| See also Kermit Hall, " The Kennedy Assassination in the Age of Open Secrets", OAH Newsletter, 25 (February). |
One year ago, Kermit Hall reported some of the findings of the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board in the OAH Newsletter. The board
has since been hard at work opening and processing relevant documents.
Many of them were released last November, and are published here for the
first time. In addition to the noteworthy reaction of Soviet officials
to the President's death, the documents also reveal U.S. plots against
the Cuban government that had approval at the highest levels in this country.
The following notes were provided by Anna Nelson, one of the Review Board
members. Transcriptions of the original documents follow Professor
Nelson's notes.
Note: Facscimiles of the documents which are referred to in the text are not yet online.
This is an FBI document that illustrates the information originally
"redacted" and the document as it now appears. It is an interesting document
because it discusses Soviet reaction to the assassination It also illustrates
the FBI at work at counter-espionage.
The body of this document which describes the substance of a Communist
party meeting in Steubenville, Ohio was opened but the first page was almost
completely black. This page lists sources of FBI information. It is interesting,
not only because the meeting discusses the assassination but because the
FBI was concerned about the meeting of 7 people (at least three of whom
were FBI sources).
This is one of the CIA documents describing their operations in Mexico
City (noted by symbol LI) and Oswald's trip there in October 1963. CIA
had covered all the information between the brackets so the reader, for
example, would not know the source was a double agent. This document also
illustrates the use of substitute language for sensitive operations. In
this case, "designated meeting times" has been substituted to protect the
vulnerable agents still in Mexico or Cuba.
Document Four
This document from the National Security Agency indicates that as early
as Dec. 6, 1963, John J. McCloy, a member of the Warren Commission, had
misgivings about the "credibility" of that investigation. The original
release completely obscured this information.
Documents Five, Six, and Seven
These documents are part of a larger body of material released by the
Department last November. Five is from the Papers of Joseph Califano, who
was a special assistant and counsel to the Secretary of the Army. Six and
Seven come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are of great interest because
they illustrate that the CIA was not the only agency plotting the demise
of Fidel Castro. While Five has samples of their ideas, Six indicates that
the President approved the anti-Castro efforts. Seven has special interest
because it is dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis and only five months
before Kennedy's death. These pages are small examples of the countless
meetings and papers on Cuba within the Defense Department in 1962-63.
Document 1
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Wick
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Lenihan
December 1, 1966
REACTION OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS TO THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
A source who has furnished reliable information in the past and who
was in Russia on the date of the assassination of the late President John
F. Kennedy advised on December 4, 1963, that the news of the assassination
of President Kennedy was flashed to the Soviet people almost immediately
after its occurrence. It was greeted by great shock and consternation and
church bells were tolled in the memory of President Kennedy.
According to our source, officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union believed there was some well-organized conspiracy on the part of
the "ultraright" in the United States to effect a "coup." They seemed convinced
that the assassination was not the deed of one man, but that it rose out
of a carefully planned campaign in which several people played a part.
They felt those elements interested in utilizing the assassination and
playing on anticommunist sentiments in the United States would then utilize
this act to stop negotiations with the Soviet Union, attack Cuba and thereafter
spread the war. As a result of these feelings, the Soviet Union immediately
went into a state of national alert.
Our source further stated that Soviet officials were fearful that without
leadership, some irresponsible general in the United States might launch
a missile at the Soviet Union. It was the further opinion of the Soviet
officials that only maniacs would think that the "left" forces in the United
States, as represented by the Communist Party, USA, would assassinate President
Kennedy, especially in view of the abuse the Communist Party, USA, has
taken from the "ultraleft" as a result of its support of peaceful coexistence
and disarmament policies of the Kennedy administration.
62-109060
REL:kas
(8)
REACTION OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS TO THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
According to our source, Soviet officials claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald
had no connection whatsoever with the Soviet Union. They described him
as a neurotic maniac who was disloyal to his own country and everything
else. They noted that Oswald never belonged to any organization in the
Soviet Union and was never given Soviet citizenship.
