FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State

Rio de Janeiro, October 28, 1962, 1 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2862. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 2:01 a.m. on October 28.

902. Department telegram 1055./1/ Pursuant Martin telecon Saturday 2145 instructing to proceed on reference telegram,/2/ I contacted Hermes Lima and visited him at home from 2330 to 0030. Began by saying this extremely important and sensitive diplomatic initiative being made under direct instructions of Secretary and requiring utmost secrecy, with perhaps vital bearing on peace. Related substance introductory paragraph, emphasizing that talk must be with Fidel alone, [1 line of source text not declassified]. Then gave him Portuguese translation eight numbered points, typed on plain paper.

/1/Document 81.

/2/October 27. No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

[1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

Hermes felt that new suggestion was a perfectly natural supplement to what they had been doing and said he would undertake it. I pointed out certain essential differences, notably effort to appeal personally to Fidel to divorce himself from Soviet control, referring to our previous talks with Dantas and to evidences some months back of friction between Fidel and Russians. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] I emphasized that Khrushchev speech Saturday should be final proof to Fidel that Soviets interested only in using Cuba to pursue own security interests, while creating new dangers for Cuba.

[12 lines of source text not declassified] Promised to advise me on action taken.

Gordon

102. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, October 28, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous. No classification marking. Other copies of this message are ibid.: Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204, and Lot 77 D 163, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. The Russian-language text is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Also printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 995-999. This "informal translation" and an "official translation" prepared by the Department of State are printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1973, pp. 650-654. According to a footnote in the Bulletin this message was broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. and a copy delivered to the Embassy in Moscow at 5:10.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27./1/ I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

/1/See Document 95.

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages--that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so, however, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.

This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed.

In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory.

The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor.

The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life.

Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the means of defense against aggression--only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba--to prevent rash acts.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers--these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers--to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,/2/ we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

/2/Document 91.

Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.

Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assist-ance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a reasonable solution.

We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension.

Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.

We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge.

Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor.

I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time, you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S. Administration.

But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurances, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.

But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states.

A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your reconnasissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this? What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol.

Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when we are living through such anxious times.

I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba.

We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zoo technicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.

I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.

We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps.

We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.

In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.

103. Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 28, 1962, 11:10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's 1-page typed summary of the meeting and Gilpatric's page of handwritten notes on the meeting are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01895A, Meetings with the President, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba, respectively. McCone's notes are reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, p. 345. An account of the meeting as dictated by Walter Elder, based on a debriefing of McCone, is reproduced ibid., p. 347. A Record of Action for the meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10)

The full TASS text of the Khrushchev reply/1/ to the President offering to withdraw Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba under UN supervision had been read by all prior to the opening of the meeting. (It had been received over the FBIS ticker beginning about 9:00 AM--copy attached.)

/1/Document 102.

Secretary Rusk began by making general comments to the effect that everyone present had helped to bring about the highly advantageous resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. Mr. Bundy interrupted to say that everyone knew who were hawks and who were doves, but that today was the doves' day.

Secretary McNamara said we would not have to face a decision on halting a Bloc ship today because the Soviet tanker Graznyy was lying dead in the water outside the quarantine zone and no other Bloc ships, if they continued toward Cuba, would be reaching the barrier.

Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk recommended, and the President agreed, that no air reconnaissance missions be flown today.

The President asked what we would substitute for our air surveillance of Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said this surveillance might be by the UN or a joint inspection of U.S./UN inspectors in a neutral plane, flown by Brazilians or Canadians. He said our objective should be to have reconnaissance carried out by the UN tomorrow. Technically, this could be arranged, but we do not know whether the UN would undertake the task.

The President suggested that we tell the UN they must carry out reconnaissance or else we will. He authorized the release to UN officials of classified information on Cuba, including photographs and refugee reports, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The purpose of the release of this information on Soviet armaments in Cuba was to facilitate the inspection task which we expected the UN to promptly undertake.

Secretary Rusk, in commenting on Khrushchev's reply, called attention to the text which said the Russians would "come to an agreement." He said Kuznetsov was coming to New York to conduct the negotiations. He suggested that we pick up and accept Khrushchev's description of what he was prepared to withdraw from Cuba, i.e. "offensive weapons."

The President called attention to the IL-28 bombers which he said we should ask the Russians to withdraw by making a private approach to Khrushchev. He said we should not get "hung up" on the IL-28 bombers, but we should seek to include them in the Soviet definition of "offensive weapons" or "weapons we call offensive."

General Taylor said our objective should be the status quo ante.

The President agreed, but added that he did not want to get into a position where we would appear to be going back on our part of the deal. The IL-28 bombers were less important than the strategic missiles. Admittedly, we would face the problem of Soviet armaments in Cuba if the Russians continued to build up their defensive capability there.

At this point the Attorney General arrived./2/

/2/Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador at the former's office. At this time Dobrynin told the Attorney General that Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle and withdraw the missiles. (Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 110)

The President agreed to a statement to be made public, as revised in the meeting./3/ He asked that a draft reply to Khrushchev's statement be prepared for him to consider. He directed that comments by everyone on the Soviet statement be reserved. Our posture is to be one of welcoming the Soviet offer to take out the offensive weapons under UN inspection, but attention should be called to the many problems we would encounter in the implementation of Khrushchev's offer. We should point out that we were under no illusion that the problem of Soviet weapons in Cuba is solved. In addition, he said we should make clear that we can draw no general conclusions about how the Russians will act in the future in areas other than Cuba. He made specific mention of the problem of Communist subversion in Latin America and asked that we refer to this problem either in our letter to Khrushchev or in U Thant's letter to Khrushchev. He directed that Ambassador Stevenson be asked to talk to UN officials about this aspect of the Cuban problem.

/3/For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 444-445.

Bromley Smith/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, October 28, 1962, 5:03 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862. Unclassified; Niact. Drafted by Thompson and Ball, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated priority to Paris, London, and New York.

1020. Following is text President's reply to Khrushchev letter of October 28/1/ for delivery to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed to Soviet Embassy and released by White House at 4:35 PM.

/1/Document 102.1

Begin text

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight even though the official text has not yet reached me because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh/2/ and your reply of today/3/ as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

/2/See Document 95.

/3/Document 102.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

John F. Kennedy

Rusk

105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, October 28, 1962, 6:05 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5211/10-2862. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and approved by Ball.

1130. For Stevenson. Am seriously disturbed at apparent lack of interest on part Secretariat in great importance of aerial photographic surveillance in carrying out task in Cuba. While we have made available to the Secretariat fullest information (derived almost entirely from aerial photography) on characteristics and locations of weapons as of forty-eight hours or more ago, this by no means is necessarily a complete inventory of offensive weapons in Cuba or their locations as of the time UN begins its operations. While aerial photography does not guarantee one hundred percent knowledge of situation nevertheless it is vastly superior, more thorough, more efficient and economical than Nineteenth Century approach based entirely on observation on the ground confined to previously established weapon sites. This is particularly true where weapons concerned are of mobile field type not requiring elaborate fixed bases. Thus we consider it essential that every effort be made to impress on Secretariat importance of aerial photography as an essential supplement to ground observation in carrying out its task of verification. As you know, we stand prepared immediately assist UN in any way agreeable to it and have made substantial preparations that would permit UN begin this mission tomorrow including possibility of flying UN marked planes carrying UN observer. If even with this assistance UN unwilling or unable undertake mission tomorrow, we must assert position that we have preserved our freedom of action and will undertake mission ourselves, recognizing however that this politically less desirable than UN mission and physically more dangerous. Only in this manner can we carry out obligation to forestall any chance trickery endangering our national security. Of course results such mission would be made available to UN to assist it in its task. If UN does not intend undertake aerial reconnaissance US may find it necessary in its own protection continue reconnaissance.

Rusk

106. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 28, 1962, 6:15 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in S on October 30. A memorandum of a similar conversation with Alphand earlier in the afternoon is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador

Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

The British Ambassador told the Secretary how gratified HMG was by the present course of events. He said that the most important thing to do now was to consider what the next stage would be (assuming that things continue to go well). His Government thought that it was important to consider what might be done next, and in what forum. Should there be an initiative in terms of NATO-Warsaw Pact discussions, or should we try to do something about Berlin?

The Secretary said he first wished to make it very clear that there had been no "cozy deals" in connection with the change in the Soviet position. The only thing that Khrushchev was getting for his present attitude was that the United States would not intervene militarily in Cuba so long as the offensive weapons were removed under conditions of proper inspection and verification. He added that we were not going to guarantee the Castro Government, and that the Rio Pact still holds.

The British Ambassador said he thought that there might be some value in making the US guarantee dependent on Khrushchev's behavior with regard to Berlin; perhaps Khrushchev could be brought to giving some assurances in this respect.

The Secretary agreed that if developments continued on their present course, this would require a major consideration of a lot of problems.

The British Ambassador said that Khrushchev would doubtless try to salvage his position by assuming the posture of "a man of peace" who was leading the world in the direction of solutions of problems of disarmament and nuclear testing, etc.

The Secretary agreed and said it was important not to "crow" about the strengthened Western position. He said he had briefed the press on a background basis today to stress the importance of maintaining a tone of moderation as well as caution./1/

/1/A transcript of the background briefing at 1:04 p.m. is ibid., S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.

The Secretary said that the prompt and full support of the British Government, as well as that of our other NATO Allies,/2/ have been a powerful factor in strengthening our position and in bringing home to Khrushchev the danger and the price of continuing on the course he had taken. However, we were not out of the woods yet, and it was not excluded that we would have to face unpleasant surprises tomorrow.

/2/A report on the North Atlantic Council discussion of the Cuban situation on October 28, is in Polto circular 12, October 28. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862) See the Supplement.

