke, and obviously said yes.

President: Yes, except that he still wants us to make a "no invasion" pledge and there can be no agreement on how to maintain surveillance. We may have to do so with disagreement. The other question, the IL-28's must be removed before we make an agreement on invasion. You realize that here this is a major political step. What happens if he doesn't agree to remove the IL-28's without our agreement on the quarantine and invasion? What is your view on our re-imposing the quarantine?

Prime Minister spoke, but apparently did not answer the question.

President: We must have him take out the bombers. Perhaps we will agree to disagree on overflights. We continue them and they won't shoot. Then we will agree, no invasion. We must have some type of inspection of sites, even though it won't mean much with all the caves and cellars in Cuba. This just becomes an action for the record.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: Now on the subject of Laos. Our information is that it is coming apart. It would be bad if Souvanna left because Laos is an example of something negotiated with the Russians. It is the one ornament of the last two years.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: We can't bring this up until Cuba is settled. So what about your going to him and pointing out that if fighting breaks out and we have partition, everyone will say that no agreement with the Russians will last more than a few months.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: Well, I thought if we got Cuba settled and if Laos will stay together, then we may have a good chance on Berlin. If he will agree to have the IL-28's out before Christmas or New Year's, and will give some type of on-site inspection for the record and understand that we will continue overflights, we will lift the quarantine and make a "no invasion" pledge.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: You go ahead on Laos. We will continue hard on Cuba.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: His conversation with Roberts gives promise. If we can get Cuba settled, we may make progress on Berlin. But from our information it looks like Laos is coming apart. If we can keep Laos together, go ahead on Berlin, we can look at Laos again six months from now.

[Here follows discussion on Yemen and Germany.]

183. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 15, 1962, midnight.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562. Confidential; Priority. Received at 1:22 a.m. and passed to the White House at 1:43 a.m.

1818. Department pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. Policy. In course three-hour meeting with Stevenson and Yost tonight/1/ at his request Kuznetsov stated he was instructed to tell us that "all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba." Also stated that offensive weapons will not be reintroduced and that USSR was prepared cooperate in seeking suitable formula and to speak about guarantees about their non-reintroduction. At outset of meeting, before Kuznetsov spoke, Stevenson expressed vigorous reaction to Castro letter to SYG/2/ threatening to shoot down US observation planes. Stevenson said this would be very serious matter with predictable consequences. Aerial surveillance was only means we had to assure ourselves in light Soviet failure produce verification in Cuba. He was certain we would issue counter-protest to Cuban protest and hoped this would end issue because consequences would not be our responsibility. Kuznetsov said he had nothing to add to previous Soviet position on overflights.

/1/A 23-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which lasted from 6 to 9:20 p.m. and was held at the Soviet Mission, is in USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, 1A October/November Meetings.

/2/Dated November 15, in which Castro also rejected any inspection of Cuban territory. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 459-460.

Reading originally from typewritten text, and frequently reiterating point throughout conversation, Kuznetsov took firm position that time had come to deal with entire settlement of Cuban problem, maintaining all remaining questions must be dealt with together and would then be more easily resolved.

Kuznetsov referred to Soviet-Cuban protocol/3/ previously given SYG, gave us copy and reviewed its general terms listing obligations mainly directed at US. He referred to suggestion for UN Caribbean presence as means verification these obligations as proposal from U Thant and stated Cuban Government was prepared to support UN presence in Caribbean including parts of US and Western Hemisphere with corresponding control of Cuban territory. Noting this was at present scheme only in principle, Kuznetsov maintained that its spelling out would not be difficult for U Thant to arrange on basis equal rights, obligations and verification.

/3/The proposed protocol was transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement.

Kuznetsov also suggested that Cuba should be brought into discussions inasmuch as they affected Cuba and dealt with obligations of three governments. He added he was "expressing Soviet opinion for US consideration, of course." Stevenson rejected proposal pointing out agreement was only between US and USSR.

Stevenson said we had studied Soviet protocol and found it "wholly unsatisfactory". We did not agree to idea of a protocol and had said on many occasions we were prepared to have mutual declarations in SC in accordance with correspondence.

Stevenson noted Kuznetsov had said nothing about most important question--withdrawal of IL-28's. Throughout rest of conversation he stressed that this was key issue which now needed to be resolved. Stevenson reiterated we were prepared to lift quarantine when Kuznetsov assured us IL-28's would be taken out within limited period of time. Kuznetsov said he had nothing to add on IL-28's.

In response to repeated Kuznetsov position that USSR had fulfilled its obligations and time had come for US to do something Stevenson said that we had made accommodations to Soviets on ship-side inspection and were prepared to lift quarantine when Soviets promised to take IL-28's out. When all offensive weapons were out and appropriate inspection arranged we would make declaration on invasion. We would also be prepared to recommend in OAS that LA states restore status quo prior October 22 by repealing resolution authorizing quarantine. This would mean all rights and obligations under Rio Pact would apply, including obligations with respect to attack of one state against another. Kuznetsov said USSR did not recognize OAS decisions and was not interested in being involved in how we obtain LA adherence to President's letter; if US stated it and LA's would not invade Cuba that would be in accord with spirit of President's letter.

Re UN presence in Caribbean to which Kuznetsov had referred, Stevenson said we were not aware of any proposal from SYG. We were unable therefore to comment on Kuznetsov's remarks. We would have to find out more and talk about it later. Kuznetsov took note of this reply and he said he would expect to hear from us further on this point.

Re on-site inspection in Cuba, Kuznetsov reiterated that USSR did not object but agreement of Government of Cuba was required.

Toward end of conversation Stevenson listed unfulfilled obligations as follows:

On part of USSR:

1. Removal of IL-28's;

2. Assurances all nuclear components, warheads and nuclear aerial bombs, had been removed; (it was in response to this that Kuznetsov made statement that "All nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba", adding that he hoped this would be sufficient to put an end to this question.)

3. Provision for on-site inspection in Cuba;

4. Assurances against reintroduction offensive weapons; (thereupon reiterated by Kuznetsov)

5. Soviet suggestions re safeguards on non-reintroduction weapons. (Stevenson subsequently made point that Kuznetsov's assurances re points 2 and 4 should be repeated in SC.)

On part of US:

1. Lifting of blockade;

2. Assurances against invasion;

3. Seeking cooperation of other LA states with respect to assurances against invasion.

Stevenson concluded with statement that US had assumed no other obligations either to USSR or to Cuba.

At conclusion of meeting Kuznetsov said that their draft protocol contained provisions which should be in any document but that he would appreciate our opinion on their protocol and other suggestions, adding that if all issues were dealt with simultaneously we could reach agreement on form and wording.

Stevenson said we would be glad to prepare and show them statement we would be willing make in SC re assurances against invasion Cuba when USSR had fulfilled its obligations; he hoped we would be able to do so tomorrow. Stressed however no final conclusion could be reached before IL-28's removed and verification of transaction worked out.

Stevenson also reiterated toward end of conversation that USSR should take careful note of our protest on Cuban threat to shoot at US planes.

Stevenson

184. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

/ Washington, November 16, 1962.

/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Status of the negotiations on removal of IL-28's

We have exchanged a series of messages with Moscow in recent days, and the sum and substance is as follows:

The Soviets say that they will take the IL-28's out, not now but at some later point, and the offer so far appears to be tied to a series of prior actions on our part: lifting of the blockade, registering assurances, etc. We have made it clear that this is quite unacceptable. Our view is that the first step must be a Soviet order to remove the IL-28's within a period of 30 days. We have said that when that order is given, we are willing to announce the lifting of the quarantine. We have given a tone of increasing urgency to our messages on this subject, and yesterday we informed Ambassador Dobrynin that this matter was reaching a turning point and that if progress cannot be made, we may soon find ourselves back in a position of increasing tension./1/

/1/Apparent reference to Document 181.

These exchanges with Moscow have included reiteration of our position on the present urgent need for surveillance, and they have produced on the Russian side support for UN observation posts in the Caribbean area, including the U.S. We have replied to this last proposal by indicating that any reciprocal inspection which included the U.S. should logically include appropriate ports of the Soviet Union.

We have strongly attacked the Soviet claim that its part of the bargain has been fulfilled. Our position is that the Soviets are in default on three points: 1) removal of the IL-28's; 2) on the spot verification of removal; and 3) adequate safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons.

The one piece of information not on the Washington-Moscow channel, which is some novelty, is the statement of Kuznetsov to Stevenson last night that he was instructed to report that "all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba."/2/

McGeorge Bundy/3/

/2/See Document 183.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

185. Summary Record of the 26th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 16, 1962, 11 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary.

Upon being informed that Castro's letter to the UN Acting Secretary General had been released to the press,/1/ the President authorized the immediate release of a statement covering our continuing aerial surveillance of Cuba. The President asked that any reply to Castro's letter be made by the OAS./2/

/1/See footnote 2, Document 183.

/2/A statement justifying surveillance and promising continuation of aircraft surveillance of Cuba was released by the Department of State through spokesman Joseph Reap at 12:23 p.m. on November 16.

The members read a summary of the current status of the negotiations on the removal from Cuba of the IL-28 bombers./3/

/3/Document 184.

The President asked how we would prove that strategic missiles would not be reintroduced into Cuba. Secretary Rusk said we could watch the Russian ships with big hatches and [1 line of source text not declassified] monitor the unloading of Russian ships. General Taylor said we should continue low-level reconnaissance. As to a Latin American nuclear-free zone, the President said Ambassador Stevenson had predicted that the UN would not accept this idea.

There was a discussion of the Soviet suggestion that the inspection of Cuba by the UN be matched by similar inspection of the U.S./4/ The point was made that inspection of Cuba and the U.S. cannot be equated. If inspection of the U.S. were to be allowed, we would have to insist on inspecting Russian ports from which the missile ships could sail. The question was asked whether we would be prepared to accept inspection of Guantanamo Base, of Cuban camps in the U.S. and of Puerto Rico.

/4/See Document 183.