(CG 5824-S*)
A second source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised
on November 27, 1963, that Nikolai T. Fedorenko, the Permanent Representative
to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, held a brief meeting with
all diplomatic personnel employed at the Soviet Mission on November 23,
1963. During this meeting, Fedorenko related for the benefit of all present
the news of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and stated that
Kennedy's death was very much regretted by the Soviet Union and had caused
considerable shock in Soviet Government circles. Fedorenko stated that
the Soviet Union would have preferred to have had President Kennedy at
the helm of the American Government. He added that President Kennedy had,
to some degree, a mutual understanding with the Soviet Union, and had tried
seriously to improve relations between the United States and Russia. Fedorenko
also added that little or nothing was known by the Soviet Government concerning
President Lyndon Johnson and, as a result, the Soviet Government did not
know what policies President Johnson would follow in the future regarding
the Soviet Union.
According to our source, Colonel Boris Ivanov, Chief of the Soviet Committee
for State Security (KGB) Residency in New York City, held a meeting of
KGB personnel on the morning of November 25, 1963. Ivanov informed those
present that President Kennedy's death had posed a problem for the KGB
and stated that it was necessary for all KGB employees to lend their efforts
to solving the problem.
According to our source, Ivanov stated that it was his personal feeling
that the assassination of President Kennedy had been planned by an organized
group rather than being the act of one individual assassin. Ivanov stated
that it was therefore necessary that the KGB ascertain with the greatest
possible speed the true story surrounding President Kennedy's assassination.
Ivanov stated that the KGB was interested in knowing all the factors and
all of the possible groups which might have worked behind the scenes to
organize and plan this assassination.
REACTION OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS TO THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
Our source added that Ivanov also emphasized that it was of extreme
importance to the Soviet Government to determine precisely what kind of
man the new President Lyndon Johnson would be. Ivanov said that President
Johnson was practically an unknown to the Soviet Government and, accordingly,
the KGB had issued instructions to all of its agents to immediately obtain
all data available concerning the incumbent President. Ivanov said that
it would be necessary for KGB personnel to gather and correlate all information
concerning President Johnson, including his background, his past working
experience and record in Congress, his present attitude toward the Soviet
Union, and particularly all information which might have bearing upon the
future foreign policy line he would follow (NY 3653-S*)
On September 16, 1965, this same source reported that the KGB Residency
in New York City received instructions approximately September 16, 1965,
from KGB headquarters in Moscow to develop all possible information concerning
President Lyndon B. Johnson's character, background, personal friends,
family, and from which quarters he derives his support in his position
as President of the United States. Our source added that in the instructions
from Moscow, it was indicated that "now" the KGB was in possession of data
purporting to indicate President Johnson was responsible for the assassination
of the late President John F. Kennedy. KGB headquarters indicated that
in view of this information, it was necessary for the Soviet Government
to know the existing personal relationship between President Johnson and
the Kennedy family, particularly between President Johnson and Robert and
"Ted" Kennedy.
On March 3, 1964, Yuri I. Nosenko, Soviet defector whose bona fides
has not been established, advised that he was handling Soviet Committee
for State Security (KGB) investigations of tourists from the United States
at the time Lee Harvey Oswald visited Russia in 1959, and consequently
was fully cognizant of the Lee Harvey Oswald case.
According to Nosenko, Oswald came to the attention of the KGB when he
expressed a wish to defect to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shortly
after his arrival in Russia. However, the KGB, after inquiry, decided he
was mentally unstable and informed him he had to return to the United States
upon completion of his visit. Thereafter, when Oswald missed a sight-seeing
tour he was to take, his hotel room was forced open and he was found with
one of his wrists badly cut.