The British Ambassador said he agreed, but that he felt that the chances were all in favor of the West emerging from the present crisis in a greatly strengthened position, and that it was important and urgent to consider how this could be turned to even greater advantage.

107. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 28, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 10:09 p.m.

1523. Re Cuba. At mtg with U Thant this evening Stevenson received SYG's message to President in regard to his negots with Castro and delivered President's reply (transmitted separately)./1/ Stevenson pointed out reference to attitude other American states toward assurances against invasion of Cuba was based on our understanding their position and should not be understood as committing other govts whose attitude would presumably be relected in early OAS mtg.

/1/U Thant's letter is dated October 28. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438) See the Supplement.

SYG said it would be extremely helpful to him in working out desired arrangements with Castro if Pres could publicly suspend quarantine on Oct 30. He pointed out that he is constantly being belabored by Sovs and Cubans with claim they have complied with his appeal of Oct 25 and that US has not. He felt that US naval units could be left at present stations but would simply not exercise right of search during SYG's two-day visit to Havana. If he should report on his return to New York either that he had not been able to establish adequate inspection or that inspection had revealed Sov failure to comply with their commitments, quarantine could be at once resumed. On other hand if his report was favorable and satisfactory verification arrangements established, suspension would become definitive.

It was also suggested that, without any public announcement, US reconnaissance flights over Cuba might be suspended during his visit there. It was pointed out that any incident caused by such flights during his visit would be extremely embarrassing to him.

In reply to our insistence that verification arrangements must be approved and in place before blockade suspended, SYG said that he simply did not believe there was any likelihood that Sovs would launch missiles on US during next two or three days. He felt it would obviously be suicidal for them and for Cubans if this were done. He expressed grave concern at call-up yesterday of Air Force Reserves and, without explicitly saying so, left impression he thought some of US actions have been excessive. In reply we explained in considerable detail very grave and important character of threat with which we had been confronted.

Stevenson mentioned possibility of Castro as useful gesture of good will restoring body of U-2 pilot.

Stevenson also suggested SYG might, if opportunity occurred, sound out Castro on ceasing his subversive activities in other countries. Stevenson emphasized however that this should not be connected in any way with present situation, which it would undoubtedly complicate but might simply be broached as an important matter to be dealt with in future. Narasimhan expressed view that Castro would almost certainly raise question of US subversion in Cuba and this would give SYG opportunity to respond in manner Stevenson suggested. He also thought Castro might raise question of Guantanamo. Stevenson urged again that all of these matters be firmly excluded from present negot since their introduction into it might cause serious delay and complication.

In closing, SYG said he hopes to leave about 10:00 am Oct 30 either on Brazilian Varig Airline Caravel or on Mexican DC6B.

Stevenson

108. Summary Record of the 11th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 29, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement.

Director McCone summarized current intelligence, including evidence that all Cuban military forces have been ordered not to fire at U.S. planes unless fired upon.

The President read and approved the announcement of the creation of a Coordinating Committee which will handle all matters involved in the conclusion of the Cuban crisis. (Text attached)/1/

/1/Not printed. The members of the committee were Ball, Gilpatric, and McCloy.

Secretary Rusk acknowledged that we need aerial reconnaissance missions today, but he recommended that none be flown until after the Russian negotiator Kuznetsov sees the UN Acting Secretary General in New York today.

The President agreed that we could wait today, but that we did face the longer range problem of how we continue surveillance of Cuba, recognizing that we cannot rely on the UN to undertake adequate surveillance.

Under Secretary of the Air Force Charyk reported on a conversation last night with UN officials. He said he had offered them RC-130 planes, which they were prepared to use, but they did not want these planes flown by U.S. crews. Mr. Charyk said the Canadians, South Africans and Indonesians have crews which could fly these planes.

Mr. Charyk said the UN official, Mr. Rikhye, who would be organizing the UN aerial reconnaissance, acknowledged that the UN could not make arrangements to fly reconnaissance missions today, but the UN observers could be on the ground in Cuba by Wednesday morning. The UN official said the UN did not want U.S. reconnaissance planes overflying Cuba during the Secretary General's visit there on Tuesday and Wednesday./2/

/2/October 30 and 31.

Mr. Charyk said that air reconnaissance could be very efficient. Pictures taken would reveal suspicious locations to which ground observers could be promptly dispatched.

Mr. Charyk said there had been no discussion yesterday of U.S. reconnaissance flights today, but UN officials had asked for our voluntary suspension of the blockade on Tuesday and Wednesday, leaving, however, the U.S. ships on station. UN inspectors would be in all ports and would report to us on incoming and outgoing cargo. We would make available film to the UN reconnaissance missions if they would provide us with copies of the exposed films.

Secretary McNamara recommended that we send reconnaissance missions this afternoon after notice is given to the Cubans and to Kuznetsov. The decision would be final unless new information came out of the U Thant/Kuznetsov discussions in New York. He recommended that U.S. ships remain on station, challenge all ships entering the quarantine zone, and let such ships through because their cargo would be inspected by the UN observers in Cuban ports.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that we must maintain the quarantine until arrangements for UN inspection of offensive weapons in Cuba are completed.

The President made clear that we should have U.S. observers on any planes flown by the UN. He agreed that the U.S. ships should stay on station, but that we should leave ambiguous for the next twenty-four hours whether or not we will maintain the quarantine. He said we should not say that the quarantine was off pending installation of a UN inspection system. He agreed that the call up of the air reserves should not be reversed.

Secretary McNamara urged that the new Coordinating Committee work immediately on the question of Communist covert aggression in Latin America which would be based in Cuba.

The President said he had talked to Ambassador Stevenson yesterday/3/ whose view was that the phrase "peace in the Caribbean" covers subversion. The President said Ambassador Stevenson had discussed this question with U Thant and would try to get back into the formulation of the settlement some specific reference to subversion.

/3/No record of this conversation has been found.

General Taylor urged that we be prepared to fly six to eight low-level missions today, but no high-level missions. He said we had seen nothing from Saturday/4/ until now. He recommended that we announce in advance we were conducting low-level reconnaissance pending satisfactory and effective UN reconnaissance arrangements.

/4/October 27.

The President agreed to the low-level reconnaissance unless he directed otherwise before 2:00 PM. He turned again to the question of what we would do on the surveillance problem for the long run.

Secretary Rusk noted that Khrushchev expressed his wish that reconnaissance cease, but he had not made it a condition to withdrawal of offensive weapons. U Thant will have to deal with this subject in the New York negotiations.

The President decided that no public announcement of the aerial reconnaissance would be made, but that if we decided to fly these missions, we will notify the Cubans and Kuznetsov immediately prior to the overflights.

General Taylor restated the requirement for the reconnaissance missions if we are to know whether the Soviets are actually dismantling the missile sites or whether they are continuing to work on the missile complexes.

Secretary McNamara noted that U Thant believes that the UN observers arriving in Cuba on Wednesday will see no missiles.

The President, saying that we would need aerial pictures on Wednesday, asked the group to consider how this should be done. Aerial missions today are not crucial, but this week we must have aerial pictures of the missile sites.

Secretary McNamara expressed his doubt that we can get the UN to fly reconnaissance missions. Such missions must be flown to satisfy domestic opinion. He recommended that the flights be authorized today, subject to any developments taking place in New York.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

109. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy)

Washington, October 29, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. The source text bears Rostow's handwritten notation: "The President may wish to see what we're up to." A summary of the Berlin/NATO subcommittee's work on October 29 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XV, pp. 411-419.

SUBJECT

Report Number Five of the Planning Subcommittee

1. The Planning Subcommittee reviewed the situation as of Monday morning, October 29, 1962.

2. The only operational issue addressed was the need to maintain continuity in our aerial inspection of the offensive weapons in Cuba, both for evident reasons of national security and as a basis for later movement to legitimize photo reconnaissance on a collective basis (either UN or OAS). This issue, in its longer run aspects, is referred to below.

3. The following tasks were discussed and assigned as follow-up of the crisis:

a. It was agreed that the Soviet adventure in Cuba in part reflected a high degree of anxiety concerning the nuclear balance. The most likely assumption is that, having failed in the Cuban ploy, they will consider other methods for retrieving or appearing to retrieve their position in the nuclear arms race; for example, a radically accelerated ICBM program, the positioning of weapons in space, etc. It was judged urgent that these possibilities be explored and that we take countermeasures for two reasons: first, to insure ourselves against some Sputnik-like move which would endanger our present favorable posture; second, to maximize the influence in Moscow of those who may argue that the only realistic road to Russian security is by inspected arms control. This task was assigned to DOD (Mr. Rowen) in consultation with other appropriate parts of the Government.

b. The crisis will evidently have implications for Soviet policy: for the Sino-Soviet split; and for the position and policies of Communist parties in every part of the world. The group chaired by Mr. Harvey will continue to explore these implications and propose courses of U.S. action.

c. The situation inside Cuba, in the wake of the Russian defection, may open to us possibilities of change in the character of the Cuban government or its policy which, evidently, should be fully explored. This task was assigned to Mr. Hurwitch (ARA).

d. It was judged possible that there are certain lessons to be drawn from the recent confrontation over Cuba for our Berlin contingency planning. Mr. Rowen and Mr. Kitchen will seek to formulate these in consultation with Mr. Nitze and his committee.

e. Viet Nam. Although it is probable that the Soviet Union will be extremely sensitive to any further pressures we may mount against the Communist position in the wake of this crisis, it was judged appropriate to consider what political and other measures may be considered to induce or force the Soviet Union to honor its pledge given at Geneva that infiltration into South Viet Nam via Laos would end after the Laos settlement. I will raise this matter with Mr. Harriman.