Secretary Rusk said that the short-term problem of inspection of offensive missiles related only to Cuba. The long-term problem of inspecting to prevent the reintroduction of missiles might be done by a UN commission charged with maintaining peace in the Caribbean. This commission might look at all complaints that peace in the area was being disturbed. Thus, the commission would not be limited geographically to Cuba but could inspect in the U.S. and in Latin American countries.

The President said that it appeared the Soviets were offering inspection in Cuba in return for inspection in Florida. Mr. Bundy said we might discuss some reciprocal inspection which we would not be prepared to implement as long as Castro was in Cuba.

The Attorney General commented that aerial reconnaissance upsets both the Russians and Castro. He predicted that Castro would accept inspection.

The President repeated his view that we should not give a pledge not to invade Cuba until we have adequate assurances protecting us against the reintroduction of strategic missiles. He asked whether we could not insist that only Cuba be inspected.

The Attorney General said he did not think that we could sell to the American people an inspection of Florida. Any adequate inspection must include not only Cuba but also two or three Soviet ports.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we not try to spell out the geographical limitations of the inspection. The President responded that we would have to limit inspection to Florida in any proposal that we might consider.

Mr. McCone expressed his concern that the Soviet military base would remain in Cuba. He considered this a more important consideration than the IL-28 bombers. If we allow a continuing Soviet military presence in Cuba we must have an inspection system. The SAM sites could ensure that we could not use U-2s to tell us of any military buildup. Without the U-2s, the Russians could secretly build up their forces in the interior of Cuba.

Mr. McCloy expressed his view that the Soviet military presence in Cuba will die on the vine. With the missiles and the IL-28 bombers removed, the remainder of the Soviet forces would then be withdrawn. The best Russian equipment now in Cuba will gradually be withdrawn because it was put there to guard the strategic missiles.

Mr. McCone expressed a reservation by pointing out that the Russians may have decided to use Cuba as a staging area for subversion in Latin America.

The President said we had the alternative of making a realistic proposal or a proposal which we know in advance they would reject and therefore provide grounds for us to hold back on any assurance against invasion. He asked what effect the two courses of action would have on our worldwide policy toward the USSR.

Ambassador Thompson replied that Khrushchev must decide shortly which road to go down. He needs to get the Cuban problem buttoned down and go on to other problems in order to continue along the existing coexistence line.

Secretary Rusk argued that we should stay put on our present position of lifting the quarantine in return for getting the IL-28 bombers out of Cuba. He would hold off on proposals covering the long-term inspection problem. He pointed out that a UN presence in Cuba had been turned down, that the proposal to have the International Red Cross conduct the inspection had been turned down, that the UN proposal to name five Latin American Ambassadors as inspectors, and later any five Ambassadors as inspectors, had also been rejected. He said it was not necessary for us to keep on making new proposals. He opposed any Cuba/Florida inspection deal now. He urged that we stay where we are and felt that we should continue to support an arrangement based on reciprocity rather than on geography.

The President pointed out that our policy of not giving an invasion assurance until we have acceptable inspection arrangements puts Khrushchev under heavy pressure. Secretary Rusk replied that we should be in no hurry to work out long-range arrangements. Khrushchev knows we are not going to invade Cuba. We should keep the situation fluid in the event that the Soviets come to favor a coup in Cuba. In such event they would want assurances that we would not interfere with their staged coup.

The President said it would be all right to wait unless Khrushchev is blocked on negotiations on other problems and if he is not further pushed by the Communist Chinese.

Secretary Dillon doubted that our negotiations with the Russians over Cuba would affect the Russians' worldwide policy.

Mr. McCloy expressed Ambassador Stevenson's view of the current situation:

a. The negotiations in New York are deadlocked.

b. The Soviets can't deliver arrangements for on-site inspection because of Castro's opposition, and hence, we can't give assurances against invasion. We can give a conditional assurance if the Soviets continue to behave, i.e., take out the missiles, move to take out the IL-28 bombers, and assure us there are no nuclear warheads in Cuba.

c. There has been considerable talk about a nuclear-free zone, but if we choose to support this idea, we will have to go through the OAS and this will take a considerable amount of time.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the difficulty of formulating any statement about our not invading Cuba. If we put in the conditions which we must, the statement comes out sounding as if we were all ready to invade.

The President asked that a statement covering our policy toward invasion be prepared for his use at his Tuesday press conference./5/ If we have no agreement from the Russians, the statement would take one form. If the Russians have agreed in New York to our current position, Mr. McCloy could tell the Russians what the President was planning to say at his press conference, namely, we will invade Cuba only if it becomes a military threat to its neighbors or if civil war develops. The President said that we would understand privately that such a position would cover only the next two years. Reference should be made to the President's September 13th statement which said that pending arms verification arrangements in Cuba, we would continue our overflights unobtrusively.

/5/For text of the statement as made on Tuesday, November 20, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 461-462.

The President suggested that we give to Kuznetsov the evidence we have of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. He asked that the State Department spell out exactly what we would accept as verification of Soviet arms in Cuba.

Mr. McCloy said we scared the Russians off their insistence on a protocol containing our invasion assurances by telling them that a protocol would require Congressional approval.

The President said he did not want any protocol on the invasion guarantee but merely a statement of our position. He asked that by Tuesday there be a detailed response to accusations that Soviet missiles are being hidden in Cuban caves. He said Mr. McCloy should ask the Russians in New York what their intentions are concerning their continued military presence in Cuba. He also said we needed to be in a position to respond to a Brazilian proposal for an atom-free zone.

The President asked for an analysis of the Soviet-Chinese differences including an estimate of the effect of the split on Khrushchev's authority and on Communist parties worldwide.

Secretary McNamara requested authority for high-level flights but said he did not favor flying low-level missions. General Taylor reported that the Chiefs wanted to continue low-level missions. Secretary McNamara said the decision should be made on political grounds rather than military. The President decided to suspend low-level flights planned for tomorrow in the expectation that we might receive a reply from Khrushchev today. High-level flights were authorized.

Concluding a discussion on what we would do if a surveillance plane were shot at or destroyed, the President accepted Secretary McNamara's recommendation that we defer a decision on the proposed courses of action until we have further word from Khrushchev with respect to the negotiations in New York./6/

/6/McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, November 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 24-32a)

Bromley Smith/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

186. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Kennedy

JCSM-910-62

Washington, November 16, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Status of Readiness for the Cuban Operation (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are glad to report that our Armed Forces are in an optimum posture to execute CINCLANT OPLANS 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba)/1/ and 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba)./2/ We are not only ready to take any action you may order in Cuba, we are also in an excellent condition world-wide to counter any Soviet military response to such action. Our status of readiness includes:

/1/OPLAN 312-62 evolved during the summer and early fall of 1962 as the build up of air-power in Cuba became apparent. The plan entailed the use of 500 tactical fighter aircraft and carrier aircraft in a series of strikes against Cuban offensive weapons. Initial strikes would eliminate SAM sites and associated conventional AA defenses. These strikes would be followed by massive attacks on Cuban hostile aircraft and other offensive weapons including, after their presence was discovered and until they were withdrawn, MRBMs and IRBMs. Subsequent attacks would target troop concentrations, artillery, and armor. (Cuban Crisis, Operational Aspects, December 26, 1962; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, High-level Exchange)

/2/For a description of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, see footnote 1, Document 150.

a. SAC is maintaining 1/8 airborne alert and has implemented its force dispersal plan. An increased SIOP generation rate--1,456 aircraft and 355 missiles, including 80 Polaris missiles--is being maintained.

b. Continental Air Defense Command interceptor forces have occupied their wartime dispersal bases and are partially deployed at increased alert (about 1/3). Special defensive measures have been taken to protect the Southeast, with particular attention to Florida.

c. Air forces involved in CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 in daylight hours can respond for selective attack in graduated increments from two to twelve hours, according to the application of force desired.

d. Amphibious and assault forces are at a high state of readiness, providing a seven-day reaction capability for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 following the air strike (CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62), with accelerated introduction of follow-on forces.

e. All naval units are in a high state of readiness.

2. In response to your request, we have studied the need for augmentation of forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 and have concluded that while the forces originally included in the plan are probably adequate, it would be prudent to earmark additional forces as a ready reserve for the operation. Accordingly, we are planning to earmark the 5th Infantry Division, at approximately 20,000 strength including supporting forces, and a combat command (strength 6,800) of the 2nd Armored Division for possible commitment as reserve forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62; but these units will not be moved from home stations until S-day for OPLAN 312-62. Utilization of the increased Army and Marine forces will require an additional 16 transports, 68 cargo ships, and 11 LSTs. The LSTs and 15 transports would come from the Reserve Fleet, would require approximately 45 days to activate and assemble on the east coast, and would cost an estimated $28 million. For the total shipping requirements of the augmented Plan, chartering, requisitioning, and prepositioning of 60 cargo ships must be accomplished well in advance of execution of the Plan. The chartering/requisitioning of the remaining 105 cargo ships would require at least 30 days. The 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade), at approximately 9,000 strength, has transited the Panama Canal, is in the Caribbean and has been added to the assault force.

3. The advanced alert levels, if maintained for a protracted period, can reduce the over-all capability of the force because of maintenance and training short-falls. The current status of alert can be maintained for about 30 more days without adverse effect. After that time we could maintain the following reaction capability:

a. With forces in present posture (Defense Condition 3)

(1) OPLAN 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba)--12 hours

(2) OPLAN 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba)--7 days

b. With forces largely returned to home bases (Defense Condition 5)

(1) OPLAN 312-62--2 days

(2) OPLAN 316-62/3/--10 to 12 days

/3/"5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its organic shipping excepted." [Footnote in the source text.]

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend staying in the present posture for the immediate future.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

187. Paper Prepared for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) for a Meeting With President Kennedy

Washington, November 16, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

CHAIRMAN'S TALKING PAPER FOR MEETING WITH THEPRESIDENT

1. The Chiefs appreciate the opportunity to discuss some aspects of the current negotiations bearing on the IL-28's and other matters related

to Cuba. To lead-off, they would like to express their unqualified support for the insistence of our government upon the withdrawal of the IL-28's. While these aircraft are of less military significance than the IRBM's and MRBM's which have withdrawn, their continued presence in Cuba would present a long-term threat to the continental United States, would consequently require a higher level of air defense of our southeastern states and would give deep concern to many parts of Latin America. These factors added to the public statements of our Government on the need for their withdrawal convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the IL-28's must go.