Document 2
United State Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
File No. CI 100-1910
Cincinnati, Ohio
December 16, 1963
On December 2, 1963, a source, who has furnished reliable information
in the past, advised that on November 20, 1963, Genne Kuhn, Wheeling, West
Virginia, who has previously been identified by the source as Chairman
of the lower Ohio Valley Section of the Communist Party, stated that Anthony
Krchmarek, head of the Communist Party in Ohio, and an Arnold, last name
not mentioned, had recently visited her. She did not give the date of this
visit. She stated that Krchmarek and Arnold spoke to an assembly of students
at Bethany College, and that after the meeting, they were invited to a
cocktail party, where Socialism was discussed until the small hours of
the morning. She said that there was no show of contempt or any hard feelings,
only friendliness[.] She stated Krchmarek and Arnold are to return Sunday,
December 8, 1963, at 6:30 P.M., and desire to discuss matters dealing with
the coal unions.
On December 2, 1963, another source, who has furnished reliable information
in the past, advised that on November 15, 1963, Arnold Johnson and Anthony
Krchmarek had stopped in Steubenville, Ohio, that day, and spoke at Bethany
College in West Virginia. Source states that Anthony Krchmarek, at a recent
meeting, had spoken of Arnold Johnson procuring speakers for college engagements.
The same source stated that on November 18, 1963, Arnold Johnson and
Anthony Krchmarek again visited Steubenville, Ohio, to arrange for a meeting
"down the river" on December 8, 1963, and to postpone a meeting scheduled
for Steubenville on November 22, 1963, to December 13, 1963. After making
these arrangements, they returned to Cleveland, Ohio.
On December 12, 1963, the first source and a third source, who has furnished
reliable information in the past, advised that at 6:30 P.M., on December
8, 1963, a Communist [document ends]
Document3
DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1963
FILE: P-8593
SovEmbActivities
RYBAT GPFLOOR LCIMPROVE
NO NIGHT ACTION
1. As HQS AWARE, STATION's DOUBLE AGENTS HAVE NOT HAD MEETINGS WITH
SOVS SINCE ASSASSINATION. THIS PRINCIPALLY DUE FACT THAT PRIOR 22 NOV THE
SOVS SCHEDULED FUTURE SESSIONS FOR PERIOD BEGINNING CIRCA 1 DEC; ALSO DUE
FACTOR THAT ONE AGENT (LIJENNET-1) OUT OF TOUCH WITH SOV C/O AND THAT ANOTHER
AGENT (LINILE-1) OUT OF COUNTRY.
2. LIJENNET-1 WILL HAVE MEETING SOV ON EVE [designated meeting times]
LITEASE-1 HAS MEET [designated meeting times] LISTEED 2 ABOUT [designated
meeting times]. WILL HAVE LINILE-1 MEET SOV EARLY [designated meeting times].
HAVE SEPARATELY ADVISED HQS RE STATION'S PROPOSAL RE LINEB-1 MEETING WITH
SOV.
3. REQUEST INSRUCTIONS ON WHAT TACTIC OR ELICITATION EFFORT IF ANY THAT
DOUBLES SHOULD MAKE.
4. ALSO REQUEST SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS RE STATION'S SOV ACCESS AGENTS
LICRAVE-1 AND LICUFF-1. [document ends]
Document 4
4 Dec 63 1000
Routine
For [omitted]
In conversation with me, MCCLOY, a member of the presidential commission
stated that he has serious doubts of the credibility of the investigation
to date. He does not eliminate the possibility that the attempt on KENNEDY
was made by two persons. However, in view of JOHNSON's order that the commission
investigate also the circumstances of OSWALD's slaying, some of the commission's
operations and its report could come after RUBY's trial and perhaps even
after the verdict and appeals. In the meantime the trial was postponed
until 3 January [sic], and the FBI released to the press information that
their investigation confirms OSWALD's guilt, and that he had no accomplices.
Document 5
Possible Actions to Provoke, Harrass [sic], of Disrupt Cuba
1. Operation SMASHER:
a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and
commercial communications facilities in Cuba.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction
of a "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The
tube, which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness
is due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube.
The chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cooled a non-conductor.
2. Operation FREE RIDE:
a. Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension
among the Cuban people.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan
American or KLM one-way airline tickets good for passage to Mexico City,
Caracas, etc. (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed with other
leaflets planned to be dropped. The number of tickets dropped could be
increased. The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a
time period.
3. Operation TURN ABOUT:
a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel
Castro that his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the
point where plans are being made for his "removal".
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence
means the crecendo [sic] increasing until it culminates in Castro's
discovery of the mechanism or hardware.
4. Operation DEFECTOR:
a. Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban
military to defect with equipment.
b. Concept: This activity when properly planned and implemented
has the effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system
the immediate reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity.
It also creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished
by intelligence means and promise of rewards.
5. Operation BREAK-UP:
a. Objective: To clandestinely introduce corrosive materials
to cause aircraft, vehicle or boat accidents.
b. Concept: This activity, if possible should be aimed primarily
toward the Soviet-provided aircraft. If properly accomplished it would
degrade confidence in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems
and seriously affect combat capability.
6. Operation COVER-UP:
a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government
of Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is
merely a cover.
b. Concept: It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this
should be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation DIRTY TRICK.
7. Operation DIRTY TRICK:
a. Objective: The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that,
should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists
et al Cuba.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by manufacturing various
pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part
of the Cubans.
8. Operation FULL-UP:
a. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel
supplied by the Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated.
B. Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological
agent into jet fuel storage facilities. This agent flourishes in jet fuel
and grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.
9. Operation PHANTOM:
a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government
that clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being is being regularly
conducted.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ
capabilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches
and air drops have been made in other areas.
10. Operation BINGO:
a. Objective: The objective is to create an incident which has
the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing
the excuse for use of U.S. might to overthrow the current government of
Cuba.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside
the confines of the Guantanamo Base. SNAKES simulate an actual fire-fight
and upon hearing such a sound it is entirely feasible that the immediate
reaction on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would,
with proper preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate
planning the base at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number
to sustain itself until other forces, which had been previously alerted,
could attack in other areas. It is envisaged that a schedule of operations
similar to the following would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its
defeat:
(1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo.
(2) Word flashed to the President.
(3) President orders counterattack to include:
(a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets are Cuban airfields.
(b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communication
in Cuba.
(c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected
targets/landing areas.
(d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to pre-selected
targets.
(e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and further
interdict lines of communication.
(f) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrops troops and secure airfields,
road/rail terminals, etc.
Document 6
ENCLOSURE B
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
Subject: Guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and his Reaction
to Original Proposed Policy for CIA Support by the Department of Defense
of CaribbeanSurvey [sic] Group (30) January 1962)
Mr. Gilpatric did not like this paper at all. He indica[ted] the paper
was too negative and restricted as though a policy towards an enemy like
we are dealing with the Germans or Itali[ans,] not a fellow department
of our Government. This is a red line operation with the blessing of the
President and approved by him as a most important task. This is probably
the most important mission we have in the government today. When a request
comes in from CIA, you (Craig) will evaluate it and request the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for their evaluation and recommendations. The Secretary of Defense
will determine, after considering the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
wha[t] the decision will be, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This decision
is the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense.
We do not want to get involved in a case-by-case basis, do not want
individual actions on each case. We do not want masses of individual actions.
This is a red line priority problem and must be handled with dispatch and
without getting involved in minutia regarding expenses and reimbursement
or other details. Department of Defense may have to do it themse[lves]
regardless who foots the bill. In some cases, CIA will be required to reimburse
if so determined by the Secretary of Defense. This is a matter which must
be decided by the Secretary of Defense - not the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Department of Defense budgets for some CIA support. We have equipment
of some types lying around not being used and should not require reimbursement
for this type, as a general rule.