f. With confidence strengthened in the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, it was judged time to make a major push in the Atlantic partnership. There is an urgent need to improve the machinery of political consultation; to press on with various trade, currency and aid problems within the orbit of the OECD; and to look to a multilateral resolution of the nuclear problem at an earlier date than might have otherwise been envisaged. (Action: EUR)

g. In the wake of the crisis, it was judged essential that we seek to consolidate the new unity and confidence of the OAS; press forward vigorously with the Alliance for Progress; and exploit the crisis to weaken the Communists; to reduce the fear of Communists in Latin America; and to draw leftist and neutralist groups away from the Communists and towards the center. It was noted that, in the face of U.S. strength, there was a danger that right wing groups might now assume that reform and development were less urgent than previously. Steps to discourage this view should be considered. (Action: ARA and AID in consultation with other interested agencies)

h. Negotiations with the USSR. An initial paper on this subject, of October 27th, is available to the Executive Committee./1/ Further staff work will go forward within the Department of State and ACDA. Two observations emerged on the subject of negotiation with the Soviet Union. Historically, the instinctive reaction of the USSR to an international setback is to regroup, to consolidate, and to avoid, for a time, fresh initiatives. If that is their reaction on the present occasion, they may use it merely as an occasion to hold to firm previous positions. In that case, there may be no significant movement forward. On the other hand, it is conceivable that Khrushchev himself may wish to move forward towards a detente on Berlin and to leave behind him some achievement in the field of arms control and disarmament. In this case, some forward movement at a summit is conceivable. There is as yet no basis for a judgment as to the course Moscow will, in fact, follow. In the light of these alternatives, we should be prepared, should a summit take place, with an array of proposals, ranging from a mere reaffirmation of the status quo through limited to quite radical steps forward; and use the occasion of such negotiations as a means of assessing the policy and intention of the Soviet Union.

/1/Attached to an October 28 memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba) See the Supplement.

i. The crisis has implications for every region and virtually every country with which we have relations in the world outside of NATO and the OAS. Courses of action designed to strengthen our position vis-a-vis these countries have to be designed on a case-by-case basis. (Action to be initiated by Mr. Jorden, with relevant regional bureaus and S/P officers.)

j. The crisis bears on future disarmament negotiations and meas-ures in two specific respects. First, the Soviet performance in Cuba dram-atizes beyond any doubt the case for inspection. Ways for driving home this lesson should be devised. (Action: ACDA) In addition, we should explore ways of consolidating the de facto precedent of our unilateral inspection of Cuban bases and the OAS ruling that secrecy is inappropriate in this Hemisphere. (Action: ACDA, IO, ARA)

4. The possibility of a White Paper on the Cuban crisis was discussed. It was universally agreed that such a paper, if it were decided to issue one, should be factual with no elaborate effort to draw lessons for propaganda purposes. The question of whether such a paper should be organized to provide a full record of what now can be made public, both for our own people and for the world, as well as the terms of reference for such a paper, were referred to Mr. U. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Edward Martin.

110. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 29, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/10-2962. Secret. Drafted by Helseth on October 30 and initialed by Tyler.

SUBJECT

Turkish Missiles and the Cuban Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu, Turkish Ambassador

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Irwin M. Tobin, Deputy Director, RPM

GTI--William A. Helseth

The Turkish Ambassador, acting on the urgent instructions of his Government, called on Mr. Tyler on October 29. First, he said, he wished to extend the thanks and gratitude of his Government for President Kennedy's refusal of any "deal" with the Soviet Union regarding the missile bases in Turkey.

Secondly, he wished to inform the United States Government that the Turkish Government had instructed its permanent representative in NATO to ask urgently for a special session of the North Atlantic Council. At this special session, the Turkish permanent representative would review the events which led up to the IRBM's being stationed in Turkey and would emphasize that the IRBM's were placed in Turkey not merely for Turkey's defense but for NATO defense. The Turkish permanent representative would state that the Turkish Government regretted that, when dangers subsequently appeared, some seemed to regard Turkey as at fault. Turkey wished to discuss this turn of events with its allies. (The Ambassador then referred to press comments in various allied countries and to some non-United States personalities who spoke in the same tone.)

Mr. Tyler stated his appreciation for the advance information the Ambassador had given us and said he wished to repeat and to reinforce what the Ambassador had said regarding the circumstances that led to the placing of the missiles on Turkish soil. The United States Government, he said, looked at these from the point of view of the NATO complex. These missiles were for the defense of the NATO area and that defense was indivisible. The United States viewed our commitments in all areas of NATO as being equal. Furthermore, he hoped that Ankara would not pay too much attention to our own press comment which had ranged far and wide. Even we, he said, wondered at times whether a given article had been inspired, was a trial balloon or what. Ambassador Menemencioglu interrupted to say that he recognized the freedom of our press but had noticed that it was disciplined when the facts were known and mentioned particularly that the line taken by the press today (October 29) was a very good one. Mr. Tyler said that the Secretary had recently talked with the press on a background basis.

Mr. Tyler stated that the Cuban crisis was not yet settled and that we would know tonight if work on the bases had been stopped. We had, he said, resumed aerial surveillance today. Mr. Tyler stated that he wished to reassure the Ambassador again that there had been no "deal" regarding Turkey. The Ambassador responded that he had no doubt of that. He remarked upon the audacity of Khrushchev in drawing a parallel between Turkey and Cuba. Mr. Tyler said that there was nothing in the arrangement with the Soviets which implied a guarantee of the Castro regime. We had only stated we would not attack Cuba. We had based our action on the Rio Treaty.

(Note: On the way out of the building, Ambassador Menemencioglu informed Mr. Helseth that his Government would be especially pleased with Mr. Tyler's response to the Ambassador's approach.)

111. Summary Record of the 12th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 29, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk reported on developments during the day in New York. The Soviet position on inspection, as stated by Kuznetsov, is that the Russians are willing to have the International Red Cross officials inspect all cargoes going to Cuba to ensure that no arms at all are taken to Cuba. The Red Cross officials could inspect cargoes at sea from non-U.S. ships or from the wharves in Cuban ports. The Russians would not permit on-site inspection until all Soviet missiles are removed. Kuznetsov hinted that the missile removal operation would take about a week. (See attached cable.)/1/

/1/Document 112.

Secretary Rusk said that if there was to be no inspection on the ground, air reconnaissance became crucial. He indicated that the Russians might not object to our overflights. He said that U Thant had asked Stevenson how long we wanted the inspection to go on. Permanent inspection would be difficult, but inspection limited to a period of weeks would be easier. He said the Russians were prepared to accept UN inspectors in Cuba.

The President said he approved of the plan to have Red Cross officials inspect all ships from Bloc ports. He also agreed to suspend the quarantine for two days during the visit of the Acting Secretary General to Havana.

Secretary McNamara reported that a Soviet ship, listing its cargo as wheat, but carrying unidentified crates, was about 300 miles off Cuba. Admiral Anderson wanted to stop this ship, but it had been decided not to stop it.

General Taylor commented that what we are asking the Russians to do is to dismantle their missiles immediately. Mr. Bundy added that our request did not include dismantling the SAM sites.

The President returned to the question of air reconnaissance. He agreed that surveillance should be done in the least provocative way, but we must continue to maintain surveillance until a satisfactory UN system is in place. He said he thought we should tell Mr. McCloy in New York of our plans, but no public announcement should be made. He agreed that no reconnaissance flights would be flown tomorrow or Wednesday./2/ He asked that a study be prepared for him as to what we consider a satisfactory inspection system.

/2/October 31.

Secretary McNamara said that if we were to have no on-site inspection in Cuba, we must have high- and low-level reconnaissance.

The President asked whether it would be possible for us to obtain pictures of the outgoing Soviet ships. He asked Secretary Rusk to make clear to our officials in New York that we must continue aerial reconnaissance unless the UN takes over this task.

Secretary Rusk commented that the political situation, as it had developed during the day, appeared to support the belief that Khrushchev's deal is still on, but if pictures from today's reconnaissance mission reveal that the nose cones are on the missiles in Cuba, then we will face a most difficult decision.

Bromley Smith/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

112. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 29, 1962, 9 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2962. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 9:16 p.m. At 5:22 p.m. McCloy had called Rusk to report on the meeting described in this telegram. A memorandum of that conversation is in the Supplement. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962)

1535. Cuba. At mtg with Stevenson, McCloy and Yost this afternoon SYG gave fol report on discussion with Kuznetzov:

Latter commenced by saying USSR had complied with SYG's appeals by suspending arms shipments and avoiding confrontation at sea but there had been no US response. Thant replied response is that US will suspend blockade when verification established. Thant had suggested to Zorin two days ago that Sov ships submit to verification. Kuznetzov replied "USSR is prepared to agree to proposal that Red Cross visit Sov ships going to Cuba in order to ascertain that they carry no weapons as the US is worried about offensive weapons to Cuba". Kuznetzov added his govt would prefer Red Cross personnel undertaking task should be from neutral nations. Red Cross could board Sov vessels either from neutral ships or Sov ships at sea. When SYG mentioned inspection at Cuban ports Kuznetzov replied he had no objection but this would depend on Cuba. He made clear he was not willing to have UN team inspect Sov ships.

SYG expressed to US personal doubts that Red Cross would undertake this duty, though UN had had offer from high Red Cross official several days ago to help in Cuban crisis. If they did accept he supposed they would fly people from Geneva to some spot near Cuba where they would embark on neutral ships to accost Sov ships. Obviously inspection in Cuban ports if Castro accepts would be far simpler. SYG expressed view Sovs would not submit even to Red Cross inspection if they had any intention of shipping arms and that they would therefore be very unlikely to do so at least during immediate future.