2. The Chiefs are aware of the offer to exchange a lifting of the quarantine for Khrushchev's removal of the IL-28's and will regret the possible loss of this useful naval tool if the offer is accepted. If the Soviets decline the offer, the quarantine will provide an immediate means to apply pressure both on Khrushchev and on Castro not only to remove the IL-28's but also to obtain other ends such as the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and the acceptance of an inspection system. After appropriate warning to Khrushchev of our intentions, the Chiefs would favor a general extension of the quarantine to include a complete blockade of POL products. Concurrently, we should continue air surveillance and withhold any assurance against the invasion of Cuba. If the expanded quarantine did not succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of the IL-28s, we should be prepared to take them out by air attack.

3. Even if the IL-28's are negotiated out of Cuba, there will remain weapons systems of significant military importance; the MIG's, the SAM's, the air defense control system, and the large stocks of modern Army equipment which we have seen in our recent photography. The air defense weapons will be a constant threat to our surveillance of Cuba while the Army weapons may be used against Guantanamo or against any invasion attempt. But more important than this equipment are the thousands of Soviet military personnel who remain in Cuba to man it. The Soviet presence in Cuba poses a particularly sensitive problem to the United States. When the extent of this presence is known and the weapons systems remaining in Soviet hands are thoroughly appreciated, it will be clear to the Western Hemisphere that it has indeed been invaded and remains invaded by the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, we may anticipate a loud popular demand in the United States and in Latin America for the removal of the Soviet personnel and neutralization of their weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the United States should generate now all the pressure possible to get the Soviet personnel out, feeling that their eviction is far more important than that of the equipment.

4. The Chiefs are very much interested in the terms in which any assurance to Castro may eventually be couched, feeling that it would be damaging to our national interest and to the sense of security of our Latin American allies to create the impression of underwriting Castro for an indefinite period without careful qualification. If it is considered necessary to give Castro any assurance, the Chiefs feel that it should be tied to Khrushchev's proposal in his 26 October letter to withdraw Soviet forces from Cuba, and to cease giving military aid to Castro. Also the assurance should be given without affecting our commitments under the Rio Pact and should be linked to concurrent good behavior on the part of Castro and to acceptance by the Castro government of continued air surveillance.

5. The Chiefs recognize both the importance and the difficulty of obtaining an adequate verification system in Cuba. While sympathetic with their purpose, the Chiefs do not like two of the current proposals for inspection and verification. The first is the proposal from Ambassador Stevenson for a UN inspection system of the Caribbean or Central America. The Chiefs do not favor it because of its reciprocal features, its doubtful effectiveness and the danger of having it regarded as a substitute for effective aerial surveillance. The second is the Brazilian suggestion for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America. Apart from objections to the precedent of supporting such a proposal for any part of the world, and the divided opinion among our allies on this subject, we do not see any way to obtain from the proposal a satisfactory verification system for Cuba. Consequently, we would advise against supporting it.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend at this juncture:

a. That the IL-28's be removed from Cuba, preferably by negotiation--otherwise by blockade followed, if need be, by military action.

b. That the removal of Soviet personnel from Cuba be made an immediate objective of negotiations with the USSR.

c. That any assurance to Castro be hedged by conditions protecting our obligations under the Rio Pact and linking the duration of the assurance to good behavior by Castro and the acceptance of air surveillance.

d. That in seeking a means of long-term verification and inspection, which we consider essential, we oppose the proposals for a reciprocal UN inspection of the Caribbean and for a nuclear free zone in Latin America.

188. Memorandum of a Conference With President Kennedy

Washington, November 16, 1962, 4 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, JCS Meetings with the President, 10/61-11/62. Secret. The meeting lasted until 4:55 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

OTHERS PRESENT

General Taylor

General Wheeler

Admiral Anderson

General LeMay

General Shoup

General Clifton

The meeting opened by General Taylor presenting three papers to the President in response to some of the President's inquiries. One paper concerned the level of readiness that we have achieved and the ability to hold this level./1/ All the Chiefs reported that they could maintain this readiness without any hardship for another month, and so recommended.

/1/The paper on the issue of level of readiness is Document 186; the other papers have not been further identified.

General Taylor and General LeMay reported that they had altered the SAC readiness so that each crew is getting one training sortie per week. They said that this was satisfactory for the moment.

General Taylor then led an additional discussion on plans and their modification, if necessary./2/

/2/See Document 187.

The President asked several questions about leave and rest policies for men away from home, and the Air Force reserves that had been called up recently.

There was considerable discussion about Soviet ground forces in Cuba.

There was a lengthy discussion of shipping and LSTs, and the President approved a recommendation that they get the LSTs out and maintain them.

Admiral Anderson reported on a meeting between the head of MSTS and shipowners and labor unions.

General Taylor summarized the views of the Joint Chiefs on the present situation, and each Chief in turn spoke about his particular zone of interest. General Wheeler showed pictures and gave a considerable discussion.

The President read to the Chiefs the letter from Chairman Khrushchev and the President's reply which went out this morning./3/ He gave the Chiefs a resume of his present feeling and disposition in regard to this situation.

The President thanked the Chiefs for coming to the meeting.

C.V. Clifton/4/

/3/Documents 176 and 181.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

189. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Former President Eisenhower

November 17, 1962, 9 to 10:10 a.m.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone, who was present at the meeting. The meeting was held at McCone's residence.

The meeting was arranged as a result of a decision reached between K and E at Mrs. Roosevelt's funeral, that they should meet at an early date and the meeting should be with me present, but under circumstances in which there would be no Press or public recognition that the meeting had taken place./1/

/1/Kennedy and Eisenhower were attending the inauguration of Dulles Airport. This meeting apparently took place there, but it is not included in Kennedy's Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)

President explained to E the present status of the Cuban situation and the problems attendant to the removal of the IL 28s, the inspection to verify that all offensive missiles had gone, and inspection arrangements against reintroduction. Kennedy reviewed all of the various proposals that had been made, each one of which had been rejected by Castro, and concluded, stating that as matters stood at the present time, we would have to depend for the immediate future on aerial surveillance.

The President throughout the conversation expressed the thought that while it was possible there was some deception in connection with the 42 missiles removed, the probability was strong that this number were actually removed, that having had to withdraw it would be probably most unlikely that the Soviets would make a further attempt to introduce offensive missiles. There was general agreement on this point. General Eisenhower raised the question of deception and the possibility, however remote, that what we looked at were sections of large diameter pipe and that the missiles were actually retained. McCone made the point that the examination of the photography gave reasonable assurance that what we were looking at was missiles and furthermore there were accompanying the shipments of missiles, which were stored on deck, large quantities of clearly identifiable related equipment as well as personnel and hence it was reasonable to conclude that missiles had actually been taken away.

The conversation then turned to the rumors and reports which were disturbing to the American public of missiles being hidden in caves, etc. McCone stated that these reports were bound to remain because in addition to the offensive missiles there were four other types of missiles, and these did remain in Cuba and they would be seen from time to time and therefore we would always be confronted with the problem of "missiles in Cuba".

It was Eisenhower's very strong recommendation that the President at an early opportunity make a very positive statement that we were taking actions which would guarantee insofar as possible our knowledge of what was going on in Cuba and that he was going to insist that these actions, which included aerial surveillance, be continued and that he can give the American public some confidence in assurances that their security was not being endangered by clandestine Soviet activities. The President responded that he intended to make such a statement on Tuesday./2/ It was agreed that this statement should reflect initiative on the part of the President and the Administration.

/2/On Tuesday, November 20, Kennedy read a statement at his press conference announcing the lifting of the blockade. In that statement, he said that as Cuba had not permitted U.N. verification and there were no safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons, "this Government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830-838)

[Here follows discussion of Berlin and reorganization of the National Security Council.]

The meeting was cordial and constructive. Both President Kennedy and General Eisenhower expressed their appreciation to me and their desire to continue communication one with the other in about the same form and in the manner of this meeting.

John A. McCone/3/

Director

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Add 11/19/62:

During the conversation General Eisenhower stated with some emphasis that he did not believe that our actions in Cuba would necessarily cause the Soviets to react in a retaliatory manner in some other tense location: Eisenhower presented many examples. He pointed out for instance that many Soviet experts predicted that his initiative in Lebanon would be met by Soviet actions in Berlin or elsewhere, however the reverse was true. The same situation developed elsewhere. Eisenhower therefore urged the President not to permit his course of action in Cuba to be dictated by fear of Soviet action elsewhere or an attempt to appraise in advance the type of actions Soviets might take elsewhere. Note: This point appealed to me as being particularly significant because it is the direct opposite of the advice that the President has been given by Ambassador Thompson and others who are presumably Soviet experts.

JAM/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

190. Summary Record of the 26th-A Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 17, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting, which took place in Secretary Rusk's conference room in the Department of State, lasted until 4:08, although Rusk continued to meet with Cleveland, Bundy, Johnson, and Ball for the rest of the afternoon until 5:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

President and Vice President absent

Others attending: Rusk, Thompson, A. Johnson, Cleveland, Bundy, Murrow, Nitze, Taylor, McNamara, Gilpatric, Dillon, McCone

1. The members revised and recommended to the President a press statement to be made Tuesday/1/ in the event the Russians have agreed to withdraw the IL-28 bombers within the next 3-4 weeks.

/1/November 20; see footnote 2, Document 189.

2. The members discussed and revised a draft letter and declaration (USUN 1835)/2/ but decided not to send it to Kuznetsov now or to authorize McCloy to inform Kuznetsov tomorrow of its contents. A decision as to when to give the Russians the letter is to be made Monday.

/2/Dated November 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1662) See the Supplement.

3. Secretary Rusk will inform McCloy that in his talk with Kuznetsov tomorrow he is to stay within the limits of our last two letters to Khrushchev and not discuss a package proposal. McCloy may discuss the situation which will exist Tuesday if we have not received a favorable decision on the IL-28 bombers before the President makes a statement to the American people on the Cuban crisis./3/

/3/Rusk did so in a November 17 letter to McCloy. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1762) See the Supplement.

4. There was a prolonged discussion as to whether low-level reconnaissance flights should be made tomorrow and Monday. Secretary Rusk will recommend to the President that no low-level flights should be made tomorrow and a decision can be made later as to Monday's low-level flights./4/ Among the factors discussed were:

/4/McCone prepared a brief memorandum of this meeting in which he noted that McNamara was opposed to low-level reconnaissance, stating that "there were no targets which demanded immediate surveillance and he preferred to depend on high-level flying." McCone noted that he, Bundy, and Thompson advocated high-level flights, but the decision was made not to fly on Sunday, November 18. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, November 19; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962)

a. There is no military requirement for low-level flights on Sunday and Monday.

b. If a plane is shot down, we must react.

c. If many more days go by without low-level flights, the Cubans and others might think that the Cuban threat to shoot down our reconnaissance planes has scared us away from further missions.

d. The effect of reconnaissance missions on the IL-28 negotiations--some believe this keeps pressure on; others believe we should tell the Russians we are not flying low-level missions in order to avoid complicating the IL-28 decision.

e. Missions could be flown over heavily fortified areas with some risk of being shot down by Cuban antiaircraft fire or could be flown over rural areas where risk of hostile Cuban action would be very low but the Cubans and the Soviets would know we were flying low-level missions.

5. State Department circulated a paper for later consideration on Caribbean security arrangements./5/

/5/Not found.

Bromley Smith/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

191. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 19, 1962, 1 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 2:32 a.m. Passed to the White House at 2:44 a.m.

1856. Department pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba--meeting between McCloy and Kuznetsov, Sunday, November 18, 1962.

Arrived at Soviet residence, old George Pratt Estate at Locust Valley, accompanied by Mrs. McCloy and son. Met by Kuznetsov, Zorin, Mrs. Zorin, Mendelevich, Morozov and translator Zherebtsov. Played Russian billiards and then had lunch. After lunch in presence of Kuznetsov, Zorin, Mendelevich and translator we had coffee and talk, which was conducted entirely in English.

Kuznetsov said he thought we were stalling in our negotiations; that they felt they had done all that could be expected of them and we had done very little to bring about rapid solution of Cuban problem. Then Kuznetsov said he would like to ask McCloy his impression of where we stood. McCloy said that he was glad to have opportunity to tell Kuznetsov just where he thought we stood.

In first place, we were getting nowhere by constant repetition on their part that they had done everything and we had done nothing. This simply not case and reiteration merely interfered with progress. It was necessary state what we had done.

In spite of assurances we had received directly from highest levels of Soviet Government no offensive weapons in Cuba and more specifically no weapons there capable of reaching targets in U.S. Soviet nuclear weapons had been secretly introduced into Cuba at same time we were receiving these assurances. Yet President, who was shocked by this revelation, did not thereupon take direct action against these weapons as we had full capacity to do. Instead President, although misled by these assurances, determined upon action which gave both sides time to work matter out. This was first important thing that we had done. This was done in spite of continuation of Mr. Zorin's false position in UN.

Next, we had advised Kuznetsov that on temporary basis and in order to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships we had worked out hail and pass arrangement in connection with quarantine on Soviet assurance that no more weapons were being introduced into Cuba from Soviet Union. President had done this to relieve tensions and we were glad to note that Soviet Premier had responded in kind by prompt action in taking out 42 missiles which Soviets stated they had introduced into Cuba, as well as providing for reasonable means checkout at sea.

Next, President, in spite of fact that Soviet Premier had committed himself to removal of jet bombers as weapons that we considered offensive, offered to raise quarantine on assurance from Soviet Premier that orders had been given to remove bombers within limited period. This major concession on part of President as he had stated and it had been agreed in the October 27-28 exchange that quarantine would not be lifted and assurance against invasion given until there had been UN verification on ground of removal of weapons and adequate assurance against their reintroduction. Soviet Premier had stated that weapons were to be removed under UN observation but no steps leading to this observation had been accomplished due large part to obduracy of Cuban Government. Although we felt Soviet Union in position to compel Cuba to permit such observation we aware irresponsibility of Castro and have sincerely attempted to cooperate with Soviet Union pending such time as verification worked out. This problem related to Soviet commitment to provide adequate arrangements to guard against reintroduction of weapons. We aware this not easy problem but must be solved and does no good to pretend that problem does not exist or that one can act as if prior conditions had already been fulfilled. They have not been.

Removal of bombers cannot be indefinitely postponed based on accomplishment of some vague future event. Offer to lift quarantine very difficult step for President to take inasmuch as he had announced to nation that lifting of quarantine was dependent upon UN observation and upon receipt of adequate assurance against reintroduction of weapons. In other words, President was prepared to waive one of preconditions even though public opinion throughout US demanding that no relief from quarantine be given until all conditions met. President had taken this action largely in response to Soviet Premier's prompt and effective action largely in regard to missiles. This action shows we are neither trying to starve out Cubans nor to be unresponsive to any constructive action taken by Soviet Union. If this offer does not result in removal of bombers President will have no choice but to reimpose quarantine in fully effective form. Effort to relate removal of bombers to some final conclusions regarding verification and arrangements for guaranteeing against reintroduction is no more appropriate than it would have been to delay removal of missiles. McCloy suggested though he could not commit his government it might be possible to work arrangements out for checking out bombers without stopping Soviet ships as had been arrangement with missiles. McCloy then stated that President was going to have a press conference this Tuesday;/1/ that he had postponed it in the interest of giving Soviets ample opportunity to respond to his request regarding IL-28's but on Tuesday he will have to say something about bombers. President will be placed in very difficult position if not able to say that Soviets have agreed to get bombers out without further conditions. If he cannot do this it will put in question whether in fact we have an agreement with Soviet Union in regard to removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

/1/See footnote 2, Document 189.

McCloy next referred to assurances that we were prepared to give in regard to invasion. First, he made it clear we were not going to have anything to do with so-called document for which Zorin had been pressing,/2/ presenting as it does a lot of things never mentioned or covered in letters of October 27-28 and including in very thinly disguised form conditions Castro has insisted upon before he will cooperate in any way with settlement of issue which he did so much to create. We will not sign any document embodying these or any other such conditions. We prepared to give our solemn declaration in UN based upon Soviet declaration and fulfillment of conditions precedented that have so often been specifically stated. Cubans can make any declarations they see fit in UN or elsewhere but we will not be a party to them. Castro has defied Soviet Union, US and UN and any proposal to conform to his wishes in return for this defiance is out of the question. Certainly it is nothing with which US can be associated.

/2/The text of this document was transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement.

US prepared, assuming we can dispose of the IL-28 matter, to sit down with Soviet representatives and attempt to draw our respective declarations in UN. We will do all we can to hasten and record them. US declaration will be very simple. It will be not to invade, assuming fulfillment of conditions and we will be prepared to recommend to or use our good offices in connection with other Western Hemisphere countries to take same position as we do assuming Cuba does not institute aggression against them. We should not have much trouble in dealing with wording of declaration but are only wasting time in talking about any such document as has been presented to US by Kuznetsov. McCloy also referred to fact that any suggestion of document with two or three signatories appended to it such as was suggested by Soviet Union would take on character of treaty which might well require consent of two-thirds of Senate and it might be years before such consent could be obtained. Moreover, in McCloy's judgment would never be recommended to Senate by President. Way to proceed is to get IL-28 issue settled and they would find US quick to give our best thought to next steps to wind up whole transaction.

There was no doubt that we have problem in connection with verification and reintroduction but suggestion that in order to obtain Castro's consent we should have reciprocal UN observation in US as well as in Cuba is something entirely new and never contemplated by October 27-28 exchange. We should not attempt to appease Castro in this form. No inspection of US would be reciprocal without inspection also of Soviet Union.

At this point McCloy said that one of reasons that caused US to look carefully at assurances regarding reintroduction of weapons into Cuba was full development now of our information in regard to extent of Soviet military presence in Cuba. We were not introducing any new conditions but we were pointing out that military presence there so far transcended any technician status that we had to be cautious about this matter of reintroduction. We had confirmed presence of Soviet combat command and presence of number of fully manned Soviet combat teams organized in precisely same manner as army units in Soviet Union. We have identified units and at proper time we would be prepared to give evidence of this military command before UN or elsewhere. We were convinced that introduction of these units and formation of this command was component of whole attempt to change nuclear balance by introduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba. They bore no relation to the defense of Cuba as such but were part of defense of Soviet missile batteries that have been installed in Cuba.

There could be no hope of "normalization" of conditions in Caribbean as long as these units were there in this form and quantity. As long as they were there possibility of another surreptitious reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba which these units would again be in position to defend, exists. Soviet Union must therefore understand our caution in regard to assurance against reintroduction of these weapons and giving of our own assurance against invasion. McCloy emphasized we were not introducing any new conditions but were simply pointing out emphasis which we had to place on presence of these units and their relation to matter of reintroduction of nuclear weapons.

We are quite as anxious as Soviet Union to wind up this transaction for there are number of things we ought to be discussing in order to keep this situation from arising again. Today it is Cuba and combination of this bearded figure who is dictator in Cuba and certain miscalculation on part of Soviet Union that almost brought us to war. Tomorrow it may be something else. In this connection McCloy said he was concerned about Chinese-Indian war. This seemed to be reaching very substantial proportions. It could easily develop into something that would cause both of us trouble in future and he wondered what thinking of Soviet Union was in regard to this. It may not be too soon for us to exchange some thoughts about it so that we would not have to act hastily and without careful prior thought if we were faced with some development there that again challenged peace of the world. Did Kuznetsov have any thoughts about China and how this war could be kept from becoming new threat to peace?

To this Kuznetsov responded that this situation caused them some concern. That was problem that troubled them and perhaps at some time some discussion could be undertaken about it. Said that this was his view but he could not speak for his government at this point. He added, however, that it was situations such as this that pointed to necessity for concluding Cuban affair promptly so that other matters and problems of concern to us both could be faced with benefit of successful solution of Cuban problem behind us.