As to sites and missiles, Kuznetzov mentioned reference in Khrushchev's second letter to SC involvement. He said missiles now being dismantled and shipped out. When dismantling has been completed Sovs will report to SC and propose UN team be sent to verify dismantling. No UN team is required until Sovs report to SC. Kuznetzov did not estimate duration of dismantling but SYG got impression it would be no longer than week or two. He is therefore thinking of SC mtg early next week after he has had opportunity for further round of consultations with US, USSR and Cuba following his return. Stevenson made clear it is imperative that US have assurance that dismantling is going on. He did not think we could allow more than 24-hour interval.

SYG expressed hope Sovs might be ready to send teams as early as next Monday. He was not inclined to press Sovs too hard since he could not imagine they would set off rockets at US during next few days. Cubans had refused to state their views on verification until he arrives in Havana but it is clear that Sovs control missile sites, are presumably engaged in rapid dismantling and will not permit verification until dismantling completed. Narasimhan pointed out this would probably be the case while weapons are actually being removed but that verification on the spot might well be permitted in second stage while launching pads and emplacements are being destroyed.

Stevenson made clear that our intense and urgent preoccupation is with weapons being rendered immediately inoperable and with this fact being verified.

SYG referred to fol phrase in second para of President's Oct 27 letter to Khrushchev:/1/"To insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments". He was worried at implications of word "continuation" and feared this meant US expected UN to continue inspection of Cuba for indefinite period. If this were the case he felt it certain that Castro would make counter-demand for inspection of what SYG called "CIA training camps for exiles" in US and certain Caribbean countries. We disabused him of idea that inspection for an indefinite period is contemplated.

/1/See Document 95.

Stevenson and McCloy again referred to necessity of inspection during immediate interim period. If inspection on the spot cannot be obtained, aerial inspection becomes all the more important. SYG said he saw no objection to aerial inspection during interim period if Cuban Govt agrees. McCloy indicated that until UN aerial observation set up US has to reserve right to maintain observation itself.

McCloy also indicated we could give no assurances concerning lifting of quarantine until verification established. Discussion ensued whether quarantine linked only with imports of arms into Cuba or with elimination of offensive weapons from Cuba with UN side maintaining former and US side latter. It was eventually agreed that for immediate purpose of SYG's visit most desirable handling would be issuance by US of simple statement to effect that at SYG's request quarantine being temporarily suspended for the duration of his visit.

Stevenson emphasized importance of dissuading Castro from introducing into negots extraneous elements, such as those covered in yesterday's five-point declaration,/2/ which would only complicate and perhaps even jeopardize settlement reached between US and USSR. He also mentioned that expression in Pres's letter to Khrushchev that he was confident other Western Hemisphere nations would also give assurances against invasion of Cuba was of course merely expression of US conviction and not commitment on behalf other American Republics. Presumably there would be an agreed OAS position on this subject.

/2/For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 447-448.

Stevenson

113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, October 29, 1962, 10:50 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2962. Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared with the Department of Defense, approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Moscow.

1136. Subject: Cuba.

1. We understand from telcons that Khrushchev has proposed that International Red Cross (ICRC) assume function of monitoring shipments into Cuba to make sure that no arms are coming in from Soviet Union to Cuba. This inspection to be in port of entering if Cuba agrees or at sea if preferred. If at sea, Red Cross personnel should board from neutral or Soviet ships, not American vessels. Red Cross personnel should be citizens of neutral or non-aligned countries.

2. This arrangement on monitoring in shipments is satisfactory. If possible, we would prefer that ICRC operate in some fashion as executive agent of the SYG, in manner analogous work of League of [International] Red Cross Societies (LICROSS) in refugee field.

3. Some continuing reconnaissance from the air seems essential, during period of dismantling and withdrawal of missiles and other major weapons. This will be especially true if no on-site inspection of missile sites can be arranged until dismantling completed. If necessary U.S. will continue its own reconnaissance. If possible, we would still prefer a technically competent reconnaissance done by UN itself. Therefore important to pursue Canadian offer of pilots for RF-101s, or other possibilities accomplishing same purpose.

FYI. One of U.S. planes on today's reconnaissance was fired on by Cubans. End FYI.

4. Statement on quarantine approved for release Monday evening:

"The White House announced tonight that, in response to the request of Acting Secretary General U Thant, enforcement of the quarantine has been voluntarily suspended during the period of his visit to Cuba."

5. Pending examination results of today's reconnaissance, no decision yet on whether to suspend US aerial reconnaissance during period SYGs visit to Cuba.

6. It will be important to have assurance, including if possible photographs, of missiles being packed up and actually leaving on ships. Perhaps as part of monitoring operation in ports, ICRC could likewise monitor export of major weapons.

Rusk

114. Summary Record of the 13th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 30, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action of this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement.

Director McCone reported that incomplete interpretation of pictures from yesterday's reconnaissance mission did not reveal whether work on the missile sites had halted or whether dismantlement of the missiles had begun. Construction at the nuclear sites appears to be continuing. Some of the missile launchers have been removed to cover areas./1/

/1/A copy of the CIA memorandum, SC No. 11155/62, with information as of 6 a.m. October 30, from which McCone briefed the Executive Committee, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16.

Secretary McNamara called attention to the reported activities of Alpha 66. The President stated that insofar as we had any control over the actions of Alpha 66, we should try to keep them from doing something that might upset the deal with the Russians. The President noted that anti-Castro groups did have a stake in continuing the struggle, and, therefore, might make an effort to cause difficulties during the period when it appeared we would be reaching some kind of a solution with the Russians.

The President authorized a public statement to the effect that it was too early to judge whether the missiles were being dismantled and construction at missile sites halted.

Secretary McNamara said he had directed that no U-2 planes fly anywhere until he was satisfied that a system had been developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflights of Soviet territory. He felt it was important to avoid another incident.

Secretary Rusk reported that U Thant had told our people in New York that he would not go to Havana if we conducted air reconnaissance during the two days he is expected to be in Cuba.

The President agreed that no air reconnaissance missions would be flown over Cuba today or tomorrow, but he directed that every effort be made to get UN surveillance under way as soon as possible. Secretary McNamara said that there were ten or twelve issues connected with the Cuban crisis which were being reviewed and would be ready for Presidential consideration tomorrow.

Turning to the question of guidance for the press, the President directed that no one on the Executive Committee should personally see any reporter and that nobody in the group should say anything except Mr. Bundy, Mr. Salinger, and Mr. Sorensen, who were authorized to talk to reporters. The President said we were not dealing with a finished episode, and, therefore, information going to the press needed to reflect the solidity of the Committee.

Mr. Salinger said that three sanitized versions of the crisis, all of them to be approved by the President, were being prepared by Defense, State, and White House press officers.

The President agreed not to issue the draft Executive Order covering ships engaged in the Cuba trade, but requested the State Department to explain to reporters that the reason for not issuing the order was because it was aimed at a situation which had been radically altered by the discovery of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

Acting Director of USIA Wilson reported that Cuban exiles were seeking to buy time on U.S. radio stations. It was expected that if they succeeded, they would make inflammatory statements about present U.S. policy toward Cuba. The President authorized Mr. Wilson to talk to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission about some way of blocking these broadcasts without appearing to be imposing censorship of the radio stations.

Bromley Smith/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

115. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3062. Secret; Niact. Repeated to USUN. Received in the Department of State at 12:15 p.m.

1139. Policy. During courtesy call on Gromyko at 4:00 p.m. today, he introduced subject of Cuba, saying that Soviet Government wished as quickly as possible to reach agreement pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters. Agreement should "codify" obligations of both sides, i.e., US obligations to refrain from attack on Cuba and to rescind blockade, "which you call quarantine, but which we regard as inadmissible arbitrary act in peace-time"; Soviet obligation to remove weapons "which President called offensive"; and Cuban obligations. Agreement should stem from talks now going on at UN in New York. Soviet Government expects US will take steps to bring negotiations quickly to satisfactory end. Gromyko said he did not want to enter upon substantive discussion this matter now, just wanted to mention it in passing.

I said that, while I had no instructions discuss this subject, it was clear US Government desired and intended to proceed as swiftly as possible to overcome crisis. President regards exchange of letters with Khrushchev as constituting agreement on basic principles involved, on basis of which question was prompt execution of obligations. So far as speed of negotiations was concerned, the faster the better, but talk should not delay action.

Kohler

116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 30, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive.

There will be a meeting without the President in the Conference Room of the Under Secretary of State at 6:00 p.m. this evening,/1/ at which time Mr. Ball will lead discussion of some of the outstanding issues. It will be helpful if members can find a little time to think about them beforehand. Among these issues are the following:/2/

/1/No record of this meeting has been found, but it is noted in Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)

/2/Another list of issues for this meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General 10/28/62-10/31/62)

1. What are the conditions for lifting the quarantine, either temporarily or permanently?

2. What other procedures for inbound inspection of shipments from the bloc are practicable?

3. What is our plan for the resumption, the continuance, and the possible abandonment of aerial reconnaissance?

4. What is our policy for the problem of definition of offensive weapons?

5. What verification do we expect before the re-export of offensive weapons?

6. What shape and definition can we give to our undertaking not to disturb the peace of the Caribbean?

7. What are the elements of a new policy toward refugee Cubans?

8. What political action can we take to exploit strains in the Castro regime?

9. What can be the long-term balance of assurance of our undertakings as against those of the USSR?

McGeorge Bundy/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

117. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3062. Secret; Priority. Received in the Department of State at 6:49 p.m.