Kuznetsov then repeated position of Soviet Union; namely, that they were prepared to consider removal of IL-28's but that this must be done in connection with solution of other problems relating to Cuba. They would like to have removal coincide with final solution. He repeated that they had impression that we were merely putting up one obstacle after another and if IL-28 matter were solved we would have another precondition. At this point he said that we should undertake at time IL-28's were removed to stop our overflights.

McCloy said he was disappointed Soviets were still attempting to postpone dealing with bombers until all problems connected with verification and reintroduction were settled. This would take some time and we would have to have some consultation with other countries in this hemisphere before we could give all assurances against invasion that Soviet Union was seeking. McCloy again referred to need for clearing up this matter before President's Tuesday press conference. Though it was clear that Kuznetsov had no authority to accept proposal in regard to IL-28's which had been offered, he did ask McCloy to repeat just what offer consisted of, which was done.

Kuznetsov came back to U Thant's proposal for reciprocal UN observation and each time he did McCloy said he found great difficulties with it and stressed necessity if there was to be UN observation in US there had also to be reciprocity UN observation in Soviet Union.

Kuznetsov said in regard to assurance against reintroduction he did not know what Soviet Union could do except to solemnly declare it was not going to reintroduce weapons and asked what other guarantees we had in mind.

Kuznetsov also said he wanted to repeat at this time that he was now authorized to say that no nuclear weapons whatsoever were any longer on territory of Cuba. Please, he said, do not complicate situation by insisting upon interminable inspection on ground. It would be impossible to go all over Cuba turning over every stone, looking into every cave and into every bathroom to determine whether nuclear weapons still existed there. They were going to reaffirm that all nuclear weapons had been removed and that they were not going to reintroduce them.

McCloy said he wanted to have it clear that we were not in any way contemplating stopping of overflights in Cuba unless and until we were sure that there was not going to be any reintroduction of these weapons. We are doing utmost to keep overflights to minimum but in absence of any adequate verification this was only thing we could do and he repeated that overflights had probably saved us from war and they might do so again. McCloy made it clear that we would return fire if our planes were shot at; that we were going to do as we had been doing in past, i.e., keep overflights to minimum necessary to protect ourselves and hemisphere.

Kuznetsov was cordial throughout. Zorin was as difficult as ever. At end Kuznetsov said that he was glad to have had this frank discussion of our position; that he was troubled about our position in regard to verification and assurances against reintroduction as he could see how discussions in regard to these might go on interminably with our putting up obstacles to giving our assurance against invasion.

We left with no understanding in regard to future meeting and with no indication from Kuznetsov that they would give way in regard to IL-28's other than to say that they would consider removal of IL-28's in connection with solution of verification and reintroduction problems.

McCloy asked Kuznetsov if he had any word about Mikoyan. Kuznetsov said he still had no definite word as to when he was coming back.

Stevenson

192. Summary Record of the 27th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 19, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 10:55 a.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A.

Director McCone summarized the week-end intelligence/1/ and commented on orders issued to Cuban anti-aircraft units to fire on reconnaissance planes.

/1/Based in part on CIA Memorandum [document number not declassified], November 19; "The Crisis, USSR/Cuba: Information as of 0600 19 November 1962." (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba) See the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk reported on yesterday's McCloy/Kuznetsov talk (attached is copy of USUN message 1856)./2/ He said the Russians in New York consider the IL-28's to be part of the deal, but we have received no word yet from Khrushchev.

/2/Document 191.

Secretary Rusk initiated a general discussion of the need for overflights and the effect of such flights on the Cubans and the Russians. Secretary McNamara commented that the overflight problem is primarily a political one. General Taylor recommended that there be six low-level sorties, some over the harbor of Mantanzas in order to watch incoming Soviet ships. The planes would be over Cuba less than eight minutes and would fly at tree-top level.

The President said the decision on flying low-level today is political. Our intelligence on the orders to the Cubans to fire on U.S. reconnaissance planes is hard. By not going today do we increase the chance of a settlement or if one of our planes is fired on, and we retaliate, would that increase our chances of settlement?

Mr. McCloy recommended against low-level flights today. Secretary Rusk, however, was concerned by the effect on the OAS and on NATO if it becomes public knowledge that the U.S. has flown no low-level mission since Castro threatened to shoot down our reconnaissance planes.

The President decided that no low-level flights would be flown today. High-level missions were authorized. On Wednesday/3/ we should plan to fly low-level. He asked that we examine, possibly next week, those military actions to be taken in retaliation for a shootdown.

/3/November 21.

General Taylor said existing plans call for an armed air reconnaissance and then an attack on the offending anti-aircraft site. Secretary McNamara noted that our plans call for two hours' advance notice before we attack Cuban territory.

The President made a comment, which was not clear, about photographs taken of our airfields by U.S. reconnaissance planes.

The President asked what was the impact on Khrushchev of the Indo-Chinese fighting.

Ambassador Thompson, reverting to an earlier question, said we should keep the way open to a coexistence line. The imposition of the quarantine would be very hard for the Russians to take. Therefore, we should act against the Cubans in Cuba. Mr. Bundy noted that we have given Khrushchev every escape hatch for the IL-28 bombers. If he does not now give in and remove them, there will be another serious Soviet miscalculation.

Mr. Nitze commented that the Russians wanted us to attack the Cuban anti-aircraft sites.

The President commented that we are heading down the road to a choice. Either the IL-28s will come out and we will continue to fly high-level missions, or if the Russians refuse to withdraw the bombers, we are heading for a new showdown on Thursday or Friday./4/ We will wait today on the low-level flights and we will fly only when we believe it necessary for intelligence reasons, not as harassment.

/4/November 22 and 23.

Mr. Bundy said the scenario called for no action until tomorrow when, if we received no answer, we would seek to obtain OAS support for our demand that the IL-28 bombers be withdrawn. The next move would involve military pressure.

Under Secretary Ball commented on his recent briefing of the NATO Council in Paris./5/ He said he was surprised at the unanimous reaction that we had let the Russians off too easily and had not demanded the elimination of the Soviet base in Cuba. He said our European allies would support us in finishing the job and that there would be no objection to putting pressure on the Russians again via a blockade.

/5/A report of Ball's briefing is in Polto 577 from Paris, November 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-2062) See the Supplement.

The President said he was not sure that a quarantine is the right response to the shooting down of a plan or the refusal to pull out the IL-28 bombers. How can Khrushchev submit a second time? Secretary Dillon responded that Khrushchev could take the quarantine more easily than a U.S. attack on Cuba. Mr. Nitze said that under Communist doctrine a Communist state can back down in the face of the superior position of an enemy. Mr. Bundy pointed out that we would be acting not against the Soviets by hitting Cuba.

The President was given a paper on proposed actions in the OAS involving conversations in advance with OAS powers with respect to our air surveillance./6/ Secretary Rusk said primarily we would be reporting our actions to the OAS. Secretary Dillon felt that inspection covering the IL-28 bombers should be an arrangement with the OAS rather than the UN.

/6/Not found.

The President said in the UN we could stress verification and in the OAS we could concentrate on the demand that the Russians withdraw the IL-28 bombers which are dangerous to other Latin American states.

In summarizing the present situation, the President said we now have no inspection and no safeguards on the reintroduction of offensive weapons. Castro has rejected UN inspection and now he has concentrated his opposition on arrangements for national inspection. He asked that a statement be prepared for his use on the assumption that we have no Russian response to our IL-28 bomber withdrawal demand. We should emphasize Castro's rejection of ground inspection, thus requiring the continuance of air surveillance. We should seek to get the OAS to re-enforce our right to continue air surveillance.

Mr. Murrow commented that the Latin Americans are of the view that we are not doing enough against Castro.

The President requested that later in the day he be given a paper containing recommended courses of political and military actions which may have to be taken this week if we have no reply on the IL-28 bombers. This would include a recommendation as to what we would do if Khrushchev offers to take out the IL-28 bombers if our air surveillance ends./7/

/7/A draft contingency paper containing as Part IV, "Action in the Event Khrushchev Agrees to Withdraw IL-28's" was prepared on November 19. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62)

(At a meeting in the Cabinet Room at 6:00 PM on November 19 without the President or the Vice President,/8/ the group discussed a contingency plan which had been prepared by the State Department./9/)

/8/McCone prepared a record of the meeting held at 6 p.m. on November 19, in which the contingency plan cited in footnote 7 was revised, a message from Kennedy to Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan was revised and approved, and it was decided that the OAS meeting should be "informative" and that a resolution should not be submitted. (Memorandum by McCone, November 20; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B1285A, DCI Meetings with President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) See the Supplement. The approved messages to Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. See the Supplement.

/9/A revised contingency plan, November 20, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. See the Supplement.

Bromley Smith/10/

/10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

193. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)

November 19, 1962, 2:45 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. Ball was in Washington; McCloy in New York.

Ball told McCloy the general conclusion was that until tomorrow afternoon the President has to be in a position to say something in the way of a fairly full report to the American people. If he is not able to say the IL-28s have been promised by that time, that obviously this going to make the pressure increased for some kind of drastic action. Ball thought it just as well if the friends up there knew that. What we are doing, for McCloy's information--not to tell them--is we are going to get our telegrams this afternoon to bring both the NATO and OAS countries up to date on this situation and to tell them the thing may get considerably heated up to the point where there may be substantial action as a result of Cuban interference with our reconnaissance on the one hand or a continued refusal of the SU to come to grips with the IL-28 thing would be the reimposition of the quarantine perhaps on an extended basis. We are putting the governments on notice so that they can't say that they are not consulted and also with the idea that if anything leaks out of the European capitals. We are not going to fly low level again before Wednesday.

Gilpatric said we were preparing for armed reconnaissance on Wednesday and following because we have now been clearly warned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that we will draw some fire and we will be prepared in one way or another to return the fire. This will be at the low-level flights so that we won't counter any fire but go on tomorrow at high level. Our story is we are continuing reconnaissance, high and low level, as required. We would try, pending resumption of low level, not to be put in any public position of having stood down the low level in response to the threats from Castro, although in fact Bob feels strongly we ought to wait until after the President's statement tomorrow before we put ourselves in a position where we may have to return fire.

McCloy told Gilpatric that if he ran into these people he would indicate that we have to take more drastic action than we have taken in the past. Should he seek that out? Ball suggested that he simply say the President is going to have to make a statement to the American people. He hasn't made any kind of comprehensive statement for some time because he wanted to keep things as quiet as possible; but out of obligation to the public opinion, he has to say something. He has set a press conference tomorrow afternoon/1/ where he will have to say there has been no indication of movement on the IL-28s, if there has been no progress on this. The result of this could very well be to increase American pressure for some kind of strong action.

/1/See footnote 7, Document 196.

McCloy said he had gone over that three or four times yesterday and he feels he has put them on enough notice in this regard. Unless he should bump into them he would be inclined to think it would be weakness to call them. If he should want another talk this afternoon McCloy will say that again. Ball and Gilpatric agreed.

McCloy said regarding the President's statement, this has to be worked on. Ball reported Sorensen and Johnson and Nitze were now working on that in another group. McCloy said they had been playing around on something up there. They may send their ideas down on this, to be put in the hopper.

194. Editorial Note

On the afternoon of November 19, 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with Georgi Bolshakov, ostensibly Press Attache of the Soviet Union but reputedly one of the leading KGB officials in Washington and a direct link to Chairman Khrushchev. The Attorney General warned Bolshakov that unless the Soviet Union withdrew its IL-28 bombers from Cuba, the United States was prepared to resume low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy insisted, required an answer before his press conference on November 20 at 6 p.m. (Memorandum by Robert Kennedy, November 30; Kennedy Library, Robert Kennedy Papers as cited in Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, page 550)

With the exception of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who had access for his biography, the Robert Kennedy Papers are not open to Department of State historians or any other researchers.

195. Memorandum of Conversation Between Alexander Fomin of the Soviet Embassy and John Scali of the American Broadcasting Corporation

Washington, November 20, 1962, 1:15-2:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Confidential. Drafted and typed by Scali at 3:40 p.m., November 20. According to a typed note on this memorandum, Fomin requested this meeting on November 16. The two men met at Aldo's Restaurant in Washington.

In long give and take, mainly on Cuba, Fomin made these main points:

1. Soviets are willing to allow the same kind of verification for exit of bombers as they allow for home shipment of missiles./1/

/1/The following handwritten sentence appears in parentheses at this point. "Check by US planes of Soviet ships taking bombers home."

2. Further on-the-spot inspection depends on U.S. negotiations with Cubans, not with negotiations with Soviets, because Cuban "sovereignty" is involved now.

3. Soviets are willing to send technicians connected with IL-28s home. He claimed all technicians connected with missiles already have gone home. He professed to be ignorant of continuing stay of any missile technicians, particularly those whose past role has been to guard missile installations.

4. Kennedy, he said, will lift the blockade today (Tuesday) and is now drafting text of non-aggression pledge he promised to make. "This will solve the Cuban problem."

5. Khrushchev has carried out all his undertakings with the President and is anxious for further progress in detente. He repeatedly asked what was next in President's priority, specifically returning to nuclear test agreement and non-aggression pact between Warsaw and Atlantic pact powers.

6. He implied repeatedly "progress could be made" in nuclear test agreement with compromise between number of on-site inspections suggested by West, which he put at 12, and number proposed by Soviets which he said was 3.

7. Nothing now seems to stand in way, he said, of Warsaw pact-Atlantic pact non-aggression treaty. Russia's ready, if only Kennedy is.

9. [sic] He brought up what he said was Russia's 1956 proposal for creating 800 mile aerial surveillance zone on both sides as step toward disarmament. Would U.S. be interested in this now, he asked, even though idea was rejected by "Dulles administration." I replied that if I remembered correctly zone proposed at that time was pretty lopsided in favor of Soviet Union. He replied this whole area could be discussed again, perhaps with better results.

10. Russia wants to concentrate on building up its economy and thus is in great need for prolonged period of peace. But there must be reasonable concessions on both sides, not on just Soviet side.

11. Soviets are being "neutral" in Chinese-Indian war. Russia is unhappy about this but at the present time can't do anything to stop it because the Chinese are being difficult. They don't approve of Soviet agreement with Kennedy because Chinese have been observers at all Soviet nuclear tests and they know power Soviets have. Therefore Chinese are asking, "why do you give in?"

12. Soviets realize Kennedy administration is much more reasonable, flexible and imaginative than Eisenhower administration was. Thus, Soviets realize there is now opportunity for reasonable agreements. But President mustn't push what he believes to be his present advantage too far, lest it encourage "hard-line" group in Moscow.

(I made points: Russia has to agree to effective on site inspection in Cuba; must also agree to pull all technicians out connected with missiles and bombers, and give satisfactory pledge not to reintroduce weapons or technicians. Kennedy considered follow-through on Cuba matter of first priority. Only after this settled would there be any reasonable prospects for successful negotiations on testing, disarmament, and Warsaw-Atlantic pact agreements. I also said it wasn't true that Kennedy had agreed to Adenauer's alleged suggestion that all negotiations with Soviets over Berlin be broken off. On contrary, I said, President believed close brush with war over Cuba made it incumbent on both Soviets and Americans to seize opportunity for at least limited start toward responsible east-west agreements.

196. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, November 20, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. No classification marking. For Robert Kennedy's account of how this message was delivered by Dobrynin, see Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, p. 550.

I have studied attentively your considerations which were forwarded through our Ambassador in Washington in the evening of November 15./1/ I wish first of all to express satisfaction with regard to your statement that the United States is also interested in the achievement of a rapid progress in untying the Cuban knot. This is our great desire too. It is good that you have confirmed once again that the U.S. commitment to give assurance of non-invasion of Cuba, which was agreed upon in the exchange of messages on October 27 and 28 remains firm and clear. I fully share also the thought expressed by you about the necessity to act with caution, to take into consideration the position of others. Now when we speak of eliminating the remnants of the crisis this is as important as at any of its past stages.

/1/Document 181.

I always believed and believe now that both of us are guided by the realization of the immense responsibility for the peaceful settlement of the crisis over Cuba being completed. The basis for such settlement already exists: the sides have achieved an agreement and have taken upon themselves certain obligations. It is precisely where we proceed from.

What have we agreed upon? In brief our agreement has come to the following.

The Soviet Union removes from Cuba rocket weapons which you called offensive and gives a possibility to ascertain this. The United States of America promptly removes the quarantine and gives assurances that there will be no invasion of Cuba, not only by the US but also by other countries of the Western Hemisphere. This is the essence of our agreement.

Later on you raised the question of removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba. I think you could not feel the precariousness of that request. Now, of course, there may appear those who would wish to rummage in the wordings and to interpret them in different ways. But you and we do know well what kind of weapons they were that set the forest on fire, they were missiles. It was not accidental, indeed, that in our and your message of October 27 and 28 there was not a single mention of bomber planes and specifically of IL-28's. At the same time those messages have direct reference to rocket weapons.

By the way, you yourself refer not to direct obligations of the sides but to the understanding implied by the American side in the expression "offensive weapons" mentioned in the messages and in this connection you recall your TV address of October 22 and your proclamation of October 23./2/ But you will agree, Mr. President, that messages that fix the subject of agreement and unilateral statements of the US Government are two different things indeed.

/2/For texts, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 806-811.

I informed you that the IL-28 planes are twelve years old and by their combat characteristics they at present cannot be classified as offensive types of weapons. In spite of all this, we regarded our request with understanding. We took into consideration that you made certain statements and therefore the question of removal of IL-28 planes assumed for you as President a certain significance and probably created certain difficulties. We grant it. Since you might really have your difficulties in this question we moved in your direction having informed you of our consent to remove these planes from Cuba. What is the situation now if to summarize it in short and to speak of the main?

We have dismantled and removed from Cuba all the medium range ballistic missiles to the last with nuclear warheads for them. All the nuclear weapons have been taken away from Cuba. The Soviet personnel who were servicing the rocket installations have also been withdrawn. We have stated it to your representatives at the negotiations in New York too.

The US Government was afforded the possibility to ascertain the fact that all 42 missiles that were in Cuba have really been removed.

Moreover, we expressed our readiness to remove also the IL-28 planes from Cuba. I inform you that we intend to remove them within a month term and may be even sooner since the term for the removal of these planes is not a matter of principle for us. We are prepared to remove simultaneously with the IL-28 planes all the Soviet personnel connected with the servicing of these planes.

What can be said in connection with the commitments of the American side? Proper consideration through the UN of the commitment not to invade Cuba--and it is the main commitment of your side--so far is being delayed. The quarantine has not been lifted as yet. Permit me to express the hope that with receipt of this communication of mine you will issue instructions to the effect that the quarantine be lifted immediately with the withdrawal of your naval and other military units from the Caribbean area.

Furthermore, your planes still continue to fly over the Cuban territory. It does not normalize the situation but aggravates it. And all this is taking place at the time when we have removed the missiles from Cuba, have given you the possibility to ascertain it through appropriate observation and when we declare our intention to remove the IL-28 planes from Cuba.

I will not conceal that lately I have to hear more and more often that we are too trustful with regard to the statements of the US readiness to carry out its part of the agreement on Cuba and that the American side will under various pretexts evade the fulfillment of the obligations which it assumed. I do not want to believe this and I proceed from something different: the President has given his word and he will keep it as well as keep our word. But in such an acute and delicate question which we face there cannot but exist the limits beyond which the trust begins losing its value if it is not being strengthened with practical steps towards each other. All this should be mutually taken into consideration to sooner crown with success our efforts in settling the conflict.

I understand, of course, that some time is needed to formalize through the U.N. the agreement on the settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean area, including commitments of non-invasion of Cuba. But this time should be measured by days, not by weeks and, of course, not by months.

Of all the commitments based on the agreement achieved between us in the course of the exchange of messages you declare of your readiness to remove the quarantine immediately as soon as we agree on the term for the removal of IL-28's, without waiting for their removal.