1547. Policy. Conversation with Kuznetsov.

At lunch with Kuznetsov today we discussed Cuba and he was very pleased that we would accept Red Cross inspection of the incoming ships. He assured me emphatically that the weapons would be dismantled and removed and that we could count on it, and then have whatever verification at the end of the process we wanted. He found it hard to believe that we would doubt their word in present circumstances, when I explained that surveillance during the interval to confirm compliance was necessary. Then he asked if we could not fly our high-level reconnaissance planes along the coast outside Cuban territorial waters and get good enough pictures. I said I doubted if that would be adequate, and suggested that reconnaissance planes could be transferred to the UN, painted and marked appropriately, and manned by neutrals if available, or even by combined Russian, Cuban and American crews. He was noncommittal, but clearly worried about Cuban objections to over-flights, although they did not appear to bother him. He did, however, say something about compromise of Russian prestige by this evidence of our skepticism. As to time involved to complete dismantling and removal process, he said Khrushchev had told him before he left Moscow that it would probably take two or three weeks.

He seemed to be especially eager to discuss disarmament and other bases and to explore any other possibilities for talks on broader basis. He plans to stay here as long as he can do anything, see people, and talk usefully about our mutual problems. He asked why he and I should not discuss the whole range of problems and added that as peoples we get along very much better than on official level, and that just now relations were badly strained.

On disarmament, he interrogated me closely in reply to suggestion about some bilateral talks on testing here in New York. He feels our positions are now so close that we should be able to reach agreement. In response to my suggestion that agreement on above-ground testing could now be reached quickly, he pressed me on why we insisted on underground inspection and why we seemed to want to make more underground tests when we had made far more tests than they, to our great advantage. Moreover, he felt confident that our scientists could really detect and identify everything. After the usual explanations that all underground tests could not be identified and that there were means to prevent any real danger of espionage, he was noncommittal and proposed a toast to disarmament and that we should talk some more.

He adverted several times to removal of our bases which threaten the Soviet Union as they had removed their base in Cuba which threatened the US.

Mtg was extremely cordial, and we also talked about previous mtgs and my writings on the Soviet Union with which he was familiar. He discussed with great candor the agricultural problem and the slow development of the virgin lands project, where they are consolidating and mechanizing and not increasing acreage. He brought me friendly messages from Khrushchev and Mikoyan.

Arthur Dean is seeing him this afternoon with regard to the disarmament negotiation.

Stevenson

118. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)

October 30, 1962, 7 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. Rusk was in Washington; Stevenson was in New York.

Stevenson said that Seamens [Narasimham] (?) called in. He said they had a wonderful code--they talk in Hindi. Riki [Rikhye] reported that the first session which has terminated went very badly. Castro says no intrusion or inspection whatsoever on Cuban soil by anybody. They are now adjourned to meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. They will do some work on him tonight and might break him down by tomorrow morning. He asked that further reconnaissance by us be held off for another day so that it would not screw the thing up. He thinks if they don't get results tomorrow and he runs in this stone wall he will come back and call a Security Council meeting Thursday to ask for further instructions. The Cubans have refused Riki any access to inspect the sites and he has no clue as to what has transpired. Kuznetsov seemed alarmed today/1/ about the attitude of the Cubans, but so far as the Russians are concerned, he was confident of progress, but we would have to take a look so far as the Cubans are concerned and we would have to run some high level overflights unless we get a breakthrough. The Security Council thing will be awkward because the absence of an agreement of that kind would, of course, only increase the offense to the Cubans. If this is the only way out we had better have a talk with Kuznetsov and see if we can reach some sort of secret agreement and then go ahead with the Security Council agreement and confer with the Soviets. The Secretary suggested possibly the Cubans and Stevenson asked do we want to do that. The Secretary replied he did not know. Stevenson would think twice about that. There might be an interim meeting of the Latin American group on this. Stevenson is not clear in his mind who it would possibly be--perhaps Mexico.

/1/See Document 117.

The Secretary said he would report this to the group meeting now/2/ and see where we come out after the session ends. Stevenson said they were having a Delegation meeting tomorrow and he will caution them on any statements.

/2/See footnote 1, Document 116.

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, October 30, 1962, 9:50 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5211/10-3062. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Sisco, cleared with Hilsman and Ball, and approved by Cleveland.

1141. Please request Narasimhan transmit confidentially to Rikhye by phone in Hindi following information for SYG. This should under no circumstances be sent by UN in clear to U Thant.

1. Before he left for Havana SYG requested information on results US aerial surveillance October 29. SYG should be informed results of October 29 surveillance inconclusive.

2. Moreover, since aerial observation not conducted October 28, pictures resulting from October 29 surveillance merely establish the initial base from which subsequent series of photographs must be made and evaluated.

3. Importance of making sure Soviets are complying with their own commitments will probably make urgent the resumption of air reconnaissance by Thursday, November 1.

Rusk

120. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. The source text bears no classification or indication who made the translation.

Moscow, October 30, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I want to convey to you confidentially some considerations which, if you agree with them, could serve, in my opinion, our common cause, that is, prompt elimination of the remnants of the dangerous crisis which you and we have in the main liquidated. This would help to finalize the settlement more quickly so that life would resume its normal pace.

First of all, I would like to express a wish that you already now remove the quarantine without waiting for the procedure for the inspection of ships on which an agreement has been reached to be put into effect. It would be very reasonable on your part. You yourself realize that the quarantine will in fact accomplish nothing since those ships that are now heading for Cuba naturally, after we have agreed on the removal of our missiles from Cuba, do not carry not only any offensive weapons, but, as I have already stated it publicly and informed you confidentially, any weapons at all. Immediate lift of the quarantine would be a good gesture. It would be appreciated both by us and world public opinion as a major step to speed up liquidation of the after effects of the crisis. For all practical purposes the quarantine is of no use to you, but being a manifestation of the crisis, it continues to poison relations among states, relations between you and us and Cuba and produces a depressing effect on world public which would like to see a complete relaxation. You would lose nothing but you would score a gain as far as public opinion is concerned.

On the other hand, immediate lift of the quarantine would give us an opportunity to use our ships that are approaching Cuba to take out the weapons which are being dismantled now and, I think, have been already dismantled. After the ships are unloaded the dismantled weapons could be loaded on them and shipped to the Soviet Union.

Naturally, after the elimination of the crisis it is impossible to continue the blockade and discrimination in trade and communications. All this must be done away with. But you, as we know, undertook measures and put pressure on your allies and other countries so that even flights of civilian passenger planes be not permitted. Do you really think that IL-28 carries any means of destruction? This is laughable.

All this is being done not to ensure security, but as pinpricks and cannot but cause irritation and worsening of our relations. Why should it be done? Who needs it? It serves only the aggressive forces to strain nerves and thus to reach their goal which is to push the world into the abyss of thermonuclear war.

Therefore I believe, that you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly and will draw appropriate conclusions aimed at clearing the way for bettering the relations between our states.

Next question. I do not know what you will think about it but if you were prepared already now to proclaim the liquidation of your base in Guantanamo, this would be an act which would give world public opinion real satisfaction and would contribute to the easing of tension. I think that you yourself realize what significance the base in Guantanamo may have now after your statement that you do not pursue the aim of invading Cuba. Then the question arises: at whom this base is aimed, what purposes does it serve, from whom can it guard the approaches to America? I do not see forces that can threaten America from that direction. Therefore the base in Guantanamo is only a burden for your budget, and what is the main thing, it is a great burden of a moral nature for political leaders in the USA. And everybody realizes that the functions of the base in Guantanamo--and this is in fact the case--are aggressive, not defensive.

You know our position with regard to the bases. We are against military bases in general and that's why we liquidated those our bases that we had in Finland and China and we think that we acted rightly. That was an act that manifested our good intentions in ensuring peaceful coexistence. By that we did not diminish our defensive capability but raised our moral prestige among the peoples of all the world. The more true it is now when there are perfect means of war the range and destructive power of which are so great that no bases could in any degree replace them.

This would be a good preparation to an agreement between you and us on the liquidation of all military bases in general since military bases have lost now their importance. Those are not my words. I think, you yourself said and even stated it publicly that you want to reduce the number of your military bases. Of this spoke Bowles and others, and they spoke correctly.

Such your step would be highly appreciated by world public.

I would like also to tell you my following consideration.

My colleagues and I consider that both sides have displayed restraint and wisdom in liquidating the military conflict which might have resulted in a world thermonuclear war. I take the liberty to think that you evidently held to a restraining position with regard to those forces which suffered from militaristic itching. And we take a notice of that. I don't know, perhaps I am wrong, but in this letter I am making the conclusion on the basis that in your country the situation is such that the decisive word rests with the President and if he took an extreme stand there would be no one to restrain him and war would be unleashed. But as this did not happen and we found a reasonable compromise having made mutual concessions to each other and on this basis eliminated the crisis which could explode in the catastrophe of a thermonuclear war, then, evidently, your role here was restraining. We so believe, and we note and appreciate it.

Our systems are different and my role was simpler than yours because there were no people around me who wanted to unleash war. My efforts aimed at eliminating the conflict were supported by both our military men and my colleagues in the leadership of the party and government.

Mr. President, we have now conditions ripe for finalizing the agreement on signing a treaty on cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons. We fully agree with regard to three types of tests or, so to say, tests in three environments. This is banning of test in atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In this respect we are of the same opinion and we are ready to sign an agreement.

But there are still some differences with regard to underground explosions. Therefore it would be good if you gave instructions to find a compromise in the decision on the underground test ban, but without inspection. We shall not accept inspection, this I say to you unequivocally and frankly. Of course, if one aims at delaying or torpedoing an agreement then there is sense in insisting on the inspection of underground explosions.

We do not carry on underground tests, we did it but once and we are not going to do it anymore. Maybe such a necessity will arise sometime in future, but in any case I do not envisage it.

It would be very useful to agree on ending tests after such strain when people lived through great anxiety. It would be a great reward for the nervous strain suffered by the peoples of all countries. I think that your people felt as much anxiety as all other peoples expecting that thermonuclear war would break out any moment. And we were very close to such war indeed. That is why it would be good to give satisfaction to the public opinion. This would contribute to easing the tension.