Moving in your direction and taking the decision on the removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba we presume that we have grounds to count on similar understanding on your part also in the questions of the flights of American planes over Cuba and in promptest formalizing through the UN of the US commitments.

As for the discontinuance of flights of American planes over Cuba you yourself can see better how this should be done. In my opinion, actual discontinuance of such flights over Cuba would already be a major step forward and would bring about a great easing in the situation, the more so that our missiles have been removed and your side has ascertained this.

They say that so far as it is a matter of formalizing the commitments through the UN it is difficult for the American side to accept the form of a protocol we are suggesting in which the commitments of the sides are to be fixed. We do not attach decisive significance to a form. Other forms are not excluded either. For instance, a declaration (or declarations) which would be confirmed by the UN. It is the content of the document which is important and also that the commitments of the sides be formalize through the UN without delay.

I heard that Americans have a rule: in any business each side should approach with the same standard the fulfillment of both its own obligations and the obligations of its counterpart and not use "double standard"--one for itself and another for the others. This is a good rule and if it is observed this promises a prompt settlement of the Cuban conflict. Let us follow this good American rule.

Now about the conditions which you set forth with regard to carrying out the verification and measures of further observation.

Yes, we really agreed to the effect that UN representatives could ascertain the removal from Cuba of rocket weapons which you called offensive. But we stipulated however that this question can be solved only with the consent of the Government of Cuba. We could not take an obligation for the Government of Cuba and your reference, Mr. President, that we allegedly took such an obligation, of course, does not reflect the real situation. I believe that you see for yourself the weakness of such a reference.

But what is the main thing in connection with the question of verification with regard to the missiles removed by us that is evaded in your communication? The main thing is that under agreement with you we gave you the possibility to carry out verification of the removal of our rockets in the open sea. We did that and that was an act of goodwill on our part. You will agree that we took this step in the circumstances when no promise had been made by us with regard to this matter in our messages. We did something more in comparison with what had been said by us in the message with regard to verification.

It is clear that the said verification of the removal of the missiles conducted in accordance with the arrangement between us substitutes the verification of which you spoke in your message and I would say, in a more effective form at that, because the American side was observing the missiles we were shipping out, so to say, at the final stage of their removal. While even verification of the dismantling would mean observing only the first stage of their removal from Cuba.

As a result the American side, as it itself so declared, had every opportunity to count the missiles put on our ships, to photograph them and to ascertain their removal.

Thus a way out was found and not a bad one, and the question of the verification must, of course, belong to the past. Now no one can doubt that we have carried out our commitment with regard to the dismantling and shipping of the missiles from Cuba which were a subject in our correspondence. The fact of the removal of those missiles has been officially confirmed also by the US Department of Defense./3/

/3/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 458.

As for the rumors alleging that the missiles may have been left in Cuba somewhere in the caves, one can say that we do not live in the cave-man age to attach great significance to the rumors of this sort. If someone is spreading rumors of this kind he is doing that deliberately to create difficulties in the negotiations.

As far as the question of the American side ascertaining our removing the IL-28 planes from Cuba is concerned, we do not see any problem here. In this respect you and we have the paved way and let us take that way. We have no objections against applying also to this case the procedure agreed upon between us for observation of the removal of the missiles though, speaking frankly, one could do without it. But if you want your naval vessels and helicopters to spend several hundred tons of fuel sailing and somersaulting around our ships carrying the IL-28 planes, let us then consider that such possibility exists.

I will tell you frankly that it was part of our plans, and we believe that we will do it at a proper time, to ship out of Cuba those groups of our military personnel which although were not directly involved in servicing the rocket weapons now removed, still had something to do with guarding those installations. We will do this upon the arrival of our ships. But I must say that the strength of those groups in Cuba is not significant.

You raise the question as to what to do next, how to ensure that those types of weapons on the removal of which we have agreed are not brought back to Cuba. I believe that with respect to non-introduction of such weapons in the future you and I do not have any differences. We are prepared to give firm assurances with regard to this matter.

However, you speak not only about this. You now want some permanent supervision to be established, in Cuba or over Cuba. But where was it taken from that we gave our consent to permanent supervision? The question has never been put that way in the exchange of messages. And generally, how one can take as a normal thing an establishment, and without any reciprocity at that, of some permanent supervision over a sovereign state?

If we are to show serious concern that no unexpected steps are taken on either side to the detriment of each other, then as I already said, the proposal of the U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant on the so-called "presence of the U.N.", i.e. on establishing U.N. posts in the countries of the Caribbean area would meet this task. This proposal of U Thant was also supported as is known by the Government of the Republic of Cuba. We believe it to be a reasonable basis on which it is possible to come to an agreement. And it would be good if that idea was accepted by you and put into life.

To tell the truth, I am somewhat surprised that in connection with the idea of "presence of the U.N." in the Caribbean area you are talking for some reason about setting up observation posts at the ports of the Soviet Union. May be you have in mind the proposals which we submitted during the negotiations on the problem of disarmament and on the problem of prevention of surprise attack in 1955 and 1958. But those proposals had nothing to do and cannot have anything to do with the question of Cuba since that question simply did not exist at that time. Incidentally, I have already told you that in our opinion it would be useful to get back to considering the proposals to set up on a mutual basis the observation posts at airfields, major sea-ports, railway junctions and auto routes. We have given our representatives at the negotiation on disarmament in Geneva the necessary instructions. I repeat--we would like to come to an agreement on this question and if you give such instructions to your representatives at the negotiations on disarmament we will only greet that.

Such is our viewpoint on the three questions raised by you: on the removal of the IL-28 planes, on organizing the verification and on non-introduction to Cuba of such weapons which in accordance with the agreement are removed from Cuba.

How should we deal with the matter now so that we and you could soon bring joy to humanity with the news that the crisis over Cuba is completely liquidated?

The Government of the USA in view of the agreement reached on the IL-28 planes should immediately remove the quarantine which corresponds to your own statement as well.

It is necessary to stick to generally recognized international norms and rules fixed in the UN Charter--not to violate the territorial waters and air space of sovereign states and stop the flights of American aircraft over Cuba. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, that I met with some relief the report that during the last one-two days the flights of American planes over Cuba did not take place. It is good if it promises maintaining of such wise decision in the future as well.

Let both of us agree, Mr. President, also that our representatives in New York be given at once the instructions to immediately proceed with working out an agreed document (or documents) that would formalize through the UN the commitments of the sides.

As we see the matter this will require only a few days if, of course, all the sides want to have speediest liquidation of the aftermath of a tense and dangerous situation evolved in the Caribbean area, the situation that really brought humanity to the brink of thermonuclear war.

One more point. I have read V. Kuznetsov's report on his talk with A. Stevenson from which I learned that the American side is going to give us a draft of its document stating the US commitments of non-invasion of Cuba./4/ Our draft of the document on settling the conflict has been already forwarded to your representatives./5/ Naturally, we will study your document with utmost attention. Let us hope that as a result of the negotiations we will manage to formalize the achieved agreement so that it satisfies all the sides.

/4/For Stevenson's account of the meeting, see Document 183.

/5/Transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement.

Your brother Robert Kennedy through our Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and Mr. McCloy through our representative in New York expressed a desire to get promptly our answer to the considerations expressed by you on the question of the removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba./6/ Well, I think, this answer of mine gives you not a bad material for your statement at your press-conference./7/ However, I hope, Mr. President, that your statement will not be one-sided but will respond to mutual understanding of the situation with regard to immediate steps to remove the quarantine and to discontinue the flights of American planes over Cuba as well as with regard to the immediate formalizing through the UN of the commitments of the sides on the final liquidation of the crisis evolved in the Caribbean area.

/6/See Documents 173 and 191.

/7/For Kennedy's press statement, November 20, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830-838.

In conclusion I wish to stress that much time has already passed since an agreement was reached between us and it is not in the interests of our countries, not in the interests of peace to delay the fulfillment of the agreement that has been reached and the final settlement of the Cuban crisis. Such is our conviction.

As far as we know F. Castro wants also to make a statement today concerning the settlement of the Cuban question. N.S. Khrushchev believes that it would be good if the President in his statements at the news conference did not introduce elements of aggravation and did not make any statements hurting the national feelings of the Cubans. Now it is especially important that the positive which has begun to show in the settling of the conflict be by all means supported and encouraged. It seems to us that the present state of affairs demands that each side display caution and restraint to avoid creating needless obstacles to the final elimination of the crisis which developed around Cuba.

If Mr. President could take this into account while conducting his news conference it would have a positive significance and would correspond to our mutual efforts to come more promptly to a solution acceptable to all sides./8/

/8/Apparently the last two paragraphs are an addendum by Dobrynin.

197. Summary Record of the 28th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, November 20, 1962, 3:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President arrived at 4 p.m. and the meeting lasted until 4:55 p.m. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book) McGeorge Bundy's record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a.

Khrushchev's reply/1/ was read to the group, the President not having yet arrived.

/1/Document 196.

A statement to be made by the President at his 6:00 PM press conference was discussed and approved./2/ The following decisions were reached:

/2/See footnote 7, Document 196.

a. The quarantine is to be lifted immediately and a proclamation revoking it is to be prepared./3/

/3/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 463.

b. U.S. naval forces in the Caribbean will remain there for the time being and carry out normal exercises. Ships in the area will not be removed because it is normal for some to be always on station in the Caribbean. Latin American ships which are in the quarantine force will be asked to stay and participate in exercises.

c. Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed, that there would be no low-level reconnaissance missions flown tomorrow.

d. High-level flights averaging not more than one a day will continue intermittently because of the importance of knowing that the IL-28 bombers are actually being removed.

Two other actions are to be taken without public notice:

a. The SAC air alert will be terminated and all other military forces will be put on a reduced alert basis.

b. TAC planes concentrated along the coast will be deployed inland.

Secretary McNamara recommended that within forty-eight hours we announce that the air reserves called up for the Cuban crisis would be released before Christmas.