We appreciate it very much that you took the initiative and in such a moment of crisis stated your readiness to conduct negotiations with the purpose of signing a non-aggression treaty between the two military blocs. We responded and supported it. We are prepared to come to an agreement on this question confidentially or through diplomatic channels and then make it public and start negotiations. This also would contribute to lessening tension. The world public would learn with satisfaction that in the moment of crisis not only declarative statements were made but certain commitments with signatures affixed were taken as well.

But the best thing to do would be--I do not know how you will look upon it--to disband all military blocs. We are not coming up with this now though we spoke of this before; however we believe now too that this would be most reasonable. But if you and your allies are not ready yet for that we are not pressing. However I must say that in the interests of the same elimination of tension this would be greatly useful.

We have eliminated a serious crisis. But in order to foresee and forestall appearance of a new crisis in future which might be impossible to cope with everything in our relations capable of generating a new crisis should be erased now. It would seem that now when we possess thermonuclear weapons, rocket weapons, submarine fleet and other means the situation obliges all states, every state to adhere to such norms of conduct which would not generate conflicts, to say nothing of wars. From our point of view, this is quite obtainable. This would be a big step forward at a time when we in effect have not yet disarmed. I think that this would be not a loss but a gain for the supporters of peaceful coexistence, a mutual benefit which the peoples of the U.S. and other countries participating in military blocs would enjoy. It can also be said with confidence that this would be highly appreciated by all peoples and would give great reassurance and satisfaction to people interested in securing peace. More efforts should be made already now to solve the problem of disarmament. To do it with regard not to one stage but to a real solution of the whole problem.

In our proposals on general and complete disarmament which we have made we have taken into consideration your wishes as well. Our recent proposals on this point were expressed by the USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko at the XVII session of the U.N. General Assembly. In those proposals of ours adjustments were made to take into account your wishes. What we considered to be reasonable we took into consideration.

And of course, Mr. President, I am again reminding you of the necessity to solve the German question because next crisis, possibly of no lesser danger, can be caused by the German question. And the main thing is that that crisis will be foolish as all crises are.

There was war, two German states emerged, or actually three states, which are in existence since the end of World War II. Specific relations among them have already developed. But these relations--economic and political--exist because the German Democratic Republic regulates traffic through its territory on the basis of some substitutes for treaties though in reality, in daily life, in practice such treaties are already operative.

Besides, we and you, our Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State, have agreed on all questions. And the only question which remains unsolved is that of the presence of troops in West Berlin and in effect not even of the troops but under what flag those troops will be and of what states, naturally within certain period of time.

Could not we both understand it? And who needs that the present unsolved situation continue? Not you and not your people. This is not in our or your interests, and not in the interests of our or your allies. This is only--and I repeat again--in the interests of revanchist forces who do not want to recognize the borders and conditions emerged as a result of the defeat of the Hitlerite Germany. Only they benefit from that. Nobody else.

Who expresses such policy now--Adenauer or somebody else--that is of no particular importance to me or to you. But if one takes a realistic view, if you, Mr. President, analyze the situation then you in your heart will undoubtedly agree with me. What you say publicly is another matter. But that comes not from how you personally understand the situation but, so to say, from political expedience, from desire "not to offend" your ally. However it would be better to be guided by a desire not to offend the public opinion and to give satisfaction to it, to give satisfaction to all peoples, the American people included--to eliminate the hotbed of international tension in the center of Europe. And we would be able to eliminate it. If you and we come to an agreement on this question--and we do want it--this would be a great joy for all peoples because this would mean consolidation of peace.

There would remain many unsettled matters in the world but the main thing after that--and I would like to tell you about it--is the question of China. It is anomalous that China is not having her seat in the U.N. Similar anomalies already existed in history and were overwhelmed by life. When the Revolution broke out and won in America the Russian Emperor showed stubbornness and did not recognize America for 26 years. But America did not cease to exist because of that. So, that was a foolish policy. The United States answered with the same lack of cleverness. But that happened, however, in different times. Therefore the U.S. acted unreasonably for roughly half that time: the Russian Emperor--for 26 years, you--for 16 years. But then the U.S. realized that it was unwise, and your great President Roosevelt took the courage and responsibility and displayed wisdom.

You would greatly raise your prestige, personal and that of your country, in the eyes of the peoples if you take an attitude facilitating China taking its lawful seat in the U.N. This is possible only if it is understood that there cannot be two Chinas. No state which respects itself can agree to a part of its territory, a part of its population being cut off, it applies even more strongly to a great power. This is an internal question of China and let the Chinese decide it among themselves. When China participated in the creation of the U.N. and when it was made a permanent member of the Security Council, then it was one China. And that one China exists now. If China occupies again its lawful seat in the U.N., if you understand the necessity of it--and I think that you do understand it--then it would be good, it would be a great contribution to the cause of peace.

It is impossible to come to an agreement on disarmament without China. There are countries with population of half a million and even less which are members of the U.N. and have voice in this international organization. Iceland, for instance, has the population of 180 thousand people. China has 650 million people and does not have such voice. We have respect for the people of Iceland and their will as well as for all peoples. But from the point of view of ensuring peace--even if there seems to be a contradiction here--the contribution of a given people and that of another people, the real contribution to the cause of ensuring peace may be different.

Therefore it would be proper to solve the question of the restoration of China's rights in the U.N.; the peoples are waiting for it. And this will happen, it is only a matter of time. Therefore in order not to prolong this time, if you understood now the necessity for such a step, then, it would in effect be possible to solve this problem at the present session of General Assembly. What satisfaction it would give to the world public opinion, you would see from the expression of feelings of all peoples because it would be a real step, indeed, towards stabilization and strengthening of peace all over the world.

We, the Soviet people and the peoples of Asian and European countries saw war. War often rolled through our territory. America participated in the two wars but it suffered very small losses in those wars. While huge profits were accumulated as a result of the wars. Of course, it was monopolists who benefited but workers, working people got something out of it, too. War did not touch the soil of the United States. The American people did not experience destruction, sufferings, they only received notifications about deaths of their kin. Now during this crisis war was knocking at the gates of America.

These, in effect, are my considerations after the crisis situation. I want to tell you that in this crisis, as our saying goes, there is no evil without good. Evil has brought some good. The good is that now people have felt more tangibly the breathing of the burning flames of thermonuclear war and have a more clear realization of the threat looming over them if arms race is not stopped. And I would say that what has just happened will serve especially good the American people.

Mr. President, I believe that you as a military man, and your military people understand that we were not preparing for war when we delivered means of defense to Cuba. Those means were not meant against the U.S., but were the means to ensure the security of Cuba. Do you really think that we are so narrow-minded in our understanding of military matters that in preparing for war against the U.S. we picked up Cuba as a bridgehead for such a war? And the means there--a certain number of missiles. This is foolish. For Cuba is no good as a bridgehead for a big war and it cannot be used for those purposes and, of course, nobody ever contemplated that. Those were the means for deterring aggressor, to use the language of the late Dulles.

It is our opinion that the crisis has been eliminated on the compromise basis through reciprocal concessions. We are satisfied with it. We also appreciate your cooperation in the elimination of the crisis and your understanding of the necessity for reciprocal concessions and compromise so that the conflict be prevented from going beyond the limits that might really break into a thermonuclear war. All the peoples of the world, the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the peoples of all other countries, are interested in eliminating this conflict. In particular, I think, it will be highly appreciated by the people of Cuba who have now been assured that their borders will be respected and there will be no threat of invasion of their land on the part of stronger states. In other words, the Cuban people will have the long-awaited opportunity to enjoy the benefits of their labor and they will have the guarantee of their independence on the basis of the U.N. Charter, which provides for non-interference into internal affairs of other states and respect for sovereignty and integrity of states.

These are the considerations, Mr. President, which I wanted to express to you. I understand that I listed a great number of questions. Therefore, if we started after breakfast we would not have finished solving them before dinner. It would require more time but they have to be solved. They face the world. And the more we delay the solution of these questions, the more of unknown will appear which can prove to be fatal in a future crisis. Therefore, the sooner we clear away the roadblock, the windfallen wood, which has piled up in the international relations, and make clear the roads to correct mutual understanding the better it would be.

Mr. President, you lived through this crisis yourself. For us too, it presented the Rubicon: whether to agree to a compromise, whether to make concessions. Indeed, from the point of view of the legal standards your claims had no grounds whatsoever. Therefore there was a great trial and there were hesitations. We still believed, however, that you might have difficulties too since how could it be that you could not know that the unjustified demands of the USA exposed the world to the hazards of catastrophe. However, we decided to make a compromise proposal which would suit both you and us. We received your assurances that you would not invade Cuba and would not permit others to do it and on this condition we withdraw the weapons which you called offensive. As a result, there has been practically achieved the purpose which had been intended to be achieved through the shipments of means of defense. Now this question is solved on these compromise and reciprocal concessions.

And we consider it to be reasonable. Having eliminated this crisis we gave each other mutual satisfaction: you promised not to attack and not to permit attack against Cuba on the part of others, and we moved forward to make the USA feel confident that we do not contemplate anything bad against it and that there is no threat against the USA on our part. You certainly possess means of destruction. But you know that we also have these means and they are of a different nature than those that were in Cuba. Those were trifles there. Our means were brought to the state of combat readiness, they were of a more serious nature and they were pointed at the USA and your allies.

To our mutual satisfaction we maybe even sacrificed self-esteem. Apparently, there will be such scribblers who will engage in hair-splitting over our agreement, will be digging as to who made greater concessions to whom. As for me, I would say that we both made a concession to reason and found a reasonable solution which enabled us to ensure peace for all including those who will be trying to dig up something.

Such is our understanding of this whole question.

I would like to sum up the above said and express in conclusion the following considerations on the questions touched upon in this letter.