The OAS Organ of Consultation meeting will be called off. The State Department will call in the Latin American Ambassadors before the President's press conference to brief them on the Russian reply.

Attention was called to the reference in the reply to Soviet ground forces. The assumption was that these forces would be removed.

The President asked where the question of our no-invasion assurance stands. In the light of what Khrushchev has agreed to do, if he does not get our assurances he will have very little. We should keep the assurances informal and not follow up with a formal document in the UN.

Alexis Johnson returned to the meeting to report that ABC reporter John Scali had been given the substance of Khrushchev's reply by a Russian source./4/ There followed a discussion of whether we should insist on shipside inspection of the IL-28 bomber removal. No clear decision was reached, some of the group believing we should insist on the shipside inspection and others saying this was not necessary.

/4/See Document 195.

There was further discussion of the no-invasion assurances. The Attorney General expressed his opposition to giving the assurance informally. We would be giving away a bargaining counter because Khrushchev is not insisting on having formal assurances. The President restated his view that Khrushchev would be in a difficult position if he gave us something and got nothing in return. We do not want to convey to him that we are going back on what he considers our bargain.

An instruction to McCloy and Stevenson/5/ is to be drafted which says that we will make no formal no-invasion assurance and explained why we declined to do so.

/5/See Document 204.

McGeorge Bundy/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

198. Editorial Note

At 5 p.m., November 20, 1962, 1 hour before President Kennedy's press conference, Ambassador at Large Thompson transmitted the following message through Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin:

"In addition to what he intends to announce at the press conference, he has also ordered a lower state of alert for the US armed forces that had been introduced in the beginning of the Cuban events. Simultaneously, those air squadrons that had been called to active duty during the Cuban crisis have been ordered back into reserve".

The text was provided by the Russian Foreign Ministry and is an unofficial translation.

199. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)

November 21, 1962, 9:45 a.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272. Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking. McCloy was in New York; Ball was in Washington.

McC: I have a feeling we have to do something now on our own and we can't stall much longer. I think they/1/ came forward pretty well yesterday.

/1/The Soviet Union.

Ball: Yes, I think they did.

McC: Kuznetsov was on the phone a minute ago with me.

Ball: What's his reaction to the President's press conference?

McC: Well, I think he was all right on that, but he was angry over the passage of words between him and Adlai yesterday. Adlai was a little too blunt. He said "You ought to take those SAM-sites out". We weren't talking SAM-sites, we were talking about getting all the troops out. Then he blew his top and said "We are digging up something new all the time". They were wrangling down at the end of the table; I was at the other end of the table and couldn't intervene. But he came out of there boiling. He said "Gee whiz, after all we've done", etc "to get that sort of reaction just convinces me you are stalling, and I'm going to pack up and go home and tell the Chairman that I have been misleading him about the good-will of the Americans in regard to settlement". I think he was quite sincere. He was angry; there is no doubt about that. Now he called me up this morning and said "I'm going to call for a meeting right away", and I said "Don't do that. I can't tell you this minute what we are going to do. I believe that the time has come to expedite the conclusion of this thing and we ought to pretty quickly have a SC meeting. Let me get in touch with Washington and let me get a little more bearing because I think their mood down there is that the Premier has made some very definite steps and it is our move--at least to sit down and give you some stuff and tell you this is the way it is going to go." Then he said: "That's okay with me. You know, the only progress we've made has been the result of our . . . . I would hope we could have another similar meeting to that which we had at Stamford and Glen Cove."/2/ Well, this is delicate. It is going to be all right if we are definite. If we know what our position is, then we can do it. If there is any further exploratory business, I'm inclined to think that it isn't wise to have one of those formal meetings. He said that he had made a complete report of the Sunday meeting/3/ to the Premier and he said he hoped that we saw in the Premier's reply/4/ the results of that meeting. And I think you do. I haven't seen that thing, by the way.

/2/Kuznetsov and McCloy met at McCloy's house in Stamford, Connecticut, on November 4 and at the Soviet compound in the city of Glen Cove (sometimes described as being located in the village of Locust Valley), on Long Island, on November 18; see Documents 142 and 191.

/3/Sunday, November 18, see footnote 2 above.

/4/Document 196.

Ball: It's on its way up by messenger right now.

McC: Okay. I think we ought to get a look at it and see the tone of it. My feeling is if you can only get off this on-site inspection you are better off than if you keep talking about verification instead. A memorandum that is coming down to you, the first one, was dictated by Stevenson and company, and the second one is the one that I did that I showed Rusk last night./5/ I think that that is a deal we can make, and that is the business of getting their troops out and the best safeguard of their reintroduction, leaving off in the vague future the UN presence. I think you ought to sit down at this stage and draft the thing that we can say in the declaration and don't pussy foot on that any longer. Rusk said yesterday that we were deliberately holding it back from us. Let's see what it looks like and send it up here so that we can get to work on it.

/5/McCloy is referring to drafts of U.S. guarantees against invasion of Cuba. A memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk, November 22, contains three drafts including the McCloy version as revised by Rusk. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62) See the Supplement.

Ball: We've got a meeting at 4 p.m./6/ scheduled to go over some instructions and we might have some conversations on the phone in the meantime about what those instructions should be.

/6/See Document 201.

McC: I think that would be good. Mind you, if the President goes off for the weekend it is going to be hard to hold Kuznetsov, and I think we should tell him something today. I think the Pentagon agrees with me on the general best safeguard business--removal of those troops, and I would push that ahead as something we ought to do and then draft the statement and get it up quickly as you can.

Ball: All right. I'll get hold of Dean and see if we can get something so that we can at least work something out with you on the phone to get approved at 4 p.m.

McC: All right. And call me back this afternoon./7/

/7/No memorandum of the afternoon conversation has been found, but Ball summarized for the President an hour-long afternoon conversation with McCloy and Stevenson, see Document 203.

200. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, November 21, 1962, noon.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 272. Telephone Conversations--Cuba. No classification marking.

Ball: I had a talk with Jack McCloy this morning./1/

/1/See Document 199.

Bundy: So did I./2/

/2/No record of Bundy's conversation has been found.

Ball: I have a feeling that we may be running down two somewhat divergent tracks here.

Bundy: I have exactly the same worry and was about to call you about it.

Ball: I wonder if we shouldn't get Jack down here for 4 p.m. and try to resolve this before we head into a long week where there can be no resolution.

Bundy: Let's talk about your track.

Ball: There are two schools of thought over here. One of them would be to try to bring this to some kind of a conclusion, even though the formulation would differ from the formulation of yesterday along this line: that if we can be assured either through appropriate UN verification arrangements or through our own means that all offensive weapons are removed and not reinstituted, then Cuba has no fear of an invasion. That suggests that we are not going to invade as long as we keep ourselves . . . .

Bundy: Not going to invade on this ground. We are always going to have to reserve on other grounds. To form language for that is not too tough.

Ball: Yes. Something along this line "As a party to solemn treaty commitments." (Ball reads draft of this morning.)

Bundy: Yes. This is my track, to be honest with you. That is what I would like to do. Does anyone think that we are really going to get much more than that?

Ball: I have Martin here at the moment, for example. He says the Latins will die; they will come to a very bad conclusion--that we shouldn't give any kind of pledge except on a condition of adequate verification and safeguards which of course we are never going to get.

Bundy: That isn't much of a pledge. It seems to me [what] I would say to Martin, and he would say to his Ambassadors, would be "We have said what we always have said." What we did was to reiterate our existing policy in return for which we got 30 bombers and 40 missiles out of there, etc. Those who aren't going to be satisfied with anything short of an invasion of Cuba aren't going to have their views changed by the character of the noises we make while we're not invading Cuba, either.

Ball: I think that may be. We ought to settle pretty solidly on it, however.

Bundy: I agree to that. I don't think there is any doubt what the USUN thinks; if we ask them without Stevenson, we create trouble. If we ask Stevenson, we get filibuster.

Ball: What we can do is try to get it on . . . .

Bundy: Where is the Secretary on this?

Ball: I talked to him earlier. I haven't had time. I don't think we would have difficulty with him on this, but I am not sure. I'd hate to speak for him on this.

Bundy: I'm pretty clear this is the line the President will want to go on. He wants to get a reasonable sort of "well this is all we can give you, because this is all you can give us with the Russians", and then go on with them to wider topics and let Fidel simmer while over the next six weeks . . . I think the President would like to or be prepared to trade a certain thickening of our assurance against a certain thickening of their affirmation that they are leaving.

Ball: Then the language I suggest "so long as we can be assured either . . ." you don't think that would be too bad?

Bundy: No. That is the sort of thing we could give to Kuznetsov to chew on at the end of the day today. Then there would be a hassle in which it is clear that we say to him "Look, we can do this better if your people would do what you haven't been able to get them to do. The best we can do in the light of what we initially said is to say that as long as we're satisfied, we'll be satisfied." Which isn't bad at all.

Ball: All right. I think we ought to be prepared.

Bundy: Why don't you prepare a paper on that framework, and if anyone in the Department wants to argue the case for a more rigorous assertion of interlocking declarations, it is even possible that we could present them both to Kuznetsov and say "Look if you can get this . . ."

Ball: I am sure he would want the alternative because I think they have really given up on the first one.

Bundy: That's right and it seems to me a question of if you spend a day on that or not. I don't frankly see the point in it.

Ball: Let me get it up both ways.

Bundy: You had better have it out with your Secretary.

Ball: Of course, I will.

Bundy: I know McNamara if, in fact, the trend line of Soviet presence in Cuba is downward, he doesn't see much point in trying to bargain for something we are never going to get and would be perfectly willing to give something that perhaps went a shade beyond what the President actually gave yesterday. One way to go at this would be for McCloy to begin with Kuznetsov "Didn't you read the President's press conference?"

Ball: I think that's right. Of course Khrushchev may want something in the SC. I think McCloy has probably indicated . . . .

Bundy: That doesn't break my heart. (He mentioned Stevenson's "rough time" with Kuznetsov yesterday.)/3/ We perhaps ought to meet a few minutes before 4 over here to see what we've got. You might send over what you've got in advance.

/3/As described in Document 199.

[end of document]

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