I think it would be possible to pick up from the questions listed by me those which are more ripe and which should, perhaps, be prepared for taking decisions on them. Then it would be possible to meet, maybe, at the U.N. or maybe at a specially arranged meeting. I repeat, I have in mind a meeting in case questions are prepared for taking decisions on them so that the appropriate agreements could be signed during the meeting. It would be a good gift for the peoples of the whole world.

We have a different understanding of the mentioned questions. Therefore I would like to know your considerations as to whether you believe that some or other of the questions raised by me are ripe for decision. If you do not consider them ripe, then there should be no meeting because a meeting in such conditions would not only fail to justify hopes of the peoples, but would distress them./1/

/1/On October 29 Dobrynin had given Robert Kennedy a different unsigned letter from Khrushchev to the President which spelled out the basis for agreement on Cuba. The Attorney General studied the letter over night before asking Dobrynin to come to his office on October 30 and take it back because it involved a quid pro quo. For an account of this incident, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times, p. 546. No record of the October 30 meeting has been found. For text of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VI, Document 70.

Sincerely,

N. Khrushchev/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 31, 1962, 2 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10-3162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 7:20 a.m. The source text notes that a copy of the telegram was passed to the White House on October 31.

1149. Policy. Gromyko initiative on Cuba yesterday (Embtel 1139)/1/ appears corroborate estimate of Soviet intentions salvage as much as possible of their position in Cuba. In this respect seems to us to reflect same kind of internal pushing and hauling which must have taken place between despatch Khrushchev private letter October 26 and published letter October 27./2/

/1/Document 115.

/2/See Documents 84 and 91.

Western colleagues incline to view "heads must roll" as result set-back, though neither they nor we are able to identify source of any differences in leadership.

In any event, we believe Khrushchev personally convinced situation was critically dangerous and had to be liquidated. (We are struck by parallel between danger to USSR in which Cuban gamble eventuated and Khrushchev's accusations against Stalin in "secret speech" for having permitted Soviet Union come up to threshold World War II grossly unprepared, both militarily and psychologically.)

On balance we consider selection of Kuznetsov for New York and decision to despatch Mikoyan to Cuba encouraging factors. Seems to us of some importance they chose to send Mikoyan via New York for consultation with Kuznetsov rather than direct, as they could have done (Embtel 1145)./3/

/3/Dated October 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/10-3162)

Factors producing dramatic decision withdraw included not only striking display US determination and unity Western alliances when chips are down, but distaste Soviet populace for Cuban adventures. Sense of relief here following publication exchanges of letters unmistakable.

Kohler

122. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 31, 1962.

//Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Legere. The source text is initialed by Taylor.

SUBJECT

Daily White House Staff Meeting--31 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout. DEFCONs no change.

2. The following matters arose:

a. Mr. Bundy devoted most of the meeting to securing ideas on what might come up at the President's press conference tomorrow, and on what ought to be the appropriate responses to these matters. The following were the major items identified and discussed:

(1) The status of dismantling is sure to arise, but the answers are unlikely to be sufficiently "hard" by tomorrow afternoon for a categorical answer. The chances are that the President will say this Government is satisfied that construction has stopped, hoping that the reporters will understand that this judgment rests only partially on hard photographic evidence, the other part being the exercise of a political judgment.

(2) I mentioned that the wolves had already begun to howl about intelligence shortcomings during the period prior to the crisis. The President's answer to this almost-certain question will probably be based on the multiplicity of indicators that must be evaluated, etc.,--i.e., more or less a standard Intelligence Officer's answer.

(3) Someone will probably ask the President whether the US means to guarantee the continuance of the Castro regime. The answer to this will in part refer to the President's statements of September 4 and 13,/1/ and in part refer in general terms to the fact that the United States and the OAS are permanently committed to resist aggression in the Hemisphere.

/1/For texts of these statements, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 369-370 and 373-374.

(4) Any question about the Cuban refugees will be extremely tough to answer. Bundy said that the fact of the matter was that these refugee organizations had been under restraint by US "law enforcement agencies" during the past week or so, but of course this is just about the last thing the President would want to say at the conference. There was no real feeling on how to handle this query.

(5) A few individuals around the table thought that the President might say a few words in a very optimistic vein about the future of world peace, but the consensus was that it would be best at this time to fuzz this over at least or maybe even stay away from it altogether.

(6) A rather abstract discussion on the role of force in international affairs thereupon ensued. Nothing much came out of it except general agreement that the President in his opening statement should steer clear of any discussion of the role of force, concentrating instead on how our Allies and other friends rallied to the cause. Given the general intellectual brilliance of this group, I was amazed to note heads nodding when Arthur Schlesinger gravely remarked that the role of force in this crisis had not been very great because, after all, no force at all had been used--e.g., only one casualty: Major Anderson.

[Here follows discussion of the Congo and Latin America.]

LJL

123. Summary Record of the 14th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Washington, October 31, 1962, 10 a.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone's 1-page summary of this meeting and the Record of Action (both ibid.) are in the Supplement.

Director McCone stated that aerial photographs taken on October 29 did not conclusively prove that the missile buildup and construction at missile sites in Cuba had halted./1/ The Russians in Cuba had received their orders to withdraw the missiles only on Sunday. There had been some movement but nothing conclusive.

/1/The CIA intelligence memorandum, SC No. 11195/62, based on information received as of 6 a.m., October 31, which McCone used to brief the Executive Committee is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16)

Referring to the task which the intelligence community had carried out in connection with the Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba, Director McCone acknowledged that from September 15 on we had failed to evaluate properly the refugee reports and reports from third country representatives in Cuba. He explained this failure in part by referring to a September 19, 1962 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-3-62)/2/ which stated all the reasons why we did not think the Russians would deploy nuclear weapons to countries outside their borders. This estimate, in effect, prompted evaluators to downgrade the fragmentary reports which we received during the latter part of September and early October.

/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Document 433.

Secretary Rusk reported that the Russians apparently are prepared to go along with the general inspection procedures which we think are necessary. However, Castro, during the conversation yesterday with Acting Secretary General U Thant, flatly refused to accept on-site UN inspection. Secretary Rusk said this meant that we must continue to obtain aerial pictures of Cuba. He asked the President to call off his press conference in view of Castro's position.

The President agreed to call off his press conference and inform the press, on a background basis; that Castro's opposition to acceptable inspection procedures created a situation about which he did not wish to speak publicly at this time. The President felt the cancellation of the press conference would have a healthy effect on both the Cubans and on U Thant.

Under Secretary Ball presented draft instructions to Ambassador Stevenson covering negotiations with the Russians and with U Thant on inspection procedures we would accept./3/ These instructions, which the President approved, did not cover inspection procedures acceptable to us during the period after the offensive missiles had been removed from Cuba.

/3/The draft has not been identified further, but see Document 125 for the final text of Stevenson's instructions.

Secretary Rusk said that on Thursday/4/ we must fly U-2 and low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba if Castro remains adamant in his opposition to on-site inspection. He suggested that Mr. McCloy tell Kuznetsov in New York that we intended to overfly Cuba and ask Kuznetsov whether the Russians in Cuba could be instructed not to fire on our planes. He also suggested that Mr. McCloy tell Kuznetsov that we have encountered real difficulties as a result of Castro's refusal to accept on-site inspection procedures. He might even propose a bilateral arrangement with the Russians for air reconnaissance in view of the fact that UN arrangements did not appear to be possible. He noted that if U Thant extends his stay in Havana, we will be in difficulty because of the UN request not to fly reconnaissance missions during the time U Thant is there.

/4/November 1.

The President agreed that reconnaissance missions should be flown tomorrow unless significant progress was made by U Thant in his negotiations with Castro. If agreement appeared likely, we might postpone further flights until Friday.

Mr. Gilpatric commented that UN reconnaissance flights were very unlikely, but that the New York group would continue efforts to establish a UN surveillance capability.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the International Red Cross will participate in inspection measures only if Castro approves. If Castro will not approve, then we must reestablish our U.S. quarantine.

Ambassador Thompson mentioned the possibility that the Soviets might go along with our air reconnaissance if we did not reimpose the quarantine.

The President said that if the Castro/U Thant negotiations break down, as we assume they will, we would fly reconnaissance missions, but what would we do about the quarantine?

Secretary Rusk said we might ask the Red Cross to inspect at sea ships bound for Cuba, but he predicted that the Red Cross would not agree to do so in view of Castro's opposition.

The Attorney General said that we must keep our ability to put pressure on the Cubans by means of a blockade. He said the Russians could tell the Cubans that unless they accepted adequate inspection procedures, the U.S. would resume the blockade and expand it to include POL cargoes.

Secretary McNamara reported that all Soviet ships near the quarantine line were now lying dead in the water, but that non-Bloc ships were proceeding toward Cuban ports.

Secretary Rusk suggested that one way of putting pressure on Castro would be to ask free world states to tell the Cubans that Cuba must comply with UN inspection procedures or else they would break diplomatic relations with the Cuban government.

The President said we should consider broadening the blockade because otherwise we would be in the position of stopping only non-Soviet ships. If U Thant stays in Cuba longer than planned, we must decide what we will do then. One proposal would call for hailing all Russian ships but allowing them to proceed. Non-Bloc ships carrying cargoes consisting of goods included on an enlarged prohibited list would be stopped. The President called attention to the importance of keeping the Organization of American States geared up so that if firmer action were required, the Latin Americans would support us. We must keep information about Castro's attitude flowing to OAS members.

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

124. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)

October 31, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking. The conversation probably took place after the 14th meeting of the Executive Committee since Rusk's Appointment Book shows that he met with Ball at 11:09 p.m. (Johnson Library)

Stevenson: When Khrushchev said to Kennedy on Sunday/1/ morning that he was going to dismantle, Castro had not been consulted. He immediately stated five points three hours after Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy./2/ He made it purposely in order to complicate the situation for the Russians. Sooner or later there will be a show-down and that is the reason, of course, for Mikoyan's arrival. So now the question of UN inspection becomes important. He wants everyone to respect our integrity. . . . outside agency to inspect on Cuban soil. No Cuban has been permitted to visit the sites. They don't even know when the construction started of the sites, or when the dismantling started. Today U Thant asked the Soviet Ambassador to come in and asked him two questions. The US is concerned about the launchings of the missiles and want urgent dismantling. When will the dismantling start? Secondly, how long will this take? The Soviet Ambassador's answer was that he would have to refer the question to the military and ask Moscow. This morning, before the second meeting with Castro, the Soviet Ambassador telephoned him. Then he arrived at U Thant's place with the General in charge of the dismantling at 2:30 this afternoon and made the following answer to the question. With regard to Khrushchev's order to dismantle on Sunday "we received it between 1 and 3 p.m. We started the dismantling on Sunday at 5 p.m. It will be all over by tomorrow night, and by the latest on Friday,/3/ when we will have finished the bulldozing of the sites by Friday night. We have asked for ships. We don't know when they will be in the ports. But the equipment will be in the ports Thursday night or Friday morning. We are crating the equipment at the ports for sea voyage. Most of it will not have to be crated because of deck loading. The bases no longer exist. Even the pads will be gone, but no Cuban observation of the dismantling is permitted." This is what the Russians say. "By Friday there will be nothing." The instruction of the UN was that this included aircraft. Although they were not very specific as to whether or [not] they have interrogated them about aircraft. As to the aircraft, the Russians assured them that the Cubans had not been trained to fly them. There was no discussion of the SAM sites. Any equipment, Soviet-manned, will go. Anti-aircraft manned by all the anti-aircraft, both SAM and conventional is manned by the Cubans. It was a Cuban Colonel that shot down our plane. Castro says all anti-aircraft commanded by Cubans will stay, including the SAM sites, they assume. Castro was apparently ranting most of the time and pretty sarcastic and kept screaming no inspection would be permitted under any circumstances, either . . . but that they must go through the blockade. Kuznetsov said in Cuba, "We'll tell them at the UN what the ship schedule of arrival will be in Cuba." Castro said "Pushoff should not have promised verification." My notes say that since the Soviet guarantee we can inspect on the high seas. The Cubans won't know what to do with what is left behind. They are using only Russian labor, only Russian equipment, like bulldozers, etc. Castro talked a lot about aerial reconnaissance, even by the United Nations, as a violation of Cuban integrity, soil, airspace, etc., as an intolerable offense. U Thant's suggestion is that the blockade continuation is not necessary if we can establish some system like . . . .

/1/October 28.

/2/For text of the five points, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 447-448; Khrushchev's letter is printed as Document 102.

/3/November 2.

Secretary: We've already done that.

Stevenson: On the incoming ships. He says the economic situation in Havana is incredible. There are no foodstuffs, no meat--all of this confirmed by the Legations there. They are shut off from the outside world. The people are getting desperate. We should be satisfied with these assurances; that the Red Cross inspection on the seas of incoming vessels. Castro is frustrated, intense, psychotic, infuriated by the US radio constantly stating that the US was coming to inspect instead of the SYG arriving with a large team to inspect. It was impossible to get across anything before 2:15--before the meeting first started. This morning he was in a better mood. U Thant decided to see him alone. He has with him Dorticos and Rowan. He said they would fight to the last man, wanted everybody to inspect their soil, their integrity, etc. They would discuss the future of Cuba only on the basis of the five points, and he distinguished in the future--not the present problem. If the SC, in other words, discusses the Cuban problem, it can only be on the basis of the five points. When the question of Major Anderson was brought up, Castro became much softer and said he would be glad to return him alive, but he is not alive, and "I will return his body under the auspices of the UN." He rejected again and again any United Nations inspection to verify. He said the Soviets have done this whole thing on Cuban soil; but the future of the UN should be involved but only on the basis of the five points. This is the long-term problem which must be done by the UN. It is his impression that the Soviets don't want to stay a single hour; that the General said that he was going at once and that he was glad to leave. There is thought there will be a show-down some time between the Cubans and the Russians. He said the Brazilian would confirm all this in two or three days--after he got back to Rio. He can't suggest what we should do but implied that maybe we should verify on Friday, after the bulldozing has been completed. The Soviet General said "ask us any questions you wish". Now they must arrange for ships to come in. The blockade, if it continues, will make the Cubans more and more angry. I told him that we had already instituted a pass on incoming ships not to in any way interrupt the shipping to get the stuff out of there. He said there is no shortage of conventional hardware in Cuba. There is so much they don't want to know what to do with it--machines, anti-aircraft, etc. What they need is food, not hardware. Then as I left the room with Jack McCloy Rikhye stopped me at the door and sort of whispered to me as a final concluding remark which the SYG apparently never felt it was appropriate to say. He said "Please lay off the aerial reconnaissance until Friday. After that you will find they have bulldozed all of the sites." . . . They will call us after they have talked with . . . in the morning. I don't know what time; I should think it will probably be after they have had a good night's sleep--possibly 10 o'clock. I think that is the substance of the thing.

Sec: Thanks a lot.

125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, October 31, 1962, 12:46 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56311/10-3162. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McNaughton and Cleveland and approved by the President at the 14th meeting of the Executive Committee (Document 123). Repeated to Moscow.

1147. Subject: Cuba: New York Negotiations

1. General Considerations

Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problem created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. In spite of Kuznetsov's eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions (USUN's 1547)/1/ the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date.

/1/Document 117.

Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine, Kuznetsov's insistence on no physical inspection of dismantling and removal Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall have to rely on aerial surveillance and port-removal inspection to satisfy ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba or destroyed.

While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post-evacuation period should, if efficiently carried out, provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted.

2. Definition of Offensive Weapons

The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are those enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23./2/ The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.

/2/For text, see Public Papers of the President of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 809-811.

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed for use at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment, including Komar class motor torpedo boats.

Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.

Not included in formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26/3/ that "the necessity for the presence of [Soviet]/4/ military specialists in Cuba would disappear" along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

/3/Document 84.

/4/All brackets are in the source text.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

3. Two-Phase Program

The US envisages two phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures:

(a) First Phase--This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetsov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments.

(b) Second Phase--This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection. This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential. This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done either by the US or by the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

We recognize that (unlike US) UN will wish to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance.

Two types of air surveillance should be considered--photographic (high and low) and visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport movements.

The Canadian Government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly Canadian supplied RF-101 aircraft. USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept. Alternatively we could make available C-130s and within two-week period train air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent crews which would take only brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile. The UN has been informed that USG prepared provide rapid (jet) transportation for C-130 crews politically acceptable to the UN from anywhere in the world.

Another highly attractive possibility would be for Mexico or Argentina to volunteer squadron of T-11s (C-45s) and crews which DOD believes would be fully capable to do kind of job we want. They have adequate high-quality camera equipment. Mexico has six aircraft and Argentina has comparable number. Also Sweden has made available for Congo operation two reconnaissance PT-9s (single-jet aircraft). It is understood that they have a number such aircraft fully equipped with photographic equipment.

Processing unit with US equipment could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place UN would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging him develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support of UN surveillance, however, should not be tied to US cessation of surveillance. Statements that "the US will reconsider its surveillance requirements based upon the effectiveness of UN operations" can be made, but we should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.

It should go without saying that to the extent no adequate substitute has been developed by the UN, the US high and low surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy us that offensive weapons have been fully removed from Cuba.

5. Incoming Cargoes

As indicated Deptel 1136,/5/ we prepared accept ICRC inspection incoming cargoes on all ships, of whatever flag, embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, _____ ships now in transit or scheduled depart bloc ports shortly to arrive in Cuba during next three or four weeks. Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will depend on whether inspection at sea or on shore. Most efficient use manpower would be port inspection at agreed ports. This would permit close inspection of vessels, one after another, without transit time required to shuttle between vessels at sea. Accordingly, hope port inspection agreeable to Cubans. If inspection done at ports, we estimate _____ personnel needed. If done on high seas, estimate _____ would be required. [Estimates to be supplied.]

/5/Document 113.

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes abroad to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action.

6. Verification of Removal of Offensive Weapons

When Soviets prepared to say they have removed from Cuba the "weapons US considers offensive", a Security Council meeting would be called to authorize the Acting Secretary General to establish arrangements for verification. Executive organization operating in Cuba for this purpose is here referred to as UN/Cuba.

(a) Terms of Reference: UN/Cuba

UN teams should inspect on spot, after dismantling, those sites which identified by US as missile bases as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers, and any other area where we have reason to believe there may have been concealment of offensive weapons, including storage sites for nuclear warheads. Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties. US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered.

(b) Number of Observers

The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50 or 60 men with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover, any UN aerial observers should participate in verification process.

(c) Composition

While we assume that probably only citizens of certain types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources of UN ground observers, it is important from our standpoint that eligibility be restricted to technically trained personnel of genuinely reliable nations who have demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crisis. For example, we would wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of distinctly "unneutral" statements made by their Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Nigeria, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

7. Administration and Finance

(a) We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group, port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate under executive direction of SYG. To the extent the International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it should (as indicated Deptel 1136) operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted also as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.

(b) We believe financing all verification measures should come under $2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the light of the then U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations./6/

/6/Following a telephone conversation later in the day between officials at the Department of State and the Mission at the United Nations changes were made in sections 3-6 of this instruction. A copy of telegram 1153 to New York at 11:09 p.m. on October 31, which enumerated the revisions, is in the Supplement. (Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, Secretary of Defense Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 25-31, 1962)

Rusk

[end of document]